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Láng István, akadémikus 
A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia vezetői a hetvenes évek második felében 
felismerték, hogy mielőbb szükséges megteremteni a szellemi és műszaki feltételeket 
ahhoz, hogy a magyar tudományos kutatás publikációs tevékenységét és annak ered-
ményességét mennyiségi és minőségi mutatókkal lehessen jellemezni. Ennek érdeké-
ben az MTA Könyvtára, és azon belül az Informatikai Igazgatóság felépítette a 
Magyar Természettudományos Alapkutás Publikációs Adatbankját, továbbá 
megteremtette a pénzügyi lehetőségeket az Institute for Scientific Information (USA, 
Philadelphia) által kiadott Science Citation Index gépi szakirodalom-figyelő szolgál-
tatás hazai adaptációjához. Közép-Kelet-Európában Magyarországon jött létre első-
nek ez az új, számítógépes rendszer, amely a szakirodalmi információigények magas 
szintű ellátása mellett, nagy hatással volt a tudományos kutatók publikációs stratégiá-
jára. A neves nemzetközi folyóiratokban való publikálás igénye minőségi változást 
hozott és ez a váltás nálunk előbb következett be, mint a többi közép- és kelet-
európai országban. Ez jól tükröződik a Nature 1993. január 14-i számában (361. 
kötet, 104. old., 1993) közölt ábrán, ahol ezen országok tudományos közleményeinek 
átlagos idézettségét mutatják be 1981 és 1990 között. A vizsgált időszakban a magyar 
publikációs mutatók meghaladják a többi országét. Ez az eredmény elsősorban a 
kellő időben felismert új publikációs stratégia megvalósításának következménye, de 
természetesen a jelentős és eredeti tudományos eredmények elérése is szükséges 
feltétel volt. 
A nyolcvanas években a természettudományos kutatások értékelésénél, 
továbbá személyek és kutatócsoportok tevékenységének megítélésénél széles körben 
használták a publikációkra vonatkozó adatokat. Ez jelentősen hozzájárult az eredmé-
nyesség objektív megítéléséhez. A módszer propagálói mindig hangsúlyozták, hogy a 
publikációs adat csupán egyike az értékelésnél használandó mutatóknak, mely 
számos egyéb adattal, információval kiegészítve adhat alapot a döntésekhez. Ennek 
ellenére túlzások, egyoldalú lekicsinylések, vagy ellenkezőleg, a publikációs adatok-
nak vélt kizárólagossága egyaránt előfordult. 
Az utóbbi években világszerte felerősödött az igény a szakértői bírálat (peer 
review) metodikájának, legyen az egyéni vagy csoportos jellegű, jobb megismerésére 
és szakavatottabb használatára az elbírálások és minősítések során. Kétségkívül 
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vannak fontos tényezők, amelyre a tudománymetria alig tud választ adni, a szakértői 
bírálat viszont képes lehet a válaszadásra. Ilyen pl. egy pályázatnál az eredetiség 
megítélése. 
Szinte minden olyan jelentésben, amelyet amerikai vagy nyugat-európai 
tudósok írtak a magyar tudomány jelenlegi helyzetéről, megtalálható az az ajánlás, 
hogy fordítsunk nagyobb figyelmet a jövőben a peer review módszer szakszerű alkal-
mazására és ahol lehet és indokolt, ott a tudománymetriai módszerekkel össze-
kapcsolva hajtsuk végre az értékelési és elbírálási munkákat. 
Ezt az igényt kívánja részben kielégíteni a jelen kiadvány, amelyben a peer 
review módszer alkalmazásáról, sajátos problémáiról találhatunk eredeti tanul-
mányokat. Angol nyelven adjuk közre ezeket a cikkeket. A magyar nyelvre való 
lefordítás egyrészt jelentős többletkiadást igényelt volna, de ettől függetlenül is úgy 
érezzük, hogy a magyar tudományos kutatók döntő többsége ma már jól olvas 
angolul és megérti a kutatások értékelésével foglalkozó módszertani cikkeket. 
Kívánom, hogy hasznosítsák mindazokat a gondolatokat, amelyek ezekben a 
cikkekben találhatók, és amelyek valóban újak és tényleg hasznosíthatók számunkra. 
Nem a nulláról indulunk a szakértői bírálati módszer alkalmazásánál, de van még mit 
tanulnunk és elsajátítanunk olyanoktól, akik valóban magas szintű módszertani 
vizsgálatokat végeztek. 
EUGENE GARFIELD: 
Refereeing and Peer Review. Part 1. 
Opinion and Conjecture on the Effectiveness of Refereeing 
Current Contents, August 4,1986 
Peer review is so much a part of the 
fabric of scholarly inquiry that it is often 
taken for granted. I have written many 
essays over the years that are directly or 
indirectly related to peer review. These 
include several on authorship1"3 and 
editing,4 faculty evaluation,5 identifying 
Nobel-class science through citation 
analysis6-9—and even a few on various 
aspects of refereeing itself.10"12 But I 
have never before discussed the intrica-
cies of the system in detail. Since the 
subject is central to scholarly life, we 
have decided to devote a three-part es-
say in Current Contents® to it. 
The first two parts will cover referee-
ing for publication. Part 1 examines how 
the refereeing system works and lists 
some of the common opinions about its 
advantages and disadvantages. Part 2 
will cover scientific studies of refereeing 
and some proposed alternatives to the 
present system. Part 3 will follow later 
and will focus on the peer review of 
grant proposals. Note that I distinguish 
between a referee (one who evaluates an 
article before it is published) and a re-
viewer (one who evaluates already pub-
lished material or, in the case of grant re-
views, research-grant proposals). I gen-
erally use the term referee to mean one 
who advises editors on the publishability 
of a scholarly manuscript. The process 
by which this advice is solicited I usually 
call refereeing, but occasionally review-
ing or peer review seems appropriate. 
The term peer review is also used to de-
note the evaluation of research propos-
als; more generally, it can refer to the 
professional review of patient records by 
special committees of physicians that 
many hospitals use to maintain high-
quality patient care. 
Refereeing: How It Came About and 
How It Works 
Refereeing is meant to ensure that ar-
ticles submitted for publication meet the 
accepted standards of their fields. Like 
editing, refereeing is a complex intellec-
tual, political, and social process; it of-
ten involves a spectrum of activities that 
blend into one another in complex ways, 
in a fashion similar to the range of prac-
tices related to ghostwriting.5 Among 
many who have expressed the idea, 
Peter Amiry, former editor, Journal of 
the Operational Research Society, wrote 
in an editorial that referees are an 
editor's insurance policy, providing a 
reservoir of knowledge that few editors 
could hope to match.13 
The practice of refereeing manu-
scripts prior to publication is now well 
established, but it was not always so, 
state sociologists Harriet Zuckerman 
and Robert K. Merton, Columbia Uni-
versity, New York, in their classic 1971 
study of patterns of evaluation in sei-
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ence.14 It evolved in response to the de-
velopment of scholarly societies and the 
scientific journal. I summarized this and 
other work in an earlier essay on the 
changes in scientific communication 
over the past 300 years.15 
According to David A. Kronick, pro-
fessor of medical bibliography, Universi-
ty of Texas Health Science Center at San 
Antonio, "science in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries...differed ir 
many ways socially, intellectually, am 
economically from the science of tin-
twentieth century."16 Although associ-
ations and societies promoting scholarly 
activities had existed for hundreds of 
years,17 (p. 46), the social role of "scien-
tist," as well as conventions for doing 
research, had yet to emerge.16 In fact, 
Kronick notes, "individuals did not 
begin to regard themselves as scientists 
rather than philosophers until the seven-
teenth century."17 (p. 34) 
The learned journal as we know it to-
day also traces its origins to the seven-
teenth century, with the founding of the 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society of London and the Journal des 
Sqavans, associated with the Académie 
des Sciences in Paris.14 By the early 
eighteenth century, Kronick says, mem-
bers of these and other scholarly soci-
eties sponsoring official or, semiofficial 
publications began to realize that if 
scholars were to have confidence in the 
content of these journals, then material 
submitted for publication had to be 
critically evaluated before it was pub-
lished.16 
Societies thus began to take measures 
to preserve their credibility. Some 
adopted strict regulations governing 
publication that members had to comply 
with to retain their membership. And by 
the mid-eighteenth century, according 
to Kronick, some—such as the Royal 
Society of Medicine of Edinburgh, 
Scotland—had developed techniques of 
evaluating and approving manuscripts 
before publication that are almost in-
distinguishable from today's system of 
refereeing.16 Kronick, incidentally, is 
the author of a recent book on the 
literature of the life sciences that in-
cludes a short section on the refereeing 
and the publication process in that 
branch of science.18 
The procedures involved in refereeing 
a manuscript vary from journal to jour-
nal and from field to field, but there are 
certain general steps that virtually every 
paper has to go through before it is pub-
lished. Among the first steps an editor 
takes, whether or not the journal is ref-
ereed, is to evaluate a submission's com-
patibility with the scope and style of the 
journal, according to Robert A. Day, 
consultant, ISI Pres^8 , and former man-
aging editor, American Society for Mi-
crobiology (ASM) journals.19 Once this 
is done, an editor must then choose ap-
propriate referees for a given manu-
script. 
Donald Christiansen, editor, IEEE 
Spectrum, conducted a survey of referee 
selection practices among 26 of the 
IEEE Transactions editors. Common 
sources from which referees are recruit-
ed include widely recognized experts, 
members of a journal's editorial board, 
professional acquaintapces, previous 
referees, and scientists cited in the au-
thor's references.20 Sometimes authors 
are asked to supply a list of suggested 
referees. A few journals are using manu-
al and computei^assisted bibliographic 
retrieval methods to select referees. For 
example, Stevan Hamad, editor, Behav-
ioral and Brain Sciences (BBS), reports 
that BBS staffers search a microcomput-
er file of the journal's referees that has 
been coded by areas of expertise. They 
also search the current biobehavioral 
literature through the Science Citation 
Index® and the Social Sciences Citation 
Index® for additional referee candi-
dates . 2 1^ 
Usually two referees are chosen, ac-
cording to Claude T. Bishop, director, 
Division of Biological Sciences, National 
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Research Council of Canada (NRCC), 
and editor-in-chief, NRCC Research 
Journals. "The merits of this system," he 
writes, "are that it usually provides at 
least one solid [report], that the two [ref-
erees] can be checked against each 
other, and that one referee may cover 
points that the other missed."23 But Har-
nad notes that, for many journals, the 
"number of referees [selected for a 
manuscript] is an empirical matter re-
quiring research."21 BBS uses five to 
eight referees per paper. In Hamad's ex-
perience, such a sample is more likely to 
produce a balanced review.24 
Along with the manuscript, referees 
generally receive a list of instructions 
and a form for comments and recom-
mendations. Routinely, referees re-
spond within a few weeks, recommend-
ing either publication or rejection or re-
questing modifications; they often in-
clude specific comments for both the au-
thor and the editor. 
A paper is most likely to be accepted, 
according to Michael Gordon, research 
associate, Primary Communications Re-
search Centre, University of Leicester, 
UK, when the referees agree that it 
meets three criteria.25 (p. 6-8) First, it 
should be sound. The authorfs) should 
have employed reliable research tech-
niques, drawn valid conclusions, and 
committed no flaws of logic. It should 
also be original, in the sense that ii.. End-
ings have never before been published. 
Finally, it should be significant, meaning 
that it should contain some new perspec-
tive or observation of potential impor-
tance.25 (p. 6-8) Of course, published ar-
ticles meet these criteria in varying de-
grees. 
Referees do not always agree with one 
another, and some authors take this as 
evidence that the system is unreliable or 
capricious. But disagreement is at the 
heart of scientific inquiry. Hamad says 
that "the current and vital ongoing as-
pect of science consists of an active and 
often heated interaction of data, ideas, 
and minds, in a process one might call 
'creative disagreement.' "26 Moreover, 
reviewer disagreements are not simply 
shrugged off; editors generally resolve 
each dispute on an individual basis. Gor-
don described some of the options open 
to editors for dealing with these con-
flicts.25 (p. 20-5) When reviewer dis-
agreements are mild, for example, edi-
tors may rely on their own judgment 
to resolve them—with, perhaps, some 
communication with the author.25 (p. 
21) When differences are profound, edi-
tors may reject the paper without further 
reviewing or they may send the manu-
script out for review once again, togeth-
er with the comments of the disputing 
referees. Editors may also ask the author 
to respond to the referees' observations. 
After the "arbitrating" referee(s) and the 
author have reported, editors should be 
in a better position to make a final judg-
ment. When authors take exception to 
referees' comments and provide editors 
with a point-by-point refutation, editors 
often follow a procedure similar to the 
one just outlined for adjudicating dis-
putes between referees.25 (p. 22-5) 
Research, Pseudo-Research, or 
Non-Research? 
The results of our literature search for 
this essay support the view that referee-
ing is an issue clouded with subjectivity 
and emotionalism—at least for a vocal 
minority. The dominant vehicle of dis-
cussion in the debate about the effec-
tiveness of refereeing has been editorials 
and correspondence. Some contain inci-
sive discussions, but with little or no em-
pirical evidence to support what 
amounts to a litany of opinion and anec-
dote. Indeed, in an endeavor such as sci-
ence, which depends on dispassionate 
logic and systematic evidence for much 
of its credibility, the dearth of rigorous 
thinking and hard data in the corre-
spondence of many who are critical of 
refereeing is remarkable. Of the relative-
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ly few controlled studies that have been 
done, many suffer from such severe 
methodological shortcomings that their 
conclusions are questionable. More will 
be said about research on refereeing in 
Part 2. 
Refereeing and other forms of peer re-
view have been discussed at length, 
especially in the four decades since 
World War II, but discussion alone does 
not constitute science or scholarship. 
Since we are all affected by peer review, 
it is not surprising that so many of us 
have opinions on the subject. Yet the lit-
erature representing controlled studies 
of peer review is either pitifully small or 
disgracefully absent, while the body of 
anecdote and opinion is quite large. We 
carefully distinguish here between stud-
ies, experiments, experience, and opin-
ions. 
In researching this essay, we also 
found that most published opinion on 
refereeing is negative. But we suspect 
that this is due, ironically, to the wide-
spread acceptance of and satisfaction 
with the current system of peer review: 
most scientists simply do not feel that 
refereeing needs defending, so positive 
opinions are relatively scarce. It should 
also be kept in mind that these opinions 
on refereeing are themselves unrefer-
eed. Furthermore, the existence and 
ranking of hundreds of refereed journals 
is concrete evidence that they are the 
preferred medium of publication. 
Fbws in the System? 
In a note published in the New En-
gland Journal of Medicine (NEJM), John 
C. Bailar III and Kay Patterson, Harvard 
School of Public Health, Boston, Massa-
chusetts, speculate that current opinion 
on refereeing seems divided among one 
or more of four paradigms.27 Based on 
their own informal observations, the au-
thors assert that many scientists seem to 
perceive the process as a sieve, sifting 
the wheat from the chaff. Many also 
liken the process to a smithy, in which 
"papers are pounded into new and better 
shapes between the hammer of peer re-
view and the anvil of editorial stan-
dards." Some seem to view it as a switch, 
reflecting the widespread belief that a 
persistent author can eventually publish 
a manuscript somewhere (although ref-
ereeing may determine exactly where). 
Finally, some scholars seem to consider 
refereeing a capricious and essentially 
unpredictable process—a "shot in the 
dark."27 
Stephen Lock, editor, British Medical 
Journal, feels that refereeing "favours 
unadventurous nibblings at the margin 
of truth rather than quantum leaps."28 
An example supporting his opinion is the 
reception given the early demonstration, 
via radioimmunoassay, of insulin-bind-
ing antibody by the late Solomon A. Ber-
son and Rosalyn S. Yalow, Veterans Ad-
ministration, New York. This work was 
fundamental to the development of the 
radioimmunoassay into a "powerful tool 
for determination of virtually any sub-
stance of biologic interest," according to 
Yalow.29 Although Yalow would share 
the 197-7 Nobel Prize with Roger Guille-
min, Salk Institute, San Diego, and 
Andrew Schally, Veterans Administra-
tion Hospital, New Orleans, the initial 
research concerning radioiodine-labeled 
insulin was rejected both by Science 
and, at first, by the Journal of Clinical 
Investigation (JCI) as erroneous.29 
Nevertheless, when the paper was re-
vised to meet the objections of review-
ers, it was published in the JCI.30 A com-
paratively recent poll of the authors of 
manuscripts rejected by the JCI, con-
ducted by editor Jean D. Wilson, De-
partment of Internal Medicine, Univer-
sity of Texas Health Science Center at 
Dallas, found that 85 percent of the re-
jected papers were subsequently pub-
lished elsewhere. And Wilson also re-
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ported that "most of the authors of the 
[other] 15 percent...were convinced by 
the review process that [their papers] 
were either unoriginal or wrong."3? 
Delays in Publication 
In addition to charges that referees 
make too many serious mistakes, com-
plaints also focus on the delays in 
publication that many attribute to the 
refereeing process. While conceding the 
value of thorough, constructive reports 
by referees, Richard Shea, editor. 
Transactions on Nuclear and Plasma 
Sciences, is nevertheless concerned 
about the time lost during the refereeing 
process; he is quoted by Christiansen as 
saying that "the ultimate referee is the 
reader."20 And as noted by Kronick, the 
historical significance of papers ulti-
mately depends on this reader evalu-
ation and readers' willingness to cite 
what impresses them.32 But one of the 
reasons for the existence of the referee-
ing system is that readers of scientific ar-
ticles have varying interests and back-
grounds; they must be able to rely on a 
high degree of validity in what they read, 
especially if it is Somewhat outside their 
field. 
Real or perceived, delays in publica-
tion resulting from refereeing may be the 
most prevalent concern among scien-
tists, who may have job security, promo-
tions, or the need to establish priority for 
a discovery hanging in the balance. In a 
note in NEJM, Thomas P. Stossel, Mas-
sachusetts General Hospital, Boston, 
voices his concern that the commercial 
potential of many new discoveries, espe-
cially in biotechnology, is giving rise to 
new and particularly taxing demands for 
rapid publication.33 
In an editorial, Lawrence D. Grouse 
offers several explanations, based on his 
experience as senior editor of JAMA, for 
the lag time between submission and 
publication: "Excellent manuscripts are 
often criticized by reviewers with vested 
interests or contrary views. Overcritical 
reviewers flay manuscripts for minor or 
supposed deficiencies.... Reviewers may 
also cynically delay the appearance of 
research competing with their own."34 
And in a 1979 editorial in the Journal of 
Clinical Psychiatry, associate editor 
Marc H. Hollender asked "why it takes 
three months or longer to review an arti-
cle that takes three minutes to read and 
perhaps took less than three months to 
write.... Does it take the referee that 
long to come to a conclusion and to dic-
tate comments? It is more likely that the 
article gathers dust among other low-pri-
ority items."35 In short, if I may use an 
old, informal phrase, referees should 
either fish or cut bait. 
Bias and Unethical Behavior 
Of all the complaints about referee-
ing, however, some of the most bitter— 
though not the most prevalent—concern 
the issue of referee bias (although little 
uncontested empirical evidence exists to 
indicate that authors' affiliations and the 
reputations of their institutions affect a 
referee's evaluation). Assuming that 
some bias exists, however, historian of 
science Donald deB. Beaver, Williams 
College, Williamstown, Massachusetts, 
suggests that a preconceived suspicion 
of scientific "have-nots" may be ex-
plained in terms of the second part of the 
"Matthew effect."36 This concept, intro-
duced by Merton in 1968,37 draws an 
analogy between the misallocation of 
scientific credit and a passage from the 
gospel of St. Matthew: "Unto every one 
that hath shall be given, and he shall 
have abundance: but from him that hath 
not shall be taken away even that which 
he hath" (emphasis ours). Presumably, 
contributions from unknown scholars 
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from unrecognized or little-known insti-
tutions are less likely to be accepted for 
publication than occasionally compara-
ble contributions by scholars of great 
repute. 
Some cases of questionable referee 
ethics have been documented. Perhaps 
the most publicized example, according 
to a 1984 article by free-lance medical 
writer Barbara Fox in Medical Commu-
nications, the journal of the American 
Medical Writers Association,38 was one 
reported on by former Science staff 
writer William J. Broad.39 It involved a 
paper submitted by Helena Wachslicht-
Rodbard, NIH, Bethesda, Maryland, to 
NEJM. The paper was assigned to two 
referees, one of whom recommended 
acceptance, while the other—Vijay 
Soman of Yale University, who had 
similar research in progress—recom-
mended rejection. Arnold Relman, 
editor, NEJM, informed Wachslicht-
Rodbard that her paper had "engen-
dered considerable differences of opin-
ion among our referees"39 and told her 
the manuscript was unacceptable unless 
revised. 
But the matter was far from over. 
Soman had photocopied Wachslicht-
Rodbard's study and, without informing 
his coauthor, Philip Felig, vice chairman 
of the Department of Medicine at Yale, 
of what he had done, sent their article in-
corporating the plagiarized data to the 
American Journal of Medicine, of which 
Felig was an associate editor. By coinci-
dence, the journal sent the article out 
for review to Wachslicht-Rodbard's su-
perior, who showed it to her. It con-
tained more than a dozen passages, ver-
batim, from her own manuscript; she 
wrote to Relman accusing Felig and 
Soman of plagiarism and conflict of in-
terest in the refereeing of her paper. Rel-
man agreed that it had been highly im-
proper for Soman to agree to even read 
the paper, which was later published in 
the NEJM under Wachslicht-Rodbard's 
name.40 
The abuse of anonymity is a long-
standing matter of concern. In an article 
appearing in New Scientist, biochemist 
Robert Jones, Royal College of Sur-
geons, London, asserted that "the act of 
submission of a paper can place the 
author at the mercy of the malignant 
jealousy of an anonymous rival."41 The 
belief seems to be that, from behind the 
walls of their fortress of anonymity, ref-
erees are free to hurl at authors volleys 
of invective that cannot be effectively 
countered. "Anonymity tends to bring 
out the worst in people," according to 
Heinz Fraenkel-Conrat, Department of 
Molecular Biology and Virus Laborato-
ry, University of California, Berkeley, in 
a letter to the editors of Nature A2 "I was 
recently asked to review, and advocated 
rejection of, a paper for a virological 
journal on the basis of factual comments 
which I would have been quite willing to 
sign. The editor sent me, out of cour-
tesy, copies of his rejection letter togeth-
er with the other referee's sarcastic 
poison-pen comments, also rejecting the 
paper. There was no justification for one 
civilised person insulting another in such 
a manner.... That outburst was solely 
the joy of releasing adrenalin with anon-
ymous impunity."42 While Fraenkel-
Conrat's analysis may be correct in this 
situation, there is little evidence, other 
than anecdotal, that this is a widespread 
phenomenon. But it suggests fertile 
ground for study: do ad hominem com-
ments—those leveled at authors, as 
distinct from strong opinions about the 
authors' text—occur more frequently in 
signed or in unsigned reviews? 
In a "Guest Comment" published in 
Physics Today, F. Curtis Michel, pro-
fessor of space physics and astronomy, 
Rice University, Houston, calls for ref-
erees to back up their comments. "Ac-
countability is now all directed back at 
the author," he writes.43 "If there is any 
dispute, it is entirely the authors' fault 
because they have 'failed to convince 
their peers.' Here, the word 'peer' has a 
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nice ring of fairness to it.... However,... 
when a group of colleagues is permitted 
to have [their] comments taken as some 
kind of gospel, [they] are no longer peers 
but quite definitely superiors insofar as 
power and influence go."43 It is in 
answer to just this kind of criticism, Har-
nad reports, that BBS is conducting an 
internal, statistical study of, among 
other things, the relationships among 
anonymity, referees' ratings of manu-
scripts, and authors' ratings of the use-
fulness of referee reports.24 
Another criticism of the system is of 
the "Newcomb variety." I have often re-
ferred to the career of Simon Newcomb, 
who proved conclusively—just months 
before the Wright Brothers took off 
from the sands of Kitty Hawk—that a 
flying machine was impossible.44.45 
Sometimes this type of rejection is the 
result of referees who are hostile to inno-
vative ideas or to those that clash with 
their own.41 We don't know how often 
thoughtful, conscientious scientists—in 
good faith and in keeping with currently 
accepted theory—rendered an opinion 
concerning the implausibility of a given 
idea or theory, only to see that theory 
become the basis of a dramatic paradigm 
shift. Still, referees and journal editors 
should not consider such rejection ex-
perience as sufficient reason for extend-
ing some kind of "publication carte 
blanche" to would-be authors who want 
to prove, for example, that perpetual-
motion machines are possible. I contin-
ue to be in favor of refereeing that pre-
vents the publication of intellectual 
atrocities, including papers with inade-
quate documentation. For those articles 
straddling the border between science 
and speculation, there exist publications 
such as Speculations in Science and 
Technology, which was started specif-
ically as a forum for the publication of 
ideas lacking support "in established 
theoretical and experimental work," ac-
cording to an article by founder William 
M. Honig, senior lecturer in the physical 
sciences and engineering, Western Aus-
tralian Institute of Technology, Perth, in 
the Sciences.46 
Refereeing and Garfield's 
Uncertainty Principle 
It is easy to "prove" on the basis of 
anecdotal evidence that the refereeing 
system doesn't work. From the hundreds 
of published Citation Classics® com-
mentaries—such as those written by Os-
car Buneman, Stanford University, Cali-
fornia,47 and Hans Lineweaver, US De-
partment of Agriculture, Washington, 
DC48—or in correspondence with their 
authors, we know that dozens of signifi-
cant papers have been rejected by some 
journals for various reasons. Some of 
these reasons might be described as 
"N-I-H," that is, "not invented here." 
Nevertheless, much scientific quackery 
is exposed by careful, insightful, con-
structive refereeing, and this far out-
weighs the ideas that have allegedly been 
suppressed because of referees who 
would not give them a chance to see the 
light of day. 
A scientist's appreciation of the col-
laborative, communal goal of referee-
ing—protecting science and the public 
from errors and inferior work—varies 
according to a host of factors, including 
the scientist's age, status, and tempera-
ment. Famous, tenured, or established 
researchers may be better able to weath-
er the occasional rejection notice than 
scientists just starting their careers and 
trying to make their mark. No other ac-
tivity is as fundamental to democratic 
scholarship as refereeing. From all this, I 
concluded that there is an Uncertainty 
Principle of Refereeing: The more we 
have of it, the less we like it—but the less 
we have of it, the more we miss it. 
We sometimes trivialize what we take 
for granted. Refereeing has been around 
for so long that it's easy to forget that it 
wasn't always there. The present stage of 
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its evolution will be affected by social 
and technological factors such as fund-
ing and electronic publishing. But the 
public discourse of scholarship, both 
formal and informal, is essential to the 
very existence of science. In the modern 
era of big science—and by that I mean 
both large-scale projects and large num-
bers of projects, whether small or 
large—we must find ways to inculcate 
new research practitioners with the pre-
cepts and ideals that "naturally" were 
taught in the era of little science. We 
cannot allow squabbling over limited re-
search funds to cloud the fundamental 
need to preserve the scientific process 
implied by refereeing. But we must rec-
ognize that the very size of the scientific 
enterprise may make it necessary to 
modify rigid application of the Ingelfin-
ger rule49 [promulgated by the late Franz 
J. Ingelfinger, former editor, NEJM, 
which states that papers submitted to 
NEJM must "have been neither pub-
lished nor submitted elsewhere (includ-
ing news media and controlled-circula-
tion publications)"] or other precepts 
that may have been reasonable before 
the electronic revolution. 
Indeed, the community of science 
may become even more relevant in the 
new communications age, and so we 
have to examine more carefully the con-
sequences for intellectual property 
rights and methods of adjudicating 
disputes concerning priority of discov-
ery. If much of this sounds Mertonian in 
tone it is no accident, since Robert K. 
Merton is one of the few scholars who 
has devoted great effort to the definition 
of the problems involved in research on 
refereeing. In fact, the work of Zucker-
man and Merton will form a significant 
part of the discussion in Part 2 of this 
essay. 
My thanks to Stephen A. Bonaduce 
and Terri Freedman for their help in the 
preparation of this essay. 
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EUGENE GARFIELD: 
Refereeing and Peer Review. Part 2. 
The Research on Refereeing and Alternatives in the Present System 
Current Contents, August 11,1986 
Continuing our discussion of referee-
ing, which focused on complaints about 
the system in Part 1,' we now examine 
the empirical research on the subject, 
the anecdotal literature supporting the 
current system, and some of the sugges-
tions for improving it. Part 3 will appear 
at a later date and will discuss the peer 
review of grant proposals. Again we will 
review the considerable literature of 
opinion and conjecture, but we will give 
special attention to the large-scale study 
by sociologists Stephen Cole, State Uni-
versity of New York (SUNY), Stony 
Brook, and Jonathan R. Cole, Columbia 
University, New York,2-3 as well as other 
papers4 and special reports.5 
Editors: The Author's Guardians 
Each anecdote purporting to reveal 
some fault in the present system of refer-
eeing seems to find a ready counterpart 
in the opinion of a supporter. For in-
stance, many critics claim that some ref-
erees do not review manuscripts dispas-
sionately. But editors say that they usu-
ally take great pains to ensure that refer-
ees are fair. In Running a Refereeing 
System, Michael Gordon, research-asso-
ciate, Primary Communications Re-
search Centre, University of Leicester, 
UK, recommends the use of two or more 
referees to reduce the risk of an offhand, 
frivolous, or biased treatment of a manu-
script.6 (p. 13-5) When referees do cause 
excessive delays, return unsupported or 
capricious reports, or otherwise display 
"questionable ethics," they tend to be 
retired from the system, according to 
Patricia Dehmer, Argonne National 
Laboratory, Illinois, and member. Publi-
cations Committee, American Physical 
Society (APS) in a "Guest Comment" in 
Physics TodayP Whether this is the case 
in other disciplines is not known. 
Critics also suggest that referees some-
times take advantage of the privileged 
information they are privy to in the 
manuscripts they review. But Dehmer 
asserts that many APS editors try to en-
sure that referees are not working along 
lines precisely like those of the papers 
sent to them, to reduce the possibility of 
conflicts of interest. But this is contrary 
to the practice in biomedicine and else-
where. Most editors try to match sub-
missions with reviewers as closely as pos-
sible, in an attempt to have the manu-
script reviewed by those presumed to be 
most qualified to judge it. In either case, 
according to Claude T. Bishop, director. 
Division of Biological Sciences, National 
Research Council of Canada (NRCC). 
and editor-in-chief, NRCC Research 
Journals, referees ought to disqualify 
themselves when there is the possibility 
of a conflict' of interest, or when they 
feel they cannot be objective about the 
paper or its author. In some instances, 
however, they might propose simulta-
neous publication of their own paper 
and the review paper, or even approach 
the authors of the review paper and pro-
pose a collaboration.8 (p. 50, 82) As a 
parallel approach, many editors honor 
author requests that a paper not be sent 
to a given referee.7 
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Authors Often Lack Knowledge of 
Publishing 
Editors also point out that authors fre-
quently do not understand the publica-
tion process. For instance, many authors 
charge that referees make up a closed, 
"elite" group. Yet the number of active 
referees for a journal can far exceed the 
number of active contributors.9 Accord-
ing to JAMA editor George D. Lund-
berg, that journal's list of active referees 
contains over 3,000 names.10 The Jour-
nal of the Operational Research Society, 
a relatively small journal, used 285 refer-
ees in 1982 alone.11 And a careful study 
of nine years of materials from the ar-
chives of Physical Review and Physical 
Review Letters by sociologists Harriet 
Zuckerman and Robert K. Merton, Co-
lumbia University,12 showed that au-
thors of every rank participated in the 
refereeing process. Their main finding, 
which is based on referee reports for 
both published and rejected manu-
scripts and which refutes another widely 
held belief, is that there is no consistent 
relationship between referee acceptance 
or rejection of manuscripts and the rela-
tive standing of authors and referees.12 
In addition, informed authors know that 
it is not referees, but editors, who are 
ultimately responsible for rejecting a 
manuscript. 
Bishop says that authors also show a 
lack of understanding when they point 
to differences of opinion among referees 
as evidence that the system is capricious 
and unreliable.8 (p. 43-9) At the root of 
some of these reviewer disagreements, 
in Bishop's view, are differences in the 
algorithms and paradigms fundamental 
to every branch of science. For instance, 
referees less often disagree substantially 
in well-established fields. But in fields 
pressing at the frontiers of knowledge, 
significant differences of opinion among 
referees are bound to be more common. 
When editors are confronted with a de-
cision between two equally plausible ref-
eree interpretations of a given manu-
script, they often employ one of several 
options that range from publishing the 
paper without comment to publication 
of the controversial paper along with 
comments by referees, invited critics, 
and rebuttals by the authors.8 (p. 43-9) 
Authors also seem to assume that their 
submissions are, in general, carefully 
written and based on substantial 
amounts of work. "Not so," asserts J. W. 
Cornforth, Milstead Laboratory of 
Chemical Enzymology, Sittingbourne 
Research Centre, Kent, UK, who served 
as a referee for a dozen journals over a 
30-year period.13 "In my experience," 
Cornforth continues in his letter to the 
editors of New Scientist, "a regrettably 
high proportion [of manuscripts] show 
careless or misleading presentation and 
meager experimental work, and the ma-
jority need some modification. Refer-
ees—and, of course, editors—almost 
invariably improve a paper that passes 
through their hands; often, they are do-
ing what the authors ought to have 
done."13 
The Many Faces of Rejection 
Authors should also be aware that the 
scientific value of a paper is not neces-
sarily the only factor that enters into edi-
tors' decisions to publish or not; many 
manuscripts never make it past the 
screening process that eliminates papers 
that are incompatible with a journal's 
readership or have not been submitted in 
the required format.14 Or a journal may 
reject a manuscript simply because it has 
recently published another, similar pa-
per, or has one currently under consid-
eration. 10 Rejection rates are also signif-
icantly affected by the existence of page 
charges, which support publication and 
thus allow for much lower rejection 
rates. This practice is widespread in 
physics and chemistry but not unknown 
even in psychology. 
It is also important to realize that re-
jection rates vary. In their study of pat-
terns of evaluation in science, Zucker-
man and Merton compiled a table of the 
rejection rates for a sample of 83 jour-
nals in the sciences, the social sciences, 
and the humanities.12 Linguistics, geolo-
gy, and physics journals had the lowest 
rate of rejection, turning down only 20 
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to 25 percent of the papers submitted to 
them. Biology journals rejected about 
30 percent of the papers they received. 
Journals in experimental and physiologi-
cal psychology had a rejection rate of 
over 50 percent, while sociology jour-
nals were over 80 percent and history 
journals hovered at 90 percent. Stephen 
Lock, editor, British Medical Journal 
(BMJ), made an observation that has 
also been noted by others who have read 
the study. He wrote that "the more hu-
manistically oriented the journal, the 
higher the rate of [rejection]; the more 
experimentally and observationally ori-
ented, with an emphasis on rigour of ob-
servation and analysis, the lower the rate 
of rejection."15 (p. 17) 
Zuckerman and Merton also reported 
that the editorial staffs attitude con-
cerning its own errors in judgment con-
stitutes an often-overlooked factor influ-
encing acceptance rates.12 Although ed-
itors and referees want to avoid errors in 
judgment altogether, they recognize 
that they cannot be infallible; thus, since 
they must make mistakes, they tend to 
have preferences for the kind of mis-
takes they are willing to risk. The staffs 
of some journals—notably those presti-
gious journals with high rejection 
rates—seem more willing to reject "un-
orthodox" manuscripts that the wider 
community of scholars might eventually 
consider important, rather than to run 
the risk of publishing a substandard 
work. The staffs of low-rejection jour-
nals, on the other hand, apparently 
prefer to publish the occasional work 
that doesn't measure up, rather than re-
ject a paper that later turns out to be sig-
nificant.12 
The Research 
A research front consists of a group of 
current papers that, together, cite one or 
more of a cluster of older, core publica-
tions. Since I referred earlier1 to the 
paucity of empirical research on referee-
ing and peer review and the abundance 
of anecdote and opinion on the subject, 
one may wonder how a research front of 
any size might be generated on this sub-
ject. But even a large anecdotal liter-
ature, through repeated citations of pre-
vious anecdotal literature, as well as rep-
utable studies, can form a pseudo-re-
search front. Only a careful analysis of 
the core and citing literature can deter-
mine the nature and extent of the re-
search front—even when very useful 
core review papers can be found. Since 
the literature on peer review and refer-
eeing is vast, at the end of Part 2 of this 
essay I have added a selected bibliogra-
phy of publications not mentioned in the 
text. 
The 1983 ISI® research front entitled 
"Objectivity of reviewers in peer review" 
(#83-8291) consists of but 2 core papers 
and 12 citing papers. One core paper is 
the highly controversial 1982 study by 
Douglas P. Peters, University of North 
Dakota, Grand Forks, and Stephen J. 
Ceci, Cornell University, Ithaca, New 
York.16 The other core paper is a 1982 
editorial by Lock, entitled "Peer review 
weighed in the balance."17 In it Lock dis-
cusses the conclusions drawn by Peters 
and Ceci and details some of the flaws in 
their study. In spite of these problems, 
however. Lock believes that Peters and 
Ceci have underscored some shortcom-
ings within the system. Most of the rec-
ommendations Lock makes for improv-
ing refereeing—particularly double-
blind review—are discussed in detail 
below. 
Peters and Ceci 
This controversial study involved the 
resubmission of 12 psychology arti-
cles—published by authors from pres-
tigious and highly productive depart-
ments—to the journals that originally 
published them.18 Peters and Ceci be-
came interested in doing the study after 
reading about an informal experiment 
conducted by Los Angeles free-lance 
writer Chuck Ross.19 He reports having 
submitted the untitled, untyped manu-
script of Polish-bom US literary author 
Jerzy Kosinski's novel Steps20 under a 
pseudonym to publishers and literary 
agents to see if "unknown" authors re-
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ceive fair consideration. Although the 
book had won the 1969 US National 
Book Award, Ross claimed that 14 pub-
lishers—including the book's original 
publisher—and 13 agents rejected it.19 
In the Peters and Ceci study, the pre-
sentation of the data in the original pa-
pers was slightly altered. Fictitious 
names and institutions were substituted 
for the real ones, but the content of the 
articles was unchanged. Three of the re-
submissions were detected as such; of 
the other nine, eight were rejected. The 
authors concluded that the rejections re-
sulted from a systematic bias against un-
known authors and institutions. In the 
commentary section published along 
with Peters and Ceci's article, however, 
many commentators pointed out a num-
ber of flaws in the study. For instance, 
according to anthropologist Sol Tax, 
University of Chicago, Illinois, and 
Robert A. Rubinstein, School of Public 
Health, University of Illinois Medical 
Center, Chicago, the names Peters and 
Ceci chose for their bogus institutions 
were far removed from the mainstream 
of psychology institutions. Thus, what 
the investigators really demonstrated, 
say Tax and Rubinstein, is a bias against 
materials originating outside appropri-
ate institutions.21 Nobel laureate Rosa-
lyn S. Yalow, Veterans Administration, 
New York, commented, "How does one 
know that the data are not fabricated?... 
Those of us who publish establish some 
kind of a track record. If our papers 
stand the test of time, it can be expected 
that we have acquired expertise in scien-
tific methodology.... The work of estab-
lished investigators in good institutions 
is more likely to have had prior review 
from competent peers and associates 
even before reaching the journal."22 
Garth J. Thomas, Center for Brain 
Research, University of Rochester, New 
York, suggests that referees and editors 
may have recognized the resubmitted ar-
ticles as very like something they had 
seen before, but rather than raise the 
specter of plagiarism, they fell back on 
statistical criticisms to justify their 
negative comments.23 Janice M. Beyer, 
School of Management, SUNY, Buffalo, 
writes that the most likely fate of any 
submitted article is to be unanimously 
rejected, as 80 to 90 percent are in the 
social sciences.24 
In addition, psychologist Grover J. 
Whitehurst, SUNY, Stony Brook, notes 
that Peters and Ceci had no control 
group.25 Richard M. Perloff, Depart-
ment of Communication, Cleveland 
State University, Ohio, and Robert Per-
loff, Graduate School of Business, Uni-
versity of Pittsburgh, suggest that, 
among other controls, Peters and Ceci's 
study should have included resubmitting 
articles by authors from low-status insti-
tutions under by-lines with equally low-
status affiliations, as well as resubmitting 
articles by high-status authors under 
equally high-status by-lines.26 "Without 
such controls it is impossible to argue 
that the findings reflect the status bias 
[that Peters and Ceci] suggest," the 
Perloff s write.26 
But Is There Bias? 
Still, Tax and Rubinstein feel that a 
bias preventing competent work from 
being published is much more damaging 
than one that lets mediocre work slip 
through.21 And anecdotal evidence of 
bias is so widespread that the possibility 
should not be dismissed by researchers. 
For instance, in another commentary on 
the Peters and Ceci article, Robert Ro-
senthal, Department of Psychology, 
Harvard, said that as a young member of 
the psychology faculty at the University 
of North Dakota, he was unable to pub-
lish 15 to 20 articles in mainstream jour-
nals in the 1960s. Within a few years of 
his move to Harvard, however, he says 
that most of these articles were pub-
lished in the same journals that had pre-
viously rejected them.27 He does not 
say, however, whether these were the 
identical articles, or if they had been 
substantially revised to meet the objec-
tions of reviewers or changed in any 
other way. 
In a 1970 investigation of how at-
titudes might influence referee judg-
ment, Leonard D. Goodstein and Karen 
19 GARFIELD: REFEREEING AND PEER REVIEW, PART 1 
Lee Brazis, University of Cincinnati, 
Ohio, mailed abstracts of an empirical 
study on astrology to 282 members of the 
American Psychological Association.28 
They were asked to rate the design of the 
paper. Half were sent an abstract that re-
flected a conclusion confirming com-
monly held scientific attitudes toward 
astrology; the other half received an 
identical abstract, except that it includ-
ed a conclusion that ran counter to 
scientific beliefs. The former was rated 
by most referees as better designed and 
having more significance for future 
research. The latter, which contradicted 
common wisdom, was rated as flawed. 
When Zuckerman and Merton exam-
ined the selection of articles for the 
Physical Review, they found that papers 
by physicists of great repute affiliated 
with prestigious institutions were more 
likely to be exempted entirely from the 
refereeing process. Their papers were 
accepted and published more quickly 
than papers by lesser known physi-
cists.12 And in a large-scale study of 
papers submitted to physics journals, 
Gordon reported a strong bias in refer-
ees from major universities toward pa-
pers by authors who were also from 
large, well-known universities.29 
Lock, however, found no evidence of 
referee bias in a study of 1,558 manu-
scripts submitted to BMJ between Janu-
ary and August 1979. The study was pub-
lished in his book A Difficult Balance: 
Editorial Peer Review in Medicine.15  
Of the 246 external referees who were 
sent manuscripts by BMJ, 143 held aca-
demic positions, while the rest had non-
academic affiliations; yet the proportion 
of papers recommended for acceptance 
did not differ from one group to the 
other.15 (p. 56-71) Moreover, regardless 
of the affiliations of both referee and 
author, Lock said that referees judged 
manuscripts "to an equal standard."15 
(p. 61) 
Suggestions for Improvement 
A few years ago, Norton D. Zinder, 
Rockefeller University, New York City, 
sent me the text of a talk he gave to the 
Society of Editors in 1969, when he was 
an associate editor of Virology.30 
Tongue partially in cheek, Zinder 
asked, "What would be so terrible if 
there were no refereeing of scientific pa-
pers?... As we now operate, with [the] 
restriction of publication by reviewing, 
the number of publications becomes a 
thing in itself.... If we were to cease ref-
ereeing papers,...there'd be little bar [to 
publication, and] quality might reassert 
its role, since there'd be less pressure to 
have long lists of publications."30 The 
Perloffs write that the "caveat emptor 
approach [of having no refereeing 
system at all] might be viewed as a nod to 
the free market of ideas. Let millions of 
flowers bloom."26 Some may feel that 
the continued growth of the literature 
may lend support to these views. How-
ever, others, including myself, believe 
that a few non-refereed publications can 
exist only because the refereed journals 
set the standards for all the others. 
I believe that most scientists would 
agree that if something is indeed shown 
to be wrong with refereeing, an attempt 
should be made to repair the system, 
rather than to abandon it. Unfortunate-
ly, with little or no solid, systematic 
evidence of refereeing's deficiencies, 
most suggestions for improvement are as 
conjectural as the ills they are meant to 
cure. Among the most discussed op-
tions—one that is already prevalent 
among sociology journals—is that of 
double-blind refereeing, also called re-
ciprocal anonymity, in which neither the 
authors nor referees are aware of the 
others' identities. There is precedent for 
author anonymity: David A. Kronick, 
professor, medical bibliography. Uni-
versity of Texas Health Science Center 
at San Antonio, notes that "maintaining 
the anonymity of the author was a stan-
dard practice in the prize essay competi-
tions (a sort of early form of sponsored 
research) of eighteenth-century scien-
tific societies, which had elaborate 
devices to maintain the anonymity of 
contributors."31 
The rationale behind double-blind 
refereeing, as was pointed out in an ap-
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propriately anonymous editorial in 
Nature, is that referees could still be 
frank about a manuscript's shortcomings 
without fear of ruining working relation-
ships or being subjected to the anger of 
rejected authors.32 Such a system would 
also, in the opinion of J. Scott Arm-
strong, Wharton School, University of 
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, "reduce the 
prejudice against unknown authors from 
low-status institutions."33 
Many justify the present system by cit-
ing what Marcel C. La Follette, editor, 
Science, Technology, & Human Values, 
calls the "crackpot avoidance" theory.34 
According to this idea, an author's 
record of achievement and the stamp of 
legitimacy provided by the author's in-
stitutional affiliation help referees 
evaluate manuscripts because they con-
stitute presumptive "proof" that the 
research described was really done. La 
Follette says that accepting manuscripts 
without regard for the potential of 
misrepresentation or error is unwise, but 
she points out that a prestigious affili-
ation is no guarantee against fraud—in 
fact, it may even help the perpetrator 
evade detection. 
According to John Moossy, editor-in-
chief, and Yvonne R. Moossy, managing 
editor, Journal of Neuropathology & Ex-
perimental Neurology, a common ob-
jection to double-blind refereeing is a 
widespread conviction that experienced 
referees can identify authors despite the 
removal of the authors' names from their 
manuscripts.35 In a study conducted to 
test this contention, they removed the 
names of authors and their departmental 
and institutional affiliations from 33 
papers sent out for refereeing from May 
1983 through April 1984. Each of the 67 
referees, who filed a total of 85 reports, 
was asked to identify the authors and 
their departments or disciplines; 34 per-
cent were able to make correct identifi-
cations. Eleven percent made incorrect 
identifications, and 55 percent would 
not even hazard a guess. Interestingly, 
only 9 referees objected to the double-
blind procedure; a surprising number— 
24—had "no opinion," while 33 favored 
it, citing such reasons as greater objec-
tivity and less risk of being swayed, 
either for good or ill, by the author's 
reputation.35 
Another frequently proposed reform 
is "open refereeing." It is the exact op-
posite of double-blind refereeing: the 
referee's name is revealed to the author, 
who in turn is made known to the refer-
ee. Proponents argue that open referee-
ing might reduce the number of careless 
and superficial reports, on the presump-
tion that referees will take more care 
with their reports if they have to sign 
their names to them. And in fact, I noted 
long ago that the time of the more quali-
fied referees is of proportionately great-
er value; thus, they may sometimes be 
less than enthusiastic over the prospect 
of a manuscript to evaluate.36 Anonymi-
ty is a dull spur to effort; "Aren't we all 
more likely to do something properly if 
our name is attached to it?" asks Ronald 
Mirman, Department of Physics, Long 
Island University, Brooklyn, New York, 
in a letter to the editor of the American 
Journal of Physics.37 
Armstrong proposes that referees 
might designate a portion of their report 
to be signed and published along with 
the manuscript. He believes this would 
provide useful information to scientists 
because few readers can devote the kind 
of attention to a paper that a referee 
gives to it.33 However, a number of 
problems might be encountered were 
referee anonymity abolished. For in-
stance, the late Franz J. Ingelfinger, 
former editor, the New England Journal 
of Medicine, believed that "the referee 
who is several steps below the author on 
the status ladder" might be put in an un-
comfortably vulnerable position and 
might even be unwilling to criticize can-
didly the manuscript in question.38 
Some reviewers might soften their ob-
jections to manuscripts, rather than 
jeopardize working relationships with 
the authors.6 (p. 16) Identifying referees 
would also enable authors to get in touch 
with them. This might foster a communi-
cation process that excludes the editor, 
or even exposes referees to verbal at-
tacks.3' 
The Perloffs have another suggestion 
for promoting a greater sensé of respon-
sibility among referees. They argue that 
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paying referees would encourage them 
to perform their task more thoroughly 
and impartially.26 Although they do not 
say how much referees should receive, 
they suggest that such fees could come 
from "authors' institutions, their re-
search funding, or their personal re-
sources."26 They present no empirical 
evidence supporting their argument, but 
the notion of paying reviewers, like 
other ideas reported in this essay, could 
form the basis of an interesting study. In 
this case, the questions might be, "Do 
paid referees perform better than unpaid 
ones?" and "How much money does it 
take before a significant effect is no-
ticed?" 
Conclusion 
It is difficult to draw substantive con-
clusions about how well the refereeing 
process functions. But Lock makes an 
interesting observation: the validating of 
experimental results and theoretical 
conclusions is ultimately not through the 
refereeing process but through the 
broader evaluation that articles receive 
over time at the hands of a larger, in-
formed scientific community.15 (p. 128) 
Of course, refereeing does not always 
detect fraud, plagiarism, errors, and 
muddy thinking. Still, it is probably 
impossible for most journals to switch to 
a system of in-house evaluation: despite 
its faults, real or imagined, refereeing is 
probably the most efficient and effective 
method for distinguishing the promising 
from the meretricious—at least, until it 
is proven otherwise. 
In assessing refereeing's supposed 
flaws, one of the key issues seems to be 
delays in publication. Much of the ac-
cumulated anxiety about refereeing in 
many fields seems traceable to the 
tedious process that is often made out of 
what should be a straightforward deci-
sion. At the heart of many delays are 
referees who allow manuscripts, to 
gather dust on their desks without in-
forming editors that they cannot com-
plete a review in a timely fashion. 
As I see it, at the root of many of the 
alleged deficiencies of peer review are 
the attitudes of the scientific community 
itself. Were quality valued over quanti-
ty, and spurious "productivity" deplored 
instead of rewarded with tenure and pro-
motions or research grants, then the in-
centive to publish shoddy or half-fin-
ished research would diminish. This 
might reduce the burden placed upon 
editors and reviewers because of the 
publish-or-perish syndrome. Unfortu-
nately, we have not yet emerged from 
the stage of regarding the sheer number 
of publications as significant,39 but there 
is a growing tendency to limit the num-
ber of papers to be listed on nominations 
for awards, grants, and so on.40 And in 
fact, one of the often-stated goals of 
citation analysis is to encourage quality, 
high-impact work, rather than publica-
tion for the sake of pure output. 
Of the myriad comments about refer-
eeing, it is difficult to find one brief, all-
encompassing statement that says it all. 
But John Ziman, Imperial College of 
Science and Technology, London, UK, 
and editor. Science Progress, has come 
close. In a commentary on Peters and 
Ceci, he wrote: 
Informed discourse on the primary 
communication system of science 
takes for granted the basic utility and 
reliability of the peer-review process, 
at least up to some modest practical 
level of human competence. The 
height of this level should not be exag-
gerated: It is not an indicator of per-
manent scientific worth. Acceptance 
for publication by a reputable journal 
implies no more than that the work is 
superficially sound, mildly interesting, 
and moderately original. The opinion 
that it should at least be taken into 
consideration by other scientists is on-
ly a preliminary assessment, likely to 
be contradicted and entirely supersed-
ed in the light of further study. Never-
theless, this weak and uneven stan-
dard of quality appears real enough to 
the authors, editors, and reviewers 
who tussle endlessly to establish and 
maintain it. Specific accusations of 
prejudice, inquiries concerning sys-
tematic bias, and demands for institu-
tional reform have all been addressed 
to imperfection of performance 
around and about this hypothetical 
benchmark.41 
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The question of refereeing must be 
discussed in the larger context of peer 
review for funding research. In the next 
part of this essay, I hope to review the 
anecdotal as well as systematic informa-
tion available. But refereeing and peer 
review are ethical and sociopolitical 
issues scientists must review periodical-
ly. Democratic institutions are dynamic. 
We want to retain the best of what we 
have had, but we must be willing to 
change that which no longer satisfies the 
needs of a changing world. 
Postscript 
Since it is a primary mission of ISI 
Pres^8 to publish books on the process 
of scientific communication, it has pub-
lished several such works mentioned in 
this essay. Several more, including 
Lock's A Difficult Balance: Editorial 
Peer Review in Medicine,15 will be 
printed or reprinted by ISI Press in the 
fall. They are: Medical Style and For-
mat: an International Manual for Au-
thors, Editors, and Publishers42 and 
How to Write and Publish Papers in the 
Medical Sciences,43 by Edward J. Huth, 
editor, Annals of Internal Medicine-, 
How to Copyedit Scientific Books and 
Journals,44 by Maeve O'Connor, CIBA 
Foundation, London, UK; and An Insid-
er's Guide for Medical Authors and Edi-
tors,45 by Peter Morgan, scientific edi-
tor, Canadian Medical Association Jour-
nal. Incidentally, Lock's book contains a 
bibliography of over 200 references— 
some of which appear following the ref-
erences in this essay in the selected bibli-
ography. In a review46 of Lock's book, 
Alfred Yankauer, editor, American 
Journal of Public Health, says it is "an in-
valuable reference for all those interest-
ed in the editorial process." In his 
review, he quotes a passage from Alex-
ander Pope47 that he feels "captured the 
essence" of Lock's views on refereeing 
and the editor's role. Yankauer suggests 
that for the word "critic," the reader 
should substitute "editor" or "refer-
ee/reviewer."46 
But you who seek to give and merit 
fame, 
And justly bear a Critic's noble 
name, 
Be sure yourself and your own reach 
to know, 
How far your genius, taste and 
learning go; 
Launch not beyond your depth, but 
be discreet, 
And mark that point where sense 
and dullness meet . . . . 
Careless of censure, nor too fond of 
fame; 
Still pleas'd to praise, yet not afraid 
of blame; 
Averse alike to flatter or offend; 
Not free from faults, nor yet too vain 
to mend. 
Alexander Pope 
An Essay on Criticism 
My thanks to Stephen A. Bonaduce 
and Terri Freedman for their help in the 
preparation of this essay. 
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EUGENE GARFIELD: 
Refereeing and Peer Review. Part 3. 
How the Peer Review of Research-Grant Proposals Works 
and What Scientists Say About It 
Current Contents, January 26,1987 
This essay is the third in a series on ref-
ereeing and peer review in science. The first 
part examined the anecdotal evidence and 
other literature and opinions about referee-
ing, the evaluation of scholarly articles be-
fore publication.1 The second discussed re-
search on refereeing and suggestions for im-
proving the system.2 This part focuses on 
the workings of the peer-review system of 
evaluating research-grant proposals, as em-
ployed by major US federal funding agen-
cies such as the National Science Founda-
tion (NSF) and the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH); the fourth section will cover 
the research on the grant-review system and 
proposed alternatives to it. 
Tlie emphasis in Parts 3 and 4 is on peer 
review in the physical, chemical, and bio-
logical sciences, since those are the fields 
examined by the major studies sponsored by 
the NSF and the NIH. However, it should 
be noted that the social sciences and the arts 
and humanities also have funding mecha-
nisms that incorporate peer review and that 
funding for science, the arts, and the human-
ities also comes from numerous private 
sources that have their own methods of de-
termining the level of support they wish to 
provide. 
The Science-Government Connection 
The principle, if not the full-fledged sys-
tem, of peer review developed along with 
the scholarly societies and learned journals 
that were founded in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.3.4 But until this cen-
tury, it remained a matter of interest and 
concern only within the scientific communi-
ty. In the US, however, during the 1940s, 
science and government began to establish 
a close working relationship that went be-
yond the advisory role scientists had previ-
ously played in affairs of state. For instance, 
according to Jay A. Levy,5 University of 
California School of Medicine, San Fran-
cisco, with the passage of the Public Health 
Service Act in 1944,6 the US Surgeon 
General was authorized to "make grants-in-
aid to universities, hospitals, laboratories, 
and other public or private institutions and 
to individuals for...research."5.7 And in 
the late 1940s, according to Rustum Roy, 
director, Science, Technology and Society 
Program, Pennsylvania State University, 
University Park, the Office of Naval 
Research (ONR) was "the first systematical-
ly organized government source of research 
funds for universities."8 At that time, 
"peer review began as an informal 'seek-
ing of a second opinion' by the grants 
manager, who mailed a copy of a proposal 
on the periphery of his competence to a col-
league and followed up with a phone 
call."8 
The close ties that evolved during World 
War II between the government and the sci-
entific community were formalized in 1950 
by the creation of the NSF.9 According to 
former NSF director, psychologist Richard 
C. Atkinson, chancellor, University of Cal-
ifornia, San Diego, and physicist William 
A. Blanpied, currently international studies 
specialist at the NSF, the "science-govern-
ment contract [was an attempt] to bring sci-
ence into the political system while at the 
same time preserving its autonomy."9 But 
Roy claims that in the process, each agen-
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cy using some form of informal peer review 
"enshrined" its version, "without any 
thought, examination, or analysis,...[as] 
'THE peer review' system."8 
As Atkinson and Blanpied note, however, 
it was primarily through peer review that 
scientists convinced the government that the 
public interest would best be served "if 
scientists...retained decisive influence over 
how public funds were spent to support sci-
entific activities."9 The assumption was— 
and is—that since few in public office have 
the expertise to determine, from a technical 
standpoint, which projects are most deserv-
ing, the task of evaluating research proposals 
should fall to scientists. The Public Health 
Service Act allowed for the provision of 
funds only to projects approved by the Na-
tional Advisory Health Council or the Na-
tional Advisory Cancer Council—the pre-
cursors of the current NIH system of Na-
tional Advisory Committees.10 This meth-
od, with peer review as its cornerstone, 
served as a model for other government 
agencies, such as the NSF. 
Atkinson and Blanpied point out, as have 
many others, that in recent years, despite 
increases in levels of NSF funding, the total 
funding of science, in terms of real dollars, 
has declined.9 There has not been a similar 
decline in funds or in buying power at the 
NIH, according to William F. Raub,10  
deputy director, but Raub does not dispute 
Levy's observation that 95 percent of com-
peting applications recommended for fund-
ing received support in the mid-1960s, while 
only 30 to 40 percent receive funds today.5 
"Funding has gone up, but the number of 
those asking for funds has gone up even fast-
er ," Raub explains.10 And of those whose 
applications are okayed, most receive sup-
port at levels reduced from the amounts 
originally recommended.5 Incidentally, an 
interview11 with Raub on the subject of 
misconduct in science was recently pub-
lished in The Scientist.12-13 
Still, until the early 1980s, scholars and 
the institutions with which they were affili-
ated abided by the consensus that peer re-
view was the best method to ensure the fair 
distribution of the ever-smaller federal pie.9 
But in 1983 and 1984, 15 universities by-
passed the peer-review system and obtained 
more than $100 million in special authori-
zations and appropriations for new facilities 
directly from the US Congress; some even 
hired professional lobbyists to assist 
them9.14 
Peer Review: Love It or Leave It? 
John Silber, president, Boston Universi-
ty, in a comment reported in Science News, 
justified his institution's abandonment of ac-
cepted channels by charging that the peer-re-
view system is an old-boy network that pref-
erentially funds some 20 institutions.14 In 
calling for reforms to the peer-review sys-
tem, Robert L. Sinsheimer, chancellor, Uni-
versity of California, Santa Cruz, said that 
peer review perpetuates the status quo.15 
And according to a recent report in Chemi-
cal A Engineering News, Senator Dennis 
DeConcini from Arizona claimed that "50 
percent of all federal R&D [research and de-
velopment] funding was put into the hands 
of 16 eastern and West Coast universities" 
in the 1984 fiscal year.16 (DeConcini 
represents an area that includes the Univer-
sity of Arizona, which secured $25 million 
from the Senate Appropriations Committee.) 
Whether or not there is research to support 
the claims of Silber, Sinsheimer, and others 
is a question that will be discussed in Part 
4, but it is interesting to note that Columbia 
University—which can by no means be la-
beled a "have-not" institution—was among 
those that took shortcuts with the system. 
Atkinson and Blanpied note that Columbia 
officials secured $8 million in US Depart-
ment of Energy (DOE) funds for the con-
struction of a chemical research laborato-
r y . 9 
The tactics of those who have bypassed 
the peer-review system have predictably 
elicited a strong, negative response from 
those who have remained within the system. 
Roland W. Schmitt, chairman, National Sci-
ence Board (the policy-making arm of the 
NSF), claims that, without peer review, US 
science is on "the fast track to mediocri-
ty. "1 4 Senator Jeff Bingaman of New Mex-
ico worries that bypassing peer review may 
weaken the morale of scientists who have 
worked hard to develop meritorious propos-
als, only to find themselves politically out-
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maneuvered.16 The practice may also divert 
scarce resources from research projects that 
the scientific community considers to be of 
higher priority. As Atkinson and Blanpied 
write, "At issue is not whether meritorious 
research will be carried out in facilities ob-
tained through pork-barrel tactics. Rather, 
[such] tactics violate the understanding that 
available resources are to be allocated in the 
best overall interests of science—and the 
public—rather than in the interests of indi-
vidual claimants."9 Roy, however, point-
edly wonders who will define what the "best 
overall interests of science" are.17 
How Peer Review Works 
The principal agencies that support basic 
scientific research in the US are the NSF, 
the NIH, the Veterans Administration (VA), 
the Department of Defense, the DOE, the 
Department of Agriculture, and the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA),9 although hinds are also provid-
ed through such organizations as the Amer-
ican Chemical Society, which administers 
the Petroleum Research Fund.18 Various 
congressional committees and the US Of-
fice of Management and Budget determine 
the amount of money each government 
agency has available to disburse.9 In gen-
eral, how that money is spent depends large-
ly on peer review: area experts judge pro-
posals on their scientific and technical merit 
and make recommendations accordingly. 
But each agency or organization charged 
with dispensing funds for scholarship oper-
ates with a somewhat different set of pro-
cedures. 
The NIH, which accounts for most US 
basic research-grant funding in terms of total 
dollars per year, makes use of a two-tiered 
system called "dual review."19 (p. 41) At 
the first level, a panel of experts in a given 
field, called the Initial Review Group (IRG), 
evaluates a research application for its sci-
entific merit. The IRG also comments on the 
applicant's performance on any previous 
grants and recommends a funding priority 
for the application, as well as the amount 
and duration of the grant.18 At the second 
level, the respective National Advisory 
Council/Board of each bureau, institute, or 
division of the NIH reviews the recommen-
dations made by the IRG and makes its own, 
final judgment concerning the application's 
relevance to the NIH's various programs and 
priorities.19 (p. 42-3) 
At the NSF, applications in chemistry, 
physics, and mathematics are mailed to 3 to 
10 independent experts selected by a pro-
gram officer.I8'20 (p. 7) These experts, re-
ferred to as mail reviewers, individually 
evaluate applications for their scientific qual-
ity through written comments and boxes 
checked off on a multiple-choice form.20 
(p. 7) Applications in the earth, biological, 
and social and behavioral sciences are usual-
ly reviewed by a combination of mail re-
viewers and panel reviewers.18'20 (p. 7) 
Panels consist of scientists selected by pro-
gram directors; the size of panels varies 
from section to section, but each meets in 
Washington, DC, three times a year to eval-
uate proposals.20 (p. 8) Like the NIH's 
IRG, NSF reviewers report on the appli-
cant's track record, as well as on the rele-
vance of the work and on the capability of 
the applicant's institution to provide tech-
nical support. Based on these comments, the 
program officer makes a recommendation 
to higher-ranking officials, who in tum make 
the final decision.1819 (p. 22-4) 20 (p. 3-11) 
One significant difference between the NIH 
and the NSF procedures is that NSF offi-
cers have considerable discretion to modi-
fy or even disregard peer-review recommen-
dations, whereas at the NIH, all recommen-
dations by the IRGs are followed very close-
ly.10 
The procedures of other agencies and or-
ganizations are, for the most part, variations 
on either the NSF or the NIH models. For 
instance, the VA, like the NIH, conducts an 
initial review of a grant application through 
a discipline-based review board that makes 
a recommendation to VA administrators; 
they constitute a second level of review.19 
(p. 25-6) Unlike the NSF or the NIH, how-
ever, the VA attempts to provide some fund-
ing for all approved proposals. When NASA 
receives unsolicited research proposals, it 
operates in much the same fashion as the 
NSF, with ad hoc reviewers who make rec-
ommendations based on scientific merit. 
Review procedures at the ONR are also sim-
28 GARFIELD: REFEREEING AND PEER REVIEW, PART 1 
ilar to the NSF's, in that Navy scientists may 
evaluate proposals themselves or have them 
reviewed through the mail or by a panel of 
experts convened for the purpose.18 Naval 
officers have much more to say in the deci-
sion-making process, however, than do their 
counterparts at the NSF or the NIH. 
Peer Review Outside the US 
The peer-review systems of the UK, 
France, and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many (FRG) provide a perspective on com-
plaints about the US system and point the 
way toward possible improvements. In the 
UK, according to a two-volume compen-
dium of source materials researched and 
published by the NSF, general support for 
all university programs and operations is 
provided through a dual system.21 The first 
element, the University Grants Committee 
(UGC), provides general support for all 
functions of British universities in the form 
of annual block grants; about a quarter of 
this money goes to the direct support of 
research. Although there is general agree-
ment between the universities and the UGC 
on how this money should be spent, the 
universities have wide latitude in the use of 
these grants. On rare occasions, however, 
the UGC makes a grant for a specific pur-
pose and suggests the most effective use for 
the funds. 
The second element of the UK system is 
provided in the form of research grants for 
specific university activities. These monies 
are administered by the five publicly fund-
ed research councils—the Science and En-
gineering Research Council, the Medical 
Research Council, the Natural Environment 
Research Council, the Agricultural Research 
Council, and the Economic and Social Sci-
ences Research Council.21 The role played 
by the UK's scientific community in the dis-
bursement of funds from the UGC and the 
research councils is similar to the peer-re-
view process in the US, but much of UK 
scientists' advice is provided through infor-
mal channels. 
The US and the UK carry out more than 
half of their key basic research in univer-
sities, whereas national laboratories and 
independent institutions produce most of the 
work in other countries. In France, for in-
stance, the single most important funding 
agency is the National Center for Scientific 
Research (CNRS) in Paris, which in 1979 
directly employed about 8,500 scientists and 
14,000 support personnel.21 R&D priorities 
are developed at the level of national policy 
by the Secretary of State for Research, and 
the size of each CNRS laboratory, its bud-
get, and the number of new positions in the 
system are all determined by the govern-
ment. All university faculty are civil ser-
vants, paid directly by the Ministry of the 
Universities. The most prominent scientific 
advisory group is the Advisory Committee 
for Research in Science and Technology 
(CCRST), also known as the Committee of 
Sages. Made up of 16 members, the CCRST 
advises the Secretary of State for Research 
on a wide range of scientific issues. 
Several large French government R&D 
agencies, however, pursue courses that are 
essentially independent of CNRS.21 The 
Ministry of Defense, for example, which ac-
counts for one-third of all government fi-
nancing of research, relies heavily on its 
own facilities and establishes its own prior-
ities, although it does have extensive con-
tact with industry and academia. Other 
largely independent agencies include the Na-
tional Institute for Health and Medical Re-
search, the National Institute for Agricul-
tural Research, the National Center for 
Space Studies, the National Center for Tele-
communications Studies, and the National 
Center for Exploitation of the Oceans. The 
CCRST has no influence with the technical 
ministries, which have their own advisory 
groups of scientists. 
Research funds in the FRG are provided 
by state and federal governments, private 
foundations, and industry.21 For basic re-
search, most of the funding is supplied by 
the federal government's Ministry of Re-
search and Technology (BMFT) and the 
Ministry for Education and Science. How-
ever, state governments also contribute 
significantly—especially to the privately 
operated Max Planck Institutes, a system of 
research institutions set up outside the 
university system to support outstanding 
scientists in key fields. The BMFT also pro-
vides the principal support for applied re-
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search. The money from these agencies is 
fiumeied into grants by the German Re-
search Society (DFG), a scholarly society 
that operates beyond the boundaries of for-
mal government. For scientists affiliated 
with German universities, which are state-
owned, DFG grants supplement a certain 
minimum level of funding. DFG support 
goes out mainly in the form of small, indi-
vidual project grants that run from one to 
three years. Grant applications are evaluat-
ed by peers who are elected to their posi-
tions by the entire scientific community.21 
In summary, the three countries briefly 
discussed here, as well as others, provide 
a relatively stable level of operating support 
to their universities, as well as to a parallel 
basic-research system separate from the uni-
versity system.21 And although many gov-
ernments provide some funds on a compet-
itive, peer-reviewed basis to scientists work-
ing both within and outside of the universi-
ty systems, such support is relatively small 
compared with the baseline funding. Since 
research support in other countries is not 
limited to individual projects for short pe-
riods of time, foreign scientists, unlike their 
US counterparts, do not have to cope with 
the distractions of securing grant money and 
the disruptions suffered when grants are re-
duced or discontinued.21 Atkinson and 
Blanpied claim that systems outside the US 
are less effective in encouraging competi-
tion among the most innovative ideas, and 
that other nations' faculty members, who are 
virtually or even literally employees of their 
respective governments, "cannot claim the 
same degree of autonomy they can in the 
United States."9 Roy says that "not one 
study has ever been supported to test this" 
claim17 or to compare the review systems 
of various government agencies with other 
methods of allocating funds.22 
Criticisms of Peer Review 
With research projects, jobs, and even ca-
reers at stake each time the review process 
renders a verdict, it is not surprising that the 
effectiveness and fairness of the system are 
matters of great concern—especially since 
the mid-1970s, when government support 
began declining.18 Making matters worse, 
the NIH and the NSF, the major grant-giv-
ing agencies, do not have the money to fund 
every application they approve. In a remark 
reported in Science, NIH director James B. 
Wyngaarden said that the issue of distin-
guishing between "shades of excellence" 
was among those that most concerned scien-
tists. The distinctions between one excellent 
proposal and another are often so fine that 
judgments concerning relative quality can-
not be rendered on an objective basis, leav-
ing those whose top-rated proposals are re-
jected "angry and frustrated."23 Many sci-
entists also feel it is inappropriate to rank 
disparate proposals that have littlejn com-
mon with one another.5 And Roy goes even 
further, charging that "there is no theoreti-
cal or empirical justification to support the 
contention that 'good' research can be pre-
dicted on the basis of the 'evaluation of pro-
posed ideas contained in an essay."8 
Another, almost universal, concern about 
fieer review—found even among reviewers 
and agency administrators—is the time, ef-
fort, and money it takes to complete the pa-
perwork involved in applying for and eval-
uating proposals. To ensure approval of a 
grant application, physiologist Daniel H. 
Osmond, University of Toronto, Canada, 
writes, "many have sacrificed 1-3 months 
of productive research.... The entire year 
is dominated by thoughts of preparation, and 
of the tragic consequences of refusal.... We 
must do quick experiments, write them up 
fast, and publish, publish, publish.... In-
novative, time-consuming work must be 
done on the side with unbudgeted dollars to 
diminish the risk of rejection by an over-
cautious grants committee when the work 
eventually surfaces."24 
Rosalyn S. Yalow, VA, New York, and 
the 1977 Nobel laureate in physiology or 
medicine, adds that grant proposals are "in-
herently dishonest," since "few established 
investigators whose contributions are highly 
original and imaginative can spell out... 
detailed plans for a three- or a five-year 
period."23 If the investigator can do so, she 
continues, then ' 'he does not expect to make 
a discovery; in fact, that mind-set can keep 
him from recognizing a discovery."26 And 
Osmond adds that the constant pressure of 
applying for grant renewals can cause seien-
30 GARFIELD: REFEREEING AND PEER REVIEW, PART 1 
tists, both consciously and unconsciously, 
to groom research results to fit the expecta-
tions of the funding agency, rather than 
allowing the work its own head.24 
Other complaints about peer review close-
ly resemble those made concerning the ref-
ereeing of manuscripts prior to publication, 
which were discussed in detail in Part 2 of 
this essay.2 Just as authors complain of ref-
eree bias and old-boy networks that conspire 
to keep new, challenging ideas out of print, 
so too do applicants for research grants 
charge that young or new scientists with little 
or no track record don't get a fair shake in 
competition with older, more established 
scientists and that grant-review committees 
are hesitant to risk funds on innovative or 
speculative proposals.18-27 And, like 
authors, grant applicants also fear that those 
who review their work may end up stealing 
from it as well.24 
Summarizing the workings of the complex 
peer-review systems in the US and some 
parts of Europe is not a simple task. Equal-
ly difficult is the job of condensing the dis-
satisfactions with peer review, which are 
mainly reflected in anecdotal complaints 
about the current US system. The final part 
of this series will focus on research findings 
concerning grant-review systems and sug-
gestions for improvements. 
* * * * * 
My thanks to Stephen A. Bonaduce and 
Terri Freedman for their help in the prepara-
tion of this essay. 
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EUGENE GARFIELD: 
Refereeing and Peer Review. Part 4. 
Research on the Peer Review of Grant Proposals and Suggestions for Improvement 
Current Contents, February 2,1987 
This is the conclusion to a four-part series 
on refereeing and peer review in science. 
The first two parts discussed the refereeing 
of scholarly articles prior to publication.'.2 
The third part focused on the mechanics of 
the peer-review system for the evaluation of 
research-grant proposals at the National Sci-
ence Foundation (NSF) and the National In-
stitutes of Health (NIH) and opinions about 
those systems.3 This part examines the re-
search on peer review and some proposed 
alternatives and improvements. 
The COSPUP Study 
One of the best-known and most thorough 
studies of peer review was conducted by so-
ciologists Stephen Cole and Leonard Rubin, 
State University of New York (SUNY), 
Stony Brook, and Jonathan R. Cole, Colum-
bia University, New York. At the request 
of the Committee on Science and Public 
Policy (COSPUP) of the US National Acad-
emy of Sciences (NAS), the Coles and Ru-
bin examined the peer-review system of the 
NSF. Phase one of the study, a retrospec-
tive statistical analysis of "how peer review 
works in the day-to-day operation of the 
Foundation [NSF],"4 (p. 17) was started in 
1974 and completed in 1978. Phase two, 
coauthored by the Coles and COSPUP, re-
ported the results of experiments designed 
to address the question of whether program 
officers influence the peer-review process 
through their selection of reviewers. It was 
started in 1978 and published in 1981.5 
In phase one, the authors interviewed 70 
scientists involved in all stages of the 
peer-review process, including current and 
former NSF program directors, advisory-
and review-panel members, NSF section and 
division heads, and the director and associate 
director of the NSF.4 (p. 18) To determine 
the most decisive factors in securing a grant, 
they collected data on 1,200 applicants, half 
of whom had been successful. In some 
cases, the authors examined not only the 
proposal but also the reviewers' comments, 
correspondence, and all paperwork connect-
ed with the funding decision. 
Phase two was carried out in two stages. 
First, the Coles submitted 150 proposals 
previously reviewed by the NSF to a set of 
surrogate program directors. Half of the sur-
rogates received proposals that had been ed-
ited in an attempt to conceal the authors' 
identities; the other half received copies that 
were exactly as they had been submitted to 
the NSF. The surrogate directors were asked 
to name a set of possible referees for the pro-
posals, and the Coles once again attempted 
to conceal the identities of half the authors. 
None of the participants knew how the pro-
posals had been rated by the NSF. The Coles 
asked them not only to evaluate the propos-
als but also, when applicable, to try to iden-
tify the authors. Reviewers of "blinded" 
proposals were also asked whether the re-
moval of title pages, fists of references, bud-
gets, and other identifying comments made 
the proposal more difficult to evaluate.5 
(P- 6-19) 
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The COSPUP Findings 
The main conclusion of phase one is that 
peer review in the NSF functions fairly.4 
(p. viii-ix) The authors found a high correla-
tion between high reviewer ratings and fa-
vorable funding decisions. They also found 
that an applicant's age and track record had 
little effect on the chances of getting a grant 
and that reviewers from major, "high-sta-
tus" institutions treated proposals from re-
searchers at prestigious institutions no dif-
ferently than proposals from workers at 
less-prestigious institutions. 
On the whole, the results of phase two 
corroborate the findings of phase one: the 
Coles found no evidence of bias on the part 
of program officers in their selection of re-
viewers and no evidence that external cri-
teria such as gender, age, and race had any 
influence on reviewer decisions.5 (p. 4) In 
the matter of blinded proposals, the Coles 
found it difficult to conceal authorship: "To 
omit all possible identifiers, in addition to 
the name(s) of the author(s) of the proposal, 
made the proposal almost unreadable," said 
Jonathan Cole.6 This was reflected by the 
opinions of the COSPUP reviewers, who 
felt that the blinding process severely com-
promised the integrity of the proposals. Nev-
ertheless, proposals that received high rat-
ings by NSF reviewers generally received 
high ratings from COSPUP reviewers as 
well. 
However, "there was a great deal of 
well-considered variance in opinions among 
equally qualified reviewers," in the words 
of Jonathan Cole.6 "Thus, if we work with 
a small number of reviewers and a high vari-
ance in opinion, the outcome of an evalua-
tion will depend greatly on the people se-
lected to review the proposal.... This is not 
to imply that the process is 'unfair,' but that 
there is a substantial level of reviewer dis-
agreement on rational grounds, e.g., quali-
ty of past work, priority given by a particu-
lar reviewer to the subject of the proposal, 
the assessment of the methods to be used, 
etc."6 
The Coles concluded that perhaps 25 to 
30 percent of NSF funding decisions would 
be reversed if applications were evaluated 
by another, equally qualified group of re-
viewers. In both their phase-two mono-
graph5 and a paper they published in 
Science with statistician Gary A. Simon, 
SUNY, Stony Brook,7 the Coles acknowl-
edge that some scholars, taking note of this, 
will feel that the complicated system of peer 
review "does not buy you much."5 (p. 43) 
Jonathan Cole points out, however, that 
"there is apt to be a great deal of disagree-
ment on the contents of proposals...at the 
cutting edge of scientific inquiry,...and 
therefore, we should not be wholly surprised 
at the proportion of reversals."6 Such re-
versals probably indicate that no "single, 
agreed-upon dogma"7 is dominant in the 
fields studied, and, in fact, one of the most 
surprising results of the COSPUP study was 
that the level of consensus among reviewers 
was no higher in physics than in the social 
sciences.4-7 
Phase one of the COSPUP study has been 
cited in over 74 papers since it appeared in 
1978; phase two has been cited in 17. The 
Science article has been cited 49 times 
through 1986 and is one of four papers form-
ing the core of a research front entitled "Al-
ternatives to, arbitration in, and other as-
pects of peer review of scientific journals 
and research proposals" (#85-4243). The 
other three core papers include the classic 
study of patterns of evaluation in science by 
Harriet Zuckerman and Robert K. Merton, 
Columbia University;8 a controversial 
study of bias in the journal refereeing pro-
cess by Douglas P. Peters, University of 
North Dakota, Grand Forks, and Stephen 
J. Ceci, Cornell University, Ithaca, New 
York;9 and a paper on the rate of agree-
ment between reviewers by psychologist 
Graver J. Whitehurst, SUNY, Stony 
Brook.10 All three papers were mentioned 
in Parts 1 and 2 of this essay.1-2 
According to Jonathan Cole, the key pol-
icy implication of the COSPUP study was 
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that "the lower the number of reviewers 
used to evaluate the proposal, the greater the 
chance for...reversals."6 As a result, the 
NSF now requires a certain minimum num-
ber of reviewers for every proposal it re-
ceives. Science journalist Tineke Bőddé lists 
a number of other changes in the NSF sys-
tem that have been made more recently.11 
For instance, the entire process has been 
streamlined, with a limit of 15 pages per 
proposal and a policy requiring a decision 
within nine months. Specific guidelines on 
conflicts of interest have been established, 
verbatim copies of all reviewer comments 
have been made available, and a system has 
been set up to reconsider declined proposals. 
Under certain circumstances, some propos-
als are now exempt from peer review, and 
program officers can extend existing grants 
without further review if they feel outstand-
ing progress has been made.11 
Peer Review in the NIH 
Fourteen scientists and administrators 
from various agencies within the NIH were 
appointed to the NIH Grants Peer Review 
Study Team by then-acting director, Ronald 
W. Lamont-Havers. Chaired by Ruth L. 
Kirschstein, director, National Institute of 
General Medical Sciences, the team was 
charged with evaluating the NIH's peer-re-
view system and with making, where appli-
cable, recommendations for improve-
ment.12 In making its assessment, the team 
printed an open solicitation in the Federal 
Register13 and mailed a memorandum to 
30,000 individuals, asking for written com-
ments on the peer-review system (1,500 re-
plies were received). The team also held 
open public hearings for the scientific and 
lay communities. The team members con-
sidered everything they read and heard, ac-
cording to William F. Raub, team member 
and deputy director, NIH, but the project 
was an informal survey and, ultimately, the 
recommendations the team made were based 
on a consensus' of its members' best 
judgments.14 
Virtually every recommendation made by 
the study team has been implemented.14 
Among these was the suggestion that guide-
lines on conflicts of interest and a formal 
appeals system for the reconsideration of re-
jected proposals be established. In addition 
as part of the appeals procedure, the teair 
suggested that specific criteria be established 
for reevaluating proposals and that an inde-
pendent ombudsman be appointed to adju-
dicate disputes between the NIH and appli-
cants. A change in NIH procedure that was 
recently instituted is the creation of two pro-
grams allowing the life of a grant to be ex-
tended for up to 10 years under certain very 
limited circumstances.15 
In connection with the report by the NIH 
study team, Jonathan Cole suggests that a 
fruitful area for research would be a rigorous 
comparison of the NIH study-section ap-
proach to peer review with the individual 
approach used by the NSF. He says thai 
"panels can evaluate the relative strength-
of a set of proposals, but, in fact, each pane 
member, while voting on all, actually only 
reads a few. This leads potentially to an ar-
tificial consensus, where a couple of strong 
characters on the panel dominate the deci-
sion-making process."6 
Studies of Scholars' Attitudes Toward 
Peer Review 
Sociologist Gilbert W. Gillespie, Cornell 
University; Daryl E. Chubin, director, 
Technology and Science Policy Program, 
Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta; 
and physician George M. Kurzon studied the 
factors that help shape applicants' attitudes 
toward the system.16 The authors expected 
to find that those who experienced success 
in obtaining funding would tend to be satis-
fied with the status quo and that those who 
failed to obtain funding would tend to blame 
the system. 
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Gillespie and colleagues sent a three-page, 
19-item questionnaire to 719 researchers 
whose proposals had been approved or re-
jected by the National Cancer Institute of the 
NIH in 1980 and 1981. The questionnaire 
stated that those who did not return the sur-
vey would be assumed to be satisfied with 
peer review, so the authors find it note-
worthy that 336 (47 percent) responded—al-
though they do not presume that satisfaction 
with the system was the only reason for non-
response. It is also interesting, the authors 
said, that 205 (61 percent) of the responses 
came from scholars whose proposals had 
been funded, since they expected a heavier 
response from scholars who had been denied 
funding.16 Because the questionnaire was 
sent to researchers who had recently sub-
mitted proposals for review, it could not 
measure the attitudes of those whose discon-
tent with the system had led them to give 
up submitting proposals. 
As the authors expected, previous success 
in obtaining funding was found to be in-
versely proportional to a desire to change 
the system. Gillespie and colleagues also 
found that those who have been unsuccessful 
until very recently in obtaining funding tend-
ed to support the current process, while 
those who had been successful in the past 
but who had recently been denied funding 
tended to favor modifications to the system. 
The authors also concluded that several 
complaints about the peer-review system re-
flected a surprising ignorance of the proce-
dures governing the operation of the system. 
For instance, those who believe that crony-
ism or old-boy networks control the process 
fail to take into account the limited time that 
an individual may serve in a review group 
and the NIH's strict requirements concern-
ing the makeup of such groups, which en-
sure a balanced cross section of scientists 
that changes constantly.16 Jonathan Cole 
points out, however, that the choice of a 
given individual reviewer from among a 
number of roughly comparable candidates 
"can be a function of social and intellectual 
ties with study-section members."6 
Flaws in the System? 
There may be instances in which peer re-
view operates with unintended blind spots 
or unsuspected inefficiency. Alan L. Porter, 
School of Industrial and Systems Engineer-
ing, and Frederick A. Rossini, School of So-
cial Sciences, Georgia Institute of Technol-
ogy, studied the fate of proposals that "fall 
between the cracks" of the NSF's disciplin-
ary programs.17 After analyzing 257 re-
views received by 38 approved, cross-dis-
ciplinary proposals in five different subject 
areas, they found that reviewer decisions 
were more favorable when the proposal fell 
within the reviewer's own discipline. In dis-
cussing this finding, the authors found it rea-
sonable "for a reviewer of proposed re 
search to favor that which is more famil-
iar In such a case, one is apt to under-
stand better what is planned; one may know 
the researchers personally or by reputation, 
and hence appreciate their expertise; and one 
can feel more secure in making strong rec-
ommendations."17 Porter and Rossini con-
clude that interdisciplinary research pro-
posals should not be reviewed in the same 
way as disciplinary projects. 
A study by Anthony S. Russell, associate 
professor of medicine, and Michael Grace, 
both at the University of Alberta, Edmon-
ton, and Bonnie D. Thorn, director of fi-
nance and administration. Arthritis Society, 
Toronto, Canada, supports the widespread 
belief that the peer-review process is un-
necessarily long and complex.18 Russell 
and colleagues examined 113 grant applica-
tions to the Arthritis Society, a national 
voluntary health organization, to determine 
whether there were any substantia] differ-
ences between the initial assessment each 
proposal received in-house and the detailed, 
out-of-house review that followed. They 
found that in-depth reviews had little impact 
on the original rating, implying that review 
procedures that operate in a similar, two-
tiered fashion could be greatly stream-
lined.18 And in fact, in an analysis of nearly 
1,400 reviews of about 200 NSF proposals, 
David Klahr, Carnegie-Mellon University, 
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Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, found that in-
dependent mail reviewers had little impact 
on the final rating given to a proposal by 
panel reviewers.19 
Suggestions for Further Change and 
Improvement 
As I mentioned earlier, both the NSF and 
the NIH have instituted changes in their re-
view procedures over the last few years. 
Nevertheless, there are plenty of suggestions 
for changing the system. Unfortunately, 
since so little empirical data exist, most of 
these suggestions are little more than reme-
dies for perceived ills. It is hard to know 
which ones are worth implementing with-
out further research. 
One suggested change concerns the time 
and effort consumed by writing proposals 
and filling out forms. Typical of many scien-
tists' feelings is a remark attributed to Nobel 
laureate biochemist Albert Szent-Györgyi 
(1893-1986). In an article published in 
Chemical & Engineering News, science 
journalist Howard J. Sanders reports that 
Szent-Györgyi once remarked that writing 
grant proposals filled his "scientific life with 
agony."20 Rosalyn S. Yalow, Veterans 
Administration, New York, the 1977 Nobel 
laureate in physiology or medicine, suggests 
that researchers of demonstrated ability 
should not have to go through the process 
of making a formal application year after 
year for the renewal of funding.21 Instead, 
they should receive a constant level of fund-
ing that is renewable every three years, sub-
ject to review of their progress.22 
Rustum Roy, director, Science, Technol-
ogy and Society Program, Pennsylvania 
State University, University Park, also 
wants research funding to be based on an 
investigator's performance.23 But in a de-
parture from other scholars' suggestions, he 
proposes a formula, "based on three kinds 
of post-hoc peer review,"24 on which to 
base grants to individuals, university depart-
ments (or research units of a similar size), 
and institutions.23-25'26 Roy claims his 
peer-review formula would eliminate the 
subjective elements of allocating grant 
money and does not tie funds to specific 
projects; instead, money would be admin-
istered at the departmental level and would 
be distributed based on a researcher's past 
performance, rather than on future promise 
(with allowances to be made for new or 
young investigators without track rec-
ords).26 Henry R. Hirsch, Department of 
Physiology and Biophysics, College of Med-
icine, University of Kentucky, Lexington, 
also proposed that all active faculty mem-
bers ought to receive funding, varying to 
reflect the administration's judgment con-
cerning "the costs and merits of different 
kinds of research."27 
Roy's proposal met with considerable in-
dividual criticism. In a number of letters 
written in reply to his original editorial in 
Science,23 various scientists expressed 
misgivings about jettisoning the "informed 
judgment"28 and the concern with quality 
that they feel are intrinsic to peer review in 
its present form.29-30 But in his reply, Roy 
says these objections assume that peer re-
view "is in some mysterious way linked 
witti the progress of science" and that the 
process can accurately predict the quality of 
research not yet performed. Roy states that 
both claims are totally unsupported.31 
Another funding alternative to peei 
review, supported by a "small but vocal 
number of scientists," as Sanders puts it,20 
involves block grants, a system common 
throughout Europe,3 in which funds are 
awarded to a research institution for alloca-
tion as it sees fit. The money would not go 
directly to an individual; instead, distribu-
tion would be determined by department 
heads or administrative officials. But San-
ders notes that most US scientists strongly 
oppose a block-grant system, in the belief 
that a department head or administrative of-
ficial or committee is less qualified to decide 
how to allocate research funds than an ex-
pert peer-review group.20 Moreover, ac-
cording to Joshua Lederberg, president, 
Rockefeller University, a block-grant system 
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would merely substitute "the politics of the 
institutions for the politics of the review 
committees."32 And the people who make 
the funding decisions not only won't be 
anonymous to those in need of funds, they 
will have to live and work with them daily, 
and thus, as Sanders writes, "are less apt 
to make their choices impartially."20 
Some scientists also question the underly-
ing assumption of the present peer-review 
system: that only experts from an appli-
cant's field or a closely allied discipline are 
qualified to judge that research proposal. 
David Apirion, Department of Microbiolo-
gy and Immunology, Washington Univer-
sity School of Medicine, St. Louis, Mis-
souri, suggests the creation of a class of pro-
fessional, salaried science reviewers to re-
place peer review.33 As Apirion puts it, 
"In all other branches of human creative en-
terprise [such] as literature, music, sculp-
ture, etc., the producers of new works as 
well as the performers of new and old works 
are often judged by a special class of per-
sons, reviewers and critics, who are seldom 
actively involved in the expansion of the par-
ticular discipline that they are entrusted to 
judge and evaluate."33 
Pressures on the Peer-Review System 
Several authors made observations con-
cerning peer review that bear emphasizing. 
Yalow pointed out that there is a certain 
deadening effect—or dishonesty—inherent 
in trying to explain or justify research that 
has yet to be done; if your project is so low-
risk that you already know what you expect 
to find, Yalow asks, then how original or 
important can it be?2122 Daniel H. Os-
mond, University of Toronto, notes that 
there may be a certain amount of pressure, 
once funding is approved, to "groom" re-
search results to fit the expectations of the 
granting agency.34 Perhaps the biggest 
problem with peer review, however, isn't 
really a problem with peer review at all, but 
rather with the amount of funding available. 
In the "golden years" of the 1950s and 
1960s, money for research was relatively 
plentiful and granting agencies generous; 
now, with money tight and with so many ap-
plicants, even deserving projects are some-
times denied funding.35 As Lederberg says, 
"When there's not enough [money] to go 
around, some people are inevitably 
hurt—sometimes arbitrarily and unfair-
ly."32 Frustration with such decisions car-
ries over to the system by which the deci-
sions are rendered. 
Obviously, the process of peer review 
grinds on in spite of such troubling issues. 
There was a consensus of views expressed 
by scientists interviewed for Sanders's 
wide-ranging special report. In spite of all 
the complaints and all the faults hinted at, 
peer review is still considered the best meth-
od by which society places its bets on the 
most fruitful research.20 Yet the credibility 
of peer review in the eyes of both the public 
and the scientific community is threatened 
by the activities of those who lobby Con-
gress directly for funds. Richard C. Atkin-
son, former director, NSF, and currently 
chancellor, University of California, San 
Diego, and physicist William A. Blanpied, 
currently international studies specialist at 
the NSF, warn that the abandonment of peer 
review might reduce science to just another 
special-interest group, with funds being al-
located based on political acumen rather than 
on a consensus of what best serves the ad-
vancement of scientific knowledge.35 To 
prevent more institutions from joining those 
that have already abandoned the system, fur-
ther changes in peer review may be neces-
sary. But we should not confuse the forest 
with the trees. Without a strong peer-review 
system, albeit constantly reexamined, sci-
ence might become tentative and inefficient. 
• » * * * 
My thanks to Stephen A. Bonaduce and 
Terri Freedman for their help in the prepara-
tion of this essay. © 1 9 0 7 ISI 
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The Reliability of Peer Review for Manuscript and Grant Submissions: 
A Cross-Disciplinary Investigation 
Behavioral and Brain Science, 14 (1991) 119-186 
Abstract: The reliability of peer review of scientific documents and the evaluative criteria scientists use to judge the work of their 
peers are critically reexamined with special attention to the consistently low levels of reliability that have been reported. Referees of 
grant proposals agree much more about what is unworthy of support than about what does have scientific value. In the case of 
manuscript submissions this seems to depend on whether a discipline (or subfield) is general and diffuse (e.g., cross-disciplinary 
physics, general fields of medicine, cultural anthropology, social psychology) or specific and focused (e.g., nuclear physics, medical 
specialty areas, physical anthropology, and behavioral neuroscience). In the former there is also much more agreement on rejection 
than acceptance, but in the latter both the wide differential in manuscript rejection rates and the high correlation between referee 
recommendations and editorial decisions suggests that reviewers and editors agree more on acceptance than on rejection. Several 
suggestions are made for improving the reliability and quality of peer review. Further research is needed, especially in the physical 
sciences. 
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1. Objectives 
This paper will analyze the peer-review process in the 
evaluation of manuscript submissions and grant applica-
tions. First, we will discuss research designs and statis-
tical procedures, and then we will critically review the 
major studies of peer review across disciplines, providing 
some reasons and remedies for the low reliability of 
manuscript and grant reviews as well as some suggestions 
for future research. 
2. Theoretical issues 
Gottfredson (1978, p. 920) has stressed the importance of 
peer evaluation in scientific activity from a Kuhnian 
standpoint (Kuhn 1962). Until the beginning of the nine-
teenth century, scientific theory was thought to be an 
approximation of what Laudan (1984, p. 83) referred to as 
"absolute truth," "certainty," or "infallible knowledge." 
By the twentieth century, this view of scientific theory 
was replaced by the more modest goal of developing 
theories that were, again in Laudan's (1984, p. 83) termi-
nology "plausible," "probable,"or "well-tested." Laudan 
(p. 83) notes that this paradigm shift "represents one of 
the great watersheds in the history of scientific philoso-
phy: the abandonment of the quest for certainty." Kuhn's 
ideas about paradigm development and paradigm 
"shifts," although undergoing reevaluation and rein-
terpretation almost since their inception (e.g., Boehme 
1977; Boehme et al. 1976; Gholson & Barker 1985; 
Lakatos 1972; Laudan 1984; Mulkay 1977; Price 1963), 
continue to play a central role in our understanding of the 
evaluation of scientific work by the community of fellow 
scientists or "peers" (e.g., Mahoney 1985). 
In a classic work, Robert Merton argued that the social 
system governing both the actions and the mobility of 
scientists is very fair and objective, supporting a nor-
mative model of science (Merton 1973): A scientist's work 
is judged for scientific merit on the basis of universal 
scholarly standards rather than by specific biases such as 
friendship, author affiliation, or nepotism (e.g., see 
Lindsey 1978, p. 55). As Lindsey (1978, p. 3) reminds us, 
however, Merton and his students (e.g., Cole & Cole 
1973) were focusing mainly on the physical sciences. The 
normative model does not appear to hold well for ei ther 
the behavioral or the medical sciences. In fact, as we shall 
discuss later, there are data to suggest that the model is 
not entirely appropriate for the physical sciences, ei ther . 
Peer review is a system of decision making by referees, 
editors, and research program directors in evaluating the 
quality of scientific research. It is here that Merton's 
normative model applies to the attributes that are used in 
evaluating papers submitted to professional organiza-
tions, manuscripts submitted to scientific journals, and 
research proposals submitted to funding agencies. These 
at tr ibutes can be derived from either objective judg-
ments (e.g., experimental design) or subjective ones 
(e.g., importance). The attributes themselves must be 
distinguished from the criteria (or norms) used to judge 
them. Thus, scientists might use the criterion "brief," "to 
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the point," or "excessively verbose" to judge the suc-
cinctness (attribute) of a given manuscript. In peer re-
view, referees evaluate the attributes of scientific docu-
ments according to sets of specific criteria. Then editors 
or granting officials apply additional evaluation criteria to 
reviewers' reports to decide whether or not to accept a 
manuscript or fund a proposal. 
A number of evaluation criteria are relevant to the 
review of manuscripts as well as grant proposals. For 
example, reviewers are usually expected to use criteria to 
assess (1) the relevance and completeness of the review of 
the research literature; (2) the author's level of originality 
or imaginativeness; (3) the adequacy of the research 
methodology; (4) the data-analytic strategies; (5) the im-
portance (usefulness) of actual or expected findings; and 
(6) the clarity and organization of the information the 
author presents. 
Other attributes are specific either to manuscript or 
grant review: Reviewers and editors must judge a manu-
script's level of interest to the readership of the journal, 
whether its length is justified, and how much space is 
available in the journal. Grant reviewers and program 
directors must judge: the applicant's prior scientific con-
tributions (or "track record"); the adequacy of the institu-
tional setting in which the research would be undertaken; 
the appropriateness of the budget request relative to the 
objectives stated in the proposal; and the availability of 
funds.1 
3. Empirical issues: Methodology and data-
analytic strategies 
3.1. Research designs used In peer-review studies. A 
wide spectrum of research designs has been used in 
studying peer review, including: 
1. Qualitative or semiquantitative studies of reviews of 
selected journal manuscripts (Ingelfinger 1974; Mc-
Cartney 1978; Patterson 1969; Smigel & Ross 1970) 
2. Quantitative studies of hypothetical reviews of 
manuscripts (requiring referees to evaluate Or rank order 
the value of normative attributes "as i f" they were apply-
ing them to actual submitted manuscripts; e.g. , Kerr et 
al. 1977; Lindsey 1978; Rowney & Zenisek 1980) 
3. Quantitative naturalistic studies of the reliability of 
referee reports on scientific documents, including papers 
submitted to professional societies (e.g., Cicchetti & 
Conn 1976; Conn 1974), journal manuscripts (Cicchetti 
1980; Cicchetti & Conn 1978; Cicchetti & Eron 1979; 
Hargens & Herting 1990a; Ingelfinger 1974; Lock 1985; 
Orr & Kassab 1965; Scott 1974; Smigel & Ross 1970; and 
Whitehurst 1983; 1984), and grant proposals (Cole & Cole 
1981; 1985; Cole et al. 1978; 1981) 
4. Quasi-experimental studies (Peter & Ceci 1982) 
5. Experimental studies of the reliability of the peer-
review process (Armstrong 1980; 1982a; Goodstein & 
Brazis 1970; Mahoney 1977; 1978; and Mahoney et al. 
1978). 
The distinction between quasi-experimental and ex-
perimental studies is based on the extent to which alter-
native interpretations of a given result can be ruled out. 
W e agree with Peters & Ceci (1982, p. 246) that "the 
quasi-experimental design . . . is, in general, insuffi-
cient to rule out alternative explanations unequivocally," 
but we also agree with the same authors (p. 247) "that 
quasi-experimental designs can provide causal inferences 
when used along with convergent and cogent reasoning 
and analysis." 
In a broader sense, when conclusions drawn from 
quasi-experimental and experimental studies are con-
sistent with those from less well controlled studies (such 
as the first three research designs just described), one can 
be more confident that the missing controls did not 
materially influence the direction or quality of the results. 
This point will be reemphasized later when we compare 
conclusions from peer-review studies differing widely in 
how well potentially relevant variables were controlled. 
3.2. Types of reliability assessments. One purpose of this 
paper is to examine the reliability of the peer-review 
process. Accordingly, it is important to analyze how 
reliability has been measured and what statistical ap-
proaches have been used. Depending on the specific 
research question, any of several types of reliability 
measures could be appropriate: internal consistency, 
interreferee agreement , or even stability across time. 
The most common measure is interreferee agreement at a 
single point in time. 
Interreferee reliability is defined as the extent to which 
two or more independent reviews of the same scientific 
document agree. To choose an appropriate statistic for 
assessing levels of interreferee agreement, it must be 
known whether or not the same referees evaluated the 
documents under study and whether or not the same 
number of referees evaluated a given document. The 
statistic should also assess how much referee agreement is 
influenced by chance alone (e.g., Watkins 1979). Finally, 
the scale of measurement by which the data are expressed 
needs to be identified. 
3.3. Appropriate statistics. Which reliability statistics are 
appropriate will vary according to whether the reviewers 
evaluate papers for presentation at scientific meetings, 
manuscripts submitted to professional journals, or grant 
proposals submitted for research funding. 
Papers submitted to scientific meetings are sometimes 
all evaluated by the same two referees, since the scientific 
documents are usually rather brief (e.g., extended ab-
stracts). Here, e i ther the unweighted kappa statistic 
(Cohen 1960) or the weighted one (Cohen 1968) would be 
appropriate.2 The choice would depend on the evaluative 
scale available to the referees. A nominal dichotomous 
scale such as "accept" or "reject" would require un-
weighted kappa, whereas an ordinal or rank-ordered 
evaluative scale, such as one ranging from "reject" to 
"accept only if t ime and space are available" to "accept 
unconditionally" would require the weighted kappa sta-
tistic. When the same three or more referees all indepen-
dently evaluate the same set of papers, then the intraclass 
correlation coefficient (R,), Model II would be appropri-
ate (e.g., see Bartko 1966, 1974; 1976; Bartko & Car-
pen te r 1976; Cicchetti et al. 1976; Cicchetti & Conn 1976; 
Fleiss 1981).3 
Manuscripts submitted to professional journals are 
evaluated by different sets of reviewers, since it is ob-
viously not feasible for the same two or more reviewers to 
undertake all the assessments. A statistic of choice here 
would be Model I of the R,.4 (For more information about 
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mathematical relationships between kappa and Models of 
R,, see (a) Fleiss 1975 for the nominal-dichotomous case; 
and (b) Fleiss & Cohen 1973; and Krippendorff 1970 for 
the ordinal case.) 
For the peer review of grant proposals, some granting 
agencies have used different sets of reviewers with the 
same number throughout (e.g., the American Heart 
Association, as described in Wiener et al. 1977): This is 
analogous to manuscript review; other granting agencies 
(e.g., National Science Foundation [NSF] as described in 
Cole & Cole 1981), however, not only use different sets of 
reviewers for each evaluated document, but the number 
of reviews varies from one proposal to the next. This 
design calls for R, Model III based on the average number 
of reviews pe r proposal (e.g., see Bartko & Carpenter 
1976; Cicchetti & Showalter 1988).5 
It should also be mentioned that Gilmore (1979, based 
on an earlier approach reported in Garner & McGill 1956) 
has described yet another statistic for assessing the relia-
bility of peer review: It fits the case of a dichotomous 
decision (e.g., "accept" or "reject"), with two ratings per 
document and does not distinguish between ratings all 
made by the same pair of referees and those made by 
different pairs of referees. Gilmore notes that the statistic 
is "very similar to the percentage of explained variance. " 
The statistic therefore has some conceptual similarity to 
Lambda (due to Goodman & Kruskal 1954) a statistic that, 
with minor modifications, has been shown by Fleiss 
(1975) to be mathematically equivalent to kappa in the 
dichotomous case. 
3.4. Inappropriate statistics. Two additional statistical 
tests have been applied, on occasion, to assess levels of 
interrater reliability for manuscript review. Both tests 
suffer from major defects. The first is the standard Pearso-
nian product moment correlation (R) This statistic as-
sesses the extent to which two independent sets of ratings 
(e.g., manuscript or grant reviews) covarv in the same 
order, but it ignores the extent to which given pairs of 
reviewers disagree on any single evaluation (e.g., see 
Bartko 1966; 1974; 1976; Bartko & Carpenter 1976; Kaz-
din 1982; Robinson 1957). In the specific context of 
journal manuscript reviews, Hendrick (1976; 1977) was 
able to demonstrate artifactually inflated levels of re-
viewer agreement when the Pearson r, rather than R„ 
was used to make the reliability assessment. 
Recently, Whitehurst (1983; 1984) reintroduced an-
other statistic for assessing levels of referee consensus. 
The statistic was developed by Finn (1970) and can be 
symbolized by Rf. The mathematical difference between 
Rf and R, (or kappa) statistics derives from an underlying 
assumption about chance agreement levels between any 
set of raters. Statistics such as Rf use levels of chance 
agreement that assume that "every judgment has the 
same probability of occurring under the hypothesis that 
the judges have no understanding of the scale applied and 
their ratings are purely random" (e.g., Lawlis & Lu 1972, 
pp. 17-18). In the specific context of manuscript review, 
this would mean that the recommendation to accept, 
reject, or resubmit a specific article would occur equally 
frequently, by chance alone. Given the known high 
rejection rates of many journals (often in excess of 80%), 
this definition of chance agreement cannot be valid (e.g., 
see Cicchetti 1985). Consistent with this argument, it has 
recently been shown that Rf (but not R, or kappa) would 
fail to distinguish chance reviewer agreement from sub-
stantially higher levels (i.e., see again Cicchetti 1985).6 
4. Empirical Issues: Major studies in peer review 
4.1. Evaluative criteria: Scientists Judge their value. Five 
studies are briefly considered here. Each bears on how 
scientists place weight on the various evaluative criteria 
we have mentioned. All five studies examined (1) the 
"importance" of the s tudy to the field and (2) the per-
ceived adequacy of the "research design" on their rating 
lists; otherwise, they were quite different. Two used "as 
i f ' designs for major behavioral science manuscripts and 
depended on mail responses, but the journals they stud-
ied were not the same ones; response rates also varied 
widely (50% in Wolff 1970, and 82% in Lindsey 1978). 
Two other studies used actual manuscript reviews, but 
again not the same journals (i.e., Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology in Scott 1974, and the Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology in a study by Cicchetti & Eron 
1979). The fifth study (Cicchetti & Conn 1976; Conn 
1974) used only three referees who made "blind" assess-
ments (author's identity unknown) of extended abstracts 
sent to a major professional medical society (The Ameri-
can Association for the Study of Liver Disease). The five 
studies also differed in data-analytic techniques. The "as 
i f " studies asked referees to rank order the set of eval-
uative criteria as if they were being used for recommend-
ing the acceptance or rejection of a hypothetical manu-
script. The remaining th ree studies used the size of the 
correlation between the ranking of a given evaluative 
criterion and the judged level of scientific merit of the 
document. Despite the extreme heterogeneity of these 
studies, all five indicated that the level of perceived 
"importance" of the contribution to the field and the 
perceived level of adequacy of the "research design" 
were the two most important evaluative criteria referees 
use for judging the meri t of a given scientific document. 
Although we are not aware of comparable studies on 
the peer review of grant proposals, information derived 
from a study (Weiner et al. 1977) of the reliability of 
reviews of grants submit ted to the American Heart Asso-
ciation (AHA, New York State Affiliate) merits brief 
discussion. Primary reviewers (2 were assigned to each 
proposal) were given a set of 10 criteria to use in evaluat-
ing each grant. Each criterion received an a priori weight 
ranging from a low of 1 to a maximum of 2.5. Four criteria 
received the maximum weight. Three of them pertained 
to importance and research design issues. They were: (1) 
"The value of the expected data in increasing knowledge 
in a scientific field or in advancing the diagnosis and 
therapy of vascular disease"; (2) "Methodology: Is it valid 
and feasible?"; and (3) Research plan: (a) overall rationale; 
(b) quality of individual experiments, controls. (For fur-
ther details, see Wiene r et al. 1977, p. 307.) 
4.2. Reliability of evaluative criteria. How well do pairs of 
referees agree in evaluating the relevance of criteria as 
they apply them to the same scientific documents? Avail-
able data for both manuscripts and abstracts (once again 
derived from several sources) are presented in Table 1 
and indicate levels of interreviewer agreement. These 
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Table 1. Levels of interreferee agreement (inlraclass correlations) on various criteria applied to the evaluation 
of manuscripts and extended abstracts 
A. For manuscripts submitted to the "Journal of Abnormal Psychology" (1973-78) 
Evaluative Criterion Number of Manuscripts Level of Interreferee Agreement 
Importance 661 .23 
Design 610 .32 
Data Analysis 611 .22 
Style and Organization 666 .22 
Literature Review 660 . 26 
Reader Interest 663 .19 
Succinctness 658 . 30 
B. For manuscripts submitted to the "Journal of Personality and Social Psychology" (Scott 1974) 
Importance 312 .28 
Design and Analysis 574 .19 
Reader Interest 312 .07 
Style and Organization 574 . 25 
Succinctness 574 . 31 
Literature Review 458 .37 
C. For manuscripts submitted to the "British Medical Journal" (1979) 
Importance 707 . 33 
Scientific Reliability 707 . 22 
Originality 707 . 21 
Suitability 707 . 22 
D. For abstracts submitted to "American Association for the Study of Liver Disease" (Cicchetti & Conn 1976) 
No. of Levels of Interreferee Composite 
Evaluative Criterion Abstracts Agreement Agreement 
A vs. B Aos. C B vs. C 
Importance 77 .22 .15 .31 .24 
Design and Execution 77 . 28 . 21 .34 . 29 
Originality 77 . 37 . 21 .32 . 30 
Note: With the exception of "Reader Interest," Section B, all values arc statistically significant at or beyond the .05 level. 
r ange from essentially 0 (R = .07 for level of "reader 
interes t") to "highs" of .37 for both "originality" and 
" l i tera ture reviews," which, according to guidelines rep-
resen t ing levels of practical significance, would be con-
s idered poor (e.g., Cicchett i & Sparrow 1981; Fleiss 
1981). 
4.3. Reliability of manuscript reviews: Behavioral sci-
ence. It can be seen from the data presented in Table 2A 
tha t the levels of chance-corrected interreviewer agree-
m e n t (kappa or R, values) range between . 19 (Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology - Cicchetti it Eron 1979) and .54 
(American Psychologist - Cicchetti 1980; Scarr & Weber 
1978). It should be noted that the reviews for the Ameri-
can Psychologist were based on a very small number of 
manuscripts (N = 87), and that the level of peer-reviewer 
reliability could not be successfully replicated in a follow-
u p peer-review study (Cicchetti, unpublished), in which 
t h e R, value dropped from .54 (fair agreement , see Cic-
che t t i & Sparrow 1981) to .38 (poor agreement, Cicchetti 
& Sparrow op. cit., p. 133). 
4.4. Reliability of manuscript and abstract reviews: Medi-
cine. The data based on peer-reviewer chance-corrected 
reliability levels for medical journals (Table 2B) are very 
similar to those just presented for peer reviews of behav-
ioral science manuscripts, namely a range between .31 
(Physiological Zoology - Hargens & Herting 1990a) to .37 
(a major medical subspecialty journal - Cicchetti & Conn 
1978). 
With respect to peer review of abstracts submitted to 
professional meetings, Cicchett i and Conn (1976) re-
ported very similar levels of chance-corrected agreement 
for ratings of overall scientific merit (i.e., between . 16 and 
.33, with corresponding p values between .10 and .01). 
4.5. Reliability of manuscript reviews: Physical sciences. 
As far as we are aware, no formal studies of the reliability 
of peer review have been undertaken for manuscript or 
abstract submissions to journals in the physical sciences, 
yet there is a prevailing belief that levels of interreferee 
agreement are substantially higher for journals in the 
physical sciences than in o ther areas studied. This conclu-
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Table 2. Levels of reviewer agreement in the evaluation of the scientific merit of submitted manuscripts 
A. Behavioral Science 
No. of R, or 
Journal Reviews Kappa Value Sources 
"Social Problems" (1958-61) 193 .40' Smigel it Ross (1970) 
"Journal of Personality and Social Psychology" 286 .26» Scott (1974) 
"Sociometry" 140 .21« Hendrick (1976) 
"Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin" 177 .21« Hendrick (1977) 
"Journal of Abnormal Psychology" (1973-8) 1319 .19« Cicchetti & Eron (1979; and unpublished) 
"American Psychologist" (1977-8) 87 .54» Cicchetti (1980); Scarr & Weber (1978) 
"American Psychologist" (1978-9) 72 .38« Ciccheti (unpublished) 
"Journal of Educational Psychology" 325 .34« Marsh & Ball (1981) 
(1978-80) 
"Developmental Review" 72 .44« Whitehurst (1983; 1984) 
"American Sociological Review" 22 .29« Hargens it Herting (1990) 
"Law & Society Review" 251 .23« Hargens it Herting (1990) 
B. Medicine 
No. of R, or 
Journal Reviews Kappa Value Sources 
2 Untitled Biomedical Journals 1572 .34' Orr & Kassab (1965) 
"New England Journal of Medicine" 496 .26' Ingelfinger (1974) 
A Major Medical Subspeciality Journal 866 .37« Cicchetti it Conn (1978) 
"British Medical Journal" 707 .31* Lock (1985) 
"Physiological Zoology" 209 .31« Hargens & Herting (1990) 
Note: »Intraclass R values; ''Kappa values; The criteria of Cicchetti & Sparrow (1981); Fleiss (1981); in which kappa or R, values < 
,40=POOR; .40—.59= FAIR; .60 - 74 = GOOD; and .75-1.00=EXCELLENT. Note that levels of observed agreement (where 
available) ranged between 68.30% and 77.00% and the levels of chance-corrected agreement were all significant at or beyond the 
.05 level. Note also that the R value of .54 for reviews of the manuscripts submitted to the "American Psychologist" dropped to .38 
on replication. 
sion seems to be based on a statement made some years 
ago about one of the most prestigious journals in the 
physical sciences: 
We have found, for example, that in a sample of 172 
papers evaluated by two referees for the Physical 
Review (in the period 1948-56), agreement was very 
high. In only five cases did the referees fully disagree, 
with one recommending acceptance and the other, 
rejection. For the rest, the recommended decision was 
the same, with two-thirds of these involving minor 
differences in the character of proposed revisions 
(Zuckerman & Merton 1971, p. 67). 
Unfortunately, this brief analysis provides no answers 
to some very basic questions: (1) What type of rating 
system was used by the referees? (2) Given the high 
acceptance rates of Physical Review, how much agree-
ment between reviewers would one expect on the basis of 
chance alone? (3) What is meant by "minor differences in 
the character of proposed revisions"? and (4) How repre-
sentative a subset is this sample of all the manuscripts 
submitted at that time? 
The question of representativeness seems the most 
important. Commenting recently on this issue, Hargens 
(1988) and Hargens and Hert ing (1990b, p. 17) note the 
following; 
One reason that studies of referee reliability are rela-
tively rare for physical-science journals is that such 
journals often use the single initial referee system. 
Thus, data on pairs of referee assessments of all submis-
sions are unavailable for these journals. Those manu-
scripts that do receive at least two independent referee 
evaluations under this system are an unrepresentative 
subset of all manuscripts. Thus, nonexperimental data 
on referee agreement for these journals, such as the 
evidence reported by Zuckerman and Merton, should 
be reviewed with caution. 
Hargens is right in his conclusions, especially with 
respect to the structure of the journal Physical Review 
during the early study period (1948-56) from which the 
Zuckerman & Merton (1971) data were derived. From 
that time until 1969, the Physical Review did not allocate 
separate sections to physics specialty areas or suhfields. 
Beginning in 1970 however, and continuing to the 
present, the Physical Review allocated its total pages to 
four distinct suhfields: genera) physics, condensed mat-
ter, nuclear physics, and particles and fields. Data, deriv-
ing from the Physical Review and Physical Review Let-
ters, Annual Report 1986, indicate that although the 
overall acceptance rate of Physical Review for 19867 (75%) 
remained consistent with previous years (an average of 
77% between 1969 and 1986), the percentage of manu-
scripts accepted in the four suhfields varied rather wide-
ly. These data indicate that the acceptance rates were 
81% for nuclear physics and 78% for condensed matter, 
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but only 70% and 69% for general physics and particles 
and fields, respectively. The nonparametric Jonckheere 
(1970) test of trend (Leach 1979) showed a highly signifi-
cant trend, producing a Z value of 21.41 (p < .00001). 
This is interesting in its own right because it is consistent 
with the known higher manuscript-rejection rates for 
m o r e general disciplines compared to more specific ones, 
the latter being thought of as "more experimentally and 
observationally oriented, with an emphasis on rigour of 
observation and analysis" (Zuckerman & Merton 1971, p. 
77). 
Wha t further implications do such data have? It 
s eemed plausible that even within the Physical Review 
journal , as the subfields become more and more general, 
t h e r e should be progressively less dependence on the 
deliberations of a single reviewer for any given manu-
script. Would the pat tern of acceptance rates across the 
four subfields covary with the tendency to rely on more 
than a single reviewer? The data in Table 3 indicate just 
that . Thus, the fit is qui te remarkable, with the rank 
order ing between acceptance rates and the use of more 
than one reviewer proceeding about as one might pre-
dict, this despite the fact that the acceptance rates are 
based on 1986 data and the variation in n u m b e r of 
reviewers per manuscript is based on 1987 data. The 
t r end for variation among the decreasing percentage of 
manuscripts using a single reviewer, subfield by subfield, 
is also statistically significant (Jonckheere 1970, Z = 6.87, 
p < .00001). 
Since manuscripts requir ing more than one reviewer 
t end to be those that are problematic, these data indicate 
that even within the same physics journal the single initial 
r e fe ree system is not uniformly applied, but, rather, 
varies as a function of the subfield, with more general 
subfields having higher rejection rates and also requir ing 
m o r e reviewers before manuscripts are finally accepted 
for publication. We would predict that if the edi tors of 
Physical Review were willing to undertake a reviewer 
reliability study of manuscripts submitted in the four 
subfields, one would find appreciably higher levels of 
agreement for nuclear physics and condensed matter 
than for particles and fields and general physics. These 
recent findings are also of great theoretical importance, 
since they allow one's reasoning to come "full circle" to 
the conclusion that Merton's normative model is not even 
wholly appropriate for the physical sciences. Another way 
of put t ing this is that physics itself appears to share many 
of the same problems facing the general journals in both 
behavioral science and medicine. 
There are other data deriving from physics that are 
consistent with those just presented. Qualitative state-
ments made about manuscripts submitted to the Physical 
Review Letters also suggest that some of the problems 
about the applicability of Merton's (1973) normative 
model may not be unique to medical and behavioral 
science. According to the editors of Physical Review 
Letters: "The referees, representative of the readers, are 
severe judges of the papers. Only about 45% of the 2,300 
papers submitted each year are accepted for publication" 
(Adair & Trigg 1979, p. 475). 
The editors continue in their Statement of Policy for the 
journal: 
For the majority of the papers the comments of the two 
referees are sufficiently equivocal so that the editor 
cannot decide, with confidence, on the disposition of 
the paper. Further information is sought from the 
authors, from further communication with the original 
referees, from other referees, and/or from the Divi-
sional Associate Editors. The editors initiate an average 
of five written communications per paper to referees, 
authors, and Associate Editors to gather the informa-
tion which allows them to come to a conclusion con-
cerning the disposition of the paper. Even then, for 
most papers, accepted or rejected, the evidence is not 
Table 3. The parallel relationship between acceptance rates for manuscripts submitted to "Physical Review" 
and the use of one or more reviewers 
A. 1986 Data (N = 5264 Total Manuscripts [MS]) 
No. MS No. MS % 
Subfield Received Accepted Accepted 
C. nuclear physics 540 440 81% 
B. condensed matter 2281 1786 78% 
A. general physics 1325 931 70% 
D. particles & fields 1118 775 69% 
Across all Subfields 5264 3932 75% 
Subfield 
No. MS 
With 1 Reviewer 
B. 1987 Data (N' 
No. MS With 
2+ Reviewers 
=933 Accepted MS) 
Total 
% MS With 
1 Reviewer 
C. nuclear physics 79 12 91 87% 
B. condensed matter 347 93 440 79% 
A. general physics 168 53 221 76% 
D. particles & fields 122 59 181 67% 
Across all Subfields 716 217 933 77% 
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completely conclusive and the editors must judge as 
best they can the inconclusive evidence which bears on 
the subjective acceptance criteria (Adair & Trigg 1979, 
p. 476). 
Consistent with Adair's assessment, Lazarus (1982, p. 
219) notes that with respect to levels of interreviewer 
agreement for manuscripts submitted to the Physical 
Review Letters, "in only 10-15% of cases do two referees 
agree on acceptance or rejection the first t ime around -
and this with the authors ' and institutional identities 
knownl" 
Adair (1982) has expressed optimism that this situation 
will improve. Formal studies of the reliability of peer 
review for manuscripts submitted to physical science 
journals, especially in the more general areas, must be 
conducted, however, so that our conclusions can be based 
on more quantitative results than have been available 
thus far. Since the Physical Review Letters has been 
considered one of the two most prestigious publications 
in the field (Beyer 1978; Lodahl 1970), and, similar to the 
general journals in behavioral science and medicine, it 
does use the two-initial-referee system, a more quan-
titative assessment of peer-review practices should be of 
more than passing interest to an important segment of the 
scientific community. If such a study were undertaken, 
we would predict that levels of referee consensus for 
Physical Review Letters would be of the same relatively 
low order of magnitude (typically below R, of .40) charac-
terizing general journals in many other disciplines. 
The 1985-86 rejection rates of Physical Review Letters 
(consistent with the ordering of those for the Physical 
Review) are the highest for the general subfields of gener-
al physics (74%, or 631 manuscripts [MS] rejected/854 
MS received) and cross disciplinary physics (68%, or 
71/106); the rejection rate was lowest for the much more 
specific subfield, atoms and molecules (52%, or 243/470). 
Moreover, these data are consistent with journal rejec-
tion rates in psychology (Summary Report of Journal 
Operations 1988) in which general focus journals have the 
highest rejection rates, for example, the Journal of Ap-
plied Psychology (93%), Psychological Review (89%), and 
the Journal of Experimental Psychology (JEP): General 
(81%). At the same time, the more specific focus journals 
have the lowest rejection rates, for example, JEP: Learn-
ing, Memory, and Cognition (58%), the Journal of Com-
parative Psychology (39%), and Behavioral Neuroscience 
(also 39%). These data are also consistent with those 
reported by Lock (1985) for medical journals. Similarly, 
Hargens (1988, p. 139) notes that "cultural anthropology 
journals have higher rejection rates than physical an-
thropology journals, and rates for journals in social, ab-
normal, and educational psychology exceed those in ex-
perimental, comparative, and physiological psychology." 
During the early 1980s, the general focus (cultural) jour-
nal, American Anthropology, had a rejection rate of 85%, 
while the American Journal of Physical Anthropology 
evidenced a sharply contrasting rejection rate of only 22% 
(Hargens 1988, p. 150). 
Our work and that of Hargens and Herting (1990b), 
support the argument that while manuscripts submitted 
to the journals studied in the behavioral and medical 
areas seem routinely to receive at least two independent 
reviews, this option is used in physics and related fields 
only when a manuscript seems problematic. In contrast to 
the experience of Physical Review and other physics 
journals (e.g., Abt 1988), fewer than 1 in 4 manuscripts 
(22% of 2274 manuscripts) submitted to the general 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology in 1973 received re-
views based on the deliberations of a single referee. 
Moreover, the overwhelming majority of them (52/59 or 
88%) were rejected. 
Since the only comprehensive study of peer review of 
grant proposals was undertaken by Cole et al. (1981), this 
area is completely open to further research. Roy (1985) 
reminds us that there are five systems of grant review 
which are so different that criticisms aimed at one of them 
are not applicable to the others. For example, although all 
five systems use mail reviewers, they differ in terms of: (a) 
who selects the reviewers (i.e., program managers or 
peers unknown to the program managers); (b) the specific 
method of grant evaluation (average of referees' ratings, 
or the decision of an independent panel of peers); and (c) 
whether or not peer reviews are followed by a panel site 
visit. One interesting research question accordingly con-
cerns how such differences might influence both the 
reliability and validity of grant reviews. 
4.6. Reliability of grant reviews. The major source of data 
on the reliability of grant reviews is NSF grant submis-
sions in three areas of study (chemical dynamics, econom-
ics, and solid state physics) as analyzed by Cole 4c Cole 
(1981, pp. 71-79). Three sets of reviews were considered: 
(1) N S F "open" (nonblind) reviews, (2) the Committee on 
Science and Public Policy of the National Academy of 
Sciences (COSPUP) "open" reviews, and (3) COSPUP 
"blind" reviews. Commenting on the interTeferee relia-
bility estimates from these data. Cole and Cole (1985, p. 
38) wrote, "We have treated the reviewer variances as 
rough indicators of disagreement among reviewers." 
In order to derive direct indicators of disagreement 
among reviewers, we first identified the problem of 
assessing grant-review reliability as a case of a more 
general problem in which: (1) there are two or more 
independent examiners per subject or object being evalu-
ated; (2) both the number and actual examiners can vary 
from subject to subject (here, submitted manuscripts), 
and (3) the data derive from a continuous, dimensional, or 
quasi-dimensional scale of measurement. In their de-
scription of a computer program for analyzing such data, 
Cicchetti and Showalter (1988, pp. 717-18) noted that 
"an area of inquiry to which this design would apply is 
the assessment of the reliability of the peer review of 
grant applications. Thus, there may be two indepen-
dent reviewers for grant A and four different indepen-
dent reviewers for grant B. The range of possible 
ratings may be between, say, 10 (lowest score possible) 
and 50 (highest score possible), such as the evaluation 
schema used by referees in the peer review of National 
Science Foundation (NSF) grants (e.g., Cole i t Cole 
1981)." 
As mentioned in section 3.3, the statistic of choice would 
be the intraclass correlation coefficient (R,, Mode) III), 
based on the average number of reviews per grant pro-
posal, as discussed in both Bartko 4c Carpenter (1976) and 
in Cicchetti 4c Showalter (1988). 
These results are presented (for the first time) in Table 
4 and once again indicate rather low levels of chance-
corrected agreement. These range from . 18 for COSPUP 
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Table 4. NSF and COSPUP reviews: Summary of interreferee consensus levels 
Area of Study No. of Proposals No. of Reviews 
Mean No. Reviews 
per proposal R, 
A. NSF open reviews 
chemical dynamics 50 242 4.84 .25 
economics 42 155 3.69 .37 
solid state physics 50 192 3.84 .32 
B. COSPUP open reviews 
chemical dynamics 50 213 4.26 .32 
economics 49 181 3.69 .36 
solid state physics 49 189 3.86 .34 
C. COSPUP blind reviews 
chemical dynamics 50 212 4.24 .18 
economics 49 198 4.04 .37 
solid state physics 50 203 4.06 .33 
Note: AU R, values are statistically significant at beyond the .005 level. 
blind reviews of grants submitted in the area of chemical 
dynamics to .37 for NSF open and COSPUP blind re-
views of grants submitted in the field of economics. 
Similarly, the data on the reliability of peer review of 
AHA grants (the final calculated priority score) are ex-
pressed by Wiener et al. (1977, p. 309, Table 1) in t e rms 
of an intraclass correlation coefficient of .37 (p < .001). 
4.7. Statistical meaning of low levels of reviewer agree-
ment. The available data are clear. Quite low levels of 
chance-corrected interreviewer agreement are obtained 
in every area of scientific inquiry, from abstract, manu-
script, and grant reviews. What does this mean from a 
biostatistical point of view? First, it must be understood 
that R, (or kappa) statistics are omnibus indexes, meaning 
that they reflect only the overall level of chance-corrected 
agreement . "Overall" means reviewer agreement aver-
aged over all possible rating categories (e.g., "accept ," 
" resubmit , " "reject" for manuscripts, or "high," "medi-
um," "low" approval, or disapproval for grants). It has 
been shown (e.g., by Cicchetti 1985, in the context of 
journal p e e r review, and by Cicchetti 1988, more gener-
ally) that the overall level of agreement is nothing more 
than a weighted average of agreement on all possible 
rating categories (see also, Fleiss 1981; Spitzer & Fleiss 
1974). It has also been demonstrated (again, Cicchetti 
1985; 1988) that low levels of R, or kappa can be produced 
not only by low levels of overall agreement, but also by 
large discrepancies in agreement on the various rat ing 
categories available to reviewers. W e are referring specif-
ically to wide discrepancies in reviewer agreement levels 
on approval (acceptance) categories as compared to rejec-
tion (disapproval) categories. 
Some of the available literature on the reliability of 
peer review (e.g., Cicchetti 1985; Ingelfinger 1974) sug-
gests, indirectly, that reviewer agreement on decisions to 
reject manuscripts is appreciably higher than agreement 
on acceptance. Is this true in general? Based on the 
available data, is there an analogue for the peer review of 
grant proposals? 
To address these questions more specifically, one must 
develop rational criteria for dichotomizing reviewer 
agreement levels as "accept" or "reject." The analogue 
for grant reviews would be to dichotomize reviewer 
agreement between proposals receiving high ratings and 
those with low ratings. In the case of the Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology, 86% of those 203 manuscripts 
receiving ratings of either "accept" or "accept subject to 
revision" by both reviewers were accepted for publica-
tion. Analogously, of those 803 manuscripts receiving a 
rating of "resubmit" by both reviewers, or "reject" by one 
and "resubmit" by the other, or "reject" by both, 95% 
were rejected by the editor. This provides a rationale for 
combining "accept" or "accept subject to revision" into 
an "accept" category and "resubmit" and "reject" into a 
"reject" category. With respect to grant reviews, Cole et 
al. (1978) note that of those N S F applicants receiving 
evaluations of "very good" to "excellent" (40-50), 92% 
were awarded grants. Conversely, of those applicants 
with grades ranging from "poor" (10-19), "fair" (20-29), 
and "good" (30-39), 86% of them were denied grants. 
This provided a rationale for dichotomizing on the basis of 
peer-review scores o f40-50 (high probability of approval) 
and 10-39 (high probability of disapproval). The number 
of individual NSF and COSPUP reviews for any given 
grant varied between 1 and 8. Since the mean number of 
ratings for N S F open and C O S P U P open reviews was 
quite similar (e.g., see Table 4), however, it seemed 
reasonable to use these more robust scores in our 
analyses. 
The results based on these dichotomies are presented 
in Table 5 for manuscript reviews and in Table 6 for grant 
reviews (again, reported here for the first time). When 
one considers the manuscripts judged acceptable by one 
reviewer and then compares them to the corresponding 
set of manuscripts considered acceptable by a second 
reviewer, the agreement levels for "accept" vary be-
tween 44% and 66%. When the same set of analyses is 
performed on manuscripts classified in the "reject" cate-
gory, however, the agreement levels vary between 70% 
and 78%. Direct comparisons between the proportion of 
reviewer agreement on accept versus reject recommen-
dations produces chi square(d) values with corresponding 
p levels ranging between . 10 and < .00001. As expected, 
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Table 5. Relationships among chance-corrected reviewer agreement levels (R,) and agreement levels for the acceptance and 
rejection of manuscripts submitted to major journals in behavioral and medical science 
Journal R, Acceptance Rejection Combined X , P 
"Journal Abnormal Psychology" .14 44% (462) 70% (857) 61% (1319) 83.99 .00001 
Untitled Medical Specialty Journal .26 50% (289) 76% (577) 67% (866) 57.895 .00001 
"Developmental Review" .27 52% (25) 74% (47) 67% (72) 3.413 .06 
"American Psychologist" .45 66% (62) 78% (97) 74% (159) 2.7315 .10 
Note: R, values are all statistically significant at beyond the .01 level. 
Table 6. Relationships among NSF and COSPUP chance-corrected agreement levels (R,) and agreement levels on htgh-(40-50) 
and lcnc-( 10-39) rated grant proposals in 3 areas of research specialisation 
Agreement on Proposals With: 
Area of  
Specialization Rj High Ratings Low Ratings All Proposals X' P 
Combined: .32 54% (52) 76% (98) 68% (150) 5.69 .01 
chemical dynamics .16 (NS) 41% (17) 70% (33) 60% (50) 2.71 .10 
solid state physics .34 60% (20) 73% (30) 68% (50) 0.46 NS 
economics 44 60% (15) 83% (35) 76% (50) 1.88 NS 
Note: The p values of R, are at greater than the .10 level for chemical dynamics; at beyond the .01 level for solid state physics; and 
at beyond .001 for economics. 
the lower chi square(d) values tend to be associated with 
those journals processing relatively small numbers of 
manuscripts. These results parallel both those reported 
earlier by Lock (1985) and those completed more recently 
for the American Sociological Review, Physiological Zool-
ogy, and Law and Society Review (Hargens & Herting 
1990a). 
The results in Table 6 for NSF and COSPUP grant 
reviews closely parallel those just reported for manu-
script reviews. Specifically, reviewer agreement levels 
for proposals with low N S F and COSPUP ratings (10-39) 
were consistently higher (70%-83%) than agreement 
levels for those with high (40-50) ratings (41%-60% 
agreement). Though the numbers were too small to be 
statistically significant for a given specialty area, the 
combined Table 6 (row 1) data indicate significantly more 
interexaminer agreement on the 98 proposals with low 
ratings (76%) than on the 52 proposals with high ratings 
(54%). 
Thus, on the basis of available data, it becomes clear for 
the first time that reviewers are indeed substantially 
more in agreement on which scientific documents to 
reject than on which to accept. Consistent with these 
data, it is noteworthy that editorial decisions for general 
journals (e.g., Journal of Abnormal Psychology) seem to 
give considerably more weight to referee consensus on 
rejection than to re feree consensus on acceptance . Of the 
203 manuscripts (of 1,316 submitted) for which indepen-
dent reviewers both recommended acceptance, 28 (or 
14%) were rejected. In comparison, only 28 (or 5%) of the 
600 manuscripts that the reviewers agreed should be 
rejected were in fact accepted. Here, chi square(d), 1 df 
= 17.94 (p < .00001). In other words, the editor was 
almost three times more likely to reject a manuscript that 
reviewers agreed should be accepted than to accept a 
manuscript that the reviewers agreed should be re-
j ec ted . 8 In attempting to interpret this important phe-
nomenon further, however, one must consider a number 
of other issues. 
5. Issues of interpretation 
5.1. Caveat #1: "One swallow does not a summer make." 
Although the findings are consistent across the types of 
scientific document analyzed (manuscripts, abstracts, 
grant proposals) and across areas of investigation (behav-
ioral science: psychology, sociology; medicine: genera] 
and specialty areas; economics; and physical sciences: 
chemical dynamics, solid state physics), one must keep in 
mind that the documents investigated do not represent a 
broad cross-section of existing materials. Rather, the 
studies of peer review have been focused on a relatively 
small number of prestigious journals, professional organi-
zations, and grant-reviewing agencies. More research is 
clearly needed to test the generality of the findings to 
date. For example, as correctly noted by Lock (1985), the 
journals investigated tend to be general ones that all share 
very high rejection rates. With such a focus in mind, 
reviewers may be more interested in determining what is 
wrong with a particular submission than in documenting 
some of its more positive attributes. It has been conjec-
tured by workers in the field that journals that have much 
higher acceptance rates, such as Physical Review (be-
tween 73% and 81%, between 1969 and 1986) may display 
the reverse phenomenon, or "when in doubt, accept" 
(Zuckerman & Merton 1971, p. 78). 
With respect to NSF grants, Cole and colleagues re-
ported that at the time their study was undertaken, 
approximately one out of every two applicants was 
eventually funded. Given the current relative scarcity of 
N S F (and other) funds, what impact will this have on 
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future performance of NSF reviewing? Our data suggest 
that the difference in agreement levels on proposals with 
low and high ratings might even intensify. In contrast to 
this, Wiener et al. (1977) provided some suggestive data 
(variances and standard deviations) to show that reviewer 
agreement levels were highest on AHA grants receiving 
top grades, worst for grants receiving the lowest grades, 
and intermediate for grants receiving intermediate 
grades. An obvious question would concern what per-
centage of AHA grants were in fact funded during this 
1974—75 period of grant submission and review. Again, 
further research and additional analyses of existing data 
on the peer review of grant proposals are urgently needed 
to help clarify these important issues. 
5.2. Caveat #2: Field studies of peer review lack neces-
sary controls for proper Interpretation. Because varying 
sets or numbers of reviewers examine different manu-
scripts or grant proposals, it is never possible in what we 
have called naturalistic research designs (sect. 3.1) to 
determine how much of the unreliability results from 
differences in the characteristics of the reviewers them-
selves: for example, level of experience; harshness or 
leniency as critics; the quality or technical difficulty of the 
manuscripts, abstracts, or proposals under review; blind-
ness or openness of reviews; or some attribute that may 
be masked in the reasons the reviewer offers for recom-
mending rejection. Such attributes include the following: 
theoretical biases; biases against statistically nonsignifi-
cant results; and the prestige of the author or institution. 
To make matters even more complicated, the unre-
liability of peer review may in fact involve some complex 
interaction among some or all of these or still other 
uncontrolled variables. 
6. Clarifying issues of interpretation 
6.1. Quasi-experimental and experimental studies of peer 
review. To study directly the influence of prestige of the 
author's affiliation on the reliability of peer review, Peters 
and Ceci (1982) resubmitted 12 articles that had already 
been published in prestigious psychology journals (be-
tween one and one-half and three years earlier) by au-
thors from highly regarded and well-published American 
psychology departments. The authors' names and affilia-
tions were fictionalized, the latter being made much less 
prestigious (e.g., 'Tri-Valley Center for Human Poten-
tial"). Only 3 of the 12 resubmissions were recognized as 
having been published previously. All but 2 of the 18 
referees and editors recommended rejection of the resub-
mitted publications. 
One weakness of this study was the authors' contention 
that the findings provided evidence of reviewer bias in 
favor of high-status authors or high-status affiliations. A 
plausible alternative explanation has been offered by 
critics, namely, that the results provide evidence of 
reviewer bias against low-status authors and/or institu-
tions. As Peters and Ceci appropriately respond how-
ever, "While we do not know for certain, which of the two 
forms of bias is more likely, neither is desirable." (Peters 
& Ceci 1982, p. 247). Consistent with Peters & Ceci's 
findings, a large number of authors using research de-
signs other than quasi-experimental ones have reported a 
relationship between author affiliation and the likelihood 
of publication in major journals (e.g., see Berelson 1960; 
Beyer 1978; Cleary & Edwards 1960; Crane 1967; Good-
rich 1945; Kraus 1950; Pfeffer et al. 1977; Yotopoulos 
1961). 
A second criticism of the Peters & Ceci study is that it 
lacked an appropriate control group consisting of pre-
viously rejected manuscripts resubmitted for fur ther re-
view. Smigel and Ross (1970) tested just that: They 
resubmitted an "accidental" sample of eight rejected 
manuscripts that had remained in their editorial files to a 
new set of reviewers under a new editor of Social Prob-
lems. Of these, seven were rejected by both editorial 
referees and one was conditionally accepted by one refer-
ee with no opinion given by the second. Whatever in-
terpretation one chooses to make of these findings (since 
neither study included proper controls), the results are 
consistent with the data presented in Tables 5 and 6, 
namely, that reviewers have much less difficulty in agree-
ing on rejection than on acceptance. 
In one of the best controlled studies of peer review 
(89% response rate, random assignment to experimental 
conditions) Mahoney (1977) invited 75 guest reviewers of 
the Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis to review 
manuscripts that all tested the same dominant behavior 
modification hypothesis. The manuscripts had identical 
Introduction and Methodology sections, but varied sys-
tematically in whether the Results and Discussion sec-
tions were (i) not provided at all, or the findings were 
described as either (ii) " positive," (iii) "negative," or (iv) 
"mixed." 
Referees were asked to judge the manuscript on the 
basis of overall scientific merit (publishability) and to 
apply normative criteria, including ratings'of topical rele-
vance, methodology, and data presentation. The referees 
of the manuscripts reporting positive results usually rec-
ommended acceptance with moderate revisions. The 
referees who received papers showing mixed results 
consistently opted for rejection. Those who read manu-
scripts giving negative results typically recommended 
rejection or major revisions. Referees evaluating manu-
scripts that reported no results at all gave more positive 
recommendations than those whose manuscripts had a 
Results section. 
For both the positive and the negative manuscripts 
there was an R of .94 between ratings of perceived 
adequacy of "methodology" and potential publishability; 
there was a corresponding R of .56 between the perceived 
adequacy of "data presentation" and publishability. 
In another set of analyses, marked discrepancies were 
found between what referees predicted as their expected 
levels of interrater reliability on the various evaluative 
criteria and what turned out to be their actual levels of 
interrater reliability: The predicted reliability (R,) levels 
for the criteria (e.g., adequacy of methodology, extent of 
overall scientific contribution) varied within a narrow 
range of. 69 to .74. The actuailevels of R, ranged between 
— .07 (below chance expectancy) and +.30. In fact, Ma-
honey's finding of an R, of only .03 between referee 
ratings of methodologic adequacy, coupled with an R of 
.94 between perceived adequacy of the methodology and 
publishability is entirely consistent with the findings of 
two naturalistic studies discussed earlier (Cicchetti & 
Eron 1979; Scott 1974) and also with the results of two 
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experimental studies (Abramowitz et al. 1975, and Cic-
chetti & Conn 1976). 
The bias against manuscripts reporting negative find-
ings is consistent with the earlier work of Bozarth and 
Roberts (1972); Hun t (1975); Kerr et al. (1977); Reid et al. 
(1981); Rowney and Zenisek (1980); Smart (1964); and 
Sterling (1959). The related issue of bias against replica-
tion studies is still be ing debated in more recent liter-
ature (e.g., Bernstein 1984; Casrud 1984; Furchtgott 
1984; Garber 1984; Heskin 1984; Sommer & Sommer 
1984). With few exceptions (e.g., Rourke & Costa 1979), 
the apparent bias against replication studies is very strong 
(on the part of both reviewers and editors). With respect 
to the testing of major theories or hypotheses in a given 
field of scientific inquiry, one would be most concerned 
about the literature be ing glutted with Type I errors, that 
is, rejecting the null hypothesis (that there are no statis-
tically significant differences) when the hypothesis is true 
(e.g., see Greenwald 1975; and most recently, Soper et 
al. 1988). A successful strategy has been simply to build 
the replication study into the first part of the research 
design, followed by the main study. Although referees 
and editors, in our experience, seem willing to accept 
replication studies embedded in an overall research de-
sign, they are quite unwilling to accept them alone. (For 
recent empirical data underscoring the vital need for 
replications in the examination of dominant theories or 
hypotheses, see again, Soper et al. 1988.) 
Finally, in a qualitative evaluation of reviewers' com-
ments, Mahoney noted the wide variability in responses. 
When examining the comments in isolation, he noted, 
"one would hardly think that very similar or even identi-
cal manuscripts were being evaluated" (Mahoney 1977, 
p. 171). 
In conclusion, the results of Mahoney's experiment 
indicate a strong reviewer bias against both negative and 
mixed results, with an opposite bias in favor of manu-
scripts reporting positive results. Mahoney describes this 
phenomenon as confirmatory bias or the tendency to 
evaluate positively those results that are consistent with 
one's own beliefs and to evaluate negatively those that are 
inconsistent with them. (See also Beck 1976; Goodstein & 
Brazis 1970; and, most recently, Greenwald et al., 1986, 
for a critical discussion of the broader corpus of literature 
in which confirmatory bias and other theoretical biases 
are seen as obstructing scientific progress.) 
In a second experimental study by Mahoney et al. 
(1978), 68 volunteer referees for two behavioristic psy-
chology journals were sent experimental manuscripts 
that were identical in content, except that half the refer-
ees were randomly assigned manuscripts in which the 
alleged authors supported their arguments by citing their 
"in press" publications. The remaining referees received 
manuscripts in which "self-citation" was not used by the 
fictitious author. In addition, half the manuscripts in each 
group were given a prestigious author affiliation, while 
the remainder were described as having come from a 
"relatively unknown college." Referees were again asked 
to rate the manuscript using various evaluative criteria 
and to provide a summary recommendation concerning 
the article's publishability potential ("accept," "accept 
with minor revisions," "accept with major revisions," or 
"reject"). Statistically significant results (p < .05) indi-
cated that articles in which the fictitious author provided 
self-citations were rated as more innovative and publisha-
ble than those in which no self-references were cited; 
institutional prestige, whether high or low, bore no 
significant relationship to either the reviewers' evaluation 
of the manuscript's normative attributes or to the re-
viewers ' summary recommendations. Mahoney and col-
leagues note what may have been an unintended flaw in 
t h e design of the study however, namely, "the fact that 
none of the four institutions was known to specialize in 
behavioristic psychology so that - from the reviewer's 
perspect ive - there may have been little perceived varia-
tion in 'relevant' prestige" (Mahoney et al. 1978, p. 70). 
Despi te this possible shortcoming, Mahoney's experi-
mental research on peer review can still be appropriately 
described by the double entendre "rare," but "weil 
d o n e . " 
How do the Mahoney studies help us understand the 
low levels of reviewer agreement in the evaluation of 
scientific merit? Earlier (sect. 5.2), we noted that the low 
levels of reviewer agreement were difficult to interpret 
because we could not determine how much of the unre-
liability was due to differences in such important vari-
ables as the reviewers themselves (e.g., harsh vs. lenient 
critic), the manuscripts rated (e.g., some manuscripts 
were technically or otherwise more difficult to review 
than others), or the availability of author identity and 
affiliations (some journals use blind reviews, others do 
not). Because such variables were controlled in the Ma-
honey experiments, the low levels of reliability that were 
repor ted earlier are easier to accept now as probably 
nonartifactual. 
In summary, on the basis of the best controlled studies 
of the peer-review process to date, we are forced to 
conclude that referees do at times apply subjective crite-
ria, which cannot be described as "fair," "careful," "tact-
fu l , " or "constructive," despite the fact that such traits are 
widely accepted as desirable characteristics of referees 
(e.g., Gordon 1977; Hall 1979; Jones 1974; Lindsey 1978; 
Mer ton 1973). The clearest instance of this phenomenon 
was that manuscripts were likely to be accepted or re-
jected on the basis of whether the findings were positive, 
negative or mixed, rather than on the basis of their 
worthiness. Such subjective considerations, when they 
affect one reviewer, or both, may have a negative influ-
ence on both the reliability and validity of the peer-
review process. Somewhat paradoxically, the consistent 
application of the same biased criterion (say, a preference 
for positive findings) to a given set of manuscripts would 
inflate the reliability of the peer-review process, while 
potentially compromising its validity (i.e., falsely assum-
ing that positive results are always more worthy of pub-
lication than negative ones). 
6.2. Further reasons (or the low reliability of peer reviews. 
As we have seen, the list of subjective criteria detected by 
the bet ter controlled manuscript-review studies includes 
the extent of "confirmatory bias," "self-citation" bias, and 
"prestige of author and affiliation" bias. Although many 
will argue that bet ter research emanates from more 
prestigious institutions, the categorical acceptance of 
such research, coupled with a summary rejection of 
research produced at less prestigious institutions, will 
build an inevitable bias into the peer-review process. 
Although comparable quasi-experimental or experi-
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mental studies of peer review of grant proposals do not 
appear to have been undertaken, there are some less 
direct data that bear on the subject. Mittroff and Chubin 
(1979) describe a report by Hensler (1976) that notes that 
both NSF reviewers and applicants feel that, all things 
being equal, applicants have a better chance of being 
funded if they are affiliated with a better known institu-
tion, are well established and well known, or are submit-
ting a "mainstream" rather than a more innovative pro-
posal. In a more comprehensive survey, however. Cole 
and Cole (1981) report little effect if any on NSF funding 
associated with the following: previous publication re-
cord, institutional affiliation, or the applicant's age. The 
lack of a substantial relation between track record and the 
probability of being funded is described by Cole and Cole 
(1981, p. 2) as "surprising, since one of the stated evalua-
tion criteria used by the NSF in evaluating proposals is 
the ability of the scientists to conduct the research pro-
posed." What Cole and Cole find to be the major deter-
mining factor in whether or not a given NSF grant is 
funded is the score (perceived merit) given to the grant by 
the reviewers. In commenting negatively on this phe-
nomenon, one peer-review expert describes an alter-
native system of peer review "that involves not a promise 
in an essay (i.e., proposal), but uses a track record of 
performance in research" (Roy 1985, p. 73; see also, 
Chubin, 1982, in support of this general strategy). Other 
factors contribute to the unreliability of the peer-review 
process in a much more subtle or enigmatic manner (e. g., 
Cicchetti 1982; Smigel & Ross 1970). 
6.3. "Enigmatic" Issues and their influence on the relia-
bility of peer review. In examining the content of referee 
comments and their relation to specific recommendations 
to the editor, Smigel and Ross (1970) identified two types 
of problem cases. In one, the referees agreed on either 
acceptance, resubmission, or rejection, but for entirely 
different and sometimes even conflicting reasons. If the 
editor were to focus solely on final reviewer recommen-
dations (i.e., ignore the content of the reviews), then the 
conclusion to accept, require revision and resubmission, 
or reject would at times be based on illusory reliability. 
The reverse phenomenon, an even more subtle one, 
occurs when referees are basically in agreement about the 
content of their reviews, but differ considerably in their 
recommendations to the editor. Specifically, one referee 
may opt for acceptance because he believes his criticisms 
are minor ones. The second referee, citing the same 
criticisms, feels they are major, and hence opts for rejec-
tion. On which referee does the editor rely? Understand-
ably, no one has yet been able to resolve such difficult 
problems. As a result, we are left with the apparent 
paradox of instances in which conscientious and well-
qualified reviewers and editors will offer essentially the 
same evaluation of a given manuscript, while drawing 
very different conclusions about its punishabili ty. 
Evidence suggests that this same phenomenon faces 
program directors in the peer review of grant proposals. 
One NSF program director noted that some of his re-
viewers never rate a grant proposal as "excellent," no 
matter how meritorious they perceive it to be. Directors 
learn not to "downgrade" an applicant on this basis, since 
one reviewer's rating of excellent for a given proposal may 
have the same meaning as another reviewer's "very good' 
(i.e., see Cole & Cole 1981). 
7. Improving the reliability of peer review 
7.1. Rationale. Somewhat paradoxically, disagreement 
among reviewers can sometimes serve a useful purpose. 
Thus, one referee may detect a flaw in reasoning that a 
second referee has failed to uncover (e.g., Bailar & 
Patterson, 1985, in the context of journal peer reviews; 
Cole & Cole, 1981, in the context of NSF peer reviews; 
Harnad, 1979; 1983, in the context of "creative" disagree-
ment in open peer commentary). But whereas a valid case 
can be made for the potential informativeness of this kind 
of reviewer "unreliability," it is not really inconsistent 
with a concurrent desire to strengthen both the reliability 
and the validity of the peer-review process, as espoused, 
for example, by Harnad (1985). 
Yet, even adopting this desideratum, Mahoney (1977; 
1985) warns that one should not seek to improve reliabili-
ty in peer review at the enormous expense of increasing 
the extent of referee bias or prejudice. Thus, training 
referees to agree by simply sharing the same biases or 
prejudices against various types of scientific documents 
would be quite "counterprogressive" (Mahoney 1985, p. 
2). W e would strongly agree. How to deal with this 
important issue then? 
7.2. The role of multiple reviewers. To improve the relia-
bility of peer review, a minimum of three independent 
referees has been recommended (e.g., Glenn 1976; New-
man 1966). The procedure is already used by Behavioral 
and Brain Sciences (BBS), which sends a given manu-
script to anywhere from five to eight reviewers (some-
times even more) explicitly chosen to represent the 
manuscript 's specialty, as well as other specialties on 
which it impinges, and to include investigators likely to 
be favorable, critical, and neutral. Moreover, BBS's deci-
sion to accept or reject hardly amounts to a "majority 
vote," referees' recommendations being weighted by 
their backgrounds, alignments and, above all, their rea-
sons (Harnad 1983; 1985). 
There are several arguments for consulting more than 
two referees: (1) The number of manuscripts that receive 
split reviews (therefore usually requiring a third review 
anyway) can be quite substantial: about 25% of manu-
script submissions to the Journal of Abnormal Psychology 
over a six-year period (Cicchetti & Eron 1979 and addi-
tional unpublished data). (2) Existing pools of referees are 
large enough to make this option viable for behavioral 
science, medicine, and the physical sciences (e.g., see 
Lindsey 1978, p. 107). (3) Concerning issues of validity, 
the likelihood that an important feature of an article (or 
grant proposal, e.g., detection of a fatal design flaw) will 
be missed decreases as the number of independent re-
views increases. (4) Consistent with argument (3), it is a 
well-known statistical fact that the reliability of ratings 
does increase as the number of raters is increased 
(Hargens & Herting 1990b; Nunnally 1978). 
7.3. Using author anonymity or blind review. The main 
argument in favor of blind review for journal submissions 
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is the contention of some authors that their manuscripts 
seem to be rejected more on the basis of reviewers' 
subjective criteria (such as prestige of the author's affilia-
tion) than on the basis of overall scientific merit (e.g., see 
Armstrong 1982b; Benwell 1979; Ceci & Peters 1984; 
Gordon 1977; Patterson 1969). Opposing arguments have 
been advanced (e.g., by Ingelfinger 1974). More recent 
criticisms of "blinding" manuscripts have been summa-
rized by Ceci and Peters (1984, p. 1492): (1) an expensive 
publicity stunt used to placate authors but with little 
effect on quality, fairness, or interreferee reliability levels 
(Thomas 1982); (2) a process making it possible for authors 
to exaggerate their publication record, presumably by 
referring to their supposed research without having to 
cite author(s), journals, and publication dates, as proof of 
its existence (Howe 1982; Over 1982); (3) a mechanism 
enabling authors to leave out crucial information required 
for successful replication of their work (Lazarus 1982); and 
(4) a process that restricts the development of a construc-
tive relationship between authors and editors (Eight APA 
journals 1972). Bradley (1981) also reports the results of a 
poll of psychologists revealing that more than 75% of 
them believed that the usual way authors' names and 
affiliations are removed from submitted manuscripts does 
not prevent reviewers from identifying the authors of 
such articles. (One consistent example of the failure of 
blinding occurs when names and affiliations are removed 
on the face sheet, but a footnote identifying the senior 
author and the institution at which the research was 
conducted is not.) 
The Ceci & Peters (1984) review of the literature found 
no sound empirical evidence for the futility of blind 
review. Rather, the negative beliefs seemed to rest on the 
anecdotal experiences of selected authors (e.g., Machol 
1981). Ceci and Peters accordingly tested hypotheses 
about the feasibility of blind review. They randomly 
selected 180 reviewers for 6 psychology journals (each 
covering a different area); 81% agreed to participate and 
73% re turned usable questionnaires. The journals were: 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Journal of 
Counseling Psychology, Human Learning, Developmen-
tal Psychology, Psychological Bulletin, and Psychome-
trika. 
Although the reviewers had predicted that they could 
correctly identify authors of manuscripts in 72% of the 
cases, their actual "hit rate" was only half of that (36%). 
Moreover, these results were not significantly affected by 
either the reviewers' age or the specific journal that was 
represented. The authors concluded: 
At a t ime when the integrity of the peer-review process 
is under siege, blind review would seem to be an 
obvious step toward regaining authors' confidence in 
the editorial process. If our findings from these six 
journals can be generalized to the 60 or so journals in 
the field (out of approximately 120) that routinely use 
blind review, including half of those published by the 
APA, then we have evidence that the personal identi-
ties and institutional affiliations of authors usually do 
not contaminate the evaluations of reviewers who are 
kept blind (Ceci & Peters 1984, p. 1494). 
Although the results of Ceci and Peters are impressive, 
one must first ask whether the peer-review glass is to be 
perceived as 64% full or 36% empty. Moreover, further 
research is needed to determine: (a) whether more spe-
cialized fields of inquiry would produce different results, 
because of the smaller numbers of scientists working on 
similar problems, and (b) whether blinding raises or 
lowers the reliability or validity of the review. 
Nonetheless, the importance of these findings should 
not be ignored. Perhaps a compromise would be optional 
blind reviewing, already the policy of some editors (e.g., 
see Adair 1981, p. 14). It would probably make sense to 
leave the responsibility of blinding a given manuscript to 
the author who makes the request, however This strat-
egy would be designed (a) to increase the probability of 
successful blinding (e.g., eliminating mechanical detec-
tion errors), since the author who made the request 
would presumably have a vested interest in maintaining 
anonymity; and (b) to free valuable time for editors and 
their staffs. Optional anonymity, however, might stig-
matize some authors (e.g., does the author have some-
thing to hide?).9 
With respect to NSF grant reviews, Cole and Cole 
(1981) note that initial attempts to blind such proposals 
compromised the integrity of the proposal in a number of 
instances, to the point that the "substantive content 
became very unclear. Moreover, since there was substan-
tial disagreement about what was an identifying sen-
tence, remark, or allusion, severe blinding depended 
heavily upon the blinder" (op. cit., p. 11). 
Cole and Cole (1981, p. 12) adopted a compromise 
blinding procedure similar to the one used by many 
scientific journals. From each grant they removed the 
title pages, relevant author references, descriptions of 
research facilities, direct references to prior work of the 
principal investigators, and other obvious identifying 
information. (The data presented in Table 4 indicate no 
obvious differences between COSPUP "blind" and 
"open" reviews of the same proposals whether in chem-
ical dynamics, solid state physics, or economics.) 
7.4. Revealing reviewer identity. The call for journal edi-
tors to force referees to reveal their identity has some-
times been strident and cuts across fields of scientific 
inquiry (e.g., the behavioral sciences, Patterson 1969; 
Surwillo 1986; the medical sciences, DeBakey & De-
Bakey 1976; Ingelfinger 1975; Margulis 1977; Stumpf 
1980; and Wright 1970; and the physical sciences, 
Robertson 1976). One author asks: "Why should the wish 
to publish a scientific paper expose one to an assassin 
more completely protected than members of the in-
famous society, the Mafia?" (Wright 1970, p. 404). 
Despite the legitimate concern about possible unfair-
ness in anonymous reviews, one needs to ask what effect 
open review might have on the younger reviewer who 
legitimately criticizes the work of an established titan in 
the field. What protection does such a reviewer have 
against possible retribution? In the reverse situation, the 
well-established critic would be less likely to suffer re-
tribution from his less well known critic (e.g., see Cic-
chetti 1982; Scarr 1982). 
Consistent with the view of Armstrong (1982b), a 
compromise solution appears appropriate. Referees 
ought to be encouraged to reveal their identities, but only 
if they so choose. Moreover, two levels of anonymity 
should be available as alternatives: anonymity from the 
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author, but not from fellow reviewers, and complete 
anonymity from everyone but the editor (this is BBS's 
current policy). Ideas similar to these would also pertain 
to reviewers of grant proposals. 
7.5. Author review of referees. To counteract possible 
unfairness or incompetence in refereeing. Hall (1979, p. 
798) has suggested "author review." Each author of a 
submitted manuscript (or grant proposal) would be given 
the opportunity to evaluate referees on the basis of 
"fairness," "carefulness," "constructiveness," or what-
ever other factors the author (or grant applicant) deems 
relevant. Such information would then be recorded, 
filed, and periodically reviewed by the editor (or, for that 
matter , the program director, or executive secretary of a 
granting agency). Those referees receiving repeated low 
ratings might then be eliminated as future peer re-
viewers. The process of author review is practiced by 
BBS. 
Another innovative strategy, also aimed at avoiding 
potential referee bias (here, Mahoney's confirmatory 
bias) has been used by a number of journals, including the 
International Journal of Forecasting (Armstrong 1982b). 
A referee is given a note containing information about an 
author 's research design, methodology, and data analysis 
but not about the results or ensuing discussion. The 
referee is instructed to review the paper using the note, 
after which he can open a sealed envelope containing the 
completed manuscript. Armstrong (1982c) also recom-
mends that authors be permitted to submit names of 
potential reviewers as well as those who, with reasons, 
should not review. All this must obviously be done in a 
nonbinding manner. 
7.6. Rewarding referee contributions. Whereas much of 
the li terature on manuscript peer review has tended to be 
highly critical of the performance record of referees, the 
opposite sentiment has also been expressed, especially 
for those referees who consistently write "commendable" 
reviews (e.g., Armstrong 1982b; Hunt 1971; Smith 1977). 
Accordingly, ways of acknowledging commendable refer-
ee performance have been suggested (e.g., letters of 
thanks, with copies to members of the editorial board of 
the journal; publication oflists of especially good referees; 
acknowledgments in footnotes for substantial referee sug-
gestions; or even an offer to publish such reviews, see 
Armstrong 1982b; Hun t 1971). Several journals have 
adopted this or similar strategies. For example, BBS 
invites reviewers to serve as commentators if the article is 
accepted for publication. 
7.7. Allowing authors multlpla manuscript submissions. 
The injunction against authors submitting the same arti-
cle to more than one journal is consistent across major 
journals in behavioral science as well as medicine (e.g., 
see the 1983 American Psychological Association (APA) 
Publication Manual for psychology journals; the Ameri-
can Sociological Association (ASA), policy for sociology 
journals, Peters 1976; and the policy for major medical 
journals, Relman 1978). Peters (1976) appears convinced 
that a policy of multiple submissions would generate 
healthy competition among journals, all vying for the 
same manuscript. He presents some cogent arguments 
against the rationale for the ASA policy statement, but 
there are a number of attendant problems to be con-
sidered. 
Referees often review for a number of different journals 
in the same general area of inquiry. Thus, when an author 
submits a manuscript simultaneously to several journals, 
a given referee may receive requests to review the same 
article from several different journal editors. What is the 
conscientious referee to do under these circumstances; 
Send the same review to each journal? Select one journal 
only? If so, which one? As another example, what hap-
pens when more than one journal accepts an author's 
paper? How can an editor intelligently organize an up-
coming issue when faced with a sudden and unexpected 
withdrawal of a previously scheduled manuscript by an 
author receiving a second acceptance from a preferred 
competing journal (e.g., see Hughes 1976)? Also, what 
justifies the time and expense of needless multiple 
refereeing? 
More important, Lindsey (1978) predicts that if the 
model of multiple submissions "is adopted by journals, 
authors will not be guaranteed a careful and impartial 
review of their work. Rather they will be vying for the 
attention of editors to their work. In this competition, 
those with prestigious credentials will receive the closest 
attention. Rather than equalizing access, there is the 
danger that multiple submissions may have just the 
reverse consequence" (Lindsey 1978, pp. 110-11). Given 
these rather serious problems, none of which appears to 
have yet received satisfactory solutions, multiple submis-
sion does not seem to be a viable procedure. 
7.8. Developing an author-to-edltor appeal process. In 
earlier sections (6.1, 6.2), we discussed a number of 
variables that have been cited in the literature that: (a) 
could be objectively identified; (b) were irrelevant to the 
publishability of a given manuscript; but (c) have never-
theless been used at times by editors to justify rejecting a 
given journal submission. There are eight such variables: 
1. documentable factual errors made by reviewers 
(e.g., suggesting an invalid procedure in lieu of a valid 
state-of-the-art one developed by the author) 
2. faulty data analyses (which are readily reparable) in 
a work that has otherwise received a quite praiseworthy 
reviewer and/or editorial evaluation 
3. prior publication in nonrefereed conference pro-
ceedings 
4. replication of previously published work 
5. null or negative findings (despite very favorable 
reviews) 
or (6-8) without supporting arguments: 
6. subject inappropriate 
7. ideas insufficiently novel or original 
8. insufficient space to accommodate the submission. 
With respect to the first five variables, it would seem 
that a carefully documented, dispassionate letter could 
result in 4 journal editor's honoring a request that the 
rejected manuscript be resubmitted to a new set of 
referees who would review it independently and without 
prior knowledge of its rejected status. Should this strat-
egy fail in the more general areas of behavioral science or 
medicine, then the author can choose, in all likelihood, 
equally prestigious alternate journals with (as we shall 
later report) a reasonably high probability of acceptance. 
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As we shall also see, the problem in the physical sciences 
is a quite different one. 
If the author is told that the subject is inappropriate for 
the journal to which it has been submitted, a search 
should be made for a more appropriate alternate journal. 
The last two reasons for manuscript rejection (i.e, lack of 
originality or lack of journal space) seem somewhat sub-
jective. A letter to the editor would accordingly seem 
pointless, and again, alternate journals should be con-
sidered. 
7.9. Developing a peer-review appeals systems for grsnt 
submissions. Both the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) and the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health 
Administration (ADAM HA) granting agencies have re-
cently established formal peer-review appeal systems. 
According to Holt (1985), classes of problems that might 
justify an appeal include: the granting agency's refusal to 
accept an application; an applicant's disagreement over 
the assignment of his grant (whether to a specific study 
section or Institute); an author's doubts about the level of 
knowledge of specific study section members; or evi-
dence of bias associated with the peer review. In a survey 
reported by Mitroff and Chubin (1979 p. 222), more than 
70% of NSF applicants favor what is referred to as a 
"formal" appeal system as a remedy for mistakes. A 
similar process is in operation at the NSF, whereby a 
principal investigator (P.I.) whose grant has been disap-
proved can call the designated program officer, who will 
provide a detailed account of the specific reasons for 
disapproval. If the P.I. is still dissatisfied, other options 
are available, including a request that the Assistant Di-
rector of NSF reconsider the grant disapproval on the 
basis of arguments set forth by the P.I. These develop-
ments portend a healthier climate for handling legitimate 
claims about perceived unfairness or incompetence; they 
become especially important as less and less funding is 
made available to support worthy research endeavors.10 
8. Concluding comments 
Given that rejections of manuscripts and disapprovals of 
grant proposals can seriously affect one's research career 
(e.g., jeopardize or delay a potential promotion), what 
conclusions can be drawn from this report? 
As Hamad (1986, p. 24) notes, this depends to a large 
extent on what one views as "closer to the truth": (a) that 
most published research is either "significant and essen-
tial to the progress of science"; or (b) that most of it is 
"neither significant nor essential." Harnad adds that 
there is some evidence to support both propositions. If 
one believes (a), then one becomes very concerned that at 
least some meritorious research will be rejected, disap-
proved, or delayed unnecessarily, thereby hampering 
scientific progress. On the other hand, if one believes 
proposition (b), then the potential problem of false nega-
tives (rejecting meritorious scientific documents) be-
comes less significant. For if most research Is unimpor-
tant and leads nowhere, then it matters less if some of it is 
rejected or delayed; indeed, this would even come as a 
welcome relief to many who, like Lock (1985), are deeply 
concerned about the literature glut. 
Our own view tends toward proposition (a), especially 
with respect to the p e e r review of grants. It has recently 
been noted that al though more and better scientists are 
be ing produced each year , the funds available to support 
research are not keeping pace (e.g., Ison 1985; Koshland 
1985). In a debate repor ted in a Science editorial by 
Culliton (1984), N I H director James B. Wyngaarden 
addressed the problem he refers to as distinguishing 
'"shades of excellence' among competing grants that are 
all at the top." He w e n t on to state that: 
in many institutes, there is money enough to fund 
those grants with top priority scores of 160 to 170, while 
those rated only slightly lower at 171 to 180 end up in 
the reject pile. Nearly everyone agrees that there is no 
objective way the peer-review system can make such 
fine-tuned distinctions about quality, (p. 1401) 
Consistent with this statement, the cur ren t editor of 
Science notes that "with quality as high as it is today, and 
funding low, a commit tee of Solomons would have diffi-
culty distinguishing between grants that should and 
should not be awarded" (Koshland 1985, p. 1387).11  
Given the decreasing availability of research funds, the 
current situation has become markedly m o r e competi-
tive, with NIH grants usually requiring priority scores of 
125 or considerably less, in order to assure funding. 
The inability of re ferees to make "f ine-tuned" distinc-
tions also affects the pee r review of manuscripts submit-
ted to prestigious scientific journals (e.g., the New En-
gland Journal of Medicine (NEJM), t h e Journal of 
Clinical Investigation (JCI) and Science). Wilson (1978) 
reported that of all manuscripts rejected by JCI in 1970, 
85% of them were later published elsewhere: "The jour-
nals in which these papers were published constitute a 
distinguished list of publications, with 14 journals ac-
counting for one-half the papers." Similarly, the editor of 
the NEJM noted that 85% of his journal's rejections in 
1975 were subsequently published or accepted for pub-
lication elsewhere (Relman 1978). Approximately 70% of 
these initially re jected manuscripts appeared in very 
distinguished medical specialty journals, general medical 
research journals (i.e., Journal of Clinical Investigation 
(JCI), Journal of Laboratory and Clinical Medicine, 
Journal of Applied Physiology), or general medical jour-
nals (i.e., Journal of the American Medical Association 
(JAMA), Lancet, British MedicalJournal(BMJ), Canadi-
an Medical Association Journal, Medical Journal of Aus-
tralia). The remaining 2Í4 articles were published in local, 
state, and other types of journals. It should also be noted 
further that of the 85% initially rejected articles, both for 
NEJM and JCI, t he majority were either not changed or 
changed in only minor ways in their ultimately accepted 
versions. Similar results were published by Lock (1985, 
p. 67): 79% (or 1223) of the manuscripts submit ted to the 
BMJ in 1979 were re jected; 68% of these "were published 
elsewhere, 15% in high-impact-factor journals, and 10% 
in high-impact-factor general journals" (based on the 
average number of citations of the published articles). 
The results of these three studies are consistent with 
those of a MEDLINE (computer) search repor ted by the 
former editor of Science. Abelson (1980) noted that al-
though Science re jects about 80% of submissions to the 
journal, "almost all of our rejected material has appeared 
in other journals" (p. 62). Finally, Garvey e t al. (1979) 
have reported that the bulk of manuscripts rejected by 
social science journals are also subsequently published, 
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often without further revisions, and usually in journals as 
prestigious as the rejecting journals to which they were 
originally submitted. 
The situation seems to be very different in t h e major 
astrophysics and astronomy journals. Only about one-
third of the rejected manuscripts are subsequently pub-
lished in other journals (Abt 1988). As noted recent ly by 
Hargens (1990), this phenomenon is consistent wi th the 
notion that unlike social and medical scientists, astro-
physicists and astronomers are more likely to conclude 
that the i r rejected work does not merit being publ ished 
elsewhere . This may in turn reflect more agreement on 
evaluation standards in well-defined areas of the physical 
sciences than in either less well defined areas of the same 
discipline (e.g., general physics, cross disciplinary phys-
ics) or in the more general areas of medicine or behavioral 
science, that have been investigated to date. 
In considering the implications of such findings for 
peer review in general, one should probably b e less 
concerned with the high rejection rates of general jour-
nals in social and behavioral science and medicine than 
with the overall increased rejection rates for grants sub-
mitted in all three areas. First, despite previous argu-
ments to the contrary (e.g., Cole 1978; 1983), re ject ion 
rates for manuscripts both between journals and within 
the same journal have remained remarkably constant 
over t ime. Hargens (1988); and Hargens (1990) repor ts 
that the rejection rates for the late 1960s and t h e early 
1980s for 30 leading U.S. journals in a wide range of 
disciplines were very highly correlated (Pearson R = . 94). 
Moreover, these rejection rates were not significantly 
associated with either changes in journal submission rates 
be tween the two time periods or with whether journals 
levied page charges. Our analysis of the rejection ra tes in 
the 10 subfields covered by the Physical Review Letters 
shows that between 1981 and 1986, all possible rank-
orderings of rejection rates (i.e., comparing each year 's 
rankings with those of each remaining year) vary be tween 
.91 and .99. Considering both the relative ease with 
which authors in many areas of social and medical science 
succeed in publishing their previously rejected articles in 
other prestigious journals and the extent to which authors 
in the physical sciences choose not to do so (tending to 
regard their rejections as decisive), the focus of concern 
should be on the problems associated with the r a the r 
arbitrary rejection of grant submissions, in which the 
phenomenon cuts across various disciplines (e.g., phys-
ics, chemistry, economics) and may prevent or seriously 
delay the implementation of worthy research en-
deavors. 1 2 
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1. For a more detailed description of normative attributes 
and specific criteria for guiding referees and editors in the 
review of scientific manuscripts, see Bowen et al. (1972); Chase 
(1970); Cicchetti it Conn (1976); Cicchetti it Eron (1979); 
Cottfredson (1978); Creenwald (1976); Maher (1978); Scott 
(1974); Whitehurst (1983); and Wolff (1973). For corresponding 
information pertaining to grant reviews, see Allen (1960); Cole 
it Cole (1981; 1985); Cole et al. (1978); Mitroffit Chubin (1979); 
Noble (1974); and Wiener et al. (1977). 
2. The general formula for the kappa or weighted kappa 
statistic is: 
Kappa,., - (PO - PC)/(1 - PC), in which: 
PO refers to the proportion of observed (or actual) rater (re-
viewer) agreement; PC refers to the proportion of agreement 
expected on the basis of chance alone; 1 - PC refers to the 
maximum possible difference between observed and chance 
agreement. 
The level of statistical significance of kappa is determined by 
dividing K by its standard error (s.e.) and referring the resulting 
Z value to a table of areas under the normal curve to determine 
the p value of kappa (e.g., a Z of kappa of 1.96 is statistically 
significant at the .05 level). The validity of this procedure was 
empirically demonstrated by Cicchetti (1981) and Cicchetti it 
Fleiss (1977). For weighting systems to be used with the kappa 
statistic, see Cicchetti (1976), Cicchetti et al. (1977); Cicchetti it 
Heavens (1979); Cicchetti (1978); Cicchetti it Sparrow (1981), 
and Heavens it Cicchetti (1978). 
3. The formula for R l ius,, Il(, when the same set of 
raters(reviewers) evaluate each subject, also deriving from a 
one-way repeated measures, ANOVA can be defined as: 
MSS - MSE* , . , 
Rin.„d.i in = • l n w h l c h -
MSS
 + (MSE'XR-1) + R ( M S " , M S E , ) 
N 
MSS = mean square between subjects; MSE = mean square 
error (or residual); MSR = mean square between raters (or 
reviewers); R = number of raters (reviewers); N = number of 
subjects (abstracts, manuscripts, grants). 
4. The formula for the intraclass correlation coefficient (Rj), 
Model I when different sets of raters or reviewers evaluate each 
subject (e.g., abstract, manuscript, grant proposal) derives from 
a repeated-measures (e.g., across reviewers) analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) model, and can be defined as: 
= MSS - MSE* . , . , 
•{Model., MSS + (MSS + (R-1XMSE*)]' I n 
MSS = mean square between subjects; MSE = mean square 
error; and R = the number of ratings (e.g., reviews) per subject 
(e.g., abstract, manuscript, grant proposal). 
The level of statistical significance of a given Ri(Mode, „ value is 
determined by referring the quantity MSS (with its number of 
degrees of freedom [df]) by MSE (with its df) to a standard 
ANOVA table. 
•Note. For the R„Model „case, MSE pools the variance associ-
ated with raters with the variance associated with residual. 
5. The formulae for the R, for determining the reliability of 
dimensionally scaled data when the numbers and specific sets of 
examiners may vary at each assessment (e.g., in the usual peer-
review process for evaluating grants), also derive from a one-way 
repeated measures ANOVA model and can be expressed as: 
r
»IMO*M ...) = (MSS - mMSE)/(MSS + m(R0 - 1)MSEJ, in 
which, 
MSS and MSE are defined as in R,(Modri R0 = the average 
number of raters per subject; m = N(R0 — 1)/[NR0 - 1)- 2]; N 
= the number of subjects (e.g., NSF grants). 
The level of statistical significance of RttM<Ml-l „„ is determined 
by application of the formula F = MSS/MSE, which, with (N — 
1) and (M — 1) degrees of freedom is referred to appropriate 
55 CICHETTI: THE RELIABII.ITY OF PEER REVIEW 
ANOVA statistical tables. Here, M = the total number of ratings 
summed across subjects. 
6. For a more comprehensive treatment of appropriate and 
inappropriate reliability statistics, the interested reader is re-
ferred to Cicchetti (1988), Cicchetti & Feinstein (1990), and 
Feinstein & Cicchetti (1990). 
7. These data derive from the Physical Review and Physical 
Review Letters; Annual Report 1986 (published in January 
1987). We wish to express our deepest appreciation to Dr. Peter 
D. Adams, Deputy Editor-in-Chief, American Physical Society 
for making available this information as well as other related 
material on the peer-review process for the Physical Review. 
8. It has been noted by several investigators in the field of 
peer-review research that the extent to which editors use 
referee recommendations is an important and often neglected 
variable (e.g., Bailar & Patterson 1985; Patterson & Bailar 1985; 
Chubin, in a 1982 peer-reviewer comment). We agree, and we 
have data bearing on this issue for the 1,313 diiferent manu-
scripts that were evaluated by at least 2 reviewers during the 
period from 1973 to 1978 and were ultimately accepted or 
rejected by the same editor of the Journal of Abnormal Psychol-
ogy. This journal uses a reviewer-summary recommendation 
format in which the submission can be rated as one of the 
following: accept (as is); accept subject to revision; revise and 
resubmit for further consideration; or reject outright. Hie joint 
reviewer recommendations compared to the final editorial deci-
sions were as follows (with numbers and/or percentages of 
manuscripts following each referee or editorial judgment): 
Accept-accept (17), all 17 (100%) accepted by the editor; 
Accept/revise-accept (86), 77 (89.5%) accepted and 9 (10.5%) 
rejected; 
Accept-revise/accept-revise (100), 81% accepted, 19% 
rejected; 
Accept/resubmit (61), 38 (62.3%) accepted, 23 (37.7%) 
rejected; 
Accept/revise-resubmit (134), 69 (51.5%) accepted, 65 
(48.5%) rejected; 
Resubmit-resubmit (49), 15 (30.6%) accepted, 34 (69.4%) 
rejected; 
Accept-reject (96), 20 (20.8%) accepted, 76(79.2%) rejected, 
Accept/revise-reject (219), 40 (18.3%) accepted, 179 (81.7%) 
rejected; 
Resubmit-reject (200), 11 (5.5%) accepted, 189 (94.5%) 
rejected; 
Reject-reject (351), 2 (0.6%) accepted and 349 (99.4%) 
rejected. 
The total number of accepted articles was 370 (28.2%). The 
number rejected was 943 or (71.8%). These data are consistent 
with data for both the American Sociological Review and the 
Physical Review, which indicate that "referees' recommenda-
tions are the major factor determining the editors' dispositions" 
(Hargens 1988, p. 146). Consistent with such findings, Bakanic 
et al. (1987) reported a correlation of .81 between referees' mean 
overall recommendations and final editorial decisions for manu-
scripts submitted to the American Sociological Review. 
9. It should be noted that BBS is systematically gathering and 
analyzing data on the relationship between levels of reviewer 
anonymity and the favorability and usefulness of the referee 
report, as indicated both by the referee's recommendations and 
the author's subjective ratings. 
10. The authors extend appreciation to staff personnel at 
NSF for making available this information, which can also be 
obtained, in more detail, by requesting appropriate NSF 
publications. 
11. It should be noted that the various funding agencies use 
different priority rating systems. For example, the Veterans 
Administration uses a 10-to-50 rating scale, which is the reverse 
of the NSF scoring system. Thus, lower scores represent higher 
quality grant proposals, and vice versa. In contrast to both these 
rating systems, reviewers for grants submitted to the American 
Heart Association used a 10-category, ordinally scaled grading 
system in which high priority (for funding) was defined as 1-3, 
intermediate priority as 4-7, and low priority as 8-10 (i.e., see 
Wiener et al. 1977). Concerning these varying scales of mea-
surement, the empirical work of Cicchetti et al. (1985) indicates 
that no appreciable increment in interrater reliability is 
achieved by increasing the size of a rating scale beyond seven 
ordinal or quasi-dimensional points or categories. These data 
serve to validate and generalize the implications of the results of 
an earlier investigation that demonstrated that analogue rating 
scales (0 to 100 points) were no more reliable than three-
category ordinal scales (here the Present State Examination 
[PSE], in assessing extent of psychiatric symptomatology (Rem-
ington et al. 1979). 
12. It is of interest that Professor Jared Diamond describes 
many difficulties that composers have encountered in their 
attempts to have their works published or supported by grants. 
TTiese and other parallels between struggling musicians and 
scientists were presented in the March 21, 1985, issue of 
Nature, in commemoration of Bach's 300th birthday. 
Open Peer Commentary 
Commentary submitted by the qualified professional readership of this 
journal will be considered for publication in a later issue as Continuing 
Commentary on this article. Integrative overviews and syntheses are 
especially encouraged. 
Peer review: An unflattering picture 
Kenneth M. Adams1 
Department of Psychiatry, University oi Michigan. Ann Arbor, Ml 48109-
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Cicchetti brings a masterly touch to an enduring problem in 
modern science. The problem of peer review calls to mind the 
old saying about the weather: "Everyone complains about it but 
no one does anything about it." One may find this more amusing 
later in one's career than earlier. 
Many researchers will regard Cicchetti's results with initial 
discouragement, if not outright embarrassment. Critics will be 
quick to point out the very real limits that low reliability placcs 
upon validity. Given these data, one must further suspect the 
peer-review process in science of being flawed. Yet several 
points deserve careful consideration. 
First, the entire process of reviewing manuscripts or grants is 
one of considering new information. Decisions concerning the 
disposition of these entities are simple in their result, but often 
complex in their structure. Cicchetti has done well in trying to 
capture disposition as the most solid data point. In the case of a 
manuscript, a research report often contains components re-
flecting various aspects of the research enterprise: (1) command 
of existing knowledge, (2) skill at formulating the research 
design, (3) expertise in analysis of the executed study, and (4) 
wisdom in guiding the reader in how to understand the place of 
the study in our knowledge. Predictably, the ability of investiga-
tors in each of these areas will not be uniform. Equally predict-
able will be the varying degree to which reviewers may have 
special skills and capabilities to judge the success of the project 
in these components. Disagreement by colleagues about papers 
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may represent a healthy state of affairs in which the author and 
reviewer are pursuing their own land of academic freedom. A 
similar situation exists with respect to the novelty of information 
in grants and their multiple components. (As an aside, it seems 
that many revieyvers have forgotten that grant proposals are just 
that - proposals.) 
Second, it is interesting that all sciences are roughly in the 
same range of reliability when it comes to reviews. This gives 
some indirect support to my first point about why novel informa-
tion is judged imperfectly by experts in a number of realms. O n e 
problem with manuscript publication decisions is that reviewers 
expect to be asked to vote on the publication of a manuscript. I 
would add to Cicchetti's suggestions a plea that journals stop 
routinely asking reviewers whether a paper should be accepted. 
This recommendation on a reviewer's part may not be at all 
helpful for ei ther the editor or the author of the manuscript. 
Many journals do appeal to reviewers to avoid making a recom-
mendation on acceptance or rejection in their review comments 
intended for the author. It is a plea that often goes unheeded. 
Journal editors are probably in a far better position to weigh the 
various factors affecting potential publication than are most 
reviewers. Editors tend to send manuscripts to reviewers who 
have special expertise for consultation on certain points. In 
supplying this information, reviewers may have their own ideas 
of what should or should not be published, but editors often are 
not aware of the fabric of reviewers' editorial philosophy. 
Third, it is probably inimical to true academic freedom to 
train reviewers. It is apparent, however, that the development 
of constructive reviewers is too often haphazard and uncertain. 
Good reviewing should be recognized by journals, institutions, 
and societies. We must find ways to groom reviewers without 
creating undue bias or suppressing scientific freedom. 
Fourth, while the reliability of decisions in evaluating manu-
scripts and adjudicating grants is poor in both cases, the results 
are clearly more deleterious with grants. If one wants to publish 
a new manuscript, there will certainly be some way to do it 
eventually - even if it is not in one's preferred journal. A similar 
situation does not prevail with respect to the awarding of grants: 
no grant, no money. Reality in many areas of research dictates 
that if the federal government does not fond certain kinds of 
research, it just won't be done. This has brought the peer-
review process under even more scrutiny, and the sense of 
frustration and arbitrariness that some "pink sheet" recipients 
feel is not going to be assuaged by the findings. 
The remedies suggested for the manuscript review process 
need more dramatic implementation with respect to grants. The 
adjudication of grants is a far more social and political process 
than manuscript review. Steps must be taken to humanize the 
grant review process by putting reviewers' names on their 
opinions. The National Science Foundation (NSF) experience in 
trying to create blind applications did not work initially, but 
remains worth trying. 
Fifth, Cicchetti 's finding that reviewers can agree more easily 
on less desirable research than on more desirable research 
parallels the situation now usually extant in the individual 
review. As a general rule, reviewers spend far too little t ime 
being constructive, collegial, and consultative in their reviews. 
One sure-fire way to limit the impact of our character defects 
and make the review process more constructive would be the 
aforementioned requirement that reviewers reveal their identi-
ties in all cases. The temptation to be petty or take cheap shots 
when reviewing others' work would diminish thereby. 
In closing, I would like to emphasize that the methodological 
basis of Cicchetti 's investigation seems sound. Agreement be-
tween reviewers of manuscripts and grants is discouragingly 
low. The reasons for this are many, but the net result is that this 
study holds a mirror up to peer review that provides a distinctly 
unflattering picture. The remedial steps proposed by Cicchetti 
require urgent attention. I would underscore his suggestion that 
reviewers be identified, encouraged, and rewarded by what-
ever means available for providing quality consultation on 
manuscripts. The situation with grants is far more complex, but 
even the most stalwart defenders of current federal funding 
review methods cannot ignore this evidence suggesting that 
some scientific decisions resulting in funding or nonfonding are 
probably being made in a nonsystematic way. I would doubt that 
we are distinguishing between "shades of excellence" any more; 
a certain degree of caprice has entered the picture. In a complex 
world that can be helped by our research at a variety of levels, 
this should open our minds to constructive alternatives. 
NOTE 
1. The author is affiliated with The Veterans' Affairs Medical Center, 
Ann Arbor, MI. 
Does the need for agreement among 
reviewers inhibit the publication of 
controversial findings? 
J. Scott Armstrong« and Raymond Hubbard" 
'The Wharton Schooi. University of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia. PA 19104 
6College of Business and Public Administration Drake University, Des 
Moines. IA 50311 
As Cicchetti indicates, agreement among reviewers is not high. 
This conclusion is empirically supported by Fiske and Fogg 
(1990), who reported that two independent reviews of the same 
papers typically had no critical point in common. Does this 
imply that journal editors should strive for a high level of 
reviewer consensus as a criterion for publication? Prior research 
suggests that such a requirement would inhibit the publication 
of papers with controversial findings. We summarize this re-
search and report on a survey of editors. 
Prior research. Horrobin (1990) suggests that the primary 
function of peer review should be to identify new and useful 
findings, that is, to promote the publication of important innova-
tions. This function is typically subordinated to the quality 
control aspects of peer review, however. The quality control 
approach looks for agreement among the reviewers. The result, 
Horrobin claims, is that competent research yielding relatively 
unimportant findings is more readily accepted for publication.1  
He provides numerous examples of harsh peer review given to 
important research that presents controversial results. 
The popular press often reports difficulties associated with 
the publication of important research findings. The scanning 
tunneling microscope (STM) is a case in point. The STM is 
capable of distinguishing individual atoms and has been hailed 
as one of the most important inventions of this century. It 
earned a Nobel Prize in physics for its inventors. Nevertheless, 
the first attempt to publish the results produced by the STM in 
1981 failed because a journal referee found the paper "not 
interesting enough" (Fisher 1989). 
Armstrong (1982c) provides additional examples of lapses in 
the peer review system, along with summaries of empirical 
evidence that discontinuing findings about important topics are 
difficult to publish. Among these, the experimental studies by 
Goodstein and Brazis (1970) and Mahoney (1977) are of particu-
lar interest. They found that reviewers were biased against 
negative findings. They rejected these papers on the basis of 
poor methodology while accepting papers with confirmatory 
outcomes that used the identical methodology. 
Given the above results, one might expect that if editors rely 
on consensus among reviewers for their publication decisions, 
few controversial findings will be published. This problem could 
be especially serious in social science journals. TTiese journals 
generally have low acceptance rates and their editors may 
decide to publish only manuscripts with high agreement among 
reviewers. 
A survey of journal editors. To assess how journals treat 
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empirical papers that present controversial findings, we con-
ducted a survey of 20 current or recent editors of American 
Psychological Association (APA) journals. The two-page ques-
tionnaire, together with a stamped, self-addressed return enve-
lope, was mailed out in March 1990. We followed up with phone 
calls 10 days after the mailing. 
Replies were received from 16 of the 20 editors. One question 
asked: "To the best of your memory, during the last two years of 
your tenure as editor of an APA journal, did your journal publish 
one or more papers that were considered to be both controver-
sial and empirical? (That is, papers that presented empirical 
evidence contradicting the prevailing wisdom.)" Seven editors 
could recall none.2 Four said "yes" and indicated that there was 
one paper. Three editors replied that there was at least one. Two 
said that they published several such papers. It seems that 
controversial empirical papers do get published, but infre-
quently. Almost half the editors could not recall publishing such 
papers \n the past two years. 
We then asked about the peer review for the one published 
controversial empirical paper that they remembered most clear-
ly. Hie question was worded: "How did the reviewers respond 
to this paper?" A five-point scale from "unanimously accepted" 
to "unanimously rejected" was provided, as well as a "don't 
recall" option. One of the nine respondents to this question 
reported unanimous acceptance, three reported "majority in 
favor," four reported "even split," and one answered "don't 
recall." In response to a question on this published paper's 
contribution to the discipline, one editor said "not important" 
four said "somewhat important," and four selected the highest 
rating, "important." 
The editors were also asked if they had rejected any papers 
that were controversial and empirical. Six of the editors stated 
that they did not receive such papers, and four said they could 
not recall any. The six editors who rejected papers with contro-
versial findings did so, they said, because of poor methodology 
and poor supporting arguments. Of the rejected papers that the 
editors "remembered most clearly," only one was "unan-
imously rejected;" a "majority not in favor" was reported for 
two, an "even split" for two, and a "majority in favor" for one. 
Three papers were rated as "not important," and three as 
"somewhat important." 
These results suggest that one can get reviewer agreement on 
controversial empirical papers. Moreover, most of these papers 
are published without high levels of reviewer agreement. Ap-
parently, editors do not rely solely on reviewer agreement. 
It is interesting that our survey found only two instances of 
unanimous reviewer agreement for empirical papers with con-
troversial findings. In one case, the recommendation was to 
reject. In the other, it was to accept. In the case of the accepted 
manuscript, it should be noted that the editor had invited this 
submission and had selected reviewers who, he said, were 
sympathetic to its content. 
Our survey indicates that some controversial empirical pa-
pers do get published, even when there is disagreement among 
the reviewers. The willingness of editors to publish such papers 
is encouraging. On the other hand, 7 of 16 editors could recall no 
instances of publishing controversial empirical findings. Conse-
quently, we consider some strategies to increase the odds of 
publishing this type of paper in the next section. 
Possible solutions. Some methods that are currently used by 
journals should help. 
1. Some journals' editorial policies allow the author to submit 
a list of possible referees, one of whom would be selected. 
2. Items can be included on structured rating sheets so that 
reviewers rate the extent to which the findings are controver-
sial. Editors can then give such ratings more weight. 
3. Additional reviews can be sought when papers are judged 
to contain controversial findings. (This strategy was used for 
only one of the nine published papers and for only one of the six 
rejected papers in our survey.) 
4. Special appeal procedures may help for controversial pa-
pers. This might involve other members of the editorial board. 
5. Controversial papers can be reviewed initially without 
revealing the findings. This procedure is currently used by the 
International Journal of Forecasting. It has not been used 
frequently but, when used, it has been beneficial. 
6. Provide a section of the journal for "Controversial Find-
ings. " The selection of an editor for such a section would indicate 
the journal's willingness to provide space for such studies. 
Unfortunately, the one application of this approach that we 
know (Armstrong 1982b) has produced only one submission, 
and the findings reported in that submission were not contro-
versial, only the methods were. 
Rather than looking for agreement, it might be useful to seek 
reviewers to act as advocates. This advocacy system would be 
used for papers that are designated as containing controversial 
results. A paper could be so designated by the author, the 
editor, or a reviewer, after which special advocacy procedures 
would be used. This might include some of the above mentioned 
suggestions. In addition, one could use more reviewers in an 
effort to find an advocate. An advocate could insist on publica-
tion; a note could be included with the published paper so that 
reviewers are, in a sense, willing to stake their reputations on 
the paper.3 Through this note, the readers would receive 
information about the nature of the acceptance. All referees 
could be given the opportunity to write peer commentary on the 
paper. This procedure would greatly increase the likelihood that 
important papers would be published. The increased effort 
given to reviewing might also improve quality control. 
Conclusions. Controversial empirical papers are expected to 
receive harsh treatment in peer review, but our survey indicates 
that such works occasionally get published, sometimes without 
much peer agreement. More can be done to encourage publica-
tion, however. We suggest ways to accomplish this, in particu-
lar, the use of an advocacy procedure that explicitly recognizes 
the need to promote this type of research. 
N O T E S 
1. It is not clear that t h e qual i ty control function is performed well. 
About one-third of the papers in biomedical journals were found to 
contain citation errors, and one-third also incorrectly quoted findings 
from the literature (Evans et al. 1990). In addition, Hubbard and 
Armstrong (1990) found that 60% of published replications with exten-
sions in three leading market ing science journals failed to support the 
original findings. 
2. "Unfortunately," according to one respondent . Also, in followup 
p h o n e calls, several editors expressed the desire that more such work be 
submit ted. * 
3. McNutt et al. (1990) found no differences in t h e quality of reviews 
based on whether or not they Were signed by the reviewer . Also, those 
w h o signed the reviews w e r e more likely to recommewd acceptance. 
Reliability, fairness, objectivity and other 
inappropriate goals in peer review 
John C. Bailar 
Department ot Epidemiology and BiostaOstícs, McGill University School of 
Medicine, Montreal H3A 1A2, Canada 
The following remarks arc cast largely in terms of peer review of 
manuscripts for possible journal publication, but they also apply 
generally to peer review of grant proposals. 
Cicchetti consistently misses the mark. The purpose of peer 
review is not reliability, but to improve decisions concerning 
publication and funding, and these authors simply do not dis-
cuss this critical matter. 
Cicchetti fairly states the value of both redundancy and 
"creative" disagreement in peer review, but fails to acknowl-
edge adequately that editors and grants managers choose (and 
should choose) reviewers for their different, complementary 
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expertise. For example, a report on a randomized trial of a new 
drug for the control of hypertension might be sent to a car-
diologist, a pharmacologist, and a statistician. They would, and 
should, be alert to quite different kinds of strengths and prob-
lems, and there is no reason to expect either their detailed 
reports or their summary judgments to agree. Too much agree-
ment is in fact a sign that the review process is not working well, 
that reviewers are not properly selected for diversity, and that 
some are redundant. Without this negative point, measures of 
inter referee agreement are of no value in assessing peer review 
mechanisms. 
Cicchetti refers to the role of the reviewer in informing the 
judgment of the editor or grants manager, but does not ade-
quately stress the point that reviewers are no more than sources 
of relevant information. I know of no leading journal where 
decisions about publication are made by a "vote" of the re-
viewers. As a former editor (of JNCI [Journal of the National 
Cancer Institute], 1974-1980) I had a section on the reviewers' 
form asking for a judgment about publication (publish as submit-
ted, publish with minor revisions, etc.) and regularly found that 
it was of little value in sorting out the merits of a paper. There is 
no substitute for careful study of specific comments, integrated 
with the wisdom of editorial board members and, sometimes, 
special consultants. As a result, it was not unusual for us to 
publish papers that three reviewers had recommended for 
disapproval, and vice versa. 
A further point is that editors can adjust for (or sometimes 
deliberately use) reviewer bias. There has been few studies of 
the comments of peer reviewers to date, and all have focused on 
what reviewers write, not on the critical issue of how they have 
affected the information base on which a decision was made. I 
knew and regularly used reviewers who could never bring 
themselves to criticize a colleague directly, though their de-
tailed comments were full of insight. And I used others who 
could never find a paper good enough to publish; with appropri-
ate interpretation, their comments, too, were helpful. On rare 
occasion, when it appeared that an editorial decision might be 
challenged on the basis of the position or prestige of an author 
rather than scientific merit, I deliberately chose reviewers from 
one or the other camp to ensure that a strong and balanced 
review would be on the record. Some other editors do the same, 
and our journals have been the stronger for it. 
The paper by Peters and Ceci (1982) is a weak reed. Shortly 
after it was published, I wrote to Peters with some specific 
questions about their work. I made at least two telephone calls 
to verify his address at the time, but received no reply to my 
letter. Folklore to the contrary, few first-class letters are really 
lost by the Postal Service. I must assume that I received no reply 
because their answers would have undercut the strength of the 
conclusions in their paper. I cannot find my copy of the letter at 
this late date, but I recall that two points of special interest were 
how they "randomly" chose the papers they resubmitted (in 
more detail than was given in their paper), and how (also in 
detail) they revised titles and content to reduce the likelihood of 
detection of their own fraud. Most long-time editors have had 
the experience of publishing papers and almost immediately 
regretting the decision to publish, so that biased selection of 
winners or losers is simply not informative about practice in 
general. 
I am concerned that Cicchetti accepts without comment the 
appropriateness of studies carried out without the consent of the 
subjects, whether journals (and editors) or reviewers. Substan-
tial investments of time, and direct financial investments as 
well, have been requested under false pretenses in the name of 
"science." I know and understand the arguments that some 
research cannot be carried out if the subject is properly in-
formed, but reject any notion that such research thereby be-
comes ethical. 
Editors do, and should, base their editorial decisions in part 
on results. Many negative studies are never properly com-
pleted; others are presented in slap-dash fashion. Some are 
trivial because few knowledgeable investigators would have 
expected anything other than negative results; still others have 
samples too small to have much chance of showing a real effect 
even if one should be present. Many other negative studies are 
indeed published in the sense of "made public," but not as full-
length original contributions. Instead, their results may be 
disseminated as abstracts, in short sections of later papers that 
extend the work, or even by word of mouth. Arching over all of 
this is the proper concern of editors about their readers' in-
terests. I know of no evidence that readers are harmed by 
editorial decisions that depend in part on results. Many fewer 
people, and different people, may need to know that something 
did not work than would need to know what did work. A good 
editor must be even more concerned about readers' legitimate 
interests than about authors' complaints, and the "need to 
know" is chief among these. Thus, some kinds of bias against 
publication of negative results in the usual full form is entirely 
appropriate and should be encouraged. 
Cicchetti's section 7, on improving the reliability of peer 
review, tacitly takes improved reliability as an important goal. 
But the fundamental objective of peer review, and of the 
manuscript selection process in general, is not "fairness" to 
authors (though that may be a welcome byproduct). It is to 
improve decisions. Will larger numbers of reviewers, better 
training, or instructions for reviewing improve decisions? The 
matter has not been studied, perhaps because no one has yet 
devised a good measure of the quality of decisions to publish or 
disapprove. I know of no good statistical evidence that blinding 
reviewers to authors, or authors to reviewers, affects editorial 
decisions in generally good or bad ways. There is substantial 
anecdotal evidence, however, that both the strengths and the 
weaknesses of a paper are appraised more accurately when 
reviewers know who the authors are, but not vice versa. 
I find no recognition here that editorial decisions can, do, and 
should make use of criteria other than abstract scientific/ 
technical merit. Such criteria include originality, the suitability 
of the topic for a given journal, readability and the appropri-
ateness of length and style, the need for a balance of topics in 
journals with broad coverage, the importance of findings to 
readers, and even whether there is reason to suspect uncon-
scious bias or deliberate error in the data or the analysis. 
Overall, I believe that Cicchetti's paper shows a misunder-
standing of the role of peer review as an aid to editorial decisions 
and grants management. 
The predictive validity of peer review: A 
neglected issue 
Robert F. Bornstein 
Department of Psychology, Gettysburg College, Gettysburg, PA 17325 
Cicchetti's analysis of inter-reviewer reliability in manuscript 
and grant proposal assessments is both timely and valuable, and 
will help to resolve a number of unsettled issues in this area. 
Cicchetti - like most researchers investigating aspects of the 
peer review process - focuses mainly on reliability issues in peer 
review. His analysis confirms that inter-reviewer reliability in 
manuscript and grant proposal assessments is generally quite 
low. An important question remains unanswered, however: 
What do we know about the validity of peer review? Peer review 
is, at least in part, an assessment tool designed to identify the 
best research efforts in a given sample of manuscripts (see 
Bornstein 1990; Eichorn & VandenBos 1985). Thus, we should 
be able to demonstrate empirically that peer reviews have 
predictive validity and that reviews can discriminate high-
quality from low-quality research. 
Unfortunately, designing studies to investigate the predictive 
59 CICHETTI: THE RELIABII.ITY OF PEER REVIEW 
validity of peer review is considerably trickier than designing 
studies to assess inter-reviewer reliabilities. In particular, diffi-
culties in selecting an appropriate criterion measure with which 
to assess research quality have hindered efforts to conduct 
empirical research on this topic. Researchers typically use 
journal citation frequency as a criterion measure in these stud-
ies, testing the hypothesis that, if manuscript reviews, have 
predictive validity, then papers that receive highly positive 
reviews should be those that report the most important, well-
designed studies. These papers should therefore be cited more 
frequently than papers that receive less positive reviews (Gott-
fredson 1978). Although citation frequencies have been used to 
assess journal quality and the eminence of individual re-
searchers (Garfield 1972; Lindzey 1977), the use of citation 
indices as a measure of the quality of a particular piece of 
research is questionable for several reasons. 
First, we make a number of assumptions regarding the quality 
of research based on the journal in which it appears. If a paper is 
published in a prestigious journal, we infer that it must be good 
and valuable research. Were the same paper to appear in a less 
prestigious journal, it would most likely be seen as less rigorous 
and important, and we would be less likely to cite it. Clearly, the 
well-known "halo effect" (Nisbett & Wilson 1977) influences our 
perceptions of psychological research. 
Second, variables unrelated to research quality will influence 
the number of citations a paper receives. Mediocre research in 
an area that is tangentially related to a variety of topics will 
probably receive a greater number of citations than excellent 
research in a more obscure and narrowly defined area. Research 
on experimental design and methodology tends to be the most 
widely cited in all branches of science (see Lindsey 1978). This is 
not surprising, given that such papers have implications for a 
wide variety of topics. 
Third, if a relationship between citation frequency and re-
search quality does exist, this relationship is not likely to be 
linear. The relationship between research quality and citation 
frequency probably takes the form of a J-shaped curve, with 
exceedingly bad research cited more frequently than mediocre 
research (e.g., as an example of an idea or a line of research that 
turned out to be a blind alley, or as an example of what not to do 
in a particular area). 
Finally, this outcome criterion does not allow the predictive 
validity of negative manuscript reviews to be assessed. Because 
studies receiving negative reviews may never be published (or 
may be published in obscure journals having very limited 
readerships), it is not possible to use criteria such as citation 
indices to assess the validity of these reviews. 
In any case, there have been very few studies of the predictive 
validity of peer review, and the results of these have not been 
reassuring. Gottfredson (1978) compared reviewers' ratings of 
psychological research papers to the number of citations re-
ceived by these papers in the first nine years following publica-
tion. He found only low to moderate correlations between 
reviewers' estimates of manuscript quality and impact and the 
number of citations received by a paper. Reviewers' ratings of 
research impact were most strongly predictive of subsequent 
citation frequencies (R = .37). Ratings of research quality did 
not fare as well (R — .24). 
Thus, we know that: (1) inter-reviewer reliability in peer 
review is generally low (as Cicchetti et al. and others have 
demonstrated); and (2) we have no hard evidence that reviews 
have predictive (or discriminant) validity. To the extent that 
"confirmatory bias" (Mahoney 1985) and other variables unre-
lated to research quality demonstrably affect the outcome of 
peer reviews, the internal validity of the review process is also 
compromised. To anyone interested in the process of scientific 
inquiry and the dissemination of scientific knowledge, such 
findings are - to say the least - a bit unnerving. Because we 
regard peer review as a "test" or measure of the scientific worth 
of manuscripts and grant proposals (Bornstein 1990; Eichorn & 
VandenBos 1985), we should be able to demonstrate that this 
"test" is psychometrically sound. Yet, even a cursory reading of 
th^ American Psychological Association's Standards for educa-
tional and psychological testing (APA 1985) reveals that peer 
review fails miserably with respect to every technical criterion 
for establishing the reliability and validity of an assessment 
instrument (see APA 1985, pp. 9-44). If one attempted to 
publish research involving an assessment tool whose reliability 
and validity data were as weak as that of the peer review process, 
there is no question that studies involving this psychometrically 
flawed instrument would be deemed unacceptable for pub-
lication. 
It is not too late to make changes in the peer review process 
that will help improve its reliability and validity. Cicchetti 
makes some useful suggestions in this area, and other re-
searchers (e.g., Bornstein 1990; in press; Mahoney 1985; 1987) 
have also proposed procedures for improving the review pro-
cess. At any rate, in addition to investigating reliability in 
manuscript and grant proposal assessments, we must now 
rigorously assess the predictive and discriminant validity of peer 
review. Altering the peer review process in order to maximize 
its reliability and validity may be difficult (in practical/ 
procedural terms), costly (in monetary terms), and somewhat 
risky (the changes could create new problems instead of solving 
the old ones). I believe, however, that the costs and risks 
associated with changing - even experimenting with - the 
review process are far less than the costs and risks of continuing 
to support uncritically a process that, in its current form, has 
many significant flaws. 
Does group discussion contribute to the 
reliability of complex judgments? 
Patricia Cohen 
Columbia University School of Public Health and New York Stata 
Psychiatric Institute. New York, NY 10032 
Cicchetti is to be congratulated on a useful summary of our 
knowledge in this field. It seems reasonable to conclude that 
these complex human judgments cannot be made very reliably, 
a state of affairs that has also been demonstrated in other arenas, 
including student and personnel selection and the identification 
of diagnostic levels of psychopathology. As a long line of re-
search in these areas has shown, when more objective indices 
are available, they will typically have higher validities than 
decisions based on human judgment alone. Such objective 
measures in manuscript evaluation might include the status of 
the institution and the publication record of the authors. Alas, in 
such a case the "objective" criteria lead directly to the kind of 
bias that peer review is designed to minimize. 
When objective criteria are biased, the only sound alternative 
is to increase the number of evaluators, assuming that they will 
be less subject to such bias. Here practical constraints intrude, 
a5 it is hardly possible for all journals to obtain a sufficient 
number of reviewers for all articles to ensure a reliable com-
posite review. The situation is somewhat different with regard 
to peer review of grant proposals, however. Here two reviewers 
typically examine the entire set of materials provided and report 
both a summary and their critiques to a larger panel. The larger 
group then discusses the material presented to them and may 
often review some portion of the proposal as well, should a 
specific issue require it. This larger panel may be thought of as a 
means of increasing the size of the review panel and is certainly 
intended to improve the reliability and validity of the resulting 
judgment. 
To my knowledge, no hard evidence is available regarding the 
effectiveness of this subsequent segment of the review process. 
Because the judgments are very far from independent, and 
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because there are social and other disincentives to strong dis-
agreement, panel ratings cannot be used as evidence of real 
consensus. Nevertheless, in a period in which the ratio of 
available funds to trained scientists is shrinking, it seems worth-
while to consider full scientific investigation of this review 
process. For example, it is at least possible that averaged ratings 
from four independent reviewers of a proposal would agree with 
an average from four other independent reviewers at a higher 
level than would the ratings between reviews from two indepen-
dent groups that had been carried óut in the current fashion. A 
larger number of noninteracting "primary" reviewers of grant 
proposals might be no more demanding of either scientists' time 
or of agency funds than the current procedure. 
Other investigations of potential biases or sources of unre-
liability in the present grant review process are also easily 
imagined. For example, it is widely thought that inexperienced 
reviewers may be "tougher" on proposals than more experi-
enced reviewers. A peer review committee officer has also told 
me that grants reviewed early in a session tend to be discussed 
more thoroughly and thus evaluated more critically than those 
reviewed later. Information on both of these issues could be 
compiled readily. If they were found to be nontrivial sources of 
bias, reviewers could be made aware of these problems in an 
attempt to minimize them. 
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that measures of agreement 
may overestimate the reliability of the judgments concerning 
grants or manuscripts in the critical region of decision where the 
cut-off occurs. In the present framework of extremely tight 
funding, a cool reception by a single reviewer may be sufficient 
to preclude a fundable priority. Therefore, differences between 
rating scale use habits of different committee members can 
make some members much more influential with regard to the 
funding outcome than others. If ratings were standardized for 
each committee member before they were combined, or if 
members were each to place grants into the same preset dis-
tribution, potential abuses relating to this likely source of error 
would be eliminated. 
Consensus and the reliability of peer-review 
evaluations 
Stephen Cole 
Department of Sociology, State University of New York at Stony Brook, 
Stony Brook. NY 11794 
Research I have conducted suggests that the low levels of 
reliability in peer review evaluations described by Cicchetti are 
not an artifact of the peer-re view system or of reviewer bias, but 
reflect the low levels of cognitive consensus that exists at the 
research frontier of all scientific disciplines (Cole 1983; Cole et 
al. 1981). I have argued that the level of cognitive consensus in 
the social sciences is not significantly lower than that in the 
natural sciences. Cicchetti presents some evidence supporting 
this view. Discussing the peer-review system used by Physical 
Review Letters, he quotes from the editors' policy statement on 
how difficult it is to make decisions; in only 10 to 15% of 
submissions do the 2 referees agree on whether the article 
should be accepted or rejected. Cicchetti concludes that if a 
more systematic study were undertaken, "we would predict 
that levels of referee consensus for Physical Review Letters 
would be of the same relatively low order of magnitude . . . 
characterizing general journals in many other disciplines" (sect. 
4.5). 
The assumption that the natural sciences have higher levels of 
consensus than the social sciences has been used to explain and 
justify the higher rejection rates of social science journals 
(Hargens 1988). I see the difference in rejection rates between 
natural and social science journals as resulting from differences 
in the amount of space available, the diffuseness of a field's 
journal system, and, most important, norms concerning the 
desirability of making Type I or Type II errors (Cole et al 1978; 
1988). Natural scientists prefer to make Type I errors; social 
scientists, Type II errors. 
My analysis leads me to be more critical than Cicchetti of 
current journal practices. He believes that since most articles in 
high-rejection-rate fields are eventually published and since 
authors of many rejected articles in low-rejection-rate fields do 
not resubmit, the system is working well. I agree with him for 
the low-rejection-rate fields, but disagree for the high-rejection-
rate fields. 
If there are approximately equal and low levels of consensus 
in fields like physics and sociology, respectively, this means that 
physics journals are publishing papers that many physicists 
believe are of little significance and sociology journals are 
rejecting papers that many sociologists would find useful. The 
policy followed in physics allows the diverse scientific communi-
ty to decide what is useful and neglect the published articles that 
are not useful. The policy followed by the sociology journals 
allows a sample of two or three referees influenced by norms 
calling for high rejection rates to make this decision. This has 
many negative consequences for the development of the field. 
We must realize that as a result of lack of consensus and norms 
supporting high rejection rates, many of these rejections are 
"unjustified," thus giving the field a pervasive sense of inequity, 
bias against some work styles, and irrationality. This serves to 
reduce motivation and seriously interferes with the communica-
tion of ideas. 
In physics, two journals, the Physical Review and the Physical 
Review Letters, publish a large portion of all the literature. By-
monitoring what is published in these journals physicists can be 
sure of being up-to-date on their research interests. In sociology 
the two leading journals publish a very small portion of the 
literature in the field. Much research that would be of use to 
some segments of the community is rejected from high-visibility 
journals and must be published in obscure sources. This makes 
it more difficult to keep up with the latest developments in areas 
of interest. Communication is further hampered by long delays, 
sometimes amounting to years, resulting from the inefficient 
publication system. 
The only disadvantage for a field like sociology in switching its 
publication system to one more similar to that used by the 
physicists would be the increased cost of journal publication. 
But given the importance of publication for advancing one's 
career, it would seem that most authors would be willing to 
reduce the length of their papers and pay modest page charges, 
even if they had to pay these out of their own pockets. 
Another possible argument against increasing the acceptance 
rate in high-rejection-rate fields would be the potential decrease 
in the quality of published articles. Among those who argue that 
journal rejection rates result from the level of disciplinary 
consensus there is the implicit assumption that because of a lack 
of agreed-on criteria in the social sciences most articles submit-
ted to the journals are of "poor" quality and not "really" 
publishable. There are two problems with this assumption. 
First, it assumes that, because most of the articles submitted to 
natural science journals are accepted, they "really" deserve to 
be published. Many studies of citation patterns, however, have 
shown that the bulk of articles published in physics journals, for 
example, are rarely if ever cited (Meyer 1979). There is also 
qualitative evidence that natural scientists are just as likely as 
social scientists to disparage the quality of articles in their 
journals. For example, Mulkay and Williams (1971), in their 
study of physicists in England, report that "all our respondents 
thought that the vast majority of papers in the journals which 
they read were of poor quality or of little significance." (p. 74) 
The second assumption is that the articles rejected by the 
social science journals "deserve" to be rejected. Stinchcombe 
and Ofshe (1969) conducted an analysis in which they assumed 
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the validity of a judgment of an article to be about .70. (We know 
from the data presented by Cicchetti that it is actually much 
lower.) They then showed that, given this assumption and the 
fact that only about 15% of submitted articles are published, 
almost as many papers that "truly" deserve to be published will 
be rejected as will be accepted. Given the real reliability of 
judgments, it is probable that more papers that "truly" deserve 
to be published are rejected than accepted. Even under the 
current system most sociologists believe that the bulk of the 
articles published in the leading journals are of poor quality and 
of little interest. As a result of low levels of consensus, these 
feelings are probably common in all scientific fields. 
Additional evidence against the view that lower rejection 
rates would reduce quality are the findings of Garvey et al. 
(1970) that a significant portion of articles published in "core" 
social science journals had previously been rejected by one or 
more journals. I am not suggesting that journals in fields like 
sociology publish all or even a majority of articles submitted. I 
am suggesting, however, that they gradually increase the pro-
portion of submissions published. 
If low levels of peer review reliability are caused by a lack of 
consensus, is there anything we can do to improve the reliabili-
ty? Cicchetti suggests increasing the number of reviewers. 
Because the selected reviewers are essentially a small sample 
from the population of eligible reviewers, the larger this sample 
is, the more likely it is that the sample statistic (the mean rating 
of the reviewers) will approximate the population statistic (the 
mean rating we would obtain if all eligible reviewers partici-
pated in the evaluation process). But this would not necessarily 
help us make a "better" decision about whether to publish the 
paper. Would we want to make publication contingent on the 
relative proportion of the population who would recommend 
publication? Following such a policy, innovative work that goes 
against current ways of thinking might not be published. 
The situation for the distribution of grants is different. Here 
there is a limited amount of money to be distributed and the 
scientific community does not have the power to increase the 
size of this pool. It is therefore necessary to be able to give 
priority ranks to submitted proposals. Because of the inherent 
lack of consensus on research-frontier science, it is inevitable 
that many worthwhile proposals will be rejected and that some 
proposals of little value will be funded. This was the major 
finding of my peer review study (Cole ct al. 1981). The problem 
here is the failure to recognize lack of consensus as the reality we 
must deal with. If we recognize this, there are a number of steps 
we can take to reduce (but never eliminate) the impact of 
random factors on the allocation of grant funds. The most 
important step is for such funding agencies as the National 
Science Foundation to recognize publicly that many rejected 
proposals are as worthy of funding as many accepted proposals. 
If they were to do this, they could set up an appeals procedure in 
which appeals would be treated sympathetically instead of as the 
complaints of "cranks." If such an appeals system were function-
ing properly, a significant portion of appeals should result in the 
awarding of grants, even at the expense of reducing the amount 
of funds available for the next round of new proposals. 
In summary, the data suggest that the reliability of peer 
review can be improved by increasing the number of reviewers, 
but that given the inherent lack of consensus in science, this will 
not help solve the problem. Lack of consensus must be recog-
nized as a reality; we can then introduce policies to minimize its 
effect on the development of knowledge and the careers of 
individual scientists. 
Unreliable peer review: Causes and cures of 
human misery 
Andrew M. Colman 
Department of Psychology, University of Leicester, Leicester LE1 7RH, 
England 
According to John Ziman (1968), the referee involved in the 
process of peer review is "the linchpin about which the whole 
business of science is pivoted" (p. 111). But, as the same 
commentator pointed out, "the most vexed and contentious 
topic in the business of scientific communication is the role of 
the referees, their danger as censors of new ideas, the pro-
cedures for appeal against their decisions, and so on" (Ziman 
1976, p. 104). Cicchetti has marshalled a considerable body of 
evidence that shows referees' evaluations of scientific docu-
ments to be lamentably unreliable, and the topic is more vexed 
and contentious than ever. I shall confine my commentary to 
two possible remedies, only one of which was discussed by 
Cicchetti and to what I see as the root cause of the problem. 
Cicchetti summarized several arguments for and against blind 
review, which is designed to eliminate the effect of referee bias 
toward individual authors or institutions. The debate about 
blind review is somewhat scholastic, in my view, because there 
is little evidence to show that this kind of crude referee bias is a 
significant factor. Even Peters őr Ceci's (1982) well-known data 
on the fate of published articles resubmitted with fictitious 
authors and institutional affiliations can best be explained in 
terms of random error without invoking referee bias, and Oc-
cam's razor bids us reject the bias hypothesis in favor of the 
simpler random error null hypothesis (Colman 1982b). One 
important point that is worth adding to Cicchetti's remarks 
about blind review is that a grant applicant's past record of 
research could with some justification be considered a signifi-
cant factor in predicting the likely outcome of any new award 
that the applicant might receive and ought, perhaps, to be taken 
into account by the referees. Blind review entails the deliberate 
concealment of this potentially relevant information. 
The use of multiple (more than two) independent referees is 
not a remedy that appeals to me, although it has its supporters, 
including Behavioral and Brain Sciences (BBS). My reserva-
tions about multiple refereeing are based partly on the findings 
of research in social psychology and partly on commonsensc 
considerations. Experimental evidence suggests that the in-
volvement of several referees would produce a well-docu-
mented phenomenon characterized by a decrease in individual 
effort, called "social loafing" (Latané et al. 1979), and would also 
encourage diffusion of responsibility (Darley Őt Latané 1968). 
Both of these phenomena are likely to undermine the general 
quality, and hence the reliability of referees' reports. People 
tend to apply themselves more diligently and to behave with 
greater social responsibility when they feel that their input is 
important and that their efforts are likely to be instrumental in 
influencing outcomes (Golman 1982a, Chapter 9), but in the 
peer review process this feeling of instrumentality is bound to 
be an inverse function of the number of referees. 
Second, multiple refereeing tends to increase the nonproduc-
tive component of scientists' workloads. The volume of material 
that requires refereeing is already daunting: Some 40,000 scien-
tific journals currently publish approximately two new articles 
per minute (Mahoney 1982). Refereeing manuscripts and grant 
applications is difficult, time-consuming, and generally unre-
warding work. What is worse, conscientious refereeing is an 
ultimately self-defeating activity because it tends to generate 
ever-increasing workloads. Conscientious referees find their 
popularity with editors increasing and more and more manu-
scripts landing on their desks long after their own research has 
begun to suffer, until they cannot even éope with their referee-
ing work efficiently. It is clear that the reinforcement structure 
of science punishes virtuous behavior and rewards sloppy, 
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superficial, casual, thoughtless, insensitive, inefficient, and 
therefore unreliable refereeing. Any increase in the number of 
manuscripts and grant applications that scientists are called 
upon to referee as a result of the introduction of multiple 
refereeing is likely to exacerbate the malaise and eat further into 
the time they should be devoting to doing science. In summary, 
multiple refereeing seems both counterproductive and gra-
tuitously labor intensive. 
The most important safeguard, not even mentioned by Cic-
chetti, against bias and incompetence on the part of referees, 
would be an automatic author's right of reply to referees' 
criticisms. Under the peer review system in its conventional 
form, authors of scientific papers and grant applicants often find 
themselves in a Kafkaesque situation analogous to that of a 
person prosecuted and condemned in a court of law without any 
right of defense. Sometimes, scientific work is rejected on 
grounds that the authors believe, rightly or wrongly, to be 
demonstrably invalid. In my view, before reaching a final 
judgment, editors and those who award research grants, should 
routinely solicit the authors' responses to the referees' crit-
icisms, and if necessary the referees' replies to the authors 
responses, until a clear resolution of the issue emerges. It may 
sometimes be necessary to submit the original manuscript 
together with the referees' reports, the authors' responses, and 
the referees' replies to a qualified independent arbiter before a 
fair decision can be reached. This procedure was implemented 
when I was editor of Current Psychology: Research 6- Reviews. I 
found it immensely helpful, and there is no doubt that at the 
very least it increased the face validity of the manuscript evalua-
tion process. Although this is clearly no panacea, I feel sure that 
if it were generally implemented, it would make authors, 
editors, and even referees feel happier about the peer review 
process. I am reasonably optimistic that the reliability and 
validity of the process would correspondingly improve. 
Evaluating scholarly works: How many 
reviewers? How much anonymity? 
John D. Cone 
School ol Human Behavior, United States International University. 10455 
Pom era do Roed, San Diego, CA 92131 
Cicchetti documents fairly convincingly that: Researchers agree 
on the "normative" criteria to apply in judging a paper's schol-
arly worthiness; they disagree on the application of these criteria 
to given manuscripts and on the punishability of given papers. 
Cicchetti also asserts the commonly held belief that "levels of 
interreferee agreement are substantially higher for journals in 
the physical sciences." 
It would be of some interest to know more about interreferee 
agreement on judgments about manuscripts submitted to phys-
ical science journals. Conducting such studies would require 
care in controlling certain likely confounding factors, however. 
For example, in comparing agreement for relatively focused 
journals (e.g., Nuclear Physics, Condensed Matter) with rela-
tively more diffuse ones (e.g., General Physics, Particles and 
Fields), the number of reviewers would need to be held con-
stant. The common belief that reviewing is more reliable in the 
physical sciences may stem from the greater use of the single 
initial reviewer system in the physical sciences. It might be that 
such a system yields higher acceptance rates. This is because 
higher acceptance rates might be prevalent when less critical 
reviewing is undertaken. The basis for this reasoning is the 
assumption that reviewing is at least partially under audience 
control. If so, the mere presence of another reviewer could lead 
to more critical reviews and, in turn, to higher rates of rejection. 
If audience control w a factor, the "partial anonymity of the 
reviewer case" should lead to greater rejection rates than the 
. "total anonymity case." It would be interesting to investigate 
this prediction. 
The well-designed study would vary both the number of 
reviewers and the level of anonymity and use acceptance rates 
and interreviewer reliability as its dependent variables. My 
prediction would be for lowest acceptance and highest agree-
ment rates for the multiple reviewers subjected to only partial 
anonymity, because reviewers who know that others are per-
forming the same task and that agreement is to be checked will 
tend to be more conscientious. The increased vigilance associ-
ated with such reviewing will turn up more concerns about 
aspects of the submission and lead to a greater probability of 
rejecting it. Related data on this issue are available in the direct 
observation assessment literature, where it has been shown that 
observers who know they are being checked for agreement tend 
to be more reliable and to record more of the behavior being 
observed (e.g., Romanczyk et al. 1973). 
Cicchetti provides no evidence for his assertion that "manu-
scripts requiring more than one reviewer tend to be those that 
are problematic." It could be that using multiple reviewers 
merely turns up more problems. This being the case, the use of 
more than one reviewer should be associated with lower rates of 
acceptance, as Cicchetti's Table 3 indeed reveals. 
An undiscussed variable in the Cicchetti review is submission 
rate. Journals with fewer submissions might be expected to have 
higher rates of acceptance, a supposition given some support by 
the data in Table 3. In behavioral psychology the proliferation of 
journals has led to correspondingly fewer submissions to any 
one journal. Associated rates of acceptance have therefore gone 
up. Research on reviewer reliability needs to take this into 
account. A journal with relatively fewer submissions (e.g., the 
Nuclear Physics section of Physical Review) will tend to have 
higher acceptance rates than one with two or three times the 
submissions (e.g., General Physics, Condensed Matter). Accep-
tance rates or judgments and their reliability should be com-
pared for journals with equivalent submission rates; this would 
help control for any tendency toward leniency just to keep the 
pages filled. 
Another variable worthy of study is the acceptance/rejection 
base rate of a particular journal and the reviewers' knowledge 
thereof. While these can be adequately controlled with appro-
priate statistics (e.g., kappa, Rt) in the computation of agree-
ment, the reviewers' judgments themselves may be partly 
determined by their knowledge of base-rate acceptance levels 
for the particular journal. The base-rate problem has long been 
studied in clinical decision making in psychology; it is well 
established that clinicians' "hit" rates for particular diagnoses 
vary with the base rates of the diagnoses in the population. If 
agreement with the editor's ultimate decision is viewed as a 
"hit," and something reviewers strive to accomplish, base rates 
would need to be controlled when comparing acceptance and, 
possibly, reviewer agreements across journals. 
Finally, while I am generally sympathetic to Cicchetti's ob-
servations and recommendations and found his review a good 
stimulus for some of my own verbal behavior, I did puzzle over 
his summary of Mahoney's studies. He asserts that the best 
available evidence shows that reviewers apply subjective crite-
ria in judging scholarly submissions. As support for this asser-
tion he points to the fact that manuscripts were "accepted or 
rejected on the basis of whether the findings were positive, 
negative, or mixed, rather than on the basis of their worthiness." 
It is not clear what is subjective about this. Indeed, basing 
decisions on outcome should be one of the more objective 
approaches to the process. Moreover, contrary to Cicchetti, it 
should have a positive influence on the reliability and validity of 
peer review. After all, at least in the behavioral sciences, it is not 
obvious that there is all that much that is worthy about a study 
that fails to reject the null hypothesis. 
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What should be done to Improve reviewing? 
Rick Crandall 
Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, Box 9838, San Rafael, CA 
94912 
The title of this commentary uses the word should rather than 
can because there is a professional ethical issue here that is not 
being faced by journals. Cicchetti's target article makes it 
obvious that the review process is unreliable. This conclusion 
should be dealt with, yet most journals blithely continue to use 
the process without trying to improve it. We must question the 
validity of the review process, and in fact the whole editorial 
process, for at least four reasons. First, there is no evidence to 
support them. The fact that very few journals are making any 
effort to improve the editorial process is unethical, in my 
opinion. (Crandall 1990). Second, low reliability can limit 
validity. Third, Cicchetti and numerous others have docu-
mented the existence of systematic biases in the editorial pro-
cess. It is frightening that, with the lack of other data on 
systematic "true" variance in the review or editorial process, 
one must wonder whether these biases account for the little 
reliability we do achieve. Fourth, in most fields, the majority of 
papers that are turned down are ultimately published in good 
journals. 
It is clear to me that if we really wanted to, we could achieve 
high reviewer reliability. Although many remedies could help, 
the obvious one is to train reviewers. If we can train small dogs 
to jump up and down off moving horses at the circus, surely we 
can train scientists to act as reviewers, despite the complexity of 
the task. Thus, I believe that underlying the question of what 
should be done is why we haven't bothered. Although I may 
tend toward a moralistic interpretation of the reason, it is likely 
that "people" don't think better review reliability is really 
needed, or the payback would not justify the investment 
required. 
Our journal has a major focus on testing and improving the 
editorial/review process. We have some unpublished data doc-
umenting the lack of existing training for reviewers by journals. 
Of 76 social and behavioral sciences editors who answered the 
question, "Do your reviewers receive any training, besides a 
general instruction sheet?" only two said yes, and their training 
was not major. It is clear that training is totally neglected. 
Reviewers must be expected to learn on the job at authors' 
expense. I had to laugh when I saw the recent American 
Psychological Association announcements recruiting members 
of underrepresented groups to be reviewers for journals. The 
only qualification mentioned was that they must have published 
articles in peer reviewed journals, because "the experience of 
publishing provides a reviewer with the basis for preparing a 
thorough, objective evaluative review" (American Psychologist 
1989). This is logically analogous to requiring people to be 
executed before they can become hangmen. I guess it is better 
than nothingl 
What training can be done? Some journals do some minimal 
training or screening of reviewers. I'm sure that editors try to 
weed out "bad" reviewers, so they should be gradually improv-
ing their pool. Cicchetti suggests that reviewers should be 
rewarded in some way. Several journals, including ours; have 
some explicit procedure for adding and subtracting reviewers 
from the published editorial panels depending on their work. 
The most common training approach is probably to exchange 
reviews after the decision so that each reviewer can learn from 
the other. This could be improved considerably if the editor's 
decision letter wer« sent to the reviewers or if they were told 
explicitly how good their review was and what the other re-
viewer did right or wrong. In other words, review the reviewsl 
It would be a logical next step to have training manuscripts with 
prototype "ideal" reviews. When you train people (or animals) 
to perform a task, you also have explicit training goals and 
criteria. These should be written down and transmitted to 
reviewers. 
It has been demonstrated that reviewers are, in fact, traina-
ble. To use a simple, confirmed example, we have been suc-
cessful in requiring reviewers to return reviews in two weeks. 
This was discussed and documented 20 years ago by a sociology 
journal editor (Rodman 1970). 
Another group in need of training is authors. Many manu-
scripts that come in to our journal would probably be better 
received if they were better presented. Although I have argued 
that efforts to get authors to "improve" (Boor 1986) amount to 
blaming the victim and would be better spent testing the 
process (Crandall 1987b), author training could improve things a 
bit. What may be more important than presentation variables, 
however, is educating all authors to the "folklore" of how to 
improve their chances of getting published. We have attempted 
to do this (Anon. 1987; Wyer et al. 1987). 
A number of other issues could be elaborated on in this area. I 
have mentioned only a few here. Elsewhere, I have suggested a 
number of simple standards that should be required of journals 
to make improvements (Crandall 1986). Among them are en-
larging the pool of reviewers and editors so the excuse about 
being "overworked volunteers" could be eliminated, and re-
quiring journals to make timely decisions and to commit to 
doing research to improve things. 
I have a few brief reactions to other points raised by Cicchetti. 
He suggests using more reviewers to increase reliability. We do 
that, and it also increases speed, since you don't have to wait for 
a slow third reviewer. Their Table 3 data on the effects of adding 
reviewers on acceptance rates may also be relevant here, how-
ever. Causality goes in both directions. In addition to weaker 
papers being sent out for more reviews, they note elsewhere 
that the more reviewers you have, the greater the chance that an 
important flaw will be caught. Unfortunately, there is also a 
greater chance that a negative "picky" review will encourage an 
editor to reject the paper. Common sense, as well as experimen-
tal evidence (Amabile 1983), tells us that when a journal (or 
grant) review process rejects 75% of the submissions, a reviewer 
will look a lot smarter erring on the side of harsh criticism than 
on the side of leniency. I believe that reviewers have a negative 
bias unless trained otherwise. 
A very important issue tends to be overlooked in discussions 
of reviewing. We have editors who are supposed to be capable of 
making independent decisions. With their exposure to all pa-
pers submitted, they should be "super reviewers." Yet, too 
many times editors may abdicate responsibility for editorial 
decisions. They should not Be conducting a vote and averaging 
reviewers opinions. They can override reviewers! They should 
be using the reviewers to review and making the editorial 
decisions themselves. Too many times, I've seen cases in which 
editors do not seem to behave this way. I believe that many 
editors do not even read the papers for which they are supposed 
to have editorial responsibility. If they don't read them closely, 
how can they be the editors? Or how can they give reviewers 
feedback, as discussed earlier? 
We need more highlighting of issues in the review process as 
Cicchetti et al. have done. We also need to take a broader look at 
the problems, and have a commitment by journals, associations, 
agencies, and reviewers to do a better job. I have directly 
challenged groups who publish journals to take responsibility 
and do something about these problems even more pointedly 
than I have here (e.g., Crandall 1987a). There has been little or 
no response. And I have seen little progress or commitment in 
the last 10 years. Why do you think this is? 
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Peer review: Explicit criteria and training can 
help 
Fred Delcomyn 
Department of Entomology and Neuroscience Program, University of 
Illinois. Urbana, IL 61801 
Electronic mail: bugoutfd@uxl.cso.uiuc.edu 
I doubt there is an active scientist in the United States who 
could not write an essay on peer review at least as long as 
Cicchetti's excellent target article. It is inevitable that our 
passions will be aroused by a process that can determine the 
success or failure of applications for funding or the acceptance or 
rejection of journal articles. After all, careers are at stake. Does 
peer review work? Yes, up to a point, as the target article shows. 
Peer review can be used to classify documents like grant applica-
tions into broad categories such as excellent, fair, and poor. 
Expecting it to allow one to distinguish between applications 
that are all in the excellent category, however, is like expecting 
to be able to measure the diameter of a nerve cell with a meter 
stick. 
I think the prospects for refining peer review for the selection 
or rejection of manuscripts for publication is greater. Cicchetti 
makes several good suggestions, but other things can be done as 
well. I have two specific proposals: Make the criteria to be used 
in a review more uniform and explicit, and "train" reviewers. 
Explicit criteria. What is the point of making review criteria 
more explicit? We all know what constitutes a good paper, right? 
Wrong. As Cicchetti points out, two reviewers can make similar 
comments about a paper and yet have opposite recommenda-
tions as to its acceptability. Let's cut down on this kind of 
conflicting advice by agreeing on the ground rules. These rules 
may be different in different disciplines, even in different fields, 
but there is no reason journals cannot develop an explicit set of 
guidelines for acceptable manuscripts, guidelines that can be 
published in the journals themselves. 
What should these criteria or guidelines be? Some journals 
already provide a partial list in their forms to reviewers. The 
Journal of Experimental Biology, for example, asks reviewers 
for an assessment of experimental techniques, presentation of 
data, and quality of reasoning, among others. There are clearly 
many other aspects of a paper that can be evaluated. Based on 
my experience as a physiologist, I will make three specific 
suggestions. 
(1) Do the experiments whose results are reported answer 
the questions set out in the introduction? I see no point in 
cluttering an already crowded literature with a publication that 
confuses issues by seeming to address one question when it 
actually addresses another (or none at all). 
(2) Are the experiments carefully executed and controlled? 
The issue here is whether conclusions can confidently be drawn 
from the results, or are the procedures so flawed that no firm 
conclusions can be made. 
(3) Are the conclusions that the author(s) draw supported by 
the data actually presented? There is a place for speculation and 
formulation of new hypotheses, but authors must obviously take 
care to separate their conclusions from their speculations. 
What if the data seem to contradict someone's favorite hy-
pothesis? Too often one hears of the struggles of a researcher to 
publish work that disputes someone else's data or interpreta-
tions. Here is where explicit criteria would be so helpful. If the 
research is well done, and the answer to each of the three 
questions above is affirmative, then there is no reason not to 
publish the work. It should not be the job of the referees or 
editor to settle scientific disputes. As long as there is no error 
that can be identified in the work, let it be published and let 
those whose work is called into question do the necessary 
experiments to settle the matter. That's the best way to make 
progress. 
Using explicit criteria will not eliminate the ability of an editor 
to select what to publish. Such other more subjective criteria as 
importance or timeliness can still be used. Explicit criteria will 
just cut down on rejections because of the controversial nature 
of someone's work. 
Reviewer training. Do we really need to "train" reviewers? Of 
course we do. I doubt that anyone who has reviewed more than a 
few years would say that their early reviews were as good as their 
later ones. Even experienced reviewers find their approaches to 
papers changing with time. One not only learns what to look for 
in a papier, one also learns how to phrase a criticism so it does not 
seem like a personal attack on the author. 
What can be done to train reviewers? First, journals can draw 
up more explicit and detailed instructions to reviewers than are 
presently sent out. (In neurobiology, my experience is that 
usually no instructions at all are sent.) A copy of the criteria or 
guidelines for what constitutes a good paper would be a start. 
Some explicit statement that reviewers should stick to objective 
descriptions of the paper, and not make derogatory comments 
about the authors) might also help. 
Another approach I have found useful as a reviewer is to 
receive copies of the remarks of other reviewer(s) after I have 
sent mine in. Cicchetti mentions this possibility. From the 
standpoint of curiosity, it would be interesting to know who the 
other reviewer was, but this is not really necessary. What is 
important is seeing a colleague's opinion of the paper, to see if 
you missed an important point, or for younger reviewers, just to 
see how someone else handles the entire review process. 
It is not likely that the system of peer review will change any 
time soon. If we have to live with it, the least we can do is to 
organize it in such a way that we make sure we all play by the 
same agreed-on rules. Periodic evaluations of the peer review 
system, such as this target article, are important steps to this 
goal. 
Different rates of agreement on acceptance 
and rejection: A statistical artifact? 
Marilyn E. Demorest 
Department of Psychology, University of Maryland Baltimore County, 
Catonsville, MD 21228 
Electronic mail: demorest@umbc.bltnet 
An important substantive finding that emerges from Cicchetti's 
target article is that reviewers of manuscripts and grant pro-
posals appear to have higher rates of agreement on rejec-
tion/disapproval than on acceptance/approval. This conclusion 
is based on category-specific rates of agreement as shown in 
Tables 5 and 6: Given that one reviewer makes a particular 
recommendation, what percentage of the time does the second 
reviewer agree? The data clearly indicate higher percentage 
agreement for negative recommendations (70%—83%) than for 
positive ones (41%-60%). 
A statistical interpretation of these findings is that the higher 
agreement rates on negative recommendations reflect their 
higher prevalence. The omnibus agreement statistics reported 
throughout the review (intraclass correlation and weighted or 
unweighted kappa) corrected for chance levels of agreement. 
(Indeed it is the adoption of chance agreement as the null model 
for evaluating observed agreement that makes the reliability of 
peer reviews appear so dismally low!) The same standard has not 
been applied in evaluating agreement on a category-by-category 
basis, however. When category-specific agreement rates are 
corrected for chance, they are shown to be identical for accep-
tance and rejection. 
To illustrate, consider the data presented for the Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology. The reconstructed agreement matrix is 
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shown in Table 1, assuming equal marginal rates for the two 
reviewers. As shown in the table of expected frequencies, by 
chance there would be 35% agreement for acceptances and 65% 
agreement for rejections. If the observed agreement rates are 
corrected for chance using kappa, the result is identical values of 
.14, which coincide with the values of the omnibus kappa and 
the intraclass R reported by Cicchetti. A moment's reflection 
(and a little algebra) reveals that for the dichotomous case it 
could not be otherwise. Any disagreement is simultaneously a 
disagreement about acceptance and about rejection. Reviewers 
cannot in principle disagree at different rates for the two catego-
ries, once the chance level of agreement is taken into account. 
Because there are additional degrees of freedom when three 
or more categories are analyzed, it is possible that differential 
agreement could have been identified had the data not been 
dichotomized. Data on submissions to the American Psychol-
ogist, presented by Whitehurst (1984) and analyzed by Cicchetti 
(1985, Table 4, p. 567), provide an example. Table 2 shows the 
five gating categories, their prevalence, percentages of observed 
agreement, chance agreement, and chance-corrected agree-
ment. Of the three observed percentages, the highest is clearly 
for outright rejection. This category was used 50% of the time by 
the reviewers, however, and therefore its expected agreement 
is also high. The chance-corrected agreement rates are quite 
comparable for unconditional acceptance and unconditional 
rejection. 
Although Cicchetti is careful to interpret his results cau-
tiously and note limitations on generalization, he speculates that 
journals with higher acceptance rates might demonstrate the 
"reverse phenomenon," higher agreement rates for acceptance 
than rejection. Indeed, just such a prediction would be made 
from a consideration of chance levels of agreement if the base 
rate for acceptance exceeds 50%. If correction for chance is 
deemed appropriate when evaluating overall agreement among 
reviewers, it must surely be relevant when considering catego-
ry-specific rates of agreement. Although reviewers may use 
different criteria and judgment processes for negative and 
positive evaluations, substantive interpretation of differences in 
agreement rates for acceptance and rejection should be sus-
pended pending evidence that the differences exceed what 
would be expected by chance. 
Table 1 (Demorest). Reviewer agreement for the "Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology" (from Cicchetti et al. Table 5: 
Review Number 2) 
Observed Frequencies 
Category 
Reject Accept Total % Agreement 
Review Accept 258 204 462 44 
No. 1 Reject 599 258 857 70 
Total 857 462 1,319 
Expected Frequencies 
Category 
Reject Accept Total % Agreement 
Review Accept 300 162 462 35 
No. I Reject 557 300 857 65 
Total 857 462 1,319 
Note: Intraclass R= . 14; kappa for agreement on acceptance = 
(.44 — .35)/(l — .35) = .14; kappa for agreement on rejection = 
(.70 - .65)/(l - .65) = .14. 
Table 2 (Demorest). Category-specific agreement (%) for 
American Psychologist submissions (from Cicchetti 1985) 
Type of Agreement 
Corrected 
Category Prevalence Observed Chance for Chance 
1 10.3 55 6 10.2 50.5 
2 8.6 26.7 6.7 21 4 
3 18.4 68.8 18.3 61 7 
4 12 6 54.5 12.5 48.0 
5 50.0 75.9 50.0 51.7 
Note. Categories are defined as 1 = accept as is, 2 = accept 
with minor revisions, 3 = reject and recommend resubmission 
after revision, 4 = reject and recommend resubmission to an-
other journal, 5 = reject. 
A P P E N D I X 
The kappa coefficient for category-specific agreement may be 
formed in the same manner as the conventional kappa statistic: 
(p0 — pc)/(l ~ pc). Letting n u , n12, n21, and n22 represent the 
frequencies in a 2 X 2 agreement matrix, the observed agree-
ment rate for category 1 is the number of agreements in category 
1, divided by the average number of category 1 ratings made by 
the two observers (Cicchetti 1985): 
„ nn  
Poll)
 i(n„ + n12) + (n„ + n21))/2 
- 2nn/(2n,i + ni2 + n2i). 
The number of agreements expected by chance for category 1 
is ( n n + n12) (nn + n 2 , ) / (n n + n12 + n21 + n22). Thus, the 
chance agreement rate for category 1 is: 
= 2(nn + ni2) (nn + "21) 0(1
 (nn + "12 + "21 +1122) (2nn + ni2 + n2i) 
Substituting these values in the formula for kappa and simplify-
ing yields: 
£ _ 2("n"22 — "2inia)  
1
 2nnn22 + n2iz + nJ2z + (nu + n^ (n2, + n12) 
The same result emerges if the subscripts are interchanged and 
K is calculated for category 2 rather than category 1. Thus for the 
dichotomous case, the category-specific agreement rates, K, 
and K2, are identical. 
When nonreliability of reviews indicates 
solid science 
Douglas Lee Eckberg 
Department of Sociology. Winthrop College. Rock Hill, SC 29733 
Cicchetti begins by arguing that low inter rater reliability in 
reviews is a scientific "problem" that challenges science's claim 
of special knowledge. Should we accept this justification for 
their research? I believe not. I reject the idea that inter rater 
agreement has a relationship to validity of scientific knowledge 
at any but extremes of reliability. There are several interlocking 
reasons for this. 
Decisions to accept or reject submissions seldom rest on 
whether or not findings are "true." One seldom sees patently 
silly submissions; on this "truth" basis almost all submissions 
could be accepted. But as Cicchetti points out, decisions are 
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based on numerous criteria. Is the work sufficiently new, com-
plete, and logically consistent? Is there adequate awareness of 
the literature and few enough errors of calculation or citation? 
Does the author address conventions and disagreements on 
methods? Is the methodology strong enough to support re-
search claims? Does it meet all of these criteria well enough to 
be accepted into an underfunded journal with limited space? 
Especially where journals are relatively general, there are 
many grounds for disagreement, and for good reasons. Research 
does not follow a precise model. Individual reviewers cannot be 
well versed in all the techniques and literature on which they 
must pass judgment. Given these impossibilities, one relies on 
one's general disciplinary training and looks for evidence of the 
above criteria where one can pass judgment without looking 
foolish later (or one may simply withdraw from the review, 
which does not solve the editor's problem). Different reviewers 
will therefore see different points, and may draw different 
conclusions about "worth." As with judgments of athletic per-
formences at high levels of complexity (e.g., Olympic ice danc-
ing or diving), there may be little difference between the 
performances of winners and losers, but "everyone" may still 
distinguish careful work from that of hack writers. What is 
acceptable to a reviewer or editor is not a problem of agreement 
per se, but of journal economics. 
As Cicchetti tells us (sect. 8), a great many "losers" ultimately 
are published. The cost of delay? Time (perhaps occasionally a 
career, but this is a different issue). The gains? Truly "bad" work 
is screened out. For other work, the increased feedback by 
peers can lead to the benefits of substantial reworking. (The 
author of the target article says this is infrequent, but he gives no 
hard figures.) It is hard to make a case that this harms science. 
Even most "winners" pass quickly from sight, with hardly the 
ripple of a citation or recognition beyond the tenure committee 
(e.g., Crane 1972; Merton 1973, p. 448). What difference can it 
make to the general progression of science which of two or more 
highly complex and generally-decent-but-not-earth-shattering 
works is published first? Science progresses because re-
searchers are motivated to continue trying to publish, to con-
tinue to take part in the great discourse on nature, and very 
occasionally, to be brilliant. 
I shall use Cicchetti's article as an example of reviewer 
problems. I would not have accepted the article for publication, 
but would have asked for revision and resubmission, along with 
a scathing note. Why? First, my weaknessés. I am not terribly 
familiar with the kappa statistic or the various models of intra-
class correlation. In any case, the work that goes into construct-
ing them is invisible, and I accept them at face value. I am also 
not up on the peer review literature, though I did take part in 
the discussion of Peters & Ceci's work (Eckberg 1982). I there-
fore cannot judge most of Cicchetti's citations. I am impressed 
by the number of citations, however. 
I can judge some things. I can tell that the article begins by 
drawing on the literature in philosophy of science concerning 
the special validity of scientific knowledge, but that this is not 
thorough and is basically dropped later. I take umbrage at the 
fact that in Table 2 the author imposes on the reader evaluative 
criteria for strength of agreement (from poor to excellent), and 
that this seems to spring from the author's brow. I am bothered 
that in section 4.5 the author "would predict" certain findings in 
an ar.ea where no research has been done. This is pure specula-
tion. I am especially bothered that the numbers in some tables 
simply do not appear to add up. 
The numbers of reviews/manuscripts of Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology and Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
differ in Tables 1 and 2. Why? R,'s in Tables 2 and 5 are different. 
Is this because of the dichotomization of data? Tables 5 and 6 
purport to show differences in proportions of agreements be-
tween reviews, on whether to accept or reject manuscripts or 
give high or low scores to grant applications, using x2 as the test 
of significance. In the lower two rows of Table 5 and all rows of 
Table 6, one can reconstruct category frequencies. In the upper 
rows of Table 5 one can quickly produce all the possible sets of 
frequencies fitting the presented data. 
There are some real problems here for this reviewer. [Note: 
This issue has been clarified by Cicchetti in sect. 1.4 of his 
response, Ed.] In ascending order of importance: (1) Why does 
the author (in sect. 4.7) believe the evidence shows a greater 
propensity to "agree" on rejections, when the results are in-
terpreted more parsimoniously as showing that these reviewers 
simply reject more often than they accept? Chance overlap 
would yield the same patterns; (2) How does the author decide 
who the "two" reviewers will be, given that (at least in the case 
of the grant reviews; Table 4) about four reviewers is the norm? 
We are not told; (3) Why is it that in all cases where frequencies 
can be determined, n of disagreements is precisely the same in 
both the Acceptance and Rejection (or High Ratings and Low 
Ratings) columns? This should not be the case, if reviewers are 
selected randomly. It appears that the author merely divides 
splits equally by handfc Even so, why are there always even 
numbers of splits? (4) I find that I can reproduce none of the x2 
scores on Tables 5 and 6, though I have tried several different 
techniques. Some of my scores are close to those the author 
provides, but none are precise and a few are off substantially. 
Either the author has been very sloppy with his calculations, in 
which case all their original data are suspect, or he is using 
conventions with which a given social scientist might be un-
familiar, in which case he should explain his usage. 
Some of my problems with this article are mere quibbles; 
others concern differences in interpretation. The methodo-
logical issues may be cleared up by the author in his replies; 
certainly, either no one else noticed the x2 "problem," or they 
followed the same conventions as the author and so had no 
"problem." From this experienced reviewer's standpoint, there 
would have been sufficient questions on enough issues to have 
warranted sending the piece back to the author. The article is 
long and complex enough, however, for me to realize that 
another reviewer and I might disagree on the importance or 
significance of various points. We might even agree to disagree. 
This is the nature of professional judgment; it does not mean that 
science is in trouble. 
Journal availability and the quality of 
published research 
Jack M. Fletcher 
Department of Pediatrics, University of Texas Medical School, Houston, TX 
77030 
In concluding his review of the reliability of various peer review 
systems, Cicchetti recommends a focus on the relationship of 
peer review and grant funding, fearing that the unreliability of 
peer review leads to a failure to fund worthwhile grant applica-
tions. This focus is certainly justified in the current climate of 
research funding, particularly since publication and funding 
mechanisms use peer review procedures that Cicchetti justifia-
bly identifies as poorly understood and potentially unreliable. 
One recommendation is always that more funds should be made 
available to reduce the probability that important research was 
not funded. If the relationship between space availability in 
journals and the quality of published research were examined, it 
would become apparent that the availability of journal space 
does not ensure that most quality research is published. Unfor-
tunately, more journal space also ensures that considerably 
more research of poor quality will be published (Lock 1985). 
If the quality of funded research were also evaluated accord-
ing to changes in the availability of funds, similar conclusions 
would be forthcoming. More emphasis should be placed on the 
goals and internal mechanisms of the journals and their pub-
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lishers, as well as those of the agencies and individuals responsi-
ble for funding research. Mahoney (1985) identified a number of 
factors responsible for the surge in published research and 
number of journals, including employment practices, require-
ments for funding, and fraud. It is possible that such factors also 
lead to a tendency to downplay editorial practices and commer-
cial needs to ensure the promotion and funding of research 
within the community of scientists. 
The number of new journals in many areas of science is 
currently increasing rapidly (Broad 1988). This increase is ac-
companied by concerns about the expansion of the scientific 
literature and possible decline in overall quality. There is 
presently so much journal space that the only recourse left to 
many editors (and publishers) may be to include research that 
would not pass muster either from peer review or common 
sense. In this sense, the unreliability of peer review can be used 
as a basis for accepting manuscripts. Journals survive either 
through subscriptions (particularly to institutions) or through 
affiliation with an organized group that provides a ready pool of 
subscribers and other more direct sources of support, financially 
and through submissions. Journals with the latter sources of 
support can generally afford higher rejection rates and can use 
peer review in a manner likely to support many submissions and 
rejections. The research cited by Cicchetti, however, is based 
primarily on general journals with higher rejection rates. These 
journals may use a single negative review as a basis for rejection; 
other journals that need manuscripts (and subscribers) may use 
a single positive review as a basis for acceptance. While these 
phenomena have apparently not been adequately studied, it 
would seem important to begin to establish mechanisms for 
periodically reviewing the quality of various journals. It would 
be interesting to know rejection rates, number of solicited 
reviews, results of these reviews, and other principally em-
pirical results of the peer review process across journals. Eval-
uations of quality by scientific polling of professional groups and 
subscribers would represent another source of information. 
Without more pressure on journals, editors, and publishers, 
Cicchetti's implicit warning that the unreliability of peer review 
leads to a failure to publish good research on a timely basis is 
somewhat diluted. If virtually all research can be matched with a 
publication outlet, why should the scientific community worry 
about the unreliability of peer review? There is apparently some 
type of implicit evaluative system among authors that leads 
them to choose and rank journals for their submissions. It would 
seem important to begin to try to make this evaluative system 
more explicit. The failure to do so may represent a tendency 
among researchers to operate in ways that will keep journal 
outlets open for publication and promote the system criticized 
by Mahoney (1985). 
The extent to which a similar problem influences funding 
mechanisms is not well understood and certainly not parallel to 
journal practices. It is simplistic, however, to lament the gov-
ernment's inability to fund high quality research on the basis of 
ever lower priority scores for unfunded research. Project of-
ficers are encouraged to solicit applications to demonstrate the 
need for more funds in their area to program directors and 
funding sources (i.e., Congress). Peer review study groups are 
generally informed as to the priority scores (or percentiles) 
necessary to ensure funding of the committee's highest rated 
proposals. There is a tendency to approve weakly lower quality 
research so that percentiles for better research will be 
improved. 
More telling, however, is the question of what happens to 
research quality when more funds become available. In the past 
decade, the federal government has placed substantially more 
emphasis on the war on drugs and on the AIDS problem. I am 
not in any sense disagreeing with these priorities; both prob-
lems clearly represent national emergencies. The question I am 
raising is simply whether increases in funding lead to greater 
availability of quality research addressing these problems. As 
with increasing the number of journal outlets, we may be 
producing a glut of information, much of which will be of 
questionable significance. 
One unintentional implication of Cicchetti's target article is 
that when peer review is unreliable, the only safe solution to 
scientific problems of national importance is to spend freely. 
The fact that mechanisms for evaluating the quality of funding 
agencies and of journals are generally ineffective, nonexistent, 
or self-serving should be of great concern to the scientific 
community, particularly if the absence of mechanisms repre-
sents in part the need for the community to publish, promote, 
and fund its membership. Current proposals for reform tend to 
focus on individual levels of responsibility. The unreliability of 
peer review extends beyond the peers. Additional focus on the 
responsible institutions (e.g., journals) would also seem war-
ranted. 
Peer review is not enough: Editors must 
work with librarians to ensure access to 
research 
Steve Fuller 
Science Studies Center, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 
Blacksburg, VA 24061 
Electronic mail: tuller@vtvm2.bttnet 
I would like to propose that peer review systems in academia 
function like markets in society at large, and that the "ra-
tionality" (if you will) of such systems be evaluated in much the 
same way as markets are. It is clear from Cicchetti's target article 
that peer review is such a vexed issue because the variety of 
views on how and why the system ought to work docs not match 
up neatly with the equally wide range of ways in which the 
system in fact does work. Do we therefore conclude that peer 
review does not promote the growth of knowledge, or that we 
have yet to fathom the "invisible hand" principle by which it 
does promote such growth? The author himself seems to be 
struck most by the variety of peer review practices across the 
disciplines, but ultimately they are noncommittal as to whether 
any one practice ought to be used as the model for all the 
disciplines. The closest I could find to an explicit, normative 
commitment in the target article was a concern (in sect. 8, para. 
3) that good scholarship not be lost to the world because of 
selection standards that are more stringent than reliable. I 
would guess that, given a chance to reform the system, Cicchetti 
would try to get other disciplines to approximate the peer 
review practices of cross-disciplinary research fields, in which 
most submitted articles eventually get published somewhere. I 
would like to subject this easy liberalism to the cold scrutiny of 
market analysis, however. 
Is peer review supposed to promote the growth of knowledge 
or the careers of scientists? It is not obvious that the two goals 
can be jointly maximized, though Cicchetti seems to presume 
that the fairer the system is to the individual scientist, the higher 
the quality of science that is likely to result. But why presume 
this? Here is why not. Peer review is only one of several 
selection mechanisms, or markets, that operate in the produc-
tion and consumption of knowledge. For example, the dif-
ferences that Cicchetti found between the rejection rates of 
specialities (low) and interdisciplinary fields (high) suggest that 
the specialists withheld submissions until they could anticipate 
acceptance, while interdisciplinarians failed to do this. This 
prior difference in self-selection is probably because of the 
specialists having been trained to write for certain target jour-
nals, whereas the interdisciplinarians were not. Moreover, the 
specialists learned to associate quality work with acceptance in 
those journals, whereas interdisciplinarians learned to be more 
flexible (or cynical?) in their journal aspirations. Thus, the 
68 CICHETTI: THE RELIABII.ITY OF PEER REVIEW 
rejected interdisciplinarians resubmit and are accepted else-
where, while the specialists tend not to. On the surface, it looks 
as though the interdisciplinary way of doing things ensures that 
innovative scholarship is not lost, as opposed to the way of 
specialties, which are more likely to stifle any innovative im-
pulse at the very start. 
That is not the end of the story, however. There is one more 
market to consider, namely, knowledge consumers (i.e., read-
ing scientists) who must choose from among the variety of 
knowledge products the ones that are best suited to their 
cognitive needs. The interdisciplinary markets are flooded with 
more articles in more obscure journals than the specialty mar-
kets are. Since the cognitive limitations of the consumer remain 
fixed as the number of markets and products grow, physical 
access is becoming an increasingly important determinant of 
which research turns out to be influential. Is it published in a 
journal that I routinely peruse? Is the journal copy readily 
available in the library? Does the article appear indexed in many 
databanks? The answers to these questions depend on issues 
quite incidental to the intellectual merits of a given article: Can I 
afford the journal, and does it publish other articles I normally 
find interesting? Is the current periodicals section properly 
policed and updated? Does the title of the article contain words 
that make the right associations with other words in the 
databank? All the best laid plans to reform peer review will have 
been for naught, if the high quality journal that publishes the 
high quality scholarship turns out to be low on physical access. 
My point, then, is that interdisciplinary research may give an 
illusory sense of preserving good scholarship simply because of 
its more liberal publication policies. This illusion is fostered by 
focusing on the editorial office as the only clearinghouse for 
knowledge products. It is not that interdisciplinarians do bad 
work, but rather that their work is so diffusely placed that access 
to such work, and hence its ultimate impact, is limited. Given 
the inaccessibility of some journals, the work might as well have 
never made it into print. This suggests some policy implications: 
1. Editors should forge closer links to the library and infor-
mation systems that will determine the access that potential 
consumers have to journals and books. 
2. The goals of peer review should be oriented more to the 
interests of a given journal's readership. At the moment, when 
there is a conflict of aims, peer review aims more at publishing 
papers that exemplify the methodological standards of the jour-
nal's discipline than papers that are likely to be taken up by the 
readership in their own research. 
3. Regardless of whether one thinks that more scientists 
make for better science, the growing number of paper submis-
sions may, at some point in the future, have to be checked by 
requiring that authors restrict the number of papers they pub-
lish over a given period. (In fact, Donald Campbell has sug-
gested on occasion that the use authors put to such self-restraint 
could be weighed in tenure and promotion decisions.) 
4. Tighter control of the knowledge markets, including in-
creased self-selection of paper submissions, could encourage 
specialization and rigidify disciplinary boundaries. Much de-
pends here on whether journal editorial policies are dictated 
more by the character of the field of study, or whether the field 
of study comes to have its character in virtue of the journal 
editorial policies. This is one of many intriguing issues that 
Cicchetti leaves hanging. 
On forecasting validity and finessing 
reliability 
J. Barnard Gilmore 
Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, 
M5S 1A1 
Electronic mell: gllmore@psych.utoronto.ca 
Reliability is of such great concern in judgments of scientific 
worth because validity is. Where there is no reliability, there 
can be no validity. Even where reliability is found, there could 
be, and often there appears to be, distressingly low validity. The 
issue facing both peer reviewers and those who engage them is 
whether or not validity had been achieved with a given set of 
ratings. 
These truths are familiar. They have been brought home to us 
many times in the past, as in the thoughtful work by Gottfredson 
(1978) and Mahoney (1985). Moreover, these are brutal truths, 
brutal, because achieving validity appears to be beyond all 
reasonable hope insofar as predicting the eventual importance 
of scientific work would require one to predict an unpredictable 
future. Let us have no illusions. The cherished arguments for 
generously supporting pure research, the arguments concern-
ing the unpredictable sources of new scientific understanding, 
are the same arguments for doubting that we can forecast in 
advance which work needs financing and which work needs 
publication. Still, yes, choose we must. But nothing requires us 
to assert that we will have chosen well. And, nothing forces the 
conclusion that it would be the least bit foolish to make many of 
our choices by drawing lots. 
Consequently, the concern with improving the reliability of 
potentially invalid ratings made by multiple reviewers, and with 
improving the measures of whatever reliability we do have, 
must not be overemphasized. Cicchetti asserts, for example, 
that some statistics are appropriate for measuring reliability and 
some are not. Instead, one might assert that the appropriateness 
or the lack thereof is more often to be found in the meaning 
ascribed to the statistics rather than to the choice of the statistics 
themselves. A careful reading of Garner & McGill (1956) makes 
it clear that some important differences in meaning and in-
terpretation are appropriate to measures that are variance-
based, such as kappa, versus measures derived from information 
theory, which reflect the proportional shared uncertainty (mea-
sured in bits) among raters. The "reliability" reflected in an 
uncertainty statistic reflects the proportion of our total uncer-
tainty about the judgment of another rater, which will be 
reduced by the information contained in knowledge of an earlier 
rating. I would submit that this shared uncertainty index is 
closer to what we always intended to mean by "agreement" than 
is that percentage-of-total-variance index implicit in most 
kappas. 
There are sound metric reasons, too, for sometimes prefer-
ring the uncertainty statistic to kappa. Garner and McGill 
remind us that variance-based statistics require an interval scale 
substrate to justify many of their interpretations, whereas un-
certainty measures are always metric free, generalizable, and 
mutually comparable. The significant and sad fact is that most 
reliabilities measured with the shared uncertainty statistic turn 
out to be "lower" in relative size than those reported using 
kappas. (For a clear example of this, see Gilmore 1979.) Thus, 
the data presented in the target article may well deserve an 
interpretation that is even less optimistic than those marginally 
optimistic interpretations offered there. 
In the conclusion of the target article the authors note that one 
of two assumptions (see Harnad 1986) prevails. One may assume 
that most published research contributes to the advancement of 
scientific work, in which case the rejection by journals of what 
would otherwise have proven to be helpful new data or new 
perspectives is indeed a serious matter. Conversely, one may 
assume that most published research does not contribute to the 
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advancement of science, in which case it seems far less serious 
that "good" articles would be rejected by unreliable reviews. I 
submit that the latter view only makes sense if one also endorses 
two unlikely additional assumptions: (1) that rejecting some of 
the few "good" articles along with the many "bad" ones will still 
reduce the absolute amount of false leads chased down, while 
not unduly delaying the eventual resubmission and publication 
(presumably by someone else) of the previously rejected, good 
idea; and (2), that researchers who cannot get funded or pub-
lished will neither be missed nor unduly hurt when they then 
leave the society of scientists. 
Pending the arrival of a better "science" of science, a better 
psychology of science, even a better political science of science, 
one can only observe that, in addition to all of its personal 
satisfactions, science is a complex social activity offering diverse 
social rewards of great value and diverse punishments of un-
suspected force. The true sources of the most fruitful ideas and 
work in science remain mysterious. Scientists differ in tempera-
ment, in their values, and in their skills at communication. 
There is no one way in science. There are no 10 ways. Scientists 
have embraced electronic mail and have welcomed multiple 
new journals despite the undeniable difficulties and frustrations 
created by the information glut. One fact seems clear, then: 
Most of us will always want to know what others are thinking, 
doing, and finding. And whatever journal we are reading, 
whoever its reviewers or gatekeepers may be, still, we decide 
for ourselves what is flawed design, what is misleading in-
terpretation, and what is "good" science. 
As electronic means for sharing papers and creating reprints 
evolve further, I submit that it makes sense (every way except 
politically, which is, alas, perhaps the most significant way) to 
separate reviewing, editing, and publication. Let us have multi-
ple professional reviewers, some of whom advise authors prior 
to publication and some of whom rate articles once they appear 
in print. But let us normally publish, electronically, all submit-
ted papers when the author, as editor, thinks each is ready. Let 
us include with each paper careful abstracts, conscientious 
keyword lists, and brief professional reviewer ratings whenever 
available, to serve us as guides through the great wilderness of 
articles we might all then fear. Let there be a gatekeeper to 
electronic publication to keep out undue repetition from au-
thors, and, when necessary, to enforce basic conventions of style 
and some reasonable quotas on how often one may publish in the 
system. Then, let authors vie not for space in prestigious 
journals, but for the attention of prestigious reviewers and 
readers. History and citations can later tell us what was useful 
and what was not. The problem of reliability would then be all 
but finessed. 
Replication, reliability and peer review: A 
case study 
Michael E. Gorman 
Humanities Division, School of Engineering and Applied Science, 
University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22903 
Electronic mall: meg3c@prime.acc.virginia.edu 
Cicchetti begins his paper with a brief discussion of Mertonian 
norms. Their concern is to see whether these norms are being 
followed by scientific journals. An issue he leaves for others is 
the question of how to evaluate empirically the efficacy of such 
norms. For example, Cicchetti discusses the way in which 
journals are biased against negative findings. Experimental 
simulations of scientific reasoning, in which science and en-
gineering students work on abstract tasks, provide independent 
support for the value of seeking negative results, and also specify 
under what conditions a disconfirmatory strategy will be most 
useful (see Gorman & Gorman 1984; Klayman & Ha 1987). 
Similarly, Cicchetti points out that there appears to be a very 
strong bias against replication studies. In a series of experiments 
I found that a strategy I called "replication-plus-extension" was 
superior to straight replication (Gorman 1989). Consider, for 
example, a student who wants to make sure that the triple 
"2,4,6" is really an instance of an abstract rule, given that the 
student knows as many as 1 triple in 5 will be subject to what 
Doherty and Tweney (1988) have called "system-failure error," 
that is, if it appears to be correct, it will actually be classified as 
incorrect and vice-versa. This student could propose "2, 4, 6" 
again. But what if the cost of an additional experiment is high? 
Then it makes more sense to propose a similar triple, "10, 12, 
14" for example, which will not only replicate the previous one 
but extend the pattern to new instances. From a logical stand-
point, this is a flawed strategy: "10, 12, 14" does not really 
replicate "2, 4, 6." But from a satisficing standpoint (see Giere 
1988), the strategy makes good sense. In fact, students working 
on more complex tasks of this sort can employ it effectively 
(again, see Gorman 1989). 
Cicchetti points out that one strategy for getting around 
journals' bias against replications is to embed the replication 
within another study or studies. Replication-plus-extension is 
an alternate strategy. Obviously, the two can be combined. I am 
aware of no empirical data regarding journals' preference for 
either strategy; future research should be directed at this ques-
tion. For example, one could investigate replication-plus-exten-
sion through experimental or quasi-experimental designs by 
sending three versions of the same results to a wide range of 
journals, one of which was deliberately written as a replication, 
another as a replication-plus-extension and still another embed-
ded with a novel finding. 
Such reliability studies as Cicchetti's are important, but they 
should be complemented by two additional kinds of research: 
(1) Experimental studies directed at determining the normative 
value of philosophical or sociological prescriptions about science 
(see Fuller 1989, for a discussion). (2) Qualitative "biographies" 
of manuscripts, in which the same paper is followed through the 
revision and publication process, often spanning several jour-
nals. Cicchetti disparages these sorts of studies, yet they can 
reveal aspects of the peer-review process inaccessible to quan-
titative studies and suggest variables like replication-plus-
extension that merit more rigorous exploration in quantitative 
designs. 
Is there an alternative to peer review? 
Richard Greene 
Veterans Affairs Central Office, Washington, DC 20420 
Cicchetti's target article is a major contribution to the peer-
review literature. It is especially useful in its collection and 
analysis of the critical research studies in this field and raises a 
number of important criticisms of the peer-review process. I 
will concentrate my comments on the grant-review process, 
because this relates to my experience managing the national 
research program of the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA). 
Cicchetti refers to a number of studies showing that reliability 
among peer reviewers is highest when considering what is 
unworthy of support. The real problem comes in assigning a 
scientific priority to a set of studies that are all, or mostly all, 
supportable. The problem is well described by the author's 
citation of James B. Wyngaarden (Culliton 1984) referring to 
distinguishing "'shades of excellence' among competing grants 
that are all at the top." There is a consensus in the scientific 
community that the peer review process was not designed to 
measure the difference between two highly meritorious pro-
jects, one with a 155 priority score that will be funded and one 
with a 156 score that will not receive support. And yet, the 
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research administrator does run out of funds at 155. Should we 
abandon the current system, or shore it up for the present, 
hoping for a better time when increased research budgets will at 
least allow more approved projects to be funded? The reliability 
question would not go away, but fewer people with high quality 
projects would go unfunded and the problem would appear less 
pressing. Cicchetti does not advocate abandoning peer review, 
but he does offer several recommendations to improve the 
system. Let us consider them. 
(1)"To improve the reliability of peer review, a minimum of 
three independent referees has been recommended." This is a 
very useful recommendation, and one that the research pro-
gram in the Department of Veterans Affairs has used successful-
ly for the last five years. DVA Medical Research Service uses 
four independent reviewers for each submitted research pro-
posal in its Merit Review Program (equivalent to the NIH ROl 
Program). Two written independent reviews are submitted by 
scientists who are not members of the Merit Review Board. 
These reviewers are selected because their own work is closely 
related to the applicant's problems. Two additional written 
reviews are prepared by the primary- and secondary-reviewer 
members of the Merit Review Board. Thus, when considering 
the application, members of the board can debate the relative 
importance of each critique and weigh the specific evaluations of 
four independent reviewers in light of this debate. The strength 
of this process goes beyond the number of reviews per proposal, 
to the discussion and analysis of the four independent critiques 
that take place during the review session, leading to a consensus 
evaluation by board members. This process still cannot accu-
rately fine-tune shades of excellence, but it is a practical method 
of weighing the opinions of four independent reviewers. 
(2) "Using author anonymity or 'blind' review'." This recom-
mendation is impractical for the grant review process. Since past 
scientific productivity is a critical element of grant review, it 
would be extremely awkward to try to disguise the authorship of 
the proposal as well as the authorship of published papers from 
previous funding or training periods. Author anonymity would, 
in my opinion, significantly weaken the grant review process. 
(3) "Revealing reviewer identity." Cicchetti comes down on 
the side of encouraging reviewers to reveal their identity volun-
tarily. Our experience in the grant review process is that 
anonymity is critical. I believe it is important to avoid person-
alization of the review process. It should be emphasized that the 
evaluation of a project is a consensus opinion of a committee, 
the membership of which is public knowledge. The strength of 
the process is that of evaluation by a group of experts. 
(4) "Author review of referees." This recommendation is 
attractive and could in fact help weed out inappropriate re-
viewers. In addition to author reviews of referees, members of 
peer review committees could also identify reviewers who are 
problematic. Consideration will be given to implementing this 
idea in the DVA's scientific review process. The DVA's system 
has already adopted the practice of encouraging applicants to list 
potential reviewers and those they do not wish to review their 
proposals. 
(5) "Developing a peer review appeals system for grant 
submission." This should be a critical aspect of any grant review 
process. The peer review system is a human enterprise and 
thus, not perfect. There must be a mechanism for applicants to 
appeal the results. The DVA system has had an effective appeals 
procedure for over a decade. Appeal has proved to be a complex 
and sensitive area and we have found it necessary to revisit the 
ground rules for appeals periodically. 
Cicchetti has raised some important concerns about the peer-
review system and has made some useful recommendations for 
improving it. While much of the stress in the current grant 
review process is a function of the small percentage of high 
quality research projects that can be funded, efforts to analyze 
and strengthen peer review are to be applauded. 
Referee agreement in context 
Lowell L. Hargens 
Department of Sociology, University of Illinois, Urbana, IL 61801 
Electronic mail: hargens@uiucvmd.bltnet 
Cicchetti provides a valuable summary of the procedures and 
results of studies of interreferee agreement in peer review. 
Many will be surprised by the generally modest associations 
between referee recommendations, with most studies yielding 
intraclass correlations in a range between .20 and .35. Cicchetti 
characterizes these levels of agreement as "poor," and others 
have claimed that they indicate that chance plays an important, 
if not dominant, role in the assessment of scholarship (Cole et al. 
1981; Lindsey 1988; Mahoney 1976). These modest associations 
should be viewed in the context of the entire peer review 
process, however; failure to do so gives a misleadingly pessi-
mistic impression of the value of referees' assessments. Below I 
focus on referees' evaluations of manuscripts submitted to schol-
arly journals, but my arguments hold in general for peer review 
of grant proposals, too. 
Those who argue that the modest associations between refer-
ees' evaluations imply that referee evaluations have low reliabil-
ity usually base their interpretation on a psychometric perspec-
tive. This perspective, often called "classical test theory," views 
different referees' recommendations as parallel measures of a 
latent trait (see Lord & Novick, 1968); usually the trait is seen as 
the "scholarly quality" of a manuscript. Editors' discussions of 
the strategies they use in selecting referees cast doubt on the 
appropriateness of this perspective, however. They report fre-
quently choosing referees they think will be sensitive to differ-
ent aspects of a manuscript, perhaps one to judge its analytic 
procedures and another, its substantive contribution (Campbell 
1982; Roediger 1987). If these different aspects are only mod-
erately correlated across manuscripts, referees' assessments 
should show low agreement. In addition, in some fields scholars 
belong to competing "schools," and editors sometimes inten-
tionally solicit evaluations from members of both sides of a 
controversy (Hull 1988). If an editor always followed this strat-
egy for controversial submissions and a large proportion of 
submissions were controversial, referees evaluations might be 
negatively correlated. Thus, referees' evaluations are often not 
parallel measures of a latent unidimensional trait, and the low 
observed associations do not necessarily imply that peer-review 
evaluations are unreliable. 
Editors' summary rejection of submissions may also produce 
low associations between referees' recommendations. Papers 
that are not sent out for review are necessarily omitted from 
referee agreement studies. If editors are right in claiming that 
summarily rejected papers are of very poor quality or are 
obviously inappropriate for the journals to which they have been 
submitted, then screening out such submissions reduces the 
range of papers evaluated by referees, and hence the association 
between referees' evaluations. Thus, reported associations be-
tween referee evaluations cannot be assessed without also con-
sidering journals' summary rejection rates. Fragmentary data 
on this question indicate that summary-rejection rates for pres-
tigious social science and medical journals can be as high as 50% 
(Gordon 1978; Zuckerman & Merton 1971). 
Even if referees' recommendations were parallel measures of 
manuscript "quality" and editors never rejected papers sum-
marily, the modest levels of referee agreement summarized by 
Cicchetti should not be taken as an indication of the reliability of 
the entire review process. Under the assumptions of classical 
test theory, referee-recommendation intraclass-correlation co-
efficients estimate the reliability of the average individual refer-
ee's evaluation (Tinsley & Weiss 1975); the reliability of an 
assessment based upon two or three referee evaluations should 
be considerably higher. (See also Cronbach, 1981, who noted 
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that Cole et al. [1981] exaggerated the role of chance in the NSF 
grant-review process by basing their analysis on the unrealistic 
assumption that the reliability of the entire NSF peer-review 
process equalled that of a single referees evaluation). For exam-
ple, under classical-test theory assumptions, if the average ref-
eree's reliability equals only .25, a composite formed from 2 
evaluations should have a reliability of. 40, and a composite based 
on 3 should have a reliability of .50 (Hargens & Herting 1990b). 
For most biomedical and behavioral science journals, editors 
reject papers that receive two negative evaluations, solicit a 
third evaluation for papers that receive split reviews, and 
personally read papers that receive two favorable reviews in 
order to advise authors about what, if any, revisions should be 
made before the paper will be accepted. Thus, most papers that 
eventually appear in these journals receive at least three evalua-
tions; those receiving split reviews from the initial referees are 
sometimes reviewed by four or five people before they are 
accepted. Only papers that receive negative evaluations from 
both initial referees are evaluated by only two people, but, as 
Cicchetti shows, negative evaluations are substantially more 
reliable than other evaluations at these journals. Thus, the 
overall reliability of the peer review process as a whole should 
be significantly higher than the levels of individual referee 
reliability implied by the reported associations between referee 
recommendations. 
I think it likely that Cicchetti will prove right in predicting 
that studies of referee agreement in general physical science 
journals, such as Physical Review Letters, will yield associations 
similar to those in the medical and behavioral sciences. I also 
suspect, however, that his speculation that specialized physical 
science journals will show greater agreement on positive com-
pared to negative recommendation categories is incorrect. The 
data in Cicchetti's Table 6 and data on referee agreement for 
Physiological Zoology (Hargens & Herting 1990a) are inconsis-
tent with that claim. If my suspicion is correct, even specialized 
physical science journals are likely to show modest levels of 
referee agreement. In part, this should happen because referee 
reports on submissions to such journals contain a relatively low 
proportion of negative evaluations (Hargens 1990), which will in 
turn tend to limit the overall reliability of individual referees' 
evaluations, because there are relatively few of the most reliable 
recommendations. Once again, however, the peer-review pro-
cess at such journals tends to mitigate the damage that low 
associations between referee recommendations might cause. 
Specifically, these journals usually use a "when in doubt, ac-
cept" decision rule (Zuckerman & Merton 1971), and require at 
least two negative recommendations to reject a paper. As a 
consequence, these journals typically publish a substantial ma-
jority of submissions. Ifit is true that negative recommendations 
are more reliable than positive recommendations at these jour-
nals, then final editorial decisions will be largely determined by 
the most reliable (negative) recommendations rather than by 
less reliable (but more positive) ones. Regardless of the fate of 
these speculations, however, it is clear that the various elements 
of a peer-review system are interrelated, and that an assessment 
of any one element must place it in the context of the entire 
system. 
Confusion between reviewer reliability and 
wise editorial and funding decisions 
Charles A. Kiesler 
Psychology Department, Vanderbllt University. Nashville, TN 37240 
Electronic mall: kieslec1@vuctrvax.bltnét 
Reviewing manuscripts for publication and grant proposals for 
funding is merely a means to an end, not an end in itself. The 
desired end product should be wise decisions about what is 
published and funded. Defining the reliability of such reviews 
as the correlation between reviewer ratings confuses process 
with outcome, and this is Cicchetti's main problem. In addition, 
there are important differences between the reliability of grant 
reviews and the reliability of article reviews; differences suffi-
ciently important that I shall tackle them separately. Let me 
take up the issue of journals first. 
A high correlation between reviewer ratings of submitted 
manuscripts should neither be expected nor desired. The ex-
pectation that these ratings should be highly correlated is naive; 
it almost assumes that reviewers are randomly drawn by the 
editor. As an editor, I intentionally act in ways that lower the 
correlation between ratings. For example, I give the manuscript 
to reviewers who have very different strengths or skills to bring 
to the manuscript: One might be a very sophisticated statisti-
cian, another a Freudian theorist. One would not expect a high 
correlation between them because they are evaluating different 
aspects of the manuscript; a valuable service to the editor. 
Sometimes, I also give manuscripts to two reviewers who I know 
will represent quite different points of view. I might select one 
reviewer who I know agrees with the general theoretical orien-
tation and another who argues strongly against it. In this man-
ner, I can see at one time both the very best and the very worst 
things one could say about the manuscript, and therefore make 
some judgment about how different and innovative it is. Fur-
thermore, since I think a scientific field should develop an 
expanding pool of educated reviewers, I often give a manuscript 
to two sophisticated and experienced reviewers, and to another 
person (usually young) whom I have not consulted before. In 
this way I can discover good new reviewers, as well as show 
young people what is expected in a review. (I return all the 
reviews to their authors, so they can see each other's 
comments.) 
All of these actions, which I submit contribute to making wise 
decisions about whether or not one accepts a manuscript for 
publication, are certainly counterproductive if one is seeking a 
high correlation between reviewers' judgments. But they are 
typical behaviors of a good editor who intends to play an active 
and decisive role in the final evaluation of a manuscript. 
This notion of the editor having a very active role in the 
judgment of a manuscript seems lost on Cicchetti. Not only does 
he not discuss the kinds of processes described above, but he 
even ignores the role of the editor in making the judgment. For 
example, he recommends that there be three reviewers rather 
than two, to avoid a one-to-one vote. In my own case, when 
sending a manuscript out for review, I try to read just enough to 
make the judgment about whom to select as a reviewer. Then, 
when the reviews come back to me, I set them aside and review 
the manuscript myself with reference to the reviews. That's why 
my reviewers are always N + 1, and I can easily compare and 
contrast what the reviewers contribute. 
The proportion of manuscripts one can accept is also a critical 
part of any investigation of reliability. I had just finished a stint 
as associate editor when Scott (1974) came out with his original 
article criticizing the low reliability of reviewers for the Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology (JPSP) and I noted an 
interesting phenomenon. In only about 15% of the cases did 
reviewers of manuscripts for JPSP agree that the manuscript 
should definitely be published. Cicchetti would regard that as 
an unreliable review process. Only about 15% of the manu-
scripts could be accepted for publication in JPSP, however. If 
the review process is supposed to lead to a wise decision rather 
than producing a high correlation between ratings, the reliabil-
ity of the JPSP process was very good. The outcomes were right 
in line with the needs of the editor to publish only a small 
subset of the manuscripts submitted. Whether that is the 15% 
to be published depends on whether or not editors see them-
selves as playing a very active role in the process. I think the 
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editor must play a very active role; Cicchetti apparently does 
not. 
In general, the proportion of manuscripts (or grant submis-
sions) that one can accept has an important influence on issues 
that concerned Cicchetti. When evaluating a submission to a 
journal (or a grant proposal), most reviewers are quite aware of 
the percentage of manuscripts (or grants) that can be approved. 
This awareness has a significant influence on the percentage of 
submissions that they rate as excellent, very good, and so on. 
Currently at the National Institutes of Mental Health (NIMH) 
grant submissions need to be close to a rating score of 125 
(meaning an average rating of 1.25 on a 1-5 scale) to be funded. 
A rating of two on the NIMH scale reads "very good," but the 
experienced reviewer knows very well that a vote of two on a 
five-point scale for NIMH is a vote not to fund. Hence, re-
viewers even interpret descriptive labels on a scale differently 
depending on the percentage of potentially successful appl-
icants. 
The proportion of successful applicants is an important influ-
ence on the differences Cicchetti observed between the sci-
ences. In general, the natural sciences and the behavioral 
sciences differ on this important statistic; the natural sciences 
typically have a higher acceptance rate on both grants and 
manuscript submissions. I argue that the differences that Cic-
chetti observed between these groups - what they specifically 
referred to as differences in emphasis on acceptance versus 
rejection - are a function of this difference in the probability of 
success. I would argue that if one were to equate the behavioral 
and the natural sciences for probability of success, whether 
regarding article or grant submissions, one would no longer find 
the differences observed by Cicchetti. 
Cicchetti also seems confused about the role of biases in the 
judgmental process. The reputation of the investigator, the 
quality of the institution the investigator works for, and prior 
work by the investigator all influence the judgment that a 
reviewer might make. What Cicchetti seems to miss is that all of 
these biases artificially inflate the kind of "rating reliability" 
they emphasize. Cicchetti seems to imply that biases decrease 
reliability. In the sense that I mean the term they probably do, 
but such biases would increase the simple numerical correlation 
between reviewers' ratings that Cicchetti is concerned with. 
Most of the issues described above apply to grants as well as 
manuscripts. There are some significant differences, however, 
that are worth noting. The potential impact of a delay is different 
for a grant than for a manuscript. As Cicchetti notes, 80 to 90% of 
manuscripts rejected by the journals to which they are submit-
ted ultimately get published elsewhere. Having an article re-
jected by one journal may only mean a delay in publication of 
two to four months. A delay of four to six months necessitated 
by a grant resubmission (which would not be unusual and may 
be minimal) may force an investigator to shut down a research 
team that had been carefully built up over a period of years. In 
that sense, it is especially important that we focus on making 
wise judgments on grant reviews and give them an impor-
tance greater than manuscript review. For example, as rating 
scores inflate for grants, a "blackball" becomes a critical prob-
lem. If an agency is required to average all ratings of a proposal 
in the decision to fund, and if a score very near 100 is necessary 
to be funded, then a single reviewer can blackball a grant 
proposal by giving it a four or five (recognizing simultaneously 
that a score of two is a recommendation not to fund). This is a 
problem particularly for controversial, new, or innovative 
research. 
The potential for blackballing grant proposals is a critical 
variable for protecting advances in science. We need greater 
flexibility for granting agencies, the sequestering of funds for 
especially innovative or new ideas, and a loosening of the 
requirement that all ratings of grant proposals be counted. 
Regarding the last, one might either report the median rather 
than the mean, or only average the N — 1 best ratings. That is, 
one might throw out the worst rating of any grant proposal and 
average the remaining ones. 
Making wise decisions about publishing articles and funding 
grants is critical for normal progress in the sciences. Viewing the 
reliability of reviewers' judgments as simply correlations be-
tween ratings is to miss the most important part of that judgmen-
tal process. What is most important is that the outcome of the 
editorial decision or the agency's funding decision be a wise one, 
one that facilitates the development of our sciences. In no way 
does a wise decision depend upon a high correlation between 
the ratings of reviewers. 
Do we really want more "reliable" 
reviewers? 
Helena Chmura Kraemer 
Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Stanford University, 
Stanford, CA 94306 
Electronic mall: mn.kra@forsythe.stanford.edu 
First of all, congratulations to Cicchetti for his excellent target 
article. This paper represents a comprehensive, stimulating, 
and provocative discussion of issues that not only profoundly 
affect our individual professional lives, but the quality, con-
sistency, and rapidity of progress within our respective fields. It 
is particularly interesting to read this paper from the perspec-
tive of the various roles each of us is asked to play in our 
professional lives: as author and reviewer of papers and pro-
posals, as well as "consumer" of the results of published papers. 
It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to be objective about one's 
own work, as a researcher, a reviewer, a "consumer," or an 
editor. The standards one might apply to a review of the review 
process are fundamentally different from these perspectives. 
Accordingly, the major contribution of Cicchetti (and others 
whom he cites) is the objective, unemotional, and quantitative 
approach to these issues. Only with such an approach is there 
hope of identifying or correcting faults in the review process. I 
doubt that I was invited to comment because of any such 
perspectives on the problem, more probably it was because of 
my research on the design and analysis of reliability studies and 
on kappa and intraclass correlation coefficients. I will briskly 
discharge my duties with regard to purely statistical issues and 
move on to more interesting themes. 
I have a few points of disagreement on what was done: the 
choice of forms of coefficients, the use of null tests, the use of 
point rather than confidence interval estimates, and the use of 
asymptotic approximations to distributions rather than Jack-
knife or Bootstrap methods (Block & Kraemer 1989). If the 
authors and I were required to resolve such issues, I would 
predict we would happily reach solutions agreeable to us all, and 
that any resulting changes would scarcely affect the messages 
delivered in this paper. A kappa of .3 might become .2, or vice 
versa. A wide confidence interval might lessen interest in one 
reported study, whereas a short one might highlight another. 
Instead, what requires reconsideration is not the magnitude 
of the reported reliabilities, but what to make of them. Difficul-
ties arise because the word "reliability" is misleading when used 
with a general audience likely to interpret it in the sense of "to 
be trusted." A "valid" measure is one "to be trusted." A 
"reliable" measure may only be a highly reproducible wrong 
answer. Two facts about reliability are well known: (1) One may 
have a prefectly reliable (precise) measure that totally lacks 
validity (accuracy), and (2) one may improve reliability (preci-
sion) at the cost of validity (accuracy). Whether we err in judging 
the review process by assessment of interreviewer reliability is 
not therefore a trivial question. 
My impression is that editors frequently seek reviewers with 
different expertise related to the various areas pertinent to the 
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submission. Reviewers are not selected to reproduce each 
other's results, but to supplement and complement each other. 
This is particularly true for submissions that are interdisciplin-
ary. For example, a study reporting the results of a randomized 
clinical trial investigating the efficacy of an educational interven-
tion for low birth weight, premature infants for enhancing 
cognitive development in the first three years of life, might well 
require review by a biostatistician, a neonatalogist, a pediatri-
cian, an educator, and a psychologist, to fully and fairly assess its 
quality. By soliciting reviews from such varied professional 
fields, editors are acting in a way that might minimize re-
producibility of the results. Are they wrong? 
I think not. A simple-minded illustration: Suppose xt repre-
sents the true scientific quality of submission i (sampled from 
those sent to a particular journal or agency), and x(J, the assess-
ment of reviewer j (sampled from competent reviewers) of 
submission i where: 
Xw - x, + e„. (1) 
with gy representing the error of reviewer / s evaluation of 
submission i, that portion of the reviewer's assessment that is 
independent of the quality of the submission (which includes 
bias and other such errors, not all of which are random). 
The validity of a reviewers' assessments for the scientific 
quality may be assessed by: 
Correlation (Xy, x,) - (r)1*, 
where 
r = Variance(x|)/[Variance(X|) + Variance^)] , (3) 
and the reliability between reviewers by: 
Correlation(Xy, Xilt) - r + ( l - r ) t , j * k , (4) 
where t is the correlation coefficient between reviewers' errors 
made for a submission. If the errors are completely indepen-
dent, then the reliability and the validity are closely related (r 
and r A t the other extreme, if the errors are perfectly 
correlated (t=l), the reliability may be perfect, but the validity 
may well be near zero. 
Now suppose we were to select a panel of R qualified re-
viewers and to use their mean as the assessment of quality. Then 
the validity of this mean as a measure of true quality would be: 
Correlation (X„ x.) - (Rr /{Rr+( l - rXl+(R- l ) t )} ] 1 / 2 . (5) 
One can see (Equation 5) that if t - 1, the reliability may be 
perfect (Equation 4), but there is no improvement in validity 
gained by soliciting more than one reviewer, and that validity 
may be near zero. The lower the correlation of errors (i), the 
lower the reliability may be (Equation 4), but ifit is nonzero (r > 
0), the greater the increase in validity may be with each addi-
tional reviewer (Equation 5). Maximal validity is obtained when 
the errors are independent, and one has as many reasonably 
reliable reviewers as possible (cf sects. 7.1,7.2). 
Consequently, if editors do indeed deliberately select multi-
ple reviewers to cover the various professional fields relevant to 
a submission, they are thereby probably minimizing the correla-
tion of errors, thus maximizing the validity of the overall assess-
ment, but thereby possibly decreasing the interreviewer relia-
bility as well. With that in mind, do we really want more reliable 
reviewers? Perhaps those reliabilities reported in the .2-.4 
range are of no concern. Not so, for the goal is to improve the 
validity of the review process. To the extent that this goal can be 
achieved by improving the reliability of individual reviewers, 
yes, we do want more reliable reviewers. The strategies dis-
cussed in section 7 should, howeVer, be assessed and amplified 
with specific strategic goals in mind: 
(1) To increase reliability by increasing the sensitivity of 
reviewers to the differential quality of submissions (increase 
Variance x()). For example, both reviewers who commend 
everything (sect. 7.6) and those who condemn everything 
should be removed from the review process. Reviewers with 
"blind spots" should excuse themselves from reviews in that 
area. My own "blind spots" include applications of Lisrel mod-
els. I have yet to see one whose scientific quality I have not 
questioned. Respected colleagues may have no problems in this 
area but might have troubles with meta analyses or quasi-
experimental or observational studies (sect. 3.1), areas in which 
I believe I am able to distinguish "good" from "bad." 
(2) To increase reliability by decreasing reliance on factors 
irrelevant to the quality of the submissions (decrease Variance 
(e^)). Double-blinding, despite its weaknesses, remains the 
prime strategy here. Thus I agree with section 7.3 and disagree 
with section 7.4. Any reviewers can choose to reveal their 
identities to the author at any time. It need not be made a formal 
part of the review process. Use of multiple reviewers (sect. 7.2) 
also serves this purpose. Finally, in journal review, one might 
add strategies already common in grant review. No editor or 
reviewer from the same institution as the submittors should 
participate in the review process. Reviewers or editors should 
excuse themselves from the review of submissions of close 
personal friends or frequent professional collaborators, or from 
any other situation in which there might be an appearance of a 
conflict of interest. 
(3) To increase validity but to decrease apparent reliability, 
by decreasing the correlation of errors (decrease t). No two 
reviewers from the same institution or who are close collab-
orators should review the same submission. Effort should be 
made to select reviewers across the broadest possible spectrum 
of specialties pertinent to the submission. 
Ultimately, however, strategies to improve the review pro-
cess focused on individual reviewers are not, I think, likely to 
optimize it. Again, let me propose a simple-minded illustration: 
Classify submissions as either Flawed or Nonflawed, and char-
acterize the review process as in Table 1. There are two possible 
errors, that of accepting a flawed submission (impaired sen-
sitivity to flaws) and rejecting a nonflawed submission (impaired 
specificity to flaws). I would argue that the Type I error, that is, 
the more serious error, is that of accepting a flawed paper, for 
such papers can mislead an entire field and may delay or derail 
progress. If the flaw is later detected and revealed, such a paper 
is an embarrassment to the authors, as well as to those who 
recommended acceptance. For a flawed grant proposal, time 
and money are wasted that might have been better invested 
elsewhere. On the other hand, rejecting a nonflawed submis-
sion (Type II error, I propose) frequently means only a delay, an 
annoyance to the submittor. In the long run, many such papers 
are published elsewhere (sect. 8); many such proposals are 
resubmitted and funded later. 
The kappa coefficient used here (the so-called "unweighted" 
form) places equal weight on the Type I and II errors, whereas, 
on the basis of the argument above, I would prefer a form that 
Table 1 (Kraemer). A model for the evaluation of the 
probabilities describing the review process. 
Decision of Review Process 
Accepted Rejected Submissions 
Flawed P(SE) P(l-SE) P 
Nonflawed (1-PX1-SP) (l-P)SP (1-P) 
Q U-Q) L 
P is determined by submissions to the journal or agency. Q is 
determined by resources of the journal, (space) or agency (fund-
ing). SE represents the sensitivity of the review process to 
flaws in submissions, SP, the specificity. 
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places maximal weight on avoiding the Type I error. How to 
estimate such a kappa from reliability data may not be known, 
but the greater agreement reported among reviewers for rejec-
tion than for acceptance gives some hope that the review process 
may be operating better than indicated by the unweighted 
kappa in avoiding Type I errors. 
Be that as it may, some of the strategies proposed (sect. 7 . 7 -
.9) are directed not at improving validity or reliability per se, 
but at reducing what is here labelled Type II error. I agree that 
Type II error should be reduced, but not at the cost of increasing 
Type I error. Well-done reviews leading to rejection may be 
beneficial in the long run. If a fatal flaw is detected, it prevents 
embarrassment, as one is allowed to withdraw quietly. If a flaw 
is remediable, the authors have the opportunity to revise the 
paper to one of substantially higher quality than the original. In 
my view, it is the editor s responsibility (not the authors') to 
detect and ignore poorly done reviews, or to ignore the occa-
sional weak points in otherwise well-done reviews. 
In place of the appeals processes Cicchetti suggests (sects. 
7.8, 7.9), let me propose an external quality control panel. For 
each published paper, the names of the authors and those of the 
reviewers and editors and their recommendations would be 
filed with this group. This group would then receive and com-
pile all challenges to the scientific validity of the results reported 
in the Abstract of the paper (i.e., ignoring typos or minor 
errors). A few such challenges now appear as letters to the 
editors or as papers submitted to the same or other journals, but 
are subject to the review of the same editors, reviewers, and 
sometimes the submittors, who may have erred in the first 
place. If enough evidence accumulates in these challenges to 
indicate a major flaw, one sufficient to raise questions about the 
validity of the overall conclusions, the journal should publish a 
summary of the challenges compiled by the quality control 
panel, along with the names of the authors, and those of the 
editors and reviewers who recommended publication. No at-
tempt at adjudication should be made. It should be required 
that any paper on which such a question is raised should 
continue to be listed in the authors' CV, followed by such a note 
as, "Results questioned (reference)." 
I share what I perceive as Cicchetti's view that, with respect 
to the review process, the cup is more full than empty, but that 
there is merit in seeking to fill the cup further. I would differ in 
proposing that the review process be judged more by the results 
it produces (valid findings) than by the procedures it uses to 
produce those results, such as the "reliability" of reviewers. The 
approach used by Cicchetti does an excellent job, however, of 
discussing what should be done, regardless of which criteria are 
emphasized. Finally, the value of the discussion is as much in its 
potential to cause readers to reevaluate their roles in the review 
process as in the specific proposals presented. 
Why is the reliability of peer review so low? 
Donald Laming 
Department of Experimental Psychology. University of Cambridge, 
Cambridge. England CB2 3EB 
Electronic mall: drjl@phx.cam.ac.uk 
I compliment Cicchetti on a careful and detailed survey of 
studies of peer review in many different disciplines. Of the 58 
tabulated correlations between independent referees, only four 
fall short of 0.18 and only four exceed 0.40 (of which the highest 
reduced to 0.38 on replication). What is to be made of these low 
levels of interreferee agreement? Cicchetti is dispassionate in 
his presentation and I am not sure how he feels about these 
results. But most scientists would, I believe, say these levels are 
not good enough and need to be improved. I am going to argue, 
on the contrary, that significant improvement may not be 
possible. 
1. Summary of argument. Laboratory studies of absolute judg-
ment of simple stimuli (frequencies of pure tones, for example, 
or sound pressure levels) show that such judgments are never-
theless relative - relative, usually, to the preceding stimulus in 
the experiment. This means that successive stimuli are com-
pared with a constantly shifting frame of reference that limits the 
accuracy of judgment much more than any specifically sensory 
confusion. There are three quite different statistics from studies 
of the judgment of sound intensity that indicate that variation in 
the frame of reference accounts for about two-thirds of the 
variability of the judgments. Now transpose that result into the 
field of peer review. Two different referees use two different 
frames of reference for the evaluation of a submitted article or 
grant proposal. If those different reference frames contributed 
two-thirds of the variability of each evaluation, the correlation 
between independent peer reviews would be limited to about 
0.33. I now fill out the details of my argument. 
1.1. Absolute Identification of simple stimuli. The most com-
pelling example of the limited accuracy of absolute judgment 
comes from Pollack (1952). Pollack presented a series of tones to 
his subjects with frequencies selected at random from some 
number (m) of chosen values in the range 100 to 8,000 Hz, the 
number of different values ranging from 2 to 14 in different parts 
of the experiment. Each tone was presented for 2.5 sec. at about 
an 85 dB loudness level. The subject identified the tone by 
assigning it a number in the range 1 to m, and was then told the 
correct identification. As the number of different auditory fre-
quencies and response categories increased above four (up to 
which point identification was nearly error-free), errors in-
creased at such a rate that the accuracy of identification never 
exceeded a level equivalent to the use of just five categories 
without error. This result - specifically the limit of five catego-
ries without error - is not peculiar to frequencies of tone, but is 
obtained for many other sensory attributes as well, with only a 
few exceptions. (See Gamer 1962, Chapter 3; Laming 1984, p. 
155, Table 1). 
This surprisingly low limit does not depend on sensory con-
fusability. Jesteadt, Wier and Green (1977) found that there 
were about 2,000 just noticeable differences between 100 and 
8,000 Hz. Moreover, in a series of supplementary experiments, 
Pollack (1952) manipulated several variables that affect discrimi-
nability without materially increasing the accuracy of identifica-
tion of single tones. The only manipulation that increased 
accuracy was the presentation of a fixed reference tone (of a 
frequency known to the subject) prior to each stimulus to be 
judged (Pollack 1953). The limit to the accuracy of absolute 
judgment has to do with lack of a stable frame of reference. 
The same conclusion may be drawn in a quite different 
manner from a study of magnitude estimation by Baird et al. 
(1980). When the intensities of two successive noise bursts 
differed by not more than 5 dB, the respective judgments (log 
magnitude estimates) correlated about +0.8. So some 0.64 of 
the variability in the judgment of the second stimulus was 
inherited from error in judging its predecessor (see Laming, in 
press). This result has been replicated several times. It is found 
in the work of Jesteadt, Luce & Green (1977), Green et al. 
(1977), Luce & Green (1978), and Green et al. (1980). All these 
experiments used the intensity of a pure tone as the stimulus-
attribute to be judged, but Baird et al. (1980) have demonstrated 
the result with the area of an arbitrary geometric figure as well. 
1.2. Transmission of error In absolute Judgments. If each stim-
ulus, and the judgment assigned to it, is used as a reference 
point for the judgment of its successor, any error in the first 
assignment will be transmitted to the second. Herein lies a 
substantial source of inaccuracy. The experiment by Baird et al. 
indicates that about two-thirds of the error judgment may be 
accounted for in this way. There are two other experiments 
(more particularly, different statistics from two other experi-
ments, not a mere replication of this present result) that also 
point to a proportion of about two-thirds. 
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J. C. Stevens and Tulving (1957) reported on a class of 70 
undergraduate students making their first-ever magnitude esti-
mates of loudness. Subsequently, S. S. Stevens (1971, Figure 8) 
plotted the cumulative distributions of those judgments (after 
"modulus equalisation" [Stevens 1971, p. 428] to remove dif-
ferences in the absolute scale of different subjects'judgments) to 
show that those distributions were approximately log-normal. 
The inverse gradient of the cumulative distribution function 
(cumulative normal probability versus log estimate) estimates 
the standard deviation, and the variabilities of successive log-
magnitude estimates, calculated in this manner, are tabulated 
by Laming (1984, p. 168, Table 2). For the very first judgment 
by each of the 70 subjects the variance was 0.010. For the second 
judgment, the variance was 0.020, and so on, increasing to an 
asymptotic level of about 0.030. So the variability contributed 
by a single stimulus presentation amounted to about one-third 
of the asymptotic value. The other two-thirds must have been 
inherited from the preceding judgment. 
Of necessity, magnitude estimation requires that the subject 
receive no knowledge of results, lest it bias the judgments. In 
absolute identification, on the other hand, feedback after each 
trial is the rule. It is possible to compare the two procedures by 
conducting an absolute identification experiment without feed-
back, however, using the same set of stimuli and the same 
presentation schedule in both kinds of experiment. Braida & 
Durlach (1972, Experiment 1) is a case in point. 
My third estimate comes from an as yet unpublished replica-
tion of Braida & Durlach's experiment. The stimuli were 10 1-
kHz tones of 0.5 sec. duration, ranging in level from 50 to 86 dB 
SPL in 4 dB steps. For the first 3,000 trials the subject was asked 
simply to estimate the loudness (without being told that there 
were only 10 different stimuli). For the next 3,000 trials the 
subject was asked to identify the stimulus, but without feed-
back. The final 3,000 trials were again absolute identification, 
but with the correct response indicated immediately after each 
judgment. The data from all three tasks were analysed using 
Torgerson's (1958, Chapter 10) model of categorical judgment 
(see also Braida & Durlach 1972). This model estimates d' for 
the separation between adjacent pairs of stimuli (cf. Luce et al. 
1982) and Figure 1 plots the cumulative d' for one subject 
performing each of the three tasks. There is not much difference 
between discrimination in the magnitude estimation and abso-
lute identification tasks, both without feedback. When immedi-
ate knowledge of results is provided, however, d' improves. 
Comparing the aggregate from 50 to 82 dB, d' improves by the 
factor 1.79. This is equivalent to a decrease in the model 
variance to 0.31 (= 1 .79 - 2 ) of its former value. Evidently, in 
the point of reference used for the ensuing judgment, imme-
diate knowledge of results substitutes the correct response for 
the response actually made, thereby preventing the transmis-
sion of error from one trial to the next. The proportion of error 
inherited from the preceding trial by this particular subject 
is 0.69. 
I have no theoretical foundation for this proportion of about 
two-thirds; it probably signifies no more than a fortuitous selec-
tion of experimental sources. But while, of necessity, the experi-
ments are all somewhat similar, my three estimates are obtained 
from different kinds of experimental statistic. For this reason, 
two-thirds is a defensible value to transpose to the domain of 
peer review. 
1.3. Application to peer review. In section 2 of his target article 
Cicchetti discusses a set of evaluative attributes and specific 
criteria for peer review of journal articles and grant proposals. 
He seems to envisage that these criteria are internalised by 
referees, possibly in the manner in which some musicians 
exercise "perfect pitch." An alternative scenario treats those 
criteria as no more than empty verbal formulae, which do not 
generate any particular behavioural correspondence between 
the bases of judgment by different referees. Instead, different 
referees formulate their judgments against different back-
St imulus ampl i tude in dB SPL 
Figure 1 (Laming). Cumulative d', cumulated from the smallest 
stimulus (50 dB) upward, for magnitude estimation, for absolute 
identification without feedback, and for identification with im-
mediate knowledge of results. 
grounds of ideas which, according to the foregoing analysis, 
should account for about two-thirds of the variability of their 
assessments. 
If those different frames of reference are truly independent, 
then the scope for agreement between two referees is limited to 
the remaining one-third of the variance, and that one-third 
corresponds as closely as one could reasonably expect to the 
spread of correlations reported by the authors. Test theory 
(Gulliksen 1950, p. 13) tells us that the reliability of any one 
assessment may be measured by the correlation between two 
independent judges, here 0.33. An editor has two or more such 
assessments on which to base a decision whether to accept an 
article for publication, however. The Spearman-Brown fonnula 
(Gulliksen 1950, p. 63) tells us that the combination of two 
independent referees raises the reliability of the editorial deci-
sion to 0.50. But I think most scientists would still regard this as 
unacceptably low. Some further exploration of the process of 
assessment is needed to discover what improvement may be 
possible. 
2. Comparison with the marking of examinations. Public ex-
aminations in the United Kingdom (GCE "O" and "A" levels) 
typically achieve a mark-remark correlation of 0.9 or better 
(Murphy 1978; 1982). The re-marking in Murphy's studies was 
undertaken by an independent examiner and in that respect is 
comparable to peer review. I exclude from this comparison 
examinations in mathematics, physics, and kindred subjects, 
because for those subjects examiners are provided with, in 
effect, a list of the admissible answers and the marks to be 
assigned to each. Even though a professional article falls within 
one of those disciplines, it is nevertheless open-ended (the 
choice of topic is always at the author's disposal), so the correct 
comparison must be with examinations in subjects such as 
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English, history, and sociology. In these subjects a reliability of 
0.9 or better is still commonly achieved. 
The difference vis-á-vis peer review is the use of a marking 
scheme, however imprecise, which is practised by the exam-
iners. This difference is immediately apparent in comparison 
with university examinations (Byrne 1980; Cox 1967; Eells 1930, 
Hartog et al. 1936; Laming 1990; again excluding mathematical 
and physical sciences), which usually have no such scheme. 
Take away any pretence at a marking scheme and the reliability 
of examination marks falls to near the levels reported for peer 
review. There is a substantial argument to be made in favour of 
my alternative scenario, that the "specific criteria" referees are 
assumed to use have little or no behavioural reality. 
3. Scientific progress? The argument that follows next is, I 
suppose, a flagrant abuse of classical test theory. But it provides 
the vehicle for a particular pessimistic view of scientific progress 
that needs to be exposed to scrutiny. 
Suppose that referees typically accord a weight w to an article 
or a grant proposal to be appraised, the residue (1— w) being 
contributed by the variability in the background with which the 
article is implicitly compared. The quantity (1— to) corresponds 
to the estimate two-thirds in section 1.3. Suppose, however, 
that the frames of reference implicitly used by different referees 
are not independent, but correlate r with each other, because 
the referees are chosen from within a common scientific tradi-
tion. The correlation to be expected between two independent 
assessments is then ([1—u>]r+tü]). If a journal editor bases his 
decision on the reports of n different referees, application of the 
general Spearman-Brown formula (Gulliksen 1950, p. 78) sug-
gests that the editorial decision will have a reliability of 
r' - n((l-w)r+uí)/{(n-l)[(l-u>)r+u>)+l}. (1) 
In Equation 1, r' is the concordance between the articles 
ultimately published and the criteria referees are supposed to 
apply. It is also the correlation between the frames of reference 
with respect to which subsequent referees will formulate their 
assessments of the next generation of journal submissions. What 
happens to successive values of r'? Do they converge to a limit 
and, if so, what is the value of that limit? 
For admissible values of n and w the process does, indeed, 
converge, and the only possible limit is 1. That is fine; the 
process of peer review converges on a common frame of refer-
ence that, in a scientific discipline, is presumably in concor-
dance with the state of Nature. But the uncomfortable import of 
the correlations reported in the target article is that this does not 
seem to be happening. The only reconciliation of the theoretical 
argument and the empirical data that I can at present think of 
runs as follows: Once attention is confined to the rather narrow 
stratum of potentially plausible grant proposals and publishable 
papers, referees are, for the most part, unable to tell the 
meritorious from the rest, and scientific "progress" is prin-
cipally a random progression. 
It is clear from their espousal of proposition (a) in section 8 
that Cicchetti does not share my pessimism. He takes an 
optimistic view of scientific progress, but on what evidence? 
The optimistic view envisages that most published research will 
have some detectable effect on the state of the field 50 or even 
100 years hence. It is difficult to see what evidence could be 
brought to bear on such a proposition. But I have had occasions 
to consult journal articles in my subject (experimental psycholo-
gy) from 50 and sometimes 100 years ago. On those occasions, I 
have often glanced at the table of contents of the journal volume 
being consulted, just to see what else was there. It is interesting 
to discover an article of historical significance that one has heard 
of in a different context. But, usually, nine articles out of ten, 
even 19 out of 20, have proved to be completely unknown. The 
present state of my subject would be no different if those articles 
had never been published. Is the situation any different today? 
Should the blinded lead the blinded? 
Stephen P. Lock 
British Medical Journal, Tavistock Square, London WC1H 9JR, England 
Given the apparent inherent variation in opinions, not only 
between referees themselves, but between referees and edi-
tors, what can be done to improve things? My personal hier-
archy of proposals would start with the editors' subcategorizing 
the questions they expect reviewers to consider. For example, 
instead of answering the question, "Is the work original?" the 
referee could indicate, "New to me; known to me: (á) by 
rumour, (b) by personal communication, (c) from presentation at 
a conference (with or without abstract), (d) from published work, 
or (e) from retrieval from database." 
Next, I would advocate two unconfirmed hunches. First, that 
the quality of a decision is enhanced by having an editorial 
"hanging committee" (named by analogy with the selection 
body of the London Royal Academy of Arts), which discusses 
most of the articles with "grey" reviewers' reports (that is, 2-4 
on a 1 -5 scale of reject/accept). Second, that for a very general 
journal better quality reviews are obtained if the choice of 
reviewer is delegated to an assistant editor in the subfield; 
expert knowledge by one competent reviewer is more helpful 
for making a decision, in my view, than having two or more 
opinions from referees with no specific expertise. 
Paramount among my suggestions, however, is the need for 
blind review - or at least for editors to study it under their own 
circumstances. To earlier suggestions of the cogency of this view 
by Mahoney (1977) and Peters and Ceci (1982) must be added 
the results of the rigorous study by McNutt et al. (1990). Not 
only did the last show that blinding was feasible for the editorial 
office and successful for 76% of reviewers, but on a 3-point scale 
there was a 21% improvement in the quality of reviews, as well 
as a striking increase in the proportion of excellent reviews 
among the blinded reviewers. So, in addition to replicating 
these findings for other journals, another study that is now 
urgent would determine the effect of blinding on the editors 
themselves, particularly in some recent findings (Garfiinkel et 
al. 1990). Some 25 manuscripts that had clearly been revised 
and accepted for publication in the Journal of Pediatrics were 
sent for re-review by two additional referees, and then reevalua-
tion by three experienced, independent assistant editors. Most 
manuscripts were thought by the new reviewers to have defects 
that warranted further revision, but, though one of the par-
ticipating assistant editors would have requested revision more 
often than the other, there was infrequent disagreement among 
them about the basic decision to accept or reject. 
My second group of comments relates to publication bias, in 
particular, the preference for original over replicative work and 
for manuscripts reporting positive results. Possibly, now that 
editors have recognised the pitfalls of this attitude, which were 
well discussed at the First International Congress on Peer 
Review in Biomedical Publication (Chalmers 1990; Chalmers et 
al. 1990; Dickersin 1990; Sharp 1990), the problem will dimin-
ish, particularly if authors appeal on this account. Nevertheless, 
the editorial decision must depend on circumstances: For exam-
ple, whatever the findings, I believe that the British Medical 
Journal would be interested in publishing other studies (how-
ever long and detailed) of the incidence of leukaemia in children 
of fathers who had been exposed to high doses of radioactivity in 
their work in various atomic power stations, thus confirming or 
refuting the recent work by Gardner et al. (1990) at Sellafield. 
The recent introduction of structured abstracts (Ad Hoc Work-
ing Group for Critical Appraisal of the Medical Literature, 1987) 
may also make it easier for editors to find the space for confir-
matory reports or reports with negative results. With a limit of 
400 words and a tightly defined vocabulary, these allow a 
detailed statement of the study's objectives, setting, methods, 
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analysis, endpoints, findings, and conclusions. Thus, in the 
future, after peer review of the full article, editors might like 
to suggest that some reports be printed in structured abstract 
form with the substantive report incorporated into an on-line 
database. 
Finally, in the past editors in many disciplines have been able 
to sleep regardless of mistaken decisions because of the concept 
of Western plurality: What gets rejected by the Lancet will be 
published by the British Medical Journal or Gut. Cicchetti 
shows disquietingly that this is not so for some journals in some 
disciplines and for research grant applications in any of them. 
We urgently need retrospective and prospective studies on 
these findings: Did the rejected ideas stand up in the light of 
history? Was the rejection the result of lack of rigour by the 
researcher, even though the original ideas were sound? Were 
they ever studied by anybody else? And should society see that 
some journal space/money is reserved for "zany" ideas in all 
disciplines as in David Horrobin's journal Medical hypotheses? 
Some^of these studies need not be too time consuming and 
might make fitting contributions to the 1992 Second World 
Conference on Peer Review. (Details are available from Drum-
mond Rennie, Journal of the American Medical Association, 
535 N. Dearborn St., Chicago, IL 60610.) 
Justice, efficiency and epistemology in the 
peer review of scientific manuscripts 
Michael J. Mahoney 
Department of Psychology, University of North Texas, Denton, TX 76203 
Cicchetti has written a valuable and comprehensive critique of 
the reliability of peer review for journal manuscripts and grant 
applications. Besides addressing some of the many subtleties, 
complexities, and practical issues involved in peer review, the 
author has identified an important and well-replicated phe-
nomenon in this area, namely, "that reviewers are indeed 
substantially more in agreement on which scientific documents 
to reject than on which to accept." This may be a heartening 
conclusion for those evolutionary epistemologists who view 
selection processes as primarily negative, but the authors offer a 
provocative discussion of caveats in the interpretation of this 
pattern. 
I agree that the high rate of rejection for grant proposals is of 
greater concern than the rejection of journal manuscripts in the 
social and behavioral sciences. In their recent report, the 
National Research Council (1988) stated that basic research in 
these sciences merits a 30% increase in funding over current 
levels. Unfortunately, federal funding for such research has 
been declining sharply since 1983. In fact, although federal 
support for research in the other sciences has increased by 36% 
in the last 15 years (1972 to 1987), federal funding for basic 
research in the social and behavioral sciences has been reduced 
by 25% during that same interval. Needless to say, those 
psychologists who recognize the need for a scientific basis for 
their activities will now have to work even harder to reverse the 
trend of declining support for their research. 
I also agree that allowing authors to engage in multiple 
manuscript submissions is not a viable solution to the problem of 
high rejection rates from journals. Indeed, the project recently 
reported by Epstein (1990) illustrates some of the problems of 
this practice as a research strategy, let alone as standard practice 
for scientific authors. Epstein apparently plagiarized an article 
and submitted it to 146 professional journals in (or related to) the 
field of social work. His methodology and quantitative results 
were very weak, and yet he offered an interpretation of his study 
that was harshly critical of the professionals who had unwittingly 
invested perhaps a total of 1,000 hours in his project. 
With other scientists, I believe that studies of peer review are 
a priority for future science studies. In this regard, it is reassur-
ing that the American Medical Association sponsored a special 
conference on the topic (Rennie 1986). "I do not believe, 
however, that such a compelling priority justifies violations of 
human rights and the professional codes of ethical conduct 
developed to protect them. The questions of how, when, and 
why we 'draw the lines' demarcating ethical and unethical 
conduct will remain with us, of course, and we can only hope 
that their challenges will teach us some important lessons about 
ourselves and our methods in the process (Mahoney 1990, p. 
54)." 
Reflections on the peer review process 
Herbert W. Marsh* and Samuel Ballb 
*School of Education, and bFaculty of Education, University of Sydney, 
Sydney NSW 2006 Australia 
The peer review process is one of the most highly regarded and 
frequently used procedures for evaluating the academic merit of 
academic manuscripts, grant proposals, tenure/promotion ap-
plications, and academic monographs and textbooks. Hence, 
peer review is of utmost importance to the academic community 
and we welcome the comprehensive review by Cicchetti. It 
brings together discussions of theoretical issues, methodo-
logical/statistical concerns, a diversity of empirical studies, and 
practical suggestions for the interpretation and application of 
the peer-review process. Given the scope of his review, we will 
limit ourselves to comments on a few specific aspects of the peer 
review process for academic journals. 
Reliability of the editor's decision. Marsh and Ball (1981; 1989) 
noted that low single-reviewer reliabilities should not be con-
fused with the reliability of the decision of the review process. 
First, the reliability of the mean response by multiple reviewers 
depends on the number of reviewers; a single-reviewer reliabili-
ty of .36 results in a reliability of .53 for 2 reviewers, .65 for 3, 
and 0.69 for 4 (using the Spearman-Brown equation). Second, 
the editor serves as an implicit additional reviewer, further 
contributing to the reliability of the final decision. Third, the 
editor's decision is typically based on additional factors not 
considered in single-reviewer reliability estimates, such as the 
detailed written comments provided by reviewers, author re-
sponses to reviewer criticisms in revisions and/or separate 
correspondence, and sometimes further reviews of the revised 
manuscript. Fourth, the exclusion of manuscripts judged to be 
grossly inappropriate further attenuates reliability estimates, in 
that agreement among reviewers would probably have been 
best for these manuscripts. Thus, the editor's decision is likely 
to be substantially more reliable than that of the single reviewer. 
Policy decisions and practices that operationally define the 
peer-review process. A general framework for the review of 
academic manuscripts is common to most journals. Editors, 
chosen for their broad expertise, generally screen manuscripts 
for appropriateness and then assign them to one or more re-
viewers with particular expertise in relevant areas. The re-
viewers are asked to provide written critiques, ratings, or 
recommendations on the advisability of publication. Editors, 
relying on these reviews and their own appraisals of the manu-
scripts, decide to accept (perhaps, subject to revision) or reject 
the manuscripts, or to seek further review. Many details, 
however, are left to the discretion of the editor including: (1) the 
criteria to be used by the reviewers; (2) the form of the review 
(ratings, written critiques, etc.); (3) the number of reviewers; (4) 
how reviewers are selected; (5) whether authors and reviewers 
are anonymous; (6) what is done with divergent or inconclusive 
reviews; (7) the extent to which the editor's decisions are 
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dictated by the reviews; (8) whether revised manuscripts are 
sent for further review to the same or different reviewers; and (9) 
whether authors have the right to challenge reviews or request 
re-reviews. These policy decisions are typically made in an ad 
hoc fashion, and editors have little guidance in establishing the 
policy practices that constitute the peer review process. Where-
as research reviewed by Cicchetti addresses some policy prac-
tices, too little research has been done summarizing existing 
policy options or testing their effectiveness. 
The design of review surveys: Multidimensional components 
and externally anchored scales. Several studies reviewed by 
Cicchetti considered ratings on specific multiple criteria in 
addition to overall ratings, and better agreement was found for 
these (e.g., attention to relevant literature and research design). 
Some disagreement among reviewers may arise from the way 
they weight the different components in determining their 
overall recommendation, or it may be limited to one particular 
aspect of the manuscript. There is surprisingly little effort to 
determine what the factorial structure of responses is, however, 
or whether more reliable composites could be obtained by 
averaging the different subscales. 
Marsh and Ball (1989) developed a 21-item reviewer survey 
based on a content analysis of written critiques. Factor analysis 
of responses to this survey clearly identified four factors affect-
ing the outcome of reviews: research methods, relevance to 
readers, writing style and presentation clarity, and significance 
or importance. Multitrait-multimethod analyses of agreement 
among multiple raters of the same manuscripts provided modest 
support for convergent validity and for the distinctiveness of the 
rating components, but it also indicated a substantial "halo 
effect" in the ratings by a given reviewer. It is interesting that 
halo effects associated with the overall recommendations were 
much smaller than with responses to the 21 rating items (even 
though one was also an overall rating item). The explanation 
seemed to be that the response categories in the overall recom-
mendation were much better anchored to concrete behaviors 
(e.g., accept as is or with slight revisions, reject outright) than 
the 9-point rating scale for the 21 items. Consequently, single-
reviewer reliabilities based on various combinations of the 21 
rating items were no higher than for the overall recommenda-
tion. The results suggest the potential usefulness of multidimen-
sional rating scales, but also point out the importance of having 
well-anchored response scales that minimize halo effects and 
response biases idiosyncratic to how each reviewer interprets 
the response scale. 
In discussing attempts to improve reviewer reliability, Marsh 
and Ball (1989) also noted that such proposals must be evaluated 
in terms of their likely impact on validity. For example, there 
are relatively objective characteristics on which reviewers could 
agree that are unrelated to manuscript quality. In addition, 
specific strategies may affect differentially reliability and valid-
ity. For example, editors are likely to send the same manuscript 
to reviewers having different perspectives, and this strategy 
may lower reliability but increase validity. 
The process of peer review: Unanswered 
questions 
Linda D. Nelson 
Department of Psychiatry, Medical Center. University of California, Irvine, 
Orange, CA 92668 
Peer review is essentially a classification system that involves 
both process (i.e., the activity that led to a decision) and outcome 
(i.e., the decision itself). 
Although Cicchetti states from the outset that a major objec-
tive of his study was to analyze the peer review process, outcome 
appears to be the focus of his target article. Dependent variables 
(e.g., accept, reject, resubmit) were carefully examined in the 
context of their own and others' work, with the results clearly 
displayed in tabular form (e.g., rates of interrater agreement). 
Their recommendations regarding the appropriate statistics for 
evaluating and determining standards of reliability added new 
and potentially useful information to the study of peer review. 
His conclusions regarding possible interactions between the 
nature of the discipline (e. g., general vs. diffuse) and acceptance 
rates were interesting and highlighted bases for differentia] 
outcomes in levels of agreement. Focusing part of his discussion 
on peer review as it relates to major funding sources (e.g., 
agreement on grant proposals by type of study and area of 
discipline) offered new interpretations regarding outcome to 
this important phenomenon. In short, tne author is to be 
commended for his efforts in updating and expanding our 
understanding of peer review as it applies to manuscripts and 
grant proposals. 
Rather than replacing outcome as a topic, per se, I would have 
liked some additional discussion on the process involved in peer 
review. This point is important to me as a psychologist and 
researcher because it challenges the interplay between what a 
person thinks and what a person does. The author cites Kuhn 
(1962) as someone who stresses the importance of peer evalua-
tion on scientific activity. It is noteworthy that Kuhn's remarks 
(1962) were used to support the importance of considering the 
relationship between process and outcome in psychotherapy 16 
years later (Orlinsky & Howard 1978). To ignore the influence of 
process on outcome in peer review misses an important link 
between what (or how) individuals think and what leads them to 
certain conclusions. Although Cicchetti touches on this in his 
discussion of reviewer bias, I am not certain from his presenta-
tion of supportive literature whether bias is actually an operative 
factor affecting outcome: One experiment used to support the 
role of author affiliation status and review outcome was soundly 
criticized (see commentaries on Peters & Ceci, 1982); another 
(Mahoney 1977) relied on a "qualitative analysis" of reviewers' 
remarks. 
Cicchetti further implies that peer review can engage refer-
ee/reviewer variables that are so powerful that evaluative crite-
ria (e.g., adequacy of methodology) become secondary factors in 
decision making. He states 
On the basis of the best controlled studies of the peer review process 
to date, we are forced to conclude that referees do at times apply 
subjective criteria (that) cannot be described as "fair," "careful," 
"tactful," or "constructive," despite the fact that such traits are 
widely accepted as desirable characteristics of referees. 
The author then cites, as an example of this phenomenon, the 
increased likelihood of reviewers accepting manuscripts based 
on type of results (e. g., positive) instead of a manuscript's overall 
worth (e.g., adequacy of methodology). 
The notion that unfair, subjective criteria may be imposed by 
journal "gatekeepers" is a provocative one. Even more unset-
tling is the contention by Mahoney (1977) that this phenomenon 
represents "confirmatory bias," wherein reviewers deem ac-
ceptable manuscripts that coincide with their beliefs and reject 
those that do not. Does this mean that papers tend to get 
published on the basis of statistical significance? Furthermore, 
are we to assume that reviewers tend to agree with any alter-
native hypothesis set forth in a paper in such a way that failure to 
reject null hypotheses is viewed as inconsistent with their 
beliefs? Considering direction of results as an operative variable 
in peer review is further clouded by the fact that the main 
experiment used to justify the notion involved a direct manip-
ulation of the operative variable in question (Mahoney 1977). An 
investigator's choice of an independent variable, and Cicchetti's 
conclusions regarding its impact on the review process, repre-
sent subjective determinations, in this instance regarding which 
reviewer variables within the complex process of peer review 
characterize prepotent predictors of outcome. As a journal 
reviewer, I would venture to say that unfortunately, papers with 
79 CICHETTI: THE RELIABII.ITY OF PEER REVIEW 
negative results rarely get submitted to begin with. Hence, 
rejection of papers that meet objective evaluation criteria, but 
contain negative results, may be an outcome that rarely occurs 
in actual practice. The point is investigators seem to act as if they 
have identified a single or small set of measurable characteristics 
of the reviewers contributing to experimental effects, when the 
need to maintain the conviction regarding potency of these 
selected variables may be greater than the evidence to support 
it. 
In short, we are still left with the questions: "What process do 
reviewers undertake when they perceive information and selec-
tively weigh its importance against arbitrary evaluation crite-
ria?" and, "Which reviewer variables are associated with differ-
ent review outcomes?" Answers to these questions pertain to 
independent variables and, as such, would serve to broaden our 
understanding of what leads to high or low levels of reliability or 
differential outcomes by discipline subspecialty. 
Examining process variables may not be the answer, but peer 
review, by virtue of being a classification system, involves a 
process or activity leading to an outcome or decision. To date, 
the study of process variables in peer review has been largely 
neglected. Kuhn (1962) reminds us that, in a preparadigmatic 
state, the "real" solution in any field cannot be negotiated by a 
representative panel of experts. Cicchetti outlines historical 
constraints operating within the system of peer review and 
invites us to break away with some concrete recommendations 
for change. An additional recommendation should be to exam-
ine process variables believed to be associated with levels of 
expected agreement. The "black box" remains as long as cre-
ative efforts to examine and improve the system of peer review 
are neglected. 
Is unreliability In peer review harmful? 
Henry L. Roediger III 
Department of Psychology, Rice University, Houston, TX 77251-1892 
Electronic mall: roedige(curicevm 1 .rice.edu 
Cicchetti's target article provides an excellent analysis of studies 
assessing the reliability of peer review in journal and conference 
submissions and grant proposals. Even the best studies show 
modest levels of reliability, a fact decried by many who see 
arbitrariness in the peer review system. The underlying as-
sumption behind the gloom that studies of peer review cast is 
that the publication (or granting) process would somehow be 
more accurate and fairer if the reliabilities involved in peer 
review were improved, say to .70 or .80. To me, this state of 
affairs seems unlikely to occur under any realistic set of condi-
tions. Furthermore, I remain unconvinced that it would even be 
desirable, in the long run, for the scientific enterprise, even 
though it might make life easier for editors and grant admin-
istrators. Below I will provide underpinnings for these opinions. 
Cognitive psychologists have long been interested in the 
processes involved in judgment and decision making in complex 
realms (e.g., hiring decisions, picking stocks, making clinical 
diagnoses). The literature is replete with findings of poor relia-
bility and validity of human judgments when people, even 
experts in a field, are faced with complex, multiattribute deci-
sions (e.g., Kahneman et al. 1982; Nisbett & Ross 1980). Given 
this backdrop, a finding of high reliability in peer review judg-
ments would come as a surprise. 
One reason for unreliability in peer review that may not 
pertain to other areas of judgment concerns how reviewers are 
selected by editors (see Roediger 1987). I spent five years as 
editor (and another three as associate editor) of a journal re-
ferred to by Cicchetti as a "specific focus journal" (thcJournal of 
Experimental Psychology, Learning, Memory, and Cognition). 
Although perhaps specific in some sense, the topics under 
consideration seemed broad enough to me: reading, attending, 
learning, remembering, decision making, judging, problem 
solving, categorizing, perceptual-motor skill learning, and other 
topics. As editor, I would skim each submission to assign 
reviewers. A common scenario would be as follows: The authors 
of the paper would be examining a particular theory or line of 
thought about some phenomenon, or they would be contrasting 
two or more viewpoints. Based on a series of several experi-
ments, they would usually reach some conclusion on the phe-
nomenon in question. As editor, I would try to pick reviewers 
who would come at the paper from different viewpoints. If the 
authors eventually concluded that their results supported Theo-
ry X, then usually I would have someone associated with Theory 
X as one reviewer, and someone associated with Theory Y (or 
some other approach) as another reviewer. If the paper had 
some fatal flaw (poor reasoning, improper methods, inappropri-
ate statistics, inconsistent results across experiments), both 
reviewers would probably argue against publication. This is just 
what Cicchetti shows: Peer reviews are quite consistent on 
flawed papers. 
But suppose the paper did not suffer from any obvious flaws. 
A typical (but not universal) pattern for such a paper supporting 
Theory X would be for another proponent of Theory X to 
evaluate the paper positively, whereas a "Theory Y reviewer" 
might recommend against publication, suggesting further re-
search. As Cicchetti notes, the reviewers may not even disagree 
on their assessments of the facts, but rather of the weightings 
given to them. Of course, these "unreliable" judgments seem 
perfectly sensible to anyone editing a journal. Further, both 
reviewers are often right, in the sense that most papers (exclud-
ing the truly bad ones weeded out by peer review) have some 
merits and some demerits to which reviewers can point. 
If this scenario is representative, then some unreliability in 
the peer review system may be occasioned by editors seeking 
the advice of experts with varying points of view on the topic at 
issue. This process may occasion unreliability of peer judgment, 
but probably provides better information to the editor and the 
authors. If this is one cause of reviewer unreliability, then one 
way to enhance reliability would be for editors to try to identify 
reviewers who had in the past consistently agreed or disagreed 
with the position argued by the author in the manuscript under 
review and to send the paper only to like-minded reviewers. I 
assume no one would seriously argue for this proposal, which 
shows the danger of emphasizing reviewer reliability at the cost 
of other considerations (such as providing a variety of per-
spectives). 
Finally, consider the neglected issue of the validity of peer 
review. Can scientists really predict accurately which manu-
scripts or grant proposals will lead to surer progress in the field? 
Can any reviewer validly discriminate the top 20% of the papers 
or proposals from the next 20%, which is often the task in the 
behavioral sciences with their high rejection rates? Given that 
peer judgments are unreliable, asking questions about validity 
is even more hazardous, especially since there is likely to be 
disagreement about the criterion variable. For example, sup-
pose that reviewers or editors were asked to predict the number 
of cumulative citations over a 10-year period for papers accepted 
for publication. Would the resulting correlations between pre-
dicted and actual citations even approach the modest .2 to .3 we 
have come to expect from peer review studies? I doubt it. 
My skepticism about the outcome of such a study is based in 
part on informal observations of colleagues discussing contro-
versial papers that have been published and have then shaped 
the direction of my field (cognitive psychology). Often, years 
later, one will still hear debates about the original paper, 
whether or not it should have been accepted, and whether the 
resulting approach has been worthwhile or a blind alley. If 
scientists cannot agree, even in retrospect, that heavily cited 
and important papers were indeed worthy, then what hope do 
we have of deciding such matters a priori? (See Roediger, 1987, 
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for an example.) This matter deserves more formal study, but 
accurate judgments of scientific importance are probably reli-
able only years after the fact of publication, with the wisdom of 
hindsight. 
In summary, let us simply grant that the peer review system is 
inherently unreliable, to a great extent. Two reasonable people, 
both experts in their fields, can look at the same manuscript or 
grant proposal and reach quite different conclusions about its 
merit. But if scientists cannot really make valid judgments about 
such matters (which seems likely, too), then the unreliability 
may not actually be harmful. Perhaps the randomness intro-
duced into the system is good for it, if even reliable judgments 
have little validity. If these conclusions are indeed facts, should 
we be depressed and give up peer review? I don't think so. After 
all, peer review does function well (a) to eliminate the real 
"bloopers," and (b) to provide expert opinion to authors, which 
is often helpful (in my experience). And there seems no reason-
able alternative to peer review, no system that would work so 
well without engendering more problems than it solved. 
My recommendation is that editors and grant administrators 
recognize fully the potential flaws in the peer review system and 
work around them. In cases of divided opinion, editors may use 
the heuristic of "when in doubt, accept" (cited by Cicchetti). My 
view is that, in most fields, the unreliability of peer review does 
little harm and may do good, assuming that several journals are 
appropriate outlets for a piece of work. If a paper is rejected by 
one, the negative reviews can be used as advice for improve-
ment for resubmission elsewhere. Given several outlets, per-
sistent authors, and unreliability in the peer review system, 
worthy papers will eventually see the light of day, even if not in 
the outlet of first choice, and at a slight delay. 
The situation with regard to grant proposals is less optimistic, 
mainly because there are fewer sources of funds. A negative 
evaluation is more likely to mean that the work will not be 
carried out. Evaluating proposed research seems even more 
fraught with difficulty than evaluating completed work. One 
solution would be to follow the Canadian system in which (as I 
understand it) many researchers are given small seed grants at 
the beginning of their careers, and then the system rewards 
those who carry forward successful research programs. Perhaps 
in awarding grants we should place greater emphasis on the 
applicant's past record of research and less emphasis on the 
writing of a promissory note (in the form of a proposal) for future 
work. This recommendation assumes that greater reliability and 
validity can be exhibited by judges in evaluating research 
records than in evaluating research proposals, a topic that awaits 
future investigation. 
Some indices of the reliability of peer review 
Robert Rosenthal 
Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138 
Cicchetti has performed an important service to the several 
sciences by summarizing what is known about the reliability of 
peer review. Given the impact of Behavioral andB rain Sciences 
target articles, it is likely that his paper will encourage further 
research and further thinking about the reliability of peer 
review. Its impact may also extend to the encouragement of the 
use of various indices of reliability of judgments. It is therefore 
of special importance to be clear about several issues relevant to 
the choice of indices of reliability. The purpose of this commen-
tary is to suggest some friendly amendments to the evaluations 
of several indices of reliability referred to or used in the target 
article. 
Three more-informatlon-efflclent Indices. Three of these in-
dices of reliability are very information-efficient in the sense 
that they use all the information available and give a single, 
unequivocal, focused, single d f , easy to interpret index of 
magnitude of relationship (Rosenthal 1987; Rosenthal & Rosnow 
1985; Rosenthal & Rubin 1982). These are the Pearson R, the 
intraclass correlation, and Cohen's (1960) kappa applied to the 
2 x 2 table. Especially for that case of the intra-class r in which 
each rater judges all stimuli, all three of these indices are 
equivalent to product-moment correlations. Indeed, Fisher 
developed the intraclass R to be able to apply Pearson R to twin-
data in which it would be arbitrary to designate either twin as 
the X or the Y. Fisher originally dealt with this situation by 
listing each twin pair twice, once as XY and once as YX 
(Snedecor & Cochran 1967). Cohen's kappa in the 2 x 2 case is 
equivalent to the Pearson R in its 0,1 incarnation, an R some-
times referred to as the phi coefficient. In short, these three 
indices all tell essentially the same story, so it seems inconsis-
tent to label the intraclass R as appropriate (Cicchdtti, sect. 3.3) 
and the Pearson R, from which the intraclass is derived, as 
inappropriate (sect. 3.4). The Pearson R "ignores the extent to 
which given pairs of reviewers disagree on any single evalua-
tion" precisely to the same degree that the intraclass R (Model 
II) does. If it is desired that absolute differences in raters' 
judgments be considered, intra-class R Model I can be used. 
Incidentally, it should be noted that the equations given for 
intraclass R Models I and II are not standard. [Corrected in 
printed version, Ed.] The definitional equation (Guilford 1954; 
Snedecor & Cochran 1980) for Model I is: 
R , - MSS - MSE MSS + ( r - l ) M S E (Model I) (1) 
where MSE pools raters and residual mean squares, whereas 
for Model II it is: 
MSS ~ MS(RS) 
MSS + (R—l)MS(RS) 
(2) 
where MS(RS) is the residual mean square only. 
Three less-lnformatlon-efflclent Indices. Three of these in-
dices are usually less information-efficient, sometimes very 
much so: rates of agreement (sect. 4.7), \ 2 (sect. 4.7), and kappa 
for tables larger than 2 X 2 in which kappa has not been 
weighted to become effectively a focused, single d f , effect-size 
estimate. Rates of agreement suffer from the problem that 
nearly perfect agreement can occur with actual R near zero 
(Rosenthal 1984; 1987). x2 suffers from its being a product of R2 
and N so that it is driven up not only by increases in reliability 
but by increases in sample size as well (Rosenthal & Rosnow 
1984). Kappa on df > 1 suffers from the same problem as any 
other diffuse or omnibus procedure, namely, that whatever its 
size, we cannot tell where the agreements or disagreements 
arise unless kappa approaches unity so that there are no dis-
agreements (see Fleiss 1981). 
An example. Because of the valuable information provided in 
Cicchetti's Note 6 we essentially had the raw data for the Jour-
nal of Abnormal Psychology set of 1,313 articles and the ratings 
of two referees for each article. Each referee could use 4 levels of 
evaluation, so the data could be cast into a 4 x 4 table of 
agreement. The product moment R using linear contrast scores 
o f - 3 , - 1 , +1, +3 for the 4 levels of evaluation was .189. The 
corresponding kappa was .108. When the 4 X 4 table was 
condensed to a 2 X 2 table, the product moment R was identical 
to kappa; both were .145, illustrating both the loss of informa-
tion in going from 4 levels to 2 and the equivalence of R and 
kappa for a 2 x 2 table (d/= 1). 
The same data of Note 6 can be used to address an additional 
issue. In section 4.7, agreement rates had been used to assess 
the question of whether reviewers agree more on decisions to 
reject than on those to accept manuscripts. Table 5 of the target 
article shows agreement levels of 44% on decisions to accept and 
70% on decisions to reject for the data on the Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology. Using kappa or Pearson R, however, 
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yields a correlation for the two highest levels of evaluation 
(acceptance) of —.017, whereas for the two lowest levels of 
evaluation (rejection) the analogous correlation is .107. The 
difference between R's of .107 and - .107 surely seems more 
modest than the difference between agreement rates of 70% and 
44%, although in the same direction. Indeed, Cohen (1988) 
treats the former difference as "small" (q = . 12) and the latter as 
"medium" (h ss .53). 
Conclusion. In this commentary on the indices of reliability 
evaluated or used in the target article, three are recommended 
as information-efficient: Pearson R, intraclass R, and Cohen's 
kappa for the 2 x 2 case. It is further recommended that 3 others 
not be used: rate of agreement, kappa for tables larger than a 
2 X 2 (with df > 1), and x2 or any other tests of significance, 
because they depend on sample size as well as on reliability 
per se. 
Toward openness and fairness in the review 
process 
Byron P. Rourke 
Department of Psychology, University of Windsor, Windsor. Ont. N9B 3P4, 
Canada 
Cicchetti's target article is thorough and thoughtful. The issues 
addressed are important, and each is dealt with in a systematic 
manner. Suggestions for future research are clear and relevant. 
The overall approach to the topic is disinterested and scientific. 
There is little to criticize in this presentation. I would point to 
some issues that seem important to me, however, that either 
were not mentioned or did not receive the sort of emphasis I 
would have given them. These are as follows: 
1. Signed reviews. From my perspective, it would seem desir-
able for all reviews to be signed. I say this in the full realization of 
realization of the problem that the author mentions regarding 
"younger" scientists and the recriminations that they may suffer 
as a result of criticizing the work of more established re-
searchers. There is also the possibility that the younger scientist 
may mute criticisms if forced to acknowledge their source. I 
would argue, however, that insisting that all reviewers acknowl-
edge their identities is fair and just. It would be easy to 
implement; in any case, it will eventually become the rule 
rather than the exception. (Hence, with regard to this issue, I 
would disagree with the position taken by Cicchetti.) 
With respect to fairness, I would simply point out that hiding 
behind the cloak of anonymity opens the door to the worst sort of 
blackballing. Stating opinions that one must stand by - and 
defend, if necessary - is part and parcel of what the social 
dimension of science is all about. With respect to ease of 
implementation, I would suggest that mandating the acknowl-
edgment of reviews would be difficult at first, but reviewers 
(i.e., active scientists) would soon become accustomed to the 
process. Finally, as is now the case for many governmental 
granting bodies, the freedom of information "movement" will 
eventually target journals to achieve the same degree of open-
ness as now exists in the area of grants. 
2. The role of the journal editor. Journal editors can do much to 
increase the probability of positive or negative reviews through 
their choice of the consulting editors) (CE). Experienced jour-
nal editors have sufficient knowledge about the likely reactions 
to particular pieces of research of many, if not most, of the 
members of their editorial boards. Even though CEs are re-
tained on the editorial board because of their perspicacity as 
well as objectivity, some can be "depended on" to look askance 
at particular research designs, methods of analysis, subject 
populations, and any number of other important dimensions of 
scientific papers. Furthermore, it is my impression that nega-
tive biases will have a much greater effect than will positive 
biases: That is, it is likely that the negative biases of CEs will 
have a larger (negative) effect than will their positive biases 
about particular kinds of research. Indeed, it has often been 
my experience that CEs will bend over backward to find fault 
with research that is clearly similar to their own (i.e., of a sort 
toward which they would be expected to have some positive 
bias). 
This being the case, what is the journal editor to do? Random 
assignment of CEs is one alternative. In all but the most 
narrowly focused journals, however, this would result in many 
nonexperts reviewing the work in question. The only other 
solution is to attempt to balance the review process by choosing 
CEs who represent conflicting stances vis-á-vis the project in 
question. If this seems to call for a rather well developed sense of 
where CEs stand with respect to important issues in the field, I 
would emphasize that this is exactly what I mean to convey. 
There is no substitute for a fair, judicious, and experienced 
journal editor if the process of evaluation is to proceed in a fair 
and judicious manner. 
3. A good article will get published somewhere, bad articles 
however, also tend to get published somewhere. Cicchetti does 
not see the high rejection of rates of, say, the New England 
Journal of Medicine, as much of a problem. He points out, with 
good reason, that the vast majority of articles rejected from the 
handful of very prestigious journals eventually see the light of 
day elsewhere. This is all well and good. What is not so good is 
the practice followed by some authors of resubmitting articles to 
any number of journals until they get lucky. For example, over 
the past 14 months I have had the opportunity to review an 
article for four different journals. I commented on the article the 
first time around, and recommended a number of changes in it. 
When I received the unamended article from a second journal, I 
informed the editor that I had reviewed the piece previously, 
and forwarded my first review to him. The third and fourth 
times around for the article - still in its unamended form - were 
handled by simply informing the editor that I had seen the 
article before, that I had recommended changes in it, that these 
had not been made, and that I did not want to go to the trouble of 
commenting any further on the manuscript. 
I should be quick to add that my experiences in this regard are 
not unique: I have shared similar stories with many of my 
neuropsychological colleagues. What usually transpires in such 
cases is that the author eventually finds space for the article in a 
low prestige journal or, worse, a high prestige generalist journal 
that does not have the editorial expertise available for the proper 
evaluation of the manuscript. 
What should be done about this situation? I think the answer 
is quite simple: Demand that authors submit a statement to the 
effect that their article has been submitted to journals, X, Y, or Z 
and that the article has been rejected. In addition, the reviews of 
the article could be provided to the editor of the journal that 
must now decide on the acceptability of the work. 
4. Journal editors should provide the verbatim reports of CEs 
to authors. This point was not raised in the target article. Nev-
ertheless, it is an important one. Justice and fairness require that 
authors see for themselves the reviews of the work submitted. A 
précis of CE comments simply will not do. This procedure would 
enhance the fairness of the process even more if the suggestion 
cited above regarding the acknowledgment of the identity of the 
reviewers were adopted. 
Finally, I would point out that the suggestions made by 
Cicchetti regarding future research in this field are quite impor-
tant. These efforts will not only enhance our knowledge about 
decision-making in the publication of scientific articles and the 
allocation of grants but will also aid immeasurably in generating 
new (and, one hopes, fairer) modes of operation by and for 
editors and granting agencies. [The commentator is co-editor of 
Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology and The 
Clinical Neuropsychologist. Ed.) 
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yields a correlation for the two highest levels of evaluation 
(acceptance) of —.017, whereas for the two lowest levels of 
evaluation (rejection) the analogous correlation is .107. The 
difference between R's of .107 and -.107 surely seems more 
modest than the difference between agreement rates of 70% and 
44%, although in the same direction. Indeed, Cohen (1988) 
treats the former difference as "small" (q s . 12) and the latter as 
"medium" (h ss .53). 
Conclusion. In this commentary on the indices of reliability 
evaluated or used in the target article, three are recommended 
as information-efficient: Pearson R, intraclass R, and Cohen s 
kappa for the 2 x 2 case. It is further recommended that 3 others 
not be used: rate of agreement, kappa for tables larger than a 
2 X 2 (with df > 1), and x2 or any other tests of significance, 
because they depend on sample size as well as on reliability 
per se. 
Toward openness and fairness in the review 
process 
Byron P. Rourke 
Department of Psychology, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ont. N9B 3P4, 
Canada 
Cicchetti's target article is thorough and thoughtful. The issues 
addressed are important, and each is dealt with in a systematic 
manner. Suggestions for future research are clear and relevant. 
The overall approach to the topic is disinterested and scientific. 
There is little to criticize in this presentation. I would point to 
some issues that seem important to me, however, that either 
were not mentioned or did not receive the sort of emphasis I 
would have given them. These are as follows: 
1. Signed reviews. From my perspective, it would seem desir-
able for all reviews to be signed. I say this in the full realization of 
realization of the problem that the author mentions regarding 
"younger" scientists and the recriminations that they may suffer 
as a result of criticizing the work of more established re-
searchers. There is also the possibility that the younger scientist 
may mute criticisms if forced to acknowledge their source. I 
would argue, however, that insisting that all reviewers acknowl-
edge their identities is fair and just. It would be easy to 
implement; in any case, it will eventually become the rule 
rather than the exception. (Hence, with regard to this issue, I 
would disagree with the position taken by Cicchetti.) 
With respect to fairness, I would simply point out that hiding 
behind the cloak of anonymity opens the door to the worst sort of 
blackballing. Stating opinions that one must stand by — and 
defend, if necessary - is part and parcel of what the social 
dimension of science is all about. With respect to ease of 
implementation, I would suggest that mandating the acknowl-
edgment of reviews would be difficult at first, but reviewers 
(i.e., active scientists) would soon become accustomed to the 
process. Finally, as is now the case for many governmental 
granting bodies, the freedom of information "movement" will 
eventually target journals to achieve the same degree of open-
ness as now exists in the area of grants. 
2. The role of the journal editor. Journal editors can do much to 
increase the probability of positive or negative reviews through 
their choice of the consulting editor(s) (CE). Experienced jour-
nal editors have sufficient knowledge about the likely reactions 
to particular pieces of research of many, if not most, of the 
members of their editorial boards. Even though CEs are re-
tained on the editorial board because of their perspicacity as 
well as objectivity, some can be "depended on" to look askance 
at particular research designs, methods of analysis, subject 
populations, and any number of other important dimensions of 
scientific papers. Furthermore, it is my impression that nega-
tive biases will have a much greater effect than will positive 
biases: That is, it is likely that the negative biases of CEs will 
have a larger (negative) effect than will their positive biases 
about particular kinds of research. Indeed, it has often been 
my experience that CEs will bend over backward to find fault 
with research that is clearly similar to their own (i.e., of a sort 
toward which they would be expected to have some positive 
bias). 
This being the case, what is the journal editor to do? Random 
assignment of CEs is one alternative. In all but the most 
narrowly focused journals, however, this would result in many 
nonexperts reviewing the work in question. The only other 
solution is to attempt to balance the review process by choosing 
CEs who represent conflicting stances vis-á-vis the project in 
question. If this seems to call for a rather well developed sense of 
where CEs stand with respect to important issues in the field, I 
would emphasize that this is exactly what I mean to convey. 
There is no substitute for a fair, judicious, and experienced 
journal editor if the process of evaluation is to proceed in a fair 
and judicious manner. 
3. A good article will get published somewhere; bad articles 
however, also tend to get published somewhere. Cicchetti does 
not see the high rejection of rates of, say, the New England 
Journal of Medicine, as much of a problem. He points out, with 
good reason, that the vast majority of articles rejected from the 
handful of very prestigious journals eventually see the light of 
day elsewhere. This is all well and good. What is not so good is 
the practice followed by some authors of resubmitting articles to 
any number of journals until they get lucky. For example, over 
the past 14 months I have had the opportunity to review an 
article for four different journals. I commented on the article the 
first time around, and recommended a number of changes in it. 
When I received the unamended article from a second journal, I 
informed the editor that I had reviewed the piece previously, 
and forwarded my first review to him. The third and fourth 
times around for the article - still in its unamended form - were 
handled by simply informing the editor that I had seen the 
article before, that I had recommended changes in it, that these 
had not been made, and that I did not want to go to the trouble of 
commenting any further on the manuscript. 
I should be quick to add that my experiences in this regard are 
not unique: I have shared similar stories with many of my 
neuropsychological colleagues. What usually transpires in such 
cases is that the author eventually finds space for the article in a 
low prestige journal or, worse, a high prestige generalist journal 
that does not have the editorial expertise available for the proper 
evaluation of the manuscript. 
What should be done about this situation? I think the answer 
is quite simple: Demand that authors submit a statement to the 
effect that their article has been submitted to journals, X, Y, orZ 
and that the article has been rejected. In addition, the reviews of 
the article could be provided to the editor of the journal that 
must now decide on the acceptability of the work. 
4. Journal editors should provide the verbatim reports of CEs 
to authors. This point was not raised in the target article. Nev-
ertheless, it is an important one. Justice and fairness require that 
authors see for themselves the reviews of the work submitted. A 
précis of CE comments simply will not do. This procedure would 
enhance the fairness of the process even more if the suggestion 
cited above regarding the acknowledgment of the identity of the 
reviewers were adopted. 
Finally, I would point out that the suggestions made by 
Cicchetti regarding future research in this field are quite impor-
tant. These efforts will not only enhance our knowledge about 
decision-making in the publication of scientific articles and the 
allocation of grants but will also aid immeasurably in generating 
new (and, one hopes, fairer) modes of operation by and for 
editors and granting agencies. [The commentator is co-editor of 
Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology and The 
Clinical Neuropsychologist. Ed.] 
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its fictions and errors, but never make any real progress. Refer-
ring specifically to "educational and psychological studies" (p. 
310) as examples, Feynman (1985) has characterized this type of 
science as "cargo cult science: They follow all the apparent 
precepts and forms of scientific investigation, but they are 
missing something essential, because the planes don't land" (p. 
311). What is missing is this: "It's a kind of scientific integrity, a 
principle of scientific thought that corresponds to a kind of utter 
honesty - a kind of leaning over backwards." (op. cit.). 
Lately, signs have multiplied that Feynman's characteriza-
tion of the behavioral sciences is less humorous than it sounds. 
Especially if one adopts a historical perspective, one finds two 
recurrent invariants: Both (a) absurd and sterile research trends, 
and (b) transparently erroneous claims persist far longer than 
would be expected on the basis of Rubin's roulette theory. Estes 
(1975) cites axiomatic measurement theory as an example of (a): 
"One reason for the relative paucity of connections between 
measurement theory and substantive theory in psychology may 
arise from the fact that models for measurement have largely 
been developed independently as a body of abstract formal 
theory with empirical interpretations being left to a later stage." 
(p. 273). That much is clear. What is unclear is why it took 20 
years to notice that "the difficulty with this approach is that the 
later stage often fails to materialize" (op. cit.). 
Similarly, in his recent autobiography, Luce (1989) cites 
mathematical learning theory as another example of false starts: 
"In learning, hundreds of papers studying and testing stochastic 
operator and Markov models have, in my opinion, come to very 
little" (p. 286). Purely random peer review might have pro-
duced this insight earlier. "At the risk of offending some col-
leagues," Luce can think of "only three areas where mathe-
matical modelling can be shown to have had a profound impact." 
One of them is psychological testing, which, in his view, "is 
more mathematized than most people realize" (p. 285). This 
may have been a mixed blessing, however, since it provides 
numerous examples of (b). Perhaps the best known instance is 
the Burt scandal, which was less a scandal about Burt than about 
his peers: "What . . . are we to make of the fact that Burt's 
transparently fraudulent data were accepted for so long, and so 
unanimously, by the "experts' in the field?" (Kamin 1981, p. 
105). 
My own experiences are linked to the rediscovery of the factor 
indeterminacy in the early '70s (Schönemann 1971; Schöne-
mann & Wang 1972; Steiger & Schönemann 1976). The signifi-
cance of the indeterminacy is that is vitiates all claims that 
"intelligence" can be operationally defined as "g." This flaw of 
Spearman's factor model went unnoticed for a quarter of a 
century, until Wilson (1928) finally pointed it out in a review of 
Spearman's (1927) Abilities of man. 
More recently, I found that one of the most popular formulae 
for estimating "hcritability," Holzinger's h2, which is supposed 
to estimate the proportion of genetic variance in the total 
(genetic plus environmental) variance, is erroneous because 
Holzinger (in Newman ct al. 1937, pp. 94-116) had made a 
mistake in his derivations. As a result, h2 contains no environ-
mental variance at all (Schönemann 1989). When this mistake 
was finally spotted after 60 years of uninterrupted use of h2, 
several statistical editors refused to publish the correction for a 
variety of reasons that had nothing to do with the facts at issue: 
"As in the earlier review by another journal, the referees do not 
claim to have found mathematical errors in your development" 
(Solomon 1989). [Sec also Wahlsten "Insensitivity of the Analy-
sis of Variance to Heredity-Environment Interaction" BBS 13 
(1) 1990.] 
A final example of (b) is Rosenthal & Rubin's (1978) failsafe 
solution of the "file-drawer problem" of meta-analysis. They 
proposed a formula intended to estimate the ("failsafe") number 
of suppressed studies from the number of published studies. 
Because they retrieved 345 studies on the experimenter expec-
tancy cffect, they estimated this number as 65,000 and dis-
missed the bias hypothesis as unreasonable for these data 
because, "it is unreasonable to suppose that there existed 
enough unretrieved nonsignificant studies to overwhelm the 
studies we were able to retrieve" (p. 385). Darlington (1980) 
soon noticed a problem with this reasoning, however: "Imagine 
that all the tested null hypotheses in a certain area are true, and 
that the only results published are the 5% of studies which 
achieve significance by chance. Suppose the 345 studies were 
published this way . . . then we are imagining that the total 
number of studies performed was T = 20 x 345 = 6900. Thus, a 
correct analysis of the data from the 345 published studies 
should in fact lead T = 6900" - not 65,000, as Rosenthal and 
Rubin's failsafe formula had predicted. 
Almost a decade went by after Rosental and Rubin published 
their Behavioral and Brain Sciences target article, before Statis-
tical Science, patterned after BBS, finally published an 
obliquely worded criticism of Rosenthal and Rubin's failsafe 
logic (Iyengar & Greenhouse 1988). After first praising the 
failsafe method as a "clever formulation of the file-drawer 
problem," the authors point out "several drawbacks that limit its 
usefulness" (p. 115). One such drawback is "the assumption that 
the unpublished studies are in fact a random sample of all 
studies that were done" (p. 110), because it conflicts with the 
very file-drawer hypothesis the failsafe number is supposed to 
cure: "Now if there were publication bias in favor of studies with 
statistically significant findings, then the Z values for the un-
published studies would not be a sample from the standard 
normal distribution" (p. 115). In this case, too, the recorded 
evidence is at odds with the charitable null hypothesis that the 
long delay in correcting Rosenthal & Rubin's claims was solely 
due to chance. In fact, not just one, but two authors repeatedly 
tried to alert editors that something was amiss with the failsafe 
argument Rosenthal (1979) had described in more detail in the 
Psychological Bulletin. 
Shortly after the article appeared, Darlington (1980) submit-
ted a Note in which he challenged the failsafe argument with the 
simple counterargument cited earlier, concluding: "(Rosen-
thal's) formula appears to be incorrect, grossly overestimating X 
in some cases and grossly underestimating it in other cases" 
(Darlington 1981, Abstract). The editor encouraged him to 
revise his paper and then rejected the revision. A few years 
later, Thomas (1985) reached the same conclusion: "The solu-
tion proposed by Rosenthal for the 'file drawer problem' is a 
product of faulty reasoning and should be forgotten" (Abstract). 
Pinpointing the flaw in Rosenthal and Rubin's reasoning pre-
cisely: "The conclusion is inescapable. In general Z* [the failsafe 
number; and by similar argument Z'] are not standard normal, 
i.e. n(0,l) in distribution" (p. 9), Thomas anticipated Iyengar 
and Greenhouse by more than five years. In the end, neither 
Darlington nor Thomas received any credit. 
To summarize: As long as the validity of peer review is 
negative, as these and numerous other examples suggest, the 
rational course of action is to diminish its reliability further, not 
to enhance it. 
Disagreement among journal reviewers: No 
cause for undue alarm 
Lawrence J. Strieker 
Educational Testing Service, Princeton, NJ 08541 
The modest agreement among reviewers of journal manuscripts 
amply documented by Cicchetti is not a cause for undue alarm. 
1. Interrevlewer reliability Is greater than It seems. The average 
intraclass correlation or kappa of approximately .30 between 
reviewers' ratings describes the reliability of ratings by a single 
reviewer.1 Reviewers are analogous to test items in this situa-
tion, and the value of.30 is akin to the reliability of one test item. 
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W h e n items or ratings by different reviewers are combined, 
reliability systematically increases. Applying the Spearman-
Brown prophecy formula (Gulliksen 1987) to a reliability of .30 
for the ratings of 1 reviewer, the estimated reliability is .46 for 
the combined ratings of 2 reviewers, .56 for the ratings of 3, .77 
for the ratings of 7, and so on. The use of three reviewers is 
increasingly common, and the reliability in this case, though 
less than ideal, is substantially better than that for a single 
referee. 
2. Disagreement among reviewers is useful. Journal editors 
often select reviewers deliberately for their dissimilarity. Re-
viewers may be chosen because they differ in the nature of their 
expertise - one a substantive specialist, another a meth-
odologist, for example - or in their theoretical viewpoints (e.g., 
Bakanic et al. 1987). It is not surprising then that reviewers 
disagree when assessing the same apparently carefully defined 
components, such as "importance," or "design and analysis." 
And, insofar as the reviewers attend to different aspects of a 
manuscript's acceptability, the validity of the combined evalua-
tions is improved (e.g., Hamad 1985), just as using predictors 
that measure different portions of the criterion variance max-
imizes the multiple correlation of the predictors with the 
criterion. 
3. Editorial decisions should not be based solely on reviewers' 
ratings. Concern with the agreement among reviewers seems 
linked in large part to a model of the journal editor as a kind of 
psychometric clerk who simply adds up the scores that a manu-
script gets from each reviewer and then accepts the paper if it 
achieves a passing score. Numerous anecdotes (e.g., Goodstein 
1982), as well as the close associations reported by Cicchetti and 
others between reviewers' recommendations and editors' deci-
sions suggest that this model may indeed describe the behavior 
of s n e editors. But good editors are not clerks. They read the 
manuscript, appraise the reasons reviewers give for their rec-
ommendations, and weigh all the information about it (e.g., 
Goodstein 1982). This kind of active decision making takes time 
and specialized knowledge, and may be too much of a burden for 
the sole editor of a journal that receives many submissions. The 
workload can always be divided up among a set of associate 
editors, however, each of whom has complete responsibility for 
processing papers in a particular area, a practice followed by the 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin and some other 
journals. 
N O T E 
1. The anomalous and unreplicable intraclass correlation of .54 for 
American Psychologist manuscripts (Cicchetti 1980, and unpublished; 
Scarr & Weber 1978) may arise because nine of the 87 papers were 
resubmissions. The nine were presumably revised in response to the 
initial reviews, making it likely that these papers would receive favor-
able ratings, especially if the original referees were used. When these 
manuscripts are excluded, the correlation drops to .45. 
Chairman's action: The importance of 
executive decisions in peer review 
Peter Tyrer 
St. Charles Hospital. London W10 6DZ, England 
Cicchetti has provided valuable data in support of a maxim I 
sometimes repeat to disconsolate writers of rejected manu-
scripts: "A determined author can get any rubbish published." 
The low levels of reviewer agreement found in this wide-ranging 
review may be regarded as unsatisfactory by some, but encour-
aging to potential authors. After noting that worthlessness 
appears easier to detect than excellence, our author-in-waiting 
must be reassured by levels of agreement between assessors 
that barely exceed those of chance when several referees are 
used. Even taking into account the omnibus quality of the R, and 
kappa statistics, which can obviously conceal islands of excellent 
agreement, the levels of agreement cannot be regarded as good 
by any scale of values. Bearing in mind that research careers and 
the funding of departments depend so much on peer review of 
scientific papers and grant applications, it is sad that apparently 
random factors play such a major part in success. 
The target article also explodes the myth that papers con-
cerned with the "hard" physical sciences are assessed with 
greater levels of agreement than papers of "soft" social and 
psychological subjects. The reasons for poor agreement, to 
paraphrase Shakespeare's Cassius, "lie not in the words but in 
ourselves, that we are underlings." 
The editor of a scientific journal and the chairman of a grant-
giving body are faced with much conflicting information before 
coming to a final judgment. Cicchetti outlines a number of ways 
of improving the reliability of peer review, but even if levels of 
agreement are improved, the position of the editor (or chair-
man) can be a very important one. Disagreement is often 
resolved by the taking of "chairman's action," whereby an 
executive decision is made to reject one or more of the views 
referees used in coming to a decision, or, alternatively, to send 
the manuscript (or application) to another referee independent-
ly. It needs to be appreciated that the editor usually has a 
completely free hand in choosing referees for any article. The 
bias of the editor can influence whether an article he would 
like to see published goes to a reviewer who is likely to provide a 
favourable report. Alternatively, a paper the editor does not 
want published can go to a tough and critical referee. The 
opinion of the editor is particularly important when contentious 
papers are being reviewed. 
The vagaries of editorial and referee judgment are particu-
larly important for a young worker on the threshold of a research 
career. In this vulnerable stage there is a danger that one or two 
rejections may mean the abandonment of a research endeavour, 
when a more hardened worker would be inclined to persist. To 
make allowances for the poor levels of agreement, and the 
importance of editorial interest and bias, it would be valuable for 
potential authors to be aware of the particular interests of the 
journals for which they are writing. For example, one important 
journal in the United Kingdom not only tries to write the first 
and last words about any relevant topic, but is prepared to take 
considerable risks in trying to achieve this. Another journal will 
bend over backwards to include topical material in its columns, 
and so the time of submission is all-important. Others, from the 
examination of their contents, consistently give proportionately 
much more space to one or two aspects of a subject even though 
there is no indication of this in the guidance to contributors. For 
example, for controversial issues such as the merits and disad-
vantages of community care in psychiatry, one well-known 
journal has a bias toward its merits and another toward its 
disadvantages. Only an informed author knows which to select 
first. 
The fact that many papers rejected by one journal are subse-
quently published in other equally prestigious journals (Wilson 
1978) suggests that bias of interest is much more potent than 
assessment of merit. In view of this, much more attention 
should be paid to giving guidance to potential authors, particu-
larly young research workers, in preparing their manuscripts 
and choosing the appropriate journal for their submission (Free-
man & Tyrer 1989). 
One other implication of the findings, which is also a major 
criticism of peer review, is the low likelihood of approval for 
papers and grant submissions concerned with "ground-break-
ing" research. Cicchetti provides data suggesting that agree-
ment about such submissions is likely to be poor and that the 
"safe" option of rejection is most likely. In such circumstances 
the whole policy of peer review appears stultifying, and one 
sometimes longs for the good old undemocratic days when the 
publication of a paper was dependent only on the editor's whim 
or on the cranky beliefs of millionaire philanthropists. Such 
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people relied more on personal intuition than the collective 
views of often faceless referees, and their success rates did not 
compare unfavourably. The citation rates (not necessarily an 
index of excellence) for the Lancet persistently show it to be 
amongst the top six medical journals, but it is only in recent 
years that outside referees have played any significant part in 
the acceptance of articles for publication. Although it would be 
unwise to turn the clock back to these early beginnings, a 
quarter turn anticlockwise would not be out of place. 
Do peer reviewers really agree more on 
rejections than acceptances? A random-
agreement benchmark says they do not 
Gerald S. Wasserman 
Department of Psychological Sciences, Purdue University, West Lafayette, 
IN 47907 
Electronic mail: codelab@psych.purdue.edu 
Cicchetti ably summarizes the accumulating evidence indicat-
ing that peer review reliability is unimpressive. And he cor-
rectly concludes that this finding has implications that should 
influence the structure of peer review systems. He weakens this 
conclusion, however, by adding the notion that reviewers agree 
fairly strongly with each other when they reject, even if they do 
not agree strongly when they accept. 
This notion is troubling for two reasons. First, it leads to a 
seductive rationalization for inaction: It is easy and quite com-
forting to say that there will never be enough money (or journal 
space or whatever) to allocate to all good research. Therefore, 
we should be content if we can make sure that scarce resources 
are not wasted by allocating any of them to bad research. The 
present systems would supposedly do this despite their low 
overall reliability, if they really did consistently exclude bad 
research. 
The second reason is that the notion is counterintuitive: 
Acceptance and rejection are just opposite sides of the same 
dichotomy. What is true for the one should be true for the other. 
Tliis intuition prompted me to examine the evidence that led 
Cicchetti to his notion. Specifically, I compared his actual 
results with benchmark results one would obtain if no real 
agreement existed and if reviewers were making purely random 
judgments. This examination shows that the intuition is correct 
and his notion is unfounded. I will illustrate the examination 
with a detailed analysis of the data Cicchetti presents in his 
Table 6. And I will present expressions to calculate the general 
case: 
Figure 1 gives a graphical representation of Cicchetti's data. 
It represents the peer review process as a sequential flow chart, 
even though the reviews are actually done independently. The 
input to the process is 150 grant proposals, of which Table 6 
indicates that 52 got high ratings and 98 got low ratings. I have 
interpreted these tabular entries to mean that the reviewers' 
average rating was high for 52 of the 150 proposals and low for 
the other 98. I have added the further assumption that the 
average individual reviewer's performance is given by the col-
lective average of all the reviewers' performances. 
The proposals are read by one peer reviewer (Rater 1) who 
accordingly judges (on average) that 52 proposals are high and 
should be accepted (YES), while 98 proposals are low and should 
be rejected (NO). Then these proposals are read by the second 
peer reviewer (Rater 2), who also says YES to 52 (i.e., 28+24) 
proposals and NO to 98 (i.e., 24 + 74) proposals (which shows 
that the flowchart representation does not depend on which 
reviewer actually judged first). 
I backed into the relation between the two raters' judgments 
by using the agreement percentages in Table 6. They show, as 
one would expect from the weak reliabilities reported in Table 
Acceptance Disagreement Rejection 
Agreement Agreement 
= = 76% 
Difference = 22% 
Figure 1 (Wasserman). Flow chart intended to represent the 
evaluation of grant proposals by two peer reviewers. Data were 
taken from Table 6 of the target article. See text for detailed 
explanation. 
6, that the reviewers' judgments are weakly correlated: Rater 2 
gives 28 YESs to the 52 proposals rated YES by Rater 1; this 
figure is computed from the tabular acceptance agreement of 
54%. On the negative side, Rater 2 gives 74 NO's to the 98 
proposals rated NO by Rater 1; this figure is computed from the 
tabular rejection agreement of 76%. 
Figure 1 shows, as noted in the target article, that rejectiQn 
agreement is 22% higher than acceptance agreement. It is on 
this kind of difference that Cicchetti bases his notion. But the 
first question should be. Against what benchmark should these 
numbers be evaluated? Figure 2 shows a benchmark created by 
a completely random process. In this case, the peer reviewers 
do not read the proposals. Instead, each reviewer has a bucket 
that contains 150 balls with 52 white balls and 98 black balls. 
Each proposal is "judged" by reaching into the bucket and 
150 White and Black Balls 
/ 3 4 £es Rater 2 no>— 
Acceptance Disagreement Rejection 
Agreement Agreement 
= 35% = 65% 
Difference = 30% 
Figure 2 (Wasserman). Flow chart representing a benchmark 
based on purely random agreements between two separate 
reviewers evaluating 150 proposals. The first reviewer does not 
read the proposals, but instead evaluates the proposals by 
pulling balls from a bucket with 52 white balls (YES) and 98 
black balls (NO). The second reviewer has another such bucket 
to use independently. 
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pulling out one ball. If the ball is white, the reviewer says yes; if 
black, the reviewers says no. This process gives a random -
agreement benchmark that can be compared with the actual 
data. This comparison reveals the following effects: 
The apparently greater rejection agreement over acceptance 
agreement is an illusion. Two outcomes support this conclusion 
when the data are examined in the metric of percentages: First, 
the difference between acceptance agreement and rejection 
agreement is lower in the real data (22%) than it is in the random 
benchmark (30%). Second, actually reading the proposals pro-
duces less of an improvement over benchmark in rejection 
agreement (11%) than in acceptance agreement (19%). Both 
effects are opposite to what one would expect from the target 
article narrative. 
The benchmark difference between acceptance and rejection 
agreements is a simple function of the acceptance rate. This can 
be seen by examining the generalized random result, as illus-
trated in Figure 3: The result is obtained by expressing the 
number of proposals as n, the typical peer reviewers' yes ratings 
as p (in proportions), and the reviewers' no ratings as q = 1 — p. 
Then the acceptance agreement is np2/np = p, the rejection 
agreement is q, and the difference is q - p = I - 2p. These 
expressions show that acceptance agreement, of course, goes to 
zero as the proportion accepted goes to zero. At the same time, 
rejection agreement goes to 1.0 and the difference goes to 1.0. 
Equality of acceptance agreement and rejection agreement only 
occurs in the random benchmark for the special case when p = q 
= 0.5. 
A metric does exist in which one finds what intuition predicts, 
namely, a perfect equivalence between acceptance agreement 
and rejection agreement. One obtains this result if one avoids 
the slippery ground of percentages and proportions. Rather, 
one simply counts proposals. Doing this shows that, relative to 
the chance count in Figure 2, peer review in Figure 1 increases 
the count for both forms of agreement by exactly 10 proposals 
each. 
The general expression for the above increase in agreement 
count is given by 2npq<t>, where n, p, and q are as defined above, 
and <J> is the (fourfold point; McNemar 1955, p. 202) correlation 
between reviewers. (For the data of Table 6 and Figure 1, <f> = 
.29.) This expression is easily interpreted by reference to Figure 
n 
Acceptance Disagreement Reject ion 
Agreement Agreement 
= P = q 
Dlflerence = 1 — 2p 
Figure 3 (Wasserman). Flow chart representing the generalized 
random-agreement benchmark. Note that agreement here is 
expressed in proportions, not in percentages. The number of 
items reviewed is n, the acceptance proportion of the average 
reviewer is p, and the rejection proportion is q = 1 — p. See text 
for detailed explanation. 
3: There are two ways of reaching a disagreement and when <j> is 
zero, as it is in both Figures 2 and 3, each way produces a count 
of npq. If the correlation were perfect (<f> = 1.0), however, then 
no disagreements would exist. In that case, the acceptance 
agreement count would be given by np2 + npq = np, and the 
rejection agreement count would be given by nq2 + nqp = nq. 
This confirms the intuition about symmetry: In general, peer 
review increases each form of agreement by npq<\> counts. In the 
particular case of Figure 1, npqrfr = 150*0.35*0.65*0.29 = 10. 
The real peer reviewers described in Table 6 and Figure 1 do 
agree slightly more often than one would expect from the 
random benchmark in Figure 2. The effect is very slight, 
however: They only get together on 20 more proposals out of 
150. By contrast, it will not escape notice that the random 
benchmark accounts for most of the variance in reviewer behav-
ior. Hence, in this particular case at least, the benchmark is a fair 
model of a peer reviewer. 
What to do about peer review: is the cure 
worse than the disease? 
Thomas R. Zentall 
Department of Psychology. University of Kentucky. Lexington, KY 40506 
Electronic mall: 2entall@ukcc.bitnet 
Peer review is among the most important professional services 
that scientists provide. It determines what research gets funded 
and what research gets published and in what journals. As 
Cicchetti so carefully documents, it is a system that is seriously 
flawed because of inherent subjectivity and reviewer bias. 
The question is, what changes can be made in the system to 
eliminate the flaws? Any major change in the peer review 
process is likely to create its own problems, perhaps even more 
serious ones. Furthermore, given that the review process de-
pends on the voluntary contribution of reviewer time, one 
needs to weigh the potential benefits that might accrue from 
change against the costs involved. 
The two major issues raised by Cicchetti are, (a) the surpris-
ing, but well-documented, low reliability of grant and manu-
script reviews, and (b) unfairness in the review process due to 
reviewer bias. Many of Cicchetti's suggestions address reviewer 
bias, but any variable that brings out a pervasive reviewer bias is 
likely to increase reliability, though perhaps at the expense of 
fairness. Thus, the issues of reviewer bias and fairness may be 
negatively correlated. Increasing fairness in the review process 
may be a valid goal, but can these biases be removed and, if so, 
at what cost? 
Blind review. Voluntary blinding defeats its purpose because 
those most likely to benefit from their reputation would be least 
likely to blind, and, as Cicchetti notes, mandatory blinding may 
be impossible to enforce. On the other hand, is it really unfair to 
include knowledge of the author's reputation in one's judgment 
of suitability for publication? Just as statistical tests address the 
question of reliability of findings, so too, the reputation of the 
author may provide indirect, supplementary information about 
the reliability of the findings (though clearly, the latter should 
be given less weight). 
Cicchetti also notes a related bias due to self-citations of "in 
press" research. Shouldn't the fact that related findings have 
gone through a (typically, stringent) review process argue for 
their increased reliability? Ideally, research findings should be 
able to stand on their own, but in reality experimental results 
are usually evaluated in the context of prior research, and in-
press self citations are a part of that literature. Because of the 
inaccessibility of these papers, however, it is reasonable, albeit 
cumbersome, for editors to request that preprints of such 
citations be included with the manuscript to be reviewed. 
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Blind reviewer. Would reviews be fairer if the reviewers could 
not hide behind their anonymity? I suspect that the resulting 
fear of retribution would greatly reduce referees' participation 
in the review process. The cure may be worse than the disease. 
Bias against negative findings. The bias against negative 
findings is more complex. Would a nonsignificant difference 
between groups be significant with greater power (e.g., more 
subjects)? Could the failure represent a Type II error (failure to 
observe a difference when a real difference exists)? Negative 
findings sometimes occur when research is not done carefully 
(resulting in increased within-group variance) or they may be 
due to inadvertent fluctuations in the experimental treatment 
(resulting in reduced between-group variance). There is a reluc-
tance to publish negative results because there are many more 
ways to fail to observe an effect than ways to observe it. 
In some cases, failure to replicate represents the useful 
establishment of boundary conditions of a phenomenon (i.e., 
when an effect is found under some conditions but not others). 
On the other hand, when the negative findings occur under 
conditions comparable to those in which the original findings 
were reported, and those negative findings are not just an 
example of Type II error (i.e., they can be replicated), they 
should be suitable for publication (see, e.g., Roberts 1976). 
Improvements. How can the system be improved? One of 
Cicchetti's suggestions is an appeal process. An informal appeal 
process already exists, in which authors who feel that an incor-
rect decision has been made can appeal to the editor. To allow 
newer contributors better access to the appeal process perhaps 
it should be formalized (e.g., authors whose submissions have 
been rejected would be informed that they have the option of 
responding to the reviewers comments). 
A second suggestion by Cicchetti is to increase the number of 
reviewers. The larger the sample of reviewers, the more reliable 
their combined judgment is likely to be. The increase in reliabil-
ity would, I think, offset the added cost in reviewer time. 
Third, I would like to see distributed to reviewers a set of 
guidelines that warn of potential biases and suggest that re-
viewers try to avoid them. This may appear too simplistic, but it 
is a cost-effective strategy that could result in the significant 
reduction of unfair biases. 
As to the lack of reviewer agreement, it may be that such 
variability is an inherent characteristic of the field. There does 
not appear to be good agreement on what constitutes quality 
research, what are minor methodological flaws, or what are 
important findings. Much of this disagreement represents 
strong theoretical and methodological (confirmation) biases 
that, realistically, cannot be eliminated. It may be possible for 
editors to reduce the effect these biases have on the review of a 
manuscript through the careful selection of reviewers who do 
not have strong biases against the kind of research or direction of 
findings submitted, and by directing reviewers to avoid intro-
ducing their biases into the review process. 
Author's Response 
Reflections f rom the peer review mirror 
Domenic V. Cicchetti 
VA Medical Center, West heven, CT 06516' 
Electronic melt: c1cchettl@yaievm.bltnet 
In an earlier BBS target article on peer review it was 
noted that "the area that seems to be most promising -
that of cross-disciplinary comparisons - is still relatively 
unresearched" (Peters & Ceci 1982, p. 252). Within this 
suggested framework, a number of hypotheses received 
support in the current target article, namely, that across 
the various disciplines: (1) agreement is bet ter on manu-
script and grant submissions of perceived poor quality 
than on submissions of good quality; (2) better-defined 
(specific and specialized) areas of scientific inquiry have 
higher acceptance rates and use fewer reviewers than less 
well-defined (general and less focused) areas of scientific 
interest; and (3) levels of chance-corrected interreferee 
agreement are rather low (R, usually £ .40). The disci-
plines thus far investigated have included psychology, 
sociology, medicine, and physics. These issues were 
discussed in the context of research design considera-
tions, statistical or data analytic approaches, and sug-
gestions for improving the quality of peer review. An-
other important issue, discussed briefly, was how editors 
or granting officials use the information supplied by 
referees (reliable or not) to arrive at publication or fund-
ing decisions. 
I am gratified by the generally positive evaluations of 
my work and its perceived heuristic value in generating 
follow-up research. My Response focuses on the areas of 
concern expressed by the various commentators. These 
fall into five categories: (1) methodological, statistical, and 
data analytic strategies; (2) interpretation of the results; 
(3) using peer reviews to improve editorial/funding deci-
sions; (4) improving the peer review process; and (5) 
f u t u r e research in peer review. 
1. Methodolological, statistical, and data analytic 
strategies 
1.1. Corrigenda. Let me begin by pointing out several 
minor errors of omission and commission that have been 
corrected in the revised target article (compared to the 
prepr in t that was circulated to the commentators). The 
first, my own discovery, pertains to the data reported in 
Table 3, section B, which depicts the parallel relationship 
be tween acceptance rates for manuscripts submitted to 
Physical Review and the use of one or more reviewers. 
The significant relationships now become even more 
apparent because the last two subfields appearing in the 
table (Particles it Fields, General Physics) interchange 
positions to reflect the same ordering as in Table 3, 
section A. This means (as previously) that as the subfields 
t end toward more general focus (Nuclear Physics, Con-
densed Matter, General Physics, Particles & Fields), 
both the percentage of accepted manuscripts and the 
percentage of manuscripts using a single reviewer de-
crease significantly (p < .000001 in the former case, p = 
.0003 in the latter). 
T h e second error, Table 5, was caught by one of the 
commentators, Eckberg. In the second row of the table, 
t h e number of rejected manuscripts should read 577 
ra ther than 578. Since t h e correct N of577 was used in the 
calculations, the resulting chi square(d) value of57.895 (p 
< .00001) is correct. 
The third error is that the ordering of the second and 
thi rd endnotes had to be reversed to be consistent with 
correct footnote citation in the text. Finally, through 
another typographical er ror that escaped my review, the 
denominator of the Formula for R, (Model I), now the third 
footnote, had to be amended , by removing the previously 
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initial term MS + . I am indebted to another of the 
commentators, Hargens, who relayed this information to 
m e several months ago by telephone. Readers will note 
that Rosenthal's commentary also questioned this R 
formula. Finally, in Table 6, the missing R, for combined 
data (.32) has now been inserted, and the R, for NSF and 
C O S P U P reviews of proposals in Chemical Dynamics 
should be . 16 rather than . 12. 
Next examined are the more formal and involved 
criticisms of the methodologic, statistical or data analytic 
techniques presented in the target article. 
1.2, Interpreting levels of kappa and R,. The re is concern 
on the part of Eckberg about the presumed arbitrariness 
of the Cicchetti & Sparrow (1981) strength of agreement 
values for kappa and intraclass correlation coefficients, 
namely: POOR (below .40); FAIR (.40- 59); G O O D (.60-
.74); EXCELLENT (.75 and above). 
These values are similar to those provided by Fleiss 
(1981), although he uses a wider range to encompass 
values between .40 and .74 (designated as FAIR to 
MODERATE). Earlier, Landis and Koch (1977) pro-
posed six evaluative categories: less than zero = POOR; 
0—.20 = SLIGHT; . 21 - .40 = FAIR; .41- 60 = MODER-
ATE; .61- .80 = SUBSTANTIAL; .81 and above = AL-
M O S T PERFECT (see also Feinstein 1987, p. 185). 
These examples show the similarity of guidelines re-
search biostatisticians recommend to differentiate mere 
statistical significance (kappa or R, larger than 0) from 
significance that may be of practical or clinical usefulness, 
as well. The general concept is analogous to Cohen's 
(1988) suggested effect sizes (ES) for interpret ing sample 
correlation values (i.e., an R. of .15 representing a 
SMALL, .30 a M E D I U M , and .50 a LARGE effect, 
when compared to expected values of zero). 
More important, these guidelines are consistent with 
t h e frequency with which high and low kappa values are 
repor ted for many clinical phenomena. Koran (1975a; 
1975b) has shown that when kappa is used to assess 
interexaminer reliability levels of the presence or ab-
sence of a wide range of clinical signs and symptoms, 
values rarely exceed .70. 
Concerning the application of these guidelines, Eck-
b e r g questions the plausibility of a specific hypothesis 
(sect. 4.5), namely, that if a formal study were conducted 
on the reliability of peer reviews for manuscripts submit-
ted to Physical Review Letters (PRL), it would be the 
same order of magnitude (e.g., R, below .40) that charac-
terizes general journals in many other disciplines. Given 
that an average of five or more PRL reviewers is required 
to arrive at consensus, coupled with a 45% rejection rate 
(Adair & Trigg 1979, sect. 4.5), I would consider the 
hypothesis reasonable rather than what Eckberg charac-
terizes as "pure speculation." 
1.3. Choice of statistical tests. It was suggested by 
Ci lmore and Rosenthal that other statistical tests may 
have been at least as appropriate as the ones that were 
used. 
Ci lmore prefers his "shared uncertainty index" (Gil-
more 1979) to the kappa and R, approaches described in 
the target article. For the reasons cited in section 3 .3 ,1 do 
not share his preference. In the list of mult iple and 
unique advantages of kappa over any and all of its com-
petitors, I would add that: 
a. Kappa has been widely generalized to fit (1) varying 
scales of measurement (Cicchetti 1976; Cohen 1968); 
different types of rater and subject reliability research 
designs, for example; (2) 3 or more raters (Fleiss 1971; 
Fleiss et al. 1979; Landis & Koch 1977); (3) differing 
numbers of raters per subject (Fleiss & Cuzick 1979); (4) 
multiple diagnoses per pat ient (Kraemer 1980; Mezzich 
et al. 1981); (5) multiple observations on small numbers of 
subjects (Gross 1986); (6) single subject reliability assess-
ments (Kraemer 1979); (7) separate reliability assess-
ments for each category on a given clinical scale (Cicchetti 
1985; Cicchetti, Lee et al. 1978; Spitzer & Fleiss 1974). 
b. Other generalizations include those in which (8) 
rater uncertainty of response is the focus (Gillett 1985); (9) 
the rat ing categories have not been defined in advance 
(Brennan & Light 1974; Brook & Stirling 1984); (10) 
multiple raters are analyzed pair by pair, when each pair 
rates t h e same set of subjects (Conger 1980) or different 
sets of subjects (Uebersax 1981; 1982); (11) the data are 
continuous with a focus on the duration rather than the 
frequency of joint events (Conger 1985); (12) jackknifing 
functions are used to r educe bias in estimating standard 
errors of kappa (Davies & Fleiss 1982; Kraemer 1980). 
c. Kappa has also been (13) subjected to a number of 
empirical studies for test ing and confirming or modifying 
the way it can be applied appropriately (e.g., Cicchetti 
1981; Cicchetti & Fleiss 1977; Fleiss & Cicchetti 1978; 
Fleiss e t al. 1969; 1979). 
d. Kappa (nominal data) and weighted kappa (ordinal 
data) have been shown u n d e r certain specified conditions 
to be (14) equivalent to various models of the intraclass 
correlation coefficient (R,) (e.g. , Fleiss 1975; 1981; Fleiss 
& Cohen 1973; Krippendorff 1970; Shrout et al. 1987). 
Finally, 
e. Kappa and kappa-type statistics have also been used 
in conjunction with a n u m b e r of multivariate approaches 
to reliability analysis: (15) cluster analysis (Blashfield 
1976); (16) signal detection models (e.g., Kraemer 1988), 
(17) latent structure ag reement analysis (Uebersax & 
Grove 1989); and (18) latent structure modeling of or-
dered category rating ag reement (Uebersax 1989); and 
(19) Kraemer (1982) has shown, in the 2 x 2 case, the 
relationship between kappa values and the sensitivity and 
specificity of a given diagnostic procedure. 
Rosenthal writes, in the 2 x 2 case, of three "more-
information-efficient" indices, kappa, R, and the standard 
Pearsonian product moment correlation (R), or the phi 
coefficient. He describes these indices as mathematically 
equivalent for that reliability research design in which the 
same two examiners independent ly evaluate all subjects 
(or objects). Rosenthal prefers their usage to three "less-
information-efficient" statistics, namely, "rate of agree-
ment" or what Rogot and Goldberg (1966) refer to as the 
"crude index of agreement" (uncorrected for chance); chi 
square(d); and unweighted kappa for 3 x 3 and larger tables. 
I agree with some of Rosenthal 's conclusions. 
First, kappa, R,, and R (or phi) will be identical only 
when marginal frequencies or category assignments are 
identical for each of any two independent reviews. For 
peer review, if the acceptance (approval) and rejection 
(disapproval) rates are the same for both independent sets 
of reviews (e.g., 20% acceptances and 80% rejections), 
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then the data in the resulting 2 x 2 or four-fold table will 
produce identical results, whether one applies kappa, R,, 
or phi (e.g., see Cicchetti 1988; Cohen I960; Fleiss 1975; 
1981). The example cited (the reviews for manuscripts 
submitted to the Journal of Abnormal Psychology, JAP, 
Footnote 6 of the target article) illustrates this equiv-
alence, as Rosenthal correctly notes. This occurs because 
there is no intuitively obvious way to distinguish "first" 
reviews from "second" reviews Therefore, the required 
Model I R, that is applied to the data will produce equal 
rater marginals (category assignments to "accept" and 
"reject") for the two independent sets of reviews. In such 
a situation, the three mathematical formulae (for kappa, 
R,, and phi) become equivalent. These identities also 
hold in the Model II case (same two raters throughout) 
providing, again, that the category assignments are iden-
tical. When these assignments are not identical (the much 
more usual case), Kappa, R,, and phi (or R) will assume 
different values, the difference depending on specific 
distributions of the two category assignments. 
As an example of the effect of unequal category assign-
ments on the values of kappa, R,, and phi, consider the 
data presented in Table 6 (target article). Here there was 
interest in distinguishing two identifiable sources of aver-
age ratings, namely those made by NSF and those made 
by COSPUP. The full data on which the condensed Table 
6 entries are based, for the area "Economics," are shown 
in Table 1: Here, R, (Model II) = Kappa = .44. If we had 
instead considered that the distinction between NSF and 
COSPUP ratings are not of concern and used R, (Model 
I), which would take into account that different pairs of 
reviewers viewed different proposals, its value would be 
.38. In either case, R (or phi) would = .41. Thus, Kappa, 
Rt, and R are identical when category assignments are 
identical) but not under any other combination of catego-
ry assignments (the more usual case). 
Concerning Rosenthal's second point, I would agree 
that chi square(d) should not be used as a measure of 
examiner agreement, for the reasons he cites, as well as 
because chi square(d) measures associations of any type, 
whereas kappa and Rj measure agreement per se. 1 would 
partially agree with Rosenthal's caveat about applying 
unweighted kappa as an omnibus statistic to 3 or more 
categories of interest. Although the overall value of kappa 
might be of somewhat limited interest, the decomposi-
tion of kappa into levels of specific agreement (observed 
and chance-corrected) on a category by category basis, 
would, in fact, be quite informative (e.g., Fleiss 1981, p. 
220). For peer review, there might be interest in the 
extent to which reviewers agree on such conceptually 
distinct evaluation attributes (nominal variables) as: im-
Table 1. Average NSF and COSPUP ratings of 50 proposals 
in the field of "Economics" 
COSPUP: 
Low Ratings High Ratings All 
NSF: (10-39) (40-50) Proposals 
Low (10-39) 29 3 32 
High (40-50) 9 9 18 
All Proposals 38 12 50 
portance of the problem under investigation; adequacy of 
research design; and interpretation of research results. 
Each evaluative attribute could be scored as "acceptable" 
or "unacceptable." If the reliability design were such that 
the same two reviewers evaluated all submissions inde-
pendently, then the generalization of kappa developed by 
Davies and Fleiss (1982) would apply. If the reviewers 
varied from one submission to another, then the kappa 
statistic developed by Fleiss (1971) and extended by 
Fleiss et al. (1979) would be relevant. Again, while the 
overall (omnibus) kappa value averaged over the 3 catego-
ries of interest might be of limited value, the levels of 
observed and chance-corrected agreement on each eval-
uative attribute would be quite meaningful. On the other 
hand, if the overall kappa value were not even statistically 
significant, one would be less interested in the specific 
category reliability assessments. For these reasons, and 
the ones expressed in my reply to Cilmore, I would 
conclude that kappa is more "information-efficient" than 
its competitors. 
Finally, with respect to Rosenthal's application of kap-
pa to the acceptance and rejection figures for the JAP data 
given in Table 5, my two values are . 14, as is true for 
overall kappa (again, the 2 x 2 equal marginals case). 
Although these values, as well as the 70% and 40% 
agreement levels, are describing the same data, each 
conveys valuable, though different, information, as ex-
plained more fully in my upcoming replies to Demorest 
and Wasserman. 
Reanalyzing data from Tables 5 and 6 respectively, 
Demorest and Wasserman arrive at the same conclusion, 
namely, that chance-corrected agreement on rejection 
(disapproval) is no bet ter than on acceptance (approval). 
They are both right. The phenomenon, as Demorest 
correctly notes, however, is specific to degrees-of-free-
dom limitations inherent in data deriving from a 2 x 2 
contingency table. As noted in my discussion of Rosen-
thal's commentary, overall kappa values are always math-
ematically identical to specific kappa values for accep-
tance and rejection (e.g., see also Cicchetti 1980; 
Cicchetti & Feinstein 1990; Fleiss 1975). 
A very important and relevant issue, however, dis-
cussed neither by Demorest and Wasserman, nor by the 
target article itself, still needs to be addressed. As noted 
recently (Cicchetti 1988, p. 621), the same kappa value 
can be reflected in a wide range of observed agreement 
levels. Some will be of substantive (practical or clinical) 
value and others will not. It thus becomes necessary to set 
some specific criterion forjudging the usefulness of both 
observed and chance-corrected levels of agreement as 
they may occur together. My colleagues and I have 
suggested that one should require a minimum level of 
agreement of 70% before correcting for chance, and an 
accompanying level of at least .40 ("fair" agreement) after 
correcting for chance (see Volkmar et al. 1988, p. 92). If 
we apply these criteria to the data presented by Demor-
est, in Table 2, namely, category-specific agreement 
levels for reviews of manuscripts submitted to the Ameri-
can Psychologist, the only category that meets these 
standards is category 5 ("reject"), for which the observed 
level of reviewer agreement is 75.9% and the chance-
corrected level (weighted kappa) is .52. Consistent with 
these results, reviewer agreement levels on 866 manu-
scripts submitted to a purposely unidentified Major Sub-
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Table 2. Category-specific agreement levels for 866 submissions to a Major Subspecialty Medical Journal 
Reviewer Average Frequency Type of Agreement Corrected 
Recommendation of Usage (%) Observed (%) Chance (%) for Chance 
Accept/Excellent 5 53 34 .29 
Accept/As Is 7 65 53 .27 
Accept/Revise 21 78 68 .33 
Resubmit 24 78 75 .12 
Specialty Journal 10 74 72 .08 
Reject 33 81 66 .44 
All Recommendations 100 77 67 .30 
Note. Weighted kappa (Cohen 1968; Fleiss, Cohen & Everitt 1969) was used with a weighting system developed and recom-
mended by Cicchetti (1976); Cicchetti & Fleiss (1977); and Cicchetti & Sparrow (1981), in which: complete reviewer agreement is 
assigned a weight of 1, followed by disagreement which is one ordinal category apart (.8), two categories apart (.6), three (.4), four 
(.2), and five categories apart (O, i.e., "Accept/Excellent" vs. "Reject Outright"). The corresponding R, value for these data was 
.37, which was shown in Table 2 of the target article. 
Source: from Cicchetti & Conn (1976). 
specialty Medical Journal (Cicchetti & Conn 1976) are 
shown in Table 2. The only reviewer recommendation 
category that meets the Volkmar et al. (1988) criterion is 
" re jec t , " with an observed rate of agreement of 81 % and a 
chance-corrected level of .44. 
In summary, the data indicate that the accompanying 
levels of observed agreement are substantially h igher for 
negative than for positive evaluations and that t h e phe-
nomenon holds, more generally, in the 3-or-more cate-
gory case where there are varying levels of chance-
corrected agreement possible. 
1.4. Interpreting the data In Tables 1, 2, 5, and 6. The 
question is raised by Eckberg why the numbers of manu-
script reviews for the Journal of Abnormal Psychology 
(JAP) and the Journalof Personality and Social Psycholo-
gy (JPSP) vary from Table 1 to Table 2. For JPSP manu-
scripts, the two samples were different ones. The JAP 
data in Table 2 are based on a complete sample of 1,319 
manuscripts submitted be tween 1973 and 1978. They 
focus on overall reviewer recommendations (scientific 
merit). The data in Table (target article) 1 are based on 
evaluation criteria (deriving from specific rating forms) 
that reviewers applied to JAP manuscripts submi t ted 
be tween 1976 and 1978. For the approximately 50% of 
the remaining manuscripts (1974-1975), these rat ing 
forms were unavailable for reviewers. To clarify this issue 
in Table 1, row A now reads: "For manuscripts submit ted 
to the Journal of Abnormal Psychology (1976-1978)," 
rather than (1973-1978). 
Referr ing to the data presen ted in Tables 5 and 6 (target 
article), Eckberg wonders why I conclude that reviewers 
agree more on rejection than acceptance, rather than that 
reviewers simply reject more often than they accept. H e 
also wonders whether the chi square(d) values in Tables 5 
and 6 are incorrect. 
Concerning the first quest ion, the data do, in fact, 
indicate substantially more agreement on rejection than 
on acceptance. This phenomenon is conceptually inde-
penden t of the fact that reviewers recommend rejection 
much more often than acceptance. Take the data for JAP 
(first en t ry of Table 5). Of the 462 manuscripts that 
received positive reviewer recommendations, how many 
were in agreement? This is 44%, or 203. For those 857 
manuscripts receiving negative recommendations, how-
ever, there was agreement on 70%, or 600. The question 
raised here is simply whether there is significantly more 
agreement on rejection than on acceptance. The chi 
square(d) value of 83.99 means that the difference is 
statistically significant at beyond the .00001 level. 
The figures reported in both Tables 5 and 6 are all 
correct as they are reported in the target article. Two 
factors will cause chi square(d) values to vary, however. 
The most obvious (and least important) pertains to how 
many places beyond the decimal point are considered. 
This produces differences from simple rounding errors. 
The conceptually more serious source of variation arises 
from whether the chi square(d) test (here with 1 degree of 
freedom) is applied with or without the Yates (1934) 
correction factor. Fleiss (1981) argues correctly (p. 27) 
that "because the incorporation of the correction for 
continuity brings probabilities associated with y2 and Z 
into closer agreement with the exact probabilities than 
when it is not incorporated, the correction should always 
be used." Soper et al. (1988) demonstrated in a recent 
computer simulation that the random application of the 
chi square(d) test to neuropsychological data resulted, as 
expected, in values that were indistinguishable from 
nominal or chance levels (e.g., .05 or .01) when the 
continuity correction was used. When it was not, many 
more significant chi square(d) values were produced than 
were warranted by the data. These results support 
Fleiss's arguments and are also consistent with the earlier 
recommendations of Delucchi (1983, p. 169) and of Lewis 
and Burke (1949), much earlier. 
Given the necessity of using the correction for con-
tinuity, what effect would its nonusage (albeit incorrect) 
have on the chi square(d) and p values shown in Tables 5 
and 6? These range from trivial to substantial depending 
on the size of the continuity-corrected chi square(d) value 
and the number of cases on which the test is based. Thus 
the chi square(d) value for JAP, based on 1,319 cases, 
increases to 85.08, which, "p-wise," is indistinguishable 
from the reported continuity-corrected chi square(d) val-
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ue of83.99. In distinct contrast, the continuity-corrected 
chi square(d) value of 3.413 (p = .06), for the 72 manu-
scripts submitted to Developmental Review (entry 3 of 
Table 5) increases to 4.46 (p = .02), when the correction 
for continuity is not used. Similar effects can be noted for 
the data in Table 6. 
Eckberg asks two additional questions: (1) In the case of 
comparing NSF and COSPUP open reviews (Table 6), 
how was it decided who would be the two reviewers? 
Each average C O S P U P rating for a given grant proposal 
(first "reviewer") was compared to each average NSF 
rating (second "reviewer"). (2) Why is the number of 
disagreements exactly the same in both the "Acceptance" 
and "Rejection" columns (Table 5) and in the "High" and 
"Low Ratings" columns (Table 6)? This is because the 
disagreed-on cases for acceptance and rejection cannot 
differ in the 2 x 2 case, because of degrees of freedom 
restrictions (see also Cicchetti 1988, Tables 6-10, pp. 
611-615, and p. 619). 
1.5. Interpreting the data In Table 3. Based on experience 
with behavioral psychology journals, Cone notes that 
journals with lower submission rates will tend to have 
higher acceptance rates. Therefore this variable needs to 
be controlled in peer review research. He concludes that 
the data presented in Table 3 (target article) provide 
partial support for this notion in the case of manuscripts 
submitted to the Physical Review (PR). For example, the 
Nuclear Physics section of PR has a higher acceptance 
rate and lower submission rate than those sections with 
two or three times as many submissions as Condensed 
Matter or General Physics. 
A more comprehensive analysis of these data do not 
support Cone's contention. Thus, the two sections with 
the lowest submission rates, Nuclear Physics and Parti-
cles & Fields, with a combined submission rate of 31.5% 
(or 1658/5264), have a combined acceptance rate of73.3% 
(or 1215/1658). There is a similar combined acceptance 
rate of 75.3% (or 2717/3606) for the two sections (General 
Physics and Condensed Matter) with more than twice the 
percentage of submissions (3606/5264 or 68.5% vs. 1658/ 
5214 or 31.5%). Chi square(d), corrected, 1 df = 2.35(p = 
n.s.). More important, the strength of association (Effect 
Size (ES), Cohen 1988) between manuscript submission 
rate and acceptance rate, as measured by phi (or X2ldf 
(uncorrected)/N) is only 0.02, a zero-order effect. 
In a related issue, pertaining again to the type of data 
presented in Table 3, Cone contends that there is no 
evidence for my assertion that "manuscripts requiring 
more than one reviewer tend to be those that are prob-
lematic. " This is based on a misunderstanding about how 
the single initial referee system works. In the field of 
physics (e.g., Physical Review, PR), the editor sends a 
manuscript initially to a single reviewer. If the reviewer 
recommends acceptance, the editor typically supports 
that decision. Only when the initial referee detects a 
problem (i.e., recommends rejection) is the manuscript 
sent to a second referee. If the second referee also 
recommends rejection, then the editor typically rejects 
the article. If the second reviewer recommends accep-
tance, however, then the paper is viewed as "prob-
lematic." Such a manuscript is usually sent to a third 
referee who will decide the fate of the submission (see 
also Hargens 1988). 
Kiesler's comments about "explaining" differences be-
tween natural and behavioral scientists in terms of their 
"success" with manuscript or grant applications seem 
confused, so I am unable to respond. They presumably 
have something to do with the data presented in Table 3, 
but I simply can not follow his arguments. Clarification in 
BBS Continuing Commentary is suggested. 
The next several sections of my Response focus on 
varying interpretations of the overall results presented in 
the target article, namely, that across disciplines and type 
of submission (manuscript, grant) levels of interreferee 
agreement (corrected for chance) tend to be rather low (R, 
usually below .40). 
2. Interpretation of the results 
2.1. Reliability levels ere correct as reported. A majority 
of commentators accepted the low levels of reliability as 
valid, and offered a number of suggestions for improving 
the reliability (and at times even the validity) of peer 
reviews (Adams, Bornstein, Cohen, Cole, Colman, 
Cone, Crandall , Delcomyn, Fletcher, Ciimore, Gor-
man , Greene , Kraemer , Laming, Lock, Mahoney, 
Nelson, Roediger, Rourke, Salzinger, Tyrer , and Zen-
tall). These views are discussed in later sections of the 
report. 
Cole feels that both editors and granting officials need 
to admit that since reliability is so poor, much high quality 
research is rejected or disapproved, whereas some poor 
quality research is accepted or funded. Therefore, editors 
should gradually increase the number of manuscripts 
they accept and granting officials should put funding aside 
for meritorious but disapproved proposals. The major 
problem with this otherwise good idea is that the time 
required to reverse a funding decision may equal or 
exceed the time required to revise the proposal and 
resubmit it to the same or a different funding agency. 
Zentall, Roediger, and Laming doubt that levels of relia-
bility could ever be improved substantially. Zentall ar-
gues that much of the disagreement reflects deep the-
oretical and methodological (confirmational) biases. 
Similarly, Roediger argues that the corpus of psychologi-
cal literature has demonstrated consistently that human 
judgments of such complex issues as hiring decisions or 
making clinical diagnoses, are of questionable reliability 
and validity. Hence, the similarity in results for peer 
reviews is to be expected. Laming, in a most imaginative 
commentary, argues by analogy with the results of a 
number of psychophysical studies across sensory modalit-
ies that the constantly shifting frames of reference with 
which successive stimuli are compared limit the accuracy 
of human judgments to the extent that about 2 /3 of the 
variability in judgments can be attributed to the vari-
ability in frames of reference. Thus, it is the absence of a 
stable frame of reference that sets limits on the extent of 
judgmental accuracy. Applying this knowledge to the 
field of peer reviews of manuscript and grant submis-
sions, Laming concludes that the shared variability be-
tween independent reviews would be restricted to an 
upper limit of about 0.33. He ends his commentary on a 
rather sombre and pessimistic note that he contrasts to 
my own more optimistic view of progress in science (in 
general) and peer review (in particular). Laming's pessi-
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mism is based on his examination of journal articles in his 
field of interest (experimental psychology) that were 
published between 50 and 100 years ago. He concludes 
that if more than 90% of this research had never been 
published, the state of experimental psychology would be 
no different than it is today. 
In contrast to the pessimism shared by Laming, 
Roediger, and Zentall , I must state emphatically that the 
progress in my own field of inquiry, assessing the reliabil-
ity and validity of standard and state-of-the-art diagnostic 
instruments in both behavioral science and medicine, has 
been nothing short of dramatic. Thus, my colleagues and 
I have developed highly reliable and valid instruments 
over a wide range of disorders: 
1. In behavioral science, for example, adaptive behav-
ior (Sparrow et al. 1984a; 1984b; 1985), alexithymia 
(Krystal et al. 1986), personality disorders (Cicchetti & 
Tyrer 1988; Tyrer, Cicchetti etal. 1984; Tyrer, Strauss et 
al. 1984), anxiety (Tyrer, Owen et al. 1984), affective 
behaviors of demented patients (Nelson et al. 1989), and 
dissociative disorders (Steinberg et al. 1990); and 
2. In medicine, the Yale Observation Scales for identi-
fying seriously ill febrile children (McCarthy et al. 1982; 
McCarthy et al. 1990), new methods for classifying cata-
racts both in vitro (Cicchetti et al. 1982); and in vivo 
(Cotlier et al. 1982), and accuracy of the barium enema in 
diagnosing (a) Hirschsprung Disease (Rosenfield et al. 
1984), and (b) acute appendicitis (Garcia et al. 1987). 
For each of these diverse areas, we have consistently 
shown levels of reliability in the GOOD to E X C E L L E N T 
range (usually kappa or R, values . 90 and above), as well as 
good evidence for validity. When I became actively 
involved in research more than two decades ago, there 
was little optimism that the low levels of reliability and 
accuracy of judgment (especially in the behavioral sci-
ences) would ever become "respectable." Yet, less that a 
decade ago, the field of psychiatric diagnosis had im-
proved dramatically as encapsulated in the writings of 
Grove et al. (1981, p. 408): 
For years, achieving adequate diagnostic reliability in 
psychiatry was considered to be a hopeless undertak-
ing. A number of landmark studies suggested that 
psychiatrists looking at the same patients frequently 
disagreed about the appropriate diagnoses. As a conse-
quence, the importance of diagnosis was minimized in 
both research and clinical work. . . The reversal of 
nihilistic attitudes about psychiatric diagnosis has led 
to a rigorous (and successful) attempt to rework the 
entire American diagnostic system used by clinicians, 
DSM-III, which demonstrated in field trials that good 
agreement could be achieved even in routine practice. 
The specific details about how I believe that similar 
breakthroughs can be made in the field of peer review 
(namely, improving both its reliability and validity) are 
expressed in a later section of the report. 
2.2. Reliability levels are worse than Indicated. Examples 
are given by Schönemann from the published literature 
in which false claims about a number of phenomena have 
been made and perpetuated (e.g., indeterminacy, herita-
bility, the results of mathematical modeling). Because 
manuscripts with high reliability (editors and reviewers 
agree they should have been published at the time) have 
"negative" validity, this can only mean that reliability is 
lower than one would think, perhaps at random or chance 
levels. 
Although Schönemann*s argument has a certain face-
validity appeal, I am hard pressed to calculate the actual 
frequency with which the unfortunate phenomena he 
reports occur relative to the mammoth corpus of research 
that has been published. In mathematical terms, we are 
faced with trying to interpret a ratio with both unknown 
numerator (the number of invalid published research 
findings) and unknown denominator (the total number of 
nonredundant published findings). In short, it is not 
possible for me to draw a cause and effect conclusion on 
these matters given the data presented thus far. Perhaps, 
given the enormousness of published research in such 
diverse outlets, one could never arrive at a valid conclu-
sion. 
2.3. Reliability Is better than Indicated. Several commen-
tators (Hargens, Marsh & Ball) mention that reliability 
levels may have been underestimated by taking into 
account only the recommendations of two independent 
reviewers. Marsh & Ball, for example, note that in 
addition to the initial two reviews, the editor often has his 
own review, author revisions, and further reviews of the 
revised manuscript on which to base a decision, thereby 
probably increasing the reliability of the process. The 
additional review, however, whether by the editor or a 
third reviewer, is often not an independent one and so 
may be heavily influenced by the results of the initial two 
reviews. Despite this problem, there is a factor men-
tioned by both Hargens and by Marsh & Ball that one can 
test empirically, namely, that the editor's process of 
weeding out very poor quality manuscripts (rejected 
without being sent out for review) might reduce the 
variance and subsequently increase the levels of inter-
reviewer agreement, because these very submissions are 
the type we have shown to produce the highest levels of 
consensus. Hargens cites both Gordon (1977) and 
Zuckerman and Merton (1971) to suggest that the editor's 
sole "summary-rejection" rates for prestigious journals in 
both social science and medicine may reach levels as high 
as 50%. Fortunately, I have been able to analyze further 
some additional data deriving from reviews for the Jour-
nal of Abnormal Psychology (JAP) during 1973 and 1977. 
As given in Table 3, and based on 996 submissions, there 
was an overall R, (or kappa) value of .24 with 73% 
agreement on rejection, 51% on acceptance, and 65% 
overall agreement. In addition to these 996 submissions, 
the editor received 384 additional manuscripts. He re-
jected 333 (86.7%) and accepted the remaining 51 
(13.3%). If we make the assumption that the rejected 
manuscripts would also have been rejected by another 
independent reviewer because of their obvious poor 
quality or inappropriateness for JAP, the results show 
that: Overall agreement increases from 65% to 74%; 
agreement on rejection increases from 73% to 82%; 
agreement on acceptance remains at 51%; and Rj (or 
kappa) increases from .24 to .34. In conclusion, even if 
one assumes that the reliability of negative editorial 
reviews is perfect, it may not have a profound effect on 
increasing the reliability of the peer review process. 
Thus, whereas the agreement level on rejection im-
proves, the lack of a corresponding increase in reliability 
for acceptance keeps the R, value at relatively low levels. 
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Table 3. Effect of editorial summary rejection of 333 
manuscripts on the overall reliability of peer review of 
manuscripts submitted to Journal of Abnormal Psychology 
(1973-1978) 
A. Based on two independent reviews 
First Second Review 
Review Accept Reject Total 
Accept 
Reject 
181 
173 
172 
470 
353 
643 
Total 354 642 996 
p o ( o v e n d l ) 
P C(ove ra l l ) 
Kappa 
(or R.) 
= 65.4% 
= 54.1% 
= .24 
r < W , = 
P O ( r e j e c t ) = 
181/353.5 
51.2% 
470/642.5 
73.2% 
B. Adding the 333 editor's rejections to the reject-reject ceil 
First 
Review 
Second Review 
Accept Reject Total 
Accept 
Reject 
181 
173 
172 
803 
353 
976 
Total 354 975 1329 
P 0 ( o v e r a l l ) 
P C(over« l l ) 
Kappa 
(or R,) 
= 74.0% 
= 60.9% 
= .34 
P < 3 (»c rep t ) = 51.2% 
82.3% 
The great majority of commentators viewed the target 
article as a worthwhile endeavor, although they differed 
on their specific interpretation of what the results mean; 
two remaining commentators, however, Kiesler and 
Bailar, questioned the value of such research. These two 
commentators share the minority view that the only 
meaningful goal of peer review is to improve decisions 
about which submissions should be accepted (or ap-
proved) and which should be rejected (or disapproved). 
As such, the issue of reliability is essentially irrelevant to 
them. They also express the view that high levels of 
agreement signal that there is too much redundancy in 
the peer review process, that it is not working well, and 
that a balanced review has not been achieved. 
Kiesler is convinced at a basic conceptual level that 
high levels of reliability are incompatible with what he 
terms "wise" editorial and funding decisions. H e states 
specifically that to expect high levels of reviewer agree-
ment is "naive" because it falsely assumes that reviewers 
are randomly drawn by editors. I would submit that 
herein lies the most serious error in Kiesler's reasoning. 
In fact, if he were to choose reviewers randomly in his 
own general area of focus (the broad field of psychology), 
this procedure would almost guarantee levels of reviewer 
agreement even lower than what has been reported. 
Given that Kiesler needed a Freudian theorist as well as a 
sophisticated statistician to obtain a balanced review 
(using his hypothetical example), the probability that 
such expertise could be obtained on the basis of purely 
random selection procedures would indeed approach 
zero. In fact, any set of reviewers selected at random in 
any genera] focus area (behavioral science, medicine, 
general suhfields of physics) would almost perforce, be 
expected to disagree to a greater extent than those chosen 
specifically for their areas and levels of expertise Rourke 
correctly intimates that the validity of the comments of 
randomly selected reviewers would also be comprised 
because of insufficient knowledge about the area they 
would have been asked to evaluate. (A similar view is 
expressed by Lock.) In short, the balanced selection of 
reviewers should, if anything, enhance both the reliabili-
ty and the validity of the resulting reviews. 
If we accept Bailar's commentary at face value then to 
expect the peer review process to be "reliable," "fair," 
and "objective" would be considered an "inappropriate" 
goal. A careful reading of Bailar's comments suggests that 
as an editor he chose to work around the obvious unre-
liability, unfairness, and subjectivity of the peer review 
process for the Journal of The National Cancer Institute 
(JNCI). As one example, his regular use of reviewers who 
were clearly biased (i.e., would never recommend pub-
lication or would never criticize their colleagues) would 
prompt other commentators to act quite differently (I 
agree). Thus Kraemer would remove reviewers who 
"condemn everything" or have an apparent conflict of 
interest with the author(s) of the paper under review 
Similarly, other commentators would rather remove than 
live with or "work around" other obvious biases in the 
peer review system (I again agree). These biases include 
"confirmatory bias" against "negative" research findings; 
well-conceived replication studies (Corman, Lock, Sal-
zinger, Schönemann, Zentall), innovative research 
(Armstrong & Hubbard, Lock); the time of day that 
grants are evaluated, subjective "rating scale use habits" 
of grant reviewers, and the hypothesized harsher (more 
negative) evaluations provided by less experienced grant 
reviewers (Cohen). 
In summary, for Bailar to allow individuals who are 
clearly biased or who may have a potential conflict of 
interest to remain as "regular" reviewers stretches to the 
breaking point my limits of permissible peer review 
practices. Consistent with the views of peers at large, I 
am totally opposed to the practice. It is also somewhat 
curious that Bailar voices concern that ethical issues were 
not discussed in the target article. His comments follow 
closely his voicing obvious frustration with not being able 
to discuss such issues directly in connection with the 
Peters & Ceci (1982) publication about eight years ago. 
The fact of the matter is that about 20% of the authors' 
reply was devoted to the ethical issue. Mahoney ad-
dresses the ethical issue more broadly and I endorse his 
sanguine remarks heartily. 
Another issue that both Kiesler and Bailar seems to 
have overlooked is that high quality research (worthy of 
support) is integrally related to: (a) asking important 
questions; (b) designing and executing the research in an 
exemplary manner (utilizing proper controls); (c) using 
state-of-the-art instrumentation (and/or test materials); 
(d) writing clearly and succinctly; and (e) presenting a 
compelling discussion of the results and their implica-
tions (or heuristic value) for furthering scientific advance-
ments in the field. Because of the interrelatedness of 
these five evaluation attributes, my many years of experi-
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ence reviewing manuscripts and grants over a broad 
spectrum of disciplines (behavioral science, medicine, 
biostatistics), as well as my activities on editorial hoards 
and grant review committees, have indicated to me that 
when the peer review process is working properly (i.e., 
reviewers are selected for their varying areas of compe-
tence and they take their reviews seriously) it is not 
unusual to find high levels of agreement on at least the 
final recommendation, if not on a number of manuscript 
or grant attributes as well. 
To clarify the relevance of Bailar's example, there is no 
a priori reason to believe that the cardiologist, pharmaco-
logist, and statistician should not agree that a given 
clinical trial evaluating a new hypertensive drug is or is 
not worth supporting simply because each represents a 
different area of expertise. They would surely agree more 
than alternative reviewers selected randomly. The major 
disagreements I have experienced (or witnessed) among 
reviewers (whether for manuscripts or grants) have oc-
curred primarily because a proper match was not made 
be tween submitters and reviewers. Although the dis-
agreement can be occasioned by a number of factors, not 
least among them is a lack of sufficient expertise (or even 
bias) on the part of one or more of the reviewers. 
So, in response to both Kiesler and Bailar, I would 
emphasize that the proper selection of reviewers to evalu-
ate a given submission, should, in the long run, increase 
both the reliability and validity of the peer review pro-
cess. The sine qua non necessity of obtaining a balanced 
set of reviews (for both manuscript and grant submissions) 
is widely accepted by editors, granting officials, re-
viewers and authors alike. See, for example the additional 
comments on this important issue by Adams, Eckberg, 
Greene , Hargens, Kraemer , Roediger, and Strieker, as 
well as the recently published work of Fiske and Fogg 
(1990). 
The next major issue I discuss concerns how a given 
editor or program director uses the information obtained 
from peer reviews - quite apart from issues of reliability 
(or validity) - to make publication or funding decisions. 
3. Use of peer reviews to improve 
editorial/funding decisions 
3.1. The editor as final arbiter. A general concern is ex-
pressed by Fletcher about how editors and granting 
officials use unreliable reviewer recommendations to 
arrive at publication or funding decisions. Strieker talks 
about the importance of the "active" editor who judi-
ciously "weighs" the information, provided by reviewers, 
to arrive at a thoughtful publication decision. Similarly, 
Rourke speaks of "fair," "judicious," and "experienced" 
editorial practices. The reader will also recall Kiesler's 
concept of the "wise" editor. These descriptions, in turn, 
are similar to Bailar's informative notion of the editors' 
integration of their own knowledge with that provided by 
the additional "wisdom" of members of the editorial 
board, as well as "special consultants," as required. 
Lock (see also Lock 1985) proposes a "hanging commit-
tee" to examine and help resolve questions about those 
manuscripts receiving "gray area" or split-review recom-
mendations. Both Bailar and Crandall speak of the need 
for editors to eschew a majority-vote-of-reviewers' op-
tion, by exercising their power to override the recom-
mendations of reviewers, whenever required. Bailar 
states that a neglected area of the target article is the 
realization that an editor's decision is based not only on 
the overall scientific (or "technical") merit of a given 
submission but also on such manuscript attributes as 
"originality," "importance to readership," or "succinct-
ness." I am somewhat puzzled at how an editor accom-
plishes this important goal, given the known unreliability 
of such attributes, that is, the data shown in Table 1. 
Bailar's further elucidation of how he was able to accom-
plish this objective for J NCI would make an important 
contribution to the field of peer review. Tyrer discusses 
the important role of the editor or chairman of a granting 
agency in which "executive decision" is used to resolve 
reviewer disagreements. In a slightly different context, 
Armstrong & H u b b a r d note that at least some innovative 
research is published by editors of the American Psycho-
logical Association (APA) journals, despite the relatively 
low levels of reviewer agreement on submissions describ-
ing such valuable research. Fuller expresses concern that 
such high quality research will frequently be published in 
relatively few access journals. 
In a more general sense, Bailar takes the position that 
the target article did not adequately "pound home" the 
relatively major role of the editor or granting official in 
the entire peer review process relative to what he feels is 
the more minor role played by the reviewers (merely the 
providers of "relevant information"). Unfortunately, in so 
doing, the views of Bailar (consistent with those of Kiesler) 
create a purely artificial distinction among authors, re-
viewers, editors, and consumers of submitted and pub-
lished papers. As noted earlier (Cicchetti 1982, p. 21), 
"one of the most persistent problems we still face appears 
to be the false dichotomy we have tended to create 
between those who evaluate research and those who are 
being evaluated. Both derive from the same research 
species. "Theprovocativeandimaginativecommentary by 
Kraemer is consistent with this view. She speaks elo-
quently of the conflicting roles each of us is called on to play 
("submittors," "reviewers," "consumers" of scientific pa-
pers) and the fundamentally different standards we might 
invoke, depending on which peer role we are assuming at a 
given moment. Her emphasis on an "objective," "dispas-
sionate," and "quantitative" approach to the study of peer 
review as the only hope of identifying and correcting the 
many shortcomings in the peer review process is to be 
taken seriously. Toward this important goal, it is almost 
axiomatic that for science to continue to operate, it re-
quires the imagination and talent of authors, dispassionate 
and sensitive editors and granting officials, and, finally, 
interested readers (or consumers) of the published re-
search findings, so that the cycle can continue anew. In this 
basic and comprehensive sense I disagree with the more 
narrow-focus views of both Bailar and Kiesler. 
Though Bailar seems to be unaware of it, data were 
provided in the target article, showing the positive rela-
tionship between peer reviewer recommendations and 
the publication decisions made for more than 1,300 
manuscripts submitted between 1973 and 1978 to the 
general focus Journal of Abnormal Psychology (JAP). It 
was further noted that the results were consistent with 
data deriving from reviews of both the Sociological Re-
view and the Physical Review, which indicate that re-
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viewer recommendations are the major factor in the 
editor's decision to accept or reject (Bakanic et al. 1987; 
Hargens 1988). 
Next is an attempt to broaden our knowledge base in 
this important area of peer review research. The data is 
based on the total number of submissions to JAP between 
1973 and 1977 (1,698 manuscripts). These could be classi-
fied as follows: 15 (0,9%) were withdrawn before an 
editorial decision could be made; 14 (0.8%) were solic-
ited; 384 (22.6%) were reviewed by the editor alone; 175 
(10.3%) were reviewed by a single referee (other than the 
editor); 996 (58.7%) were evaluated by two independent 
reviewers; 112 (6.6%) received three independent re-
views; and 2 (0.1%) received four independent reviews. 
As reported in section 2.3 of this Response, 86.7% (333 
of 384 manuscripts) were reviewed and summarily re-
jected by the editor alone on the basis of very poor 
quality, inappropriateness for the readership of the jour-
nal, or on both accounts. All 14 of the solicited manu-
scripts were accepted for publication. Of the two manu-
scripts receiving four reviews, one was accepted, the 
other rejected. 
The fate of the remaining manuscripts, namely, those 
with a single review, two reviews, or three reviews 
follows. 
3.2. The editor's use ot single reviews: "Go with the 
flow." Table 4 shows that of the 175 manuscripts sent to a 
single reviewer, 58 (33.1%) were accepted by the editor 
and 117 (66.9%) were rejected. 
The full set of data (Part A ofTable 4) indicates that, as a 
general rule, the editor's final decision closely parallels 
single reviewer recommendations. Part B of the table 
indicates that when the reviewer recommended that the 
manuscript be accepted ("as is" or "subject to revision") 
there was an 85% likelihood of acceptance. Analogously, 
when the reviewer recommended either resubmission or 
rejection, there was a 90% probability of rejection. An 
inspection of discrepancies between reviewer recom-
mendations and editorial decisions indicated that the 
editor was no more likely to reject manuscripts receiving 
an "accept/as is" or "accept/revise" recommendation 
(8/54 = 14.8%) than to accept manuscripts receiving a 
"resubmit" or "reject" recommendation (12/121 = 
9.9%). Applying McNemar's (1947) statistic for correlated 
proportions produced a chi square(d) value of zero-order 
significance, that is, 0.45. 
3.3. The editor's use of two reviews: "Go with the low." 
Results are presented in Table 5 for those 996 manu-
scripts receiving two reviews during the period 1973-
1977. 
The data can easily be understood if one considers that: 
(1) Manuscripts receiving a joint reviewer recommenda-
tion of "Resubmit" had a 27% probability of being accept-
ed for publication, which is indistinguishable from the 
base rate journal acceptance rate of 28%; (2) those manu-
scripts receiving two reviewer votes for acceptance or a 
split between acceptance and resubmission had a 72% 
probability of being published, as compared to the 72% 
baseline rejection rate of the journal; and (3) the remain-
ing 635 manuscripts (65%) had only a 5.5% probability of 
being accepted for publication, a rate more than five 
times less than the journal baseline acceptance rate of 
28%. 
These findings also have cross-disciplinary implica-
tions. Specifically, Lock (1985, pp. 20-21) presented 
analogous data for 282 articles, or 50% of the 564 articles 
that were submit ted to the medical journal Thorax and 
evaluated independently by two referees. Thirty-eight 
percent (or 107) of the manuscripts received a unanimous 
reviewer recommendation for acceptance. All of them 
were accepted by the editor. The reviewers were in 
agreement that an additional 38% (or 107) manuscripts 
should be rejected. The editor rejected all these submis-
sions. Twenty-four percent (or 68) of the submissions 
received a split-decision, with one reviewer recommend-
ing "accept" and the other "reject." The editor accepted 
Table 4. The fate of Journal of Abnormal Psychology submissions receiving a single editorial review (1973-1977) 
A. Considering each reviewer recommendation 
Reviewer Number of Editorial decision Percentage 
Recommendation Manuscripts Accept Reject Accepted 
1 = Accept/As Is 24 22 2 91.7 
2 = Accept/Revise 30 24 6 80.0 
3 = Resubmit 26 11 15 42.3 
4 = Reject 95 1 94 01.1 
Total 175 58 117 33.1 
B. Considering 1-2 — Accept; 3-4 = Reject 
Reviewer Number of Editorial decision Percentage 
Recommendation Manuscripts Accept Reject Accepted 
(1-2) = Accept 54 46 8 85.2 
(3-4) = Reject 121 12 109 90.1 
Total 175 58 117 
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Table 5. The fate of Journal of Abnormal Psychology submissions receiving two editorial reviews (1973-1977) 
A. Considering "Accept/As Is" and "Accept/Revise" as "Accept" 
Reviewer Number of Editorial Decision Percentage 
Recommendation Manuscripts Accept Reject Accepted 
Accept-Accept 181 159 22 87.8 
Accept-Resubmit 150 79 71 52.7 
Resubmit-Resubmit 30 8 22 26.7 
Accept-Reject 195 28 167 14.4 
Resubmit-Reject 162 6 156 03.7 
Reject-Reject 278 1 277 00.4 
Total 996 281 715 28.2 
B. Considering 1 — Accept; 2-3 = Reject 
Reviewer Number of Editorial decision Percentage 
Recommendation Manuscripts Accept Reject Agree Disagree 
Accept 353 212 141 60.1% 39.9% 
Reject 643 69 574 89.3% 10.7% 
Total 996 281 715 
2% (or 6) such manuscripts and rejected the remaining 
22% (or 62) manuscripts. Thus, there was a 62/6 or m o r e 
than tenfold probability that an editor would reject ra ther 
than accept a manuscript receiving mixed reviews. 
In summary, at least for the general focus journals 
examined thus far, when editors are faced with split-
decisions, they tend overwhelmingly to go with the lower 
of the two reviewer recommendations. 
3.4. The editor's use ot three reviews; "Go with the 
mode." Of the 1698 (6.6%) submissions to JAP (1973-
1977), 112 received three reviews. As shown in Table 6, 
the disposition of these manuscripts is again closely relat-
ed to reviewer recommendations. 
Thus, all 5 manuscripts receiving unanimous accep-
tance votes were accepted for publication. Analogously, 
the 9 submissions receiving unanimous rejection votes 
were rejected. The disposition of the remaining 98 (or 
87.5%) manuscripts is best understood by the editor 's 
general adoption of majority rule or applying the formula 
"go with the mode." Thus, 24 of 33 (or 73%) of those 
submissions receiving 2 "accept" recommendations were 
accepted, whereas 80% (or 52/65) submissions receiving 
two "reject" votes were rejected. Application of the 
McNemar test of correlated proportions indicated no 
significant difference favoring ei ther the editor's accep-
tance of these articles (20%) with majority rejection votes 
or his rejection of those articles (17%) with majority 
acceptance votes (McNemar's chi square(d), corrected, 1 
df = .41, or of zero order significance). 
I am unaware of comparable studies on manuscripts 
submitted to medical journals. Bailar noted that it was 
not unusual, in his role as editor of JNCI (1974-1980), 
however, ei ther to reject manuscripts receiving th ree 
positive reviews or to publish submissions receiving 
three negative reviews. Given the importance of this 
phenomenon, I would invite Bailar to publish these data, 
because they contrast so sharply with what I have pre-
sented here for a prestigious behavioral science journal. 
It would be important to know; (a) precisely how fre-
quently the phenomenon occurred; and (b) in what 
important respects the targeted manuscripts were dis-
similar from those that were less problematic. Perhaps 
Bailar could provide this information in a BBS Continuing 
Commentary. 
In the field of physics, recall that journal editors in the 
more specific focus areas use the "single initial reviewer 
system"(e.g., Hargens & Herting 1990; Lock 1985, p.20) 
and so would tend not to have much data on the fate of 
manuscripts receiving three reviews. Although it is equal-
ly clear that the more general focus areas of physics often 
receive three reviews (or more), the extent to which an 
editor uses this information to make specific publication 
decisions is unknown. Despite this lack of specific informa-
tion, there are some sparse data, deriving from the field of 
physics, that bear on the broader issue of how editors use 
information gained from referees to improve the quality of 
the editorial decision-making process. These data ap-
peared in the Physical Review (PR) and Physical Review 
Letters (PRL) (1987, p. 7) Annual Report for the previous 
year, 1986. The statements pertain to a change in editorial 
policy for manuscripts submitted from the community of 
particle theorists to the subfield section, Elementary 
Particles, which represents one of 10 PRL areas of spe-
cialization. (The remaining nine subfields, orPRLcontent 
areas, are: General Physics, Cross-Disciplinary Physics, 
Astrophysics and Geophysics, Condensed Matter (CM), 
Electricity, CM Mechanics, Plasma Physics, Optics and 
Fluids, Nuclear Physics, and Atoms and Molecules.) The 
statement of journal policy change bears quoting; 
In March, 1985, a new system of handling papers in the 
theory of particles and fields was introduced. The 
divisional Associate Editors were enlisted to work 
closely on the processing of these papers, with the 
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Table 6. The fate of 112 Journal of Abnormal Psychology manuscripts receiving three reviews (1973-1977) 
Reviewer Number of Editorial decision Percentage 
Recommendation Manuscripts Accept Reject Accepted 
3 "Accept" 5 5 0 100.0 
2 "Accept," 1 "Reject" 33 24 9 72.7 
1 "Accept," 2 "Reject" 65 13 52 20.0 
3 "Reject" 9 0 9 00.0 
Total 112 42 70 37.5 
Note. "Accept" = "Accept/As Is" or "Accept/Revise"; "Reject" = "Resubmit" or "Reject" 
directive of securing more expert and even-handed 
reviews and bet ter serving our readers by attracting a 
larger share of the important papers in this area. To 
date, the experiment has been working smoothly, and 
we sense an improvement in relations with the commu-
nity of particle theorists. This is reflected in increased 
submissions and publication in this area: Submissions 
for 1985 and 1986 were about 35% above the 1984 level 
and the numbers of published papers were about 45% 
above the 1984 level (reflecting also a moderately in-
creased acceptance rate). 
4. Improving the reliability and validity of peer 
review 
4.1. Rationale, unifying concepts. The thoughtful, 
thought-provoking, and conceptually sound ideas of 
Kraemer seem especially valuable at this point in the ex-
position. Her very special talent for accurately relating 
pure mathematical reasoning to the flawed world of 
clinical reality has been achieved once again, and the field 
of peer review will be the richer for it. Hers is a well-
reasoned commentary on the subtle interplay between 
issues of reliability and validity. I share her view on the 
importance of improving reliability but not at the expense 
of validity and, conversely, of improving validity without 
compromising reliability; I agree that both can be accom-
plished. Kraemer 's most valuable contribution is a the-
oretically and empirically sound framework, in which 
more specific ideas for improving the quality of peer 
review can be bet ter classified, integrated, and examined 
critically. 
Take Kraemer 's first comment about editors' basic 
need to select reviewers with varying degrees of expertise 
to achieve a balanced and comprehensive review. Her 
conclusion that "maximal validity" is achieved when 
errors are independent and the editor uses as many 
reliable reviewers as possible is correct. Moreover, if one 
evaluates this proposition in a cross-disciplinary or cross-
specialty sense, its meaning can be further elucidated. 
For example, in the general subspecialty fields of so-
ciology, psychology, medicine, and physics, it would be 
essential to select reviewers for their area of expertise 
(e.g., content specialist, biostatistician, biochemist) to 
increase the validity of the review. However, this careful 
selection of reviewers (weeding out the biased and non-
discriminating) should also increase significantly the reli-
ability of the peer review process, at least for the overall 
reviewer recommendation. (See also the commentaries of 
Kraemer and Lock.) 
Now if one considers the same issue for specific spe-
cialties of sociology, psychology, medicine, or physics, 
the community of peers may be so well defined that one 
could select reviewers randomly. This might obviate the 
nonrandom and unwitting selection of potentially biased 
reviewers. In summary, a selection process that would be 
a disaster for a general area may be just what is required in 
a more specific subspecialty area. 
A second, unifying matter that Kraemer suggests may 
not be aimed at improving the reliability or the validity of 
peer review is the delicate and sensitive problem of 
striking a meaningful balance between committing Type I 
(alpha) errors (accepting flawed submissions) and Type II 
(beta) errors (rejecting nonflawed submissions). Kraemer 
and I agree that Type II error needs to be reduced but not 
at the expense of magnifying a Type I error. Again, if 
Kraemer's broad framework is extended to specific as well 
as more general areas of inquiry, her ideas dovetail nicely 
with those of Cole, whose theoretically meaty commen-
tary uses the Type I -Type II distinction to explain dif-
ferences in acceptance and rejection rates for the social 
and natural sciences. 
Cole argues that behavioral scientists prefer to make 
Type II errors, whereas social scientists prefer to make 
Type I errors. There is certainly evidence for this hypoth-
esis. Thus, the data presented in section 3 show quite 
clearly that when editors of major general journals in 
psychology are faced with a split review, they over-
whelmingly opt for rejection. Moreover, Lock (1985) 
shows that the same phenomenon is at work for editors of 
general medical journals. The much higher rejection 
rates for general areas in physics itself, however, seems to 
indicate that the phenomenon is even broader than Cole 
suggests. Perhaps the idea needs to be amended: Editors 
in general areas across and within fields of inquiry desire 
to avoid Type I errors, whereas their specialized counter-
parts try to avoid Type II errors. Consistent with this 
philosophy, Roediger, a former editor of a psychology 
specialty journal, recommends the "when in doubt, ac-
cept" philosophy for editorial decisions on manuscripts 
receiving split reviews. 
There appears to be a concerted effort on the part of 
general focus scientists to set criteria for deciding on just 
how to achieve the best balance between Type I and Type 
II errors. It is especially important to accomplish this 
because it is a well-known biostatistical fact that one can 
avoid a Type II error by simply increasing sufficiently the 
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size of N. What this means is that any difference between 
study samples, no matter how trivial, will produce statis-
tical significance, or a so-called "positive" result. Cohen 
(1988) addresses this issue directly by suggesting, in the 
broader context of power analysis, that: (a) as a general 
rule, one adopt a Type II error rate of .20, thereby 
producing power of .80 (i.e., power = [1 — beta error]. 
Because Type I (alpha error rate) is often set at the 
nominal or conventional p level of .05, the adoption of this 
strategy means, literally, that one considers a Type I error 
to be of the order of four times as serious as a Type II 
error; and (b) the substantive, practical, or clinical mean-
ing of the group difference, above and beyond its level of 
statistical significance should interpret .15 as a SMALL 
effect, .30 as a M E D I U M effect, and .50 as a LARGE 
effect. (See section 1.2 of this Response to Eckbergfor the 
adoption of analogous guidelines for interpreting the 
practical significance of kappa, R,, and R values.) 
In the remaining parts of this section of the Response, I 
examine commentators ' reactions to a number of further 
specific suggestions for improving the quality of peer 
reviews for both manuscript and grant submissions. 
These include: the role of multiple reviewers; using 
author anofiymity or "blind" review; revealing reviewer 
identity; author review of referees; rewarding referee 
contributions; allowing authors multiple manuscript sub-
missions; developing peer review appeals systems; and 
training reviewers. 
4.2. The role of multiple reviewers. This strategy received 
widespread endorsement from those commentators who 
voiced an opinion (i.e., see specifically Cohen, Crandall , 
Greene, Hargens , Kraemer , Marsh & Ball, Strickerand 
Zentall). 
On the other hand, Colman was opposed to the use of 
multiple reviewers, which he felt would: (a) produce 
"social loafing," or a lessening in reviewer effort; (b) 
encourage a "diffusion of responsibility"; and (c) increase 
substantially the workload of already overburdened refer-
ees. I believe that the "social loafing" phenomenon, to 
the extent that it might exist among multiple peer re-
viewers, can be greatly attenuated or even eliminated by 
appropriately rewarding useful and thoughtful reviews, 
while eliminating reviewers who consistently produce 
biased and poorly reasoned reviews. I am not so con-
cerned about the increase in reviewer workload for the 
reasons given in section 7.2 of the target article, namely, 
that there are pools of potential referees large enough to 
make multiple reviews possible across disciplines (see 
also the relevant remarks of Fletcher in this regard). 
4.3. Using author anonymity or "blind" review. A prefer-
ence is expressed by Kraemer and Lock for author 
anonymity (blind reviews) as a strategy for improving the 
overall quality of peer review. Lock, Colman, and 
Greene mention the nonfeasibility of the practice for peer 
review of grants because it would minimize or eliminate 
the important role of the author's research "track record" 
in deciding on the merits of the proposed research. 
Zentall feels that voluntary blinding might defeat its own 
purpose because those most likely to benefit from their 
past record of research accomplishments would be the 
least likely to use the process. Bailar claims "substantial 
anecdotal evidence" to support the notion that reviewers 
evaluate more accurately the strong and weak qualities of 
a given manuscript submission when they are not blinded 
to authors. Lock presents some recent empirical data on 
this issue, which conflicts with Bailar's conjectures. Spe-
cifically, McNutt et al.'s (1990) report that blinding 
proved successful for 76% of reviewers, and that it also 
resulted in a 21% improvement in the overall quality of 
the reviews. On a 5 point scale for assessing the quality of 
peer review (in which 1 = very poor and 5 = excellent) 
the mean "summary grade" was significantly higher (p = 
.007) for the blinded over the nonblinded evaluations of 
the same manuscripts. Moreover, the difference in medi-
an grade was a full point. Blind reviews had a median 
quality of review of 4, whereas the nonblind reviews of 
the same submissions showed a median value of 3. Final-
ly, based on an intriguing study by Garfunkel et al. (1990) 
Lock notes the urgency of studying the effects of blinding 
on editors themselves. 
4.4. Revealing reviewer Identity. It is argued by Adams 
that forcing reviewers to sign their evaluations would 
result in more constructive criticism of an author's work. 
Rourke concurs and predicts that the freedom of informa-
tion movement will ultimately force journals to adopt the 
policy of signed reviews. 
On the opposite side of the ledger, Kraemer is opposed 
to signed reviews. Consistent with the position I endorsed 
(sect. 7.4, target article), she opts instead for a voluntary 
decision for whether or not to sign. Zentall and Greene are 
also opposed to signed reviews, and for somewhat similar 
reasons. Zentall predicts that the fear of retribution would 
significantly reduce the likelihood of individual participa-
tion in the peer review process. Greene argues for the 
continued need to prevent the peer review of grants from 
becoming "personalized." 
4.5. Author review ot referees. The responsibility of de-
tecting and discarding poor quality peer reviews is placed 
directly on the editor by Kraemer. Similarly, Colman 
enjoins the editors periodically to "solicit" authors' eval-
uations of reviewers' criticisms, reviewers' replies to 
authors' criticisms (as required) and possibly to invoke the 
aid of an independent judge (or "arbiter") until a "fair" 
editorial decision occurs. Consistent with these views, 
Kiesler's "wise" editor would identify and ignore biased 
reviews. With respect to peer review of grants, Greene 
finds author review a useful screening procedure whose 
implementation in the Department of Veterans Affairs 
(DVA) will be considered as an adjunct to the present 
policy of inviting authors to submit the names of accept-
able and nonacceptable reviewers. I agree with these 
recommendations, which complement those suggested 
in section 7.4 of the target article. 
4.6. Rewarding referee contributions. It is suggested by 
Adams that referees be rewarded for providing quality 
peer reviews, without creating "undue bias" or imping-
ing on the "freedom of scientists." I strongly agree. 1 
would also add that whenever possible reviewers who 
consistently provide high quality evaluations (well rea-
soned, well documented, balanced) should be invited to 
serve as consulting editors, members of the boards of 
journals for which they review, or even associate or full 
editors, as appropriate. They should also be asked to 
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serve on grant review panels for such funding agencies as 
NIH, DVA, and NSF. In this manner scientists would be 
rewarded on the basis of their own scholarly contributions 
to peer review rather than on the basis of potentially more 
subjective criteria. 
4.7. Allowing authors multiple manuscript submission. 
Agreement is voiced by Mahoney with the position taken 
in section 7.7 of the target article that, for a number of 
cogent reasons, the option of multiple manuscript sub-
missions is not a viable one. His citation of Epstein (1990) 
adds confirming empirical support for the position. In my 
informal discussions with colleagues, I have yet to find 
one who would endorse such a practice. 
4.8. Developing peer review appeals systems. Whereas 
an argument for a more formal appeals system for rejected 
manuscripts is made by Zentall, Cole, citing the finding 
by Stinchcombe and Ofshe (1969) that many acceptable 
articles are falsely rejected, opts for editors gradually to 
increase publication rates for submitted articles even at 
the risk of levying page charges on authors. Although this 
is an interesting suggestion, I am not sure what specific 
criteria editors would apply to justify increasing their 
acceptance rates. Commentators were in agreement, 
however, that the unfair disapproval of a grant submission 
is far more serious in its consequences than the unfair 
rejection of a journal article (e.g., Adams, Cole, Kiesler, 
Mahoney, Salzinger, Zentall). The problem is especially 
serious for funding in the social and behavioral sciences. 
Thus, as Mahoney notes, the National Research Council 
(1988) emphasized the need for a 30% increase in funding 
in these areas where funding has dropped 25% between 
1972 and 1987, whereas it has increased by 36% in other 
areas of science during the same funding period. 
Greene advocates strongly the need for an appeals 
system for 'any funding agency, because the peer review 
system is an imperfect one. H e notes that the DVA has 
had an "effective" system for more than a decade. He also 
admits that appeal is a "sensitive" and "complex" phe-
nomenon, so the ground rules on which it is based require 
periodic assessment. I agree with Greene's position. 
Rather than a formal appeal process per se, Cole recom-
mends that granting foundations admit publicly that 
many of their rejected proposals are as fundable as many 
that are approved. He advocates specifically that the 
approval of such previously declined proposals should be 
undertaken even at the expense of reducing funding 
levels for the ensuing round of new grant proposals. 
My concern with Cole's recommendation is that once a 
grant proposal receives the official federal stamp of "dis-
approval," it becomes more and more difficult to con-
vince such lay persons as members of Congress that the 
submission should really have been funded in the first 
place. My solution would be to assign high priorities (no 
number attached) to the best considered proposals quite 
independently of whether there is funding available to 
support them. One could then request from Congress 
whatever additional funds may be required to support all 
the high priority grants. I believe that the way the system 
works today - assigning arbitrary funding cutoffs based on 
arbitrary numbers - creates the dilemma of funding a 
proposal with a priority score of, say, 112 and declining 
one with a score of 113 when in fact no reasonable peer 
reviewer can be expected to make a reliable differentia-
tion of this minute degree of magnitude. To paraphrase 
Delcomyn's analogy, the task that grant reviewers face is 
one of being asked to measure the dimensions of a nerve 
cell with a yardstick. My recommendation is intended to 
help obviate that measurement problem. 
4.9. Training reviewers. The important issue of training 
reviewers was mentioned, in varying degree, by several 
commentators (i.e., Adams, Crandall, Delcomyn, 
Kiesler, Rourke, and Zentall) 
Adams describes the typical "haphazard" and "uncer-
tain" manner in which reviewers eventually learn to 
become "constructive" evaluators. Adam's previously 
mentioned support of reviewers disclosing their identity 
to authors is one way of producing such constructive 
reviewer reports. With a somewhat similar purpose in 
mind, Zentall proposes that editors send to reviewers a 
list of recommended guidelines for avoiding potential 
biases in the evaluation of a given submission. The same 
general strategy can be used with grant proposals. 
Crandal l , Delcomyn, and Rourke write of the impor-
tance of reviewers sharing others' reviews of the same 
manuscripts. Unfortunately, some granting agencies 
(e.g., NSF) have policy forbidding such a learning experi-
ence. The DVN, on the other hand, does provide this 
valuable service to its reviewers. 
Crandal l and Delcomyn note that the ability to write a 
useful review improves with experience. Crandall la-
ments the fact that this experience is often gained at 
authors' expense. To help remedy the situation, De-
lcomyn provides a useful set of guidelines for reviewers 
that, though it derives from physiology, is pitched at a 
level general enough to be of cross-disciplinary use. The 
advantage of his guidelines over many others I have 
examined is that they contain within them the message 
that it is neither the task of reviewers nor editors to settle 
differing points of view in a given area of inquiry. Thus, if 
important questions raised in the introduction are an-
swered through carefully controlled, well executed ex-
periments, and the conclusions spring from the data, then 
the article should be accepted quite apart from whose 
particular theory or hypothesis is or is not being sup-
ported. 
Crandal l addresses more formally the notion of train-
ing reviewers by introducing the provocative idea of 
using prototype "ideal" reviews as guides. Filling in some 
of the required details, I would imagine that editors could 
locate in their files appropriate prototypie reviews that 
could be reliably rated as evidence for: "Accept/as is"; 
"Accept/Revise"; "Reject/Revise/Resubmit"; and "Re-
ject/Unconditionally." With the necessary identifying 
information removed and the content disguised, these 
can be sent to authors to use in the same general manner 
that, for example, prototypie stages of cataract have been 
used to train ophthalmologists to classify cataract stages 
(i.e., Cicchetti et al. 1982). 
The need for such formal training of reviewers may 
have been implicit though it appeared via a different 
route to Nelson. In a thoughtful commentary, she raises 
the issue of the specific process by which reviewers use 
information to arrive at publication or funding recom-
mendations. She is right that very little is known about 
this process in peer review. Some findings reported a few 
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years back (Cicchetti & Eron 1979) were described in 
m o r e detail in a subsequent BBS commentary (Cicchetti 
1982). We found that although there were high correla-
tions between what reviewers perceived as "important" 
and "well-designed" studies and their tendency to rec-
o m m e n d publication (rs between .62 [research design] 
and .73 [importance]), t h e reliability of these ratings was 
appreciably lower (.19 and .28, respectively, as given in 
Table 1 of the target article). Although reviewers were 
asked to use specific rat ing forms describing "impor-
tance , " "research des ign," and other manuscript at-
t r ibutes , it is entirely possible that they first read the 
manuscript , decided on thei r recommendation, and then 
filled out the form to be consistent with that recommen-
dat ion (e.g., if one thinks the article is worth publishing 
then it must be important , well-enough designed, of 
appropriate reader interest). 
Regardless of what specific interpretations may be 
appropriate , the more formal training of reviewers would 
probably enable them to use the same set of specific 
evaluative criteria more consistently. Then the process 
tha t reviewers use to arrive at a recommendation will 
have become standard, reliable, and if applied appropri-
ately (e.g., using prototypic reviews as standards), valid. 
5. Concluding comments 
A n u m b e r of commentators have suggested fu r the r inves-
tigations to place the area of peer review on an ever more 
solid scientific foundation. Given the interdisciplinary 
na ture of science - my strongest appeal is that the cross-
disciplinary approach taken in this target article should be 
fu r the r encouraged in fu tu re investigations. I would sim-
ply refer the interested reader to the specific commen-
taries of Bornstein, Cohen , Gorman, Hargens , Lock, 
M a r s h & Ball, Nelson, and Salzinger. 
In my opinion, the training of reviewers, as well as 
editors, authors, and consumers of research, is pivotal in 
increasing both the reliability and the validity of peer 
review. 
I have recently come across the first study of which I am 
aware that broaches this topic directly. Oxman et al. (in 
press) were able to train successfully three classes of 
referees ("experts in research methodology," " M D s with 
research training," and "research assistants" - three in 
each group) to assess the overall scientific quality and 
o t h e r evaluation attributes of 36 review articles published 
in a wide range of journals in medicine (e.g., New En-
gland Journal of Medicine), psychiatry (e.g., American 
Journal of Psychiatry), and psychology (e.g., Psychologi-
cal Bulletin): 
Following specific training (or practice) on review arti-
cles and an additional one hour training session, the 36 
articles were evaluated independently by the n ine re-
viewers. For level of "overall scientific quali ty," the 
intraclass R, across the n ine examiners, was .71; Rf values 
for each of the three groups of reviewers, separately, 
were , as follows: "Experts in research methodology" - R, 
= .77 (EXCELLENT); " M D s with research training" -
R, = .74 (GOOD); and "Research Assistants" - R, = .62 
(GOOD). 
Nine additional evaluative attributes, were measured 
on 7-point ordinal scales with four anchorage points 
provided for the scoring of each attribute (e.g., see 
Cicchetti et al. 1987). The nine attributes and their 
average R, values, across the nine judges, concerned the 
extent to which: (1) search methods were reported (R, > 
.8, or EXCELLENT); (2) a comprehensive search of the 
literature was conducted (R, > .6 or GOOD); (3) inclu-
sion criteria were reported (Rä > .8 or EXCELLENT); 
(4) selection biases were avoided (R, > .6, or GOOD); (5) 
validity criteria were reported (R, > .6, or GOOD); 
(6) validity data were reported (R, > .6, or GOOD); (7) 
findings were combined appropriately (Rj = .5 or FAIR; 
(8) methods for combining the data were reported (R, > 
.6, or GOOD); and (9) conclusions were supported by 
the data (R, = .40, or FAIR). Although there were 
somewhat lower levels of agreement among the research 
assistants than within the other two groups of reviewers, 
for eight of the 10 evaluations (items 1 - 7 and the overall 
evaluation of scientific quality) the differences in R, val-
ues were small. The average lower R, values of the 
remaining two attributes, however, were due to the very 
low Rj levels achieved by "research assistants" relative to 
the other two groups of evaluators. For rating the extent 
to which "the findings were combined appropriately," 
the R, for "experts" was at .6 (GOOD) and for "MDs 
with research training," it was > .9 (EXCELLENT). 
The corresponding R, for "research assistants," however, 
was in the very "POOR" range, at > .2. Similarly, the 
extent to which "conclusions were supported by the 
data," the R/s for "experts" and "MDs with research 
training" were beyond .6 (GOOD), whereas the corre-
sponding R, for "research assistants" was again in the 
very POOR range, or barely beyond the . 1 level. 
These results to my knowledge are the first to demon-
strate that reviewers of different levels of experience, can 
be taught to evaluate reliably the same scientific docu-
ments. It is hoped that additional investigations of this 
kind will be undertaken across a broad range of research 
topics both within and across disciplines. Following the 
lead of commentator Lock, I would also hope that the 
important issue of training peer reviewers will be dis-
cussed at the 1992 Second World Conference on Peer 
Review. 
Finally, in the open forum of "creative disagreement," 
I would extend a special invitation to those two commen-
tators (Bailar and Kiesler), who were the most dubious 
about the need to study fur ther the reliability and validity 
of the peer review process. I hope the panorama of ideas 
expressed by commentators across disciplines will con-
vince them of the need to turn some of their own anec-
dotal experiences into fur ther valuable research in this 
area. As editors of prestigious journals in behavioral 
science and medicine, their future insights and empirical 
investigations can make major contributions to the fur-
ther understanding of the vicissitudes of peer review. 
NOTE 
1. Author is also affiliated with Yale University. 
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IAN I. MITROFF AND DARYL E. CHUBIN: 
Peer Review at the NSF: 
A Dialectical Policy Analysis 
Social Studies of Science, 9 (1979) 199-232 
The controversy over peer review is viewed as a dialectic. The arguments 
espoused by advocates and critics of the system wherein research proposals are 
evaluated by advisors to funding agencies are reviewed, particularly the findings 
of two recent studies of peer review at the National Science Foundation. These 
findings seem to establish merit as the primary factor in the recommendations of 
peer reviewers to fund proposals. The findings also beg several questions as to 
'acceptable' definitions of meritoriousness and innovativeness, the links among 
belief, perception, and evaluation, and the sanctioned operation of particularistic 
factors in the review process. Future studies, it is suggested, must include 
psychological variables — especially measurement of applicants' and reviewers' 
'cognitive styles' — if data are to narrow gaps in knowledge and inform the 
debate itself. Finally, three models which undergird views of peer review are 
discussed and related to key social issues in the debate. 
In recent years, scientific controversies have, with growing 
regularity, attracted public scrutiny and debate. The controversy 
over the nature and functioning of the peer review system is an 
outstanding case in point. That this controversy strikes to the heart 
of science's most sacred and cherished values — institutional and 
political autonomy vis-a-vis the external society — may account for 
the intensity of the debate.1 That the debate did not reverberate 
through the American scientific community at large until 1975, 
however, suggests two complementary realities that may have 
forestalled the definition of peer review as a pressing and 
researchable problem: (1) the sanguinity of scientists during the 
halcyon years of growth in federal funding for R&D and graduate 
training;2 and (2) the tenacity of certain values which undergird the 
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very institution of science, precluding systematic investigation of 
mechanisms by which the institution's autonomy, self-governance, 
and 'uneasy partnership' with government is maintained.3 
As sanguinity and tenacity have flagged, a more defensive posture 
has emerged, resulting in empirical investigation of contemporary 
peer review. The results of such investigation occasion this paper, 
the purpose of which is fourfold : 
1. to outline the nature of the debate: that is, to present 
systematically the position of the contending parties; 
2. to review critically some of the evidence, particularly that 
emanating from two studies of peer review at the National 
Science Foundation, which bears upon the debate; 
3. to raise issues not addressed in recent studies, but which 
bear fundamentally on the debate; and 
4. to propose a strategy for future studies that will clarify old 
and new issues and hasten collection of appropriate data 
for informing, if not resolving, the debate — a debate 
which centres on peer review as an evaluative mechanism 
in the execution of science policy. 
Before proceeding, two caveats must be sounded, lest we be 
misconstrued. Firstly, notwithstanding our commentary, we are 
neither anti-science not anti-peer review. Indeed, we regard peer 
review in principle as the best available system; this does not mean 
that the system in practice cannot be improved. Likewise, and one 
would think with greater ease, studies of peer review can be im-
proved, not merely in terms of measurement and modes of 
analysis, but in approach. If scientists refuse to be reflexive, scep-
tical, and probing of their own institution — its organization and 
management — then can they really decry congressional 'incur-
sions' into their policies and practices? Part of the responsibility of 
autonomy and self-governance is self-scrutiny. This is a reasonable 
expectation, yet too few dissenting voices within the scientific com-
munity tend to be heard." 
The second caveat is closely related to our first, but pertains to 
the scope of this paper. We regard peer review as a kind of science 
advice involving select members of the community, all of whom act 
— to a greater or lesser degree — as gatekeepers. These gatekeepers 
help to regulate the flows of information and fiscal resources 
through the community by directing, impeding, and expediting 
flows based upon judgments of quality and merit, allegiances and 
biases and, probably, on sheer caprice as well.5 The point is that 
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science advising entails the disposition of scholarly work (such as 
grant proposals and manuscripts) by referees representing, but not 
representative of, the scientific community.6 It is the linking of ad-
vice with ultimate dispositions (that is, decisions) which endows 
peer review with a distinctive content. Clearly, we seek to generalize 
in this paper about content, recognizing that the form of peer 
review varies. For example, whereas the National Institutes of Health 
use a system of study sections, NSF uses review panels.7 Whereas 
some referees act as ad hoc mail reviewers, others attend periodic 
meetings as panel members. But what counts is that multiple 
judgments are solicited and weighed differentially (depending on 
the source) to reach a decision: to fund or not to fund. What we 
shall argue is that defensible decisions are not inevitably guaranteed 
by the peer review mechanism. Indeed, the process can be used to 
justify any decision. The power vested in the mechanism or process 
is derived, in large part, from the power (for instance, reputation) 
of the referee-advisor-gatekeeper, and is rationalized by the 
system.8 To reiterate, it is to this content we shall generalize, 
though our data are of a more limited form. The philosophy 
underlying the mechanism of peer review (at least in the US) war-
rants such substantive generalization. 
The Debate: 
A Dialectical Statement of the Issues 
The mode of presenting the peer review debate can help to elucidate 
the substance of the debate itself. Insofar as a debate features 
arguments sampled from a continuum of opinion, those arguments 
can be presented in the form of a dialectic.9 However, since this 
way of posing policy issues may not be as familiar as other forms, it 
might be helpful to offer at least a brief exposition of dialectical 
analysis. 
In recent years scholars in those diverse fields now subsumed 
under the 'social studies of science' rubric — particularly in 
history, philosophy, sociology, and management science — have 
advanced a series of potent theoretical arguments for a dialectical 
treatment of policy issues: indeed, they have argued that the con-
duct of science is dialectical in its basic structure.10 The essence of 
the argument is as follows: 
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(1) most social issues, and for that matter, topics on the leading 
edge of the sciences (natural as well as social) are conflictual in 
nature: that is to say, it is difficult, if not impossible, to secure 
widespread agreement (at least initially) as to their basic definition, 
let alone their solution; 
(2) the failure to secure agreement is not because such issues in-
herently defy treatment or analysis, but because various parties, 
due to their respective social, intellectual, and/or value positions, 
will perceive the same issue in very different ways: in a word, par-
ties at interest bring fundamentally different background assump-
tions to the same issue; as a result, they tend to develop various in-
terpretations of the same set of data (observations or 'facts'); 
(3) by themselves, data or facts may not be sufficient to resolve 
the dispute between contending parties, but may actually serve to 
intensify it;" therefore, rather than presume and depend upon in-
itial agreement between parties, what is required is a method for 
identifying the disparate assumptions that parties bring to an issue 
and its debate. 
Table 1 is a dialectical representation12 of the views of the pro-
ponents (pro) and the critics (con) toward the peer review system, 
as currently used by NSF. A careful reading of the report by the US 
House of Representatives on National Science Foundation Peer 
Review," plus related documents by the proponents and critics of 
the present system,14 clearly reveals the operation of two distinct 
sets of assumptions about peer review. This means that in Table 1 
for every assumption or contention we have identified as 
characteristic of the position of one side, we have identified a 
counter-assumption which is characteristic of the other side. Not 
only are the assumptions on each side strongly held by their pro-
ponents, but they are maximally opposed as well. For each assump-
tion which is characteristic of the one side, there is an equally 
strong assumption on the other such that the two assumptions are 
the diametric (or nearly diametric) opposite of one another)5 
This characteristic procedure is largely responsible for making 
the dialectic a distinctive means of conducting policy analysis.16 By 
aligning the positions side by side, the method explicitly contrasts 
and draws out the implications of each. It not only shows what 
each position affirms (that is, what it alone entails) but it also 
shows explicitly that to which it is maximally opposed. Clearly, no 
position, no matter how internally consistent and comprehensive it 
is, is ever completely self-contained. As a result, no position can be 
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TABLE 1 
A Dialectical Representation of the 
Current System of NSF Peer Review 
Basic Assumptions and/or Contentions 
PRO the Current System 
1. The current system is open; it is 
free from substantial bias. 
2. The system leans over backwards in 
favour of the maverick. 
3. It is possible for programme 
managers to manipulate the system 
to get the review they want but this 
is not being done. 
4. Proposals should not be 'blind 
reviewed' since it is not only 
difficult to conceal completely the 
identity of a proposer but it is 
'a significant factor in determining 
the likelihood of success of a 
project'. 
5. Reviewers should not be selected at 
random because the most 
knowledgeable persons would 
thus be eliminated. 
6. ' . . . the system should be designed 
on the presumption that pro-
gramme managers and reviewers 
are, on the whole, honest and 
ethical, but that vigilance should 
be maintained over the system in 
such a way as to insure that 
unscrupulous acts are rare.' 
CON the Current System 
1. The current system is closed; it 
contains substantial bias ('an 
incestuous buddy system') 
2. There is a natural bias against 
revolutionary and innovative ideas. 
3. Programme managers do manipu-
late the system to get the reviews 
they want. 
4. Proposals should be'blind 
reviewed' so that 'the reviewer 
cannot play favourites or be biased 
by his knowledge or ignorance of 
the proposer'. 
5. Reviewers should be selected at 
because this would 'eliminate the 
possibility of the programme 
manager purposefully biasing the 
review through selecting reviewers 
whose opinions he can predict'. 
6. It is 'best to design decision-
making systems defensively, i.e., 
on the presumption that the pro-
portion of dishonest or 
unscrupulous people among (NSF) 
programme managers and 
reviewers is high enough to cause 
severe problems if those people 
have a significant opportunity to 
turn the system to their advantage.' 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
Basic Assumptions and/or Contentions 
PRO the Current System 
7. 'Applicants should receive 
verbatim reviewer comments or 
requests but should not know the 
identity of reviewers;' 'reviewers 
will be more candid on all aspects 
of the proposal . . . if their 
(identities] . . . are kept 
confidential.' 
CON the Current System 
7. 'Applicants should receive signed 
verbatim peer reviews or requests;' 
'openness would result in more 
responsible and objective reviews.' 
8. There should not be formal appeal 
procedures for rejected applicants; 
'formal appeal procedures will 
introduce adversary relationships 
into the scientific community that 
have heretofore fortunately been 
missing.' 
9. NSF should fund less research at 
colleges and less prestigious 
universities. 
8. There should be formal appeal 
procedures for rejected applicants; 
'a procedure is needed to check 
peer review and ensure that 
important innovations arc 
supported.' 
9. NSF should fund more research at 
colleges and less prestigious 
universities. 
Source: Op. cit. note 13; see also note 15. 
fully explicated and understood in terms of itself alone; we need to 
understand, at a minimum, how a position pertains to an extreme 
counter-position. One main purpose of a dialectical policy analysis 
is to make as explicit as possible the points of opposition between 
different views of an issue. Because it is vitally important to unders-
tand on which points parties disagree, Table 1 frames the debate 
and allows us hereafter to take the term 'policy analysis' as 
synonymous with a dialectical treatment of peer review. 
Faced with a profound disparity of views, one may be tempted to 
trivialize or demean the position of one side or the other. Thus, for 
example, Gustafson states: 
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A few conservative members of the House of Representatives have recently at-
tacked the confidentiality of peer review in NSF and have questioned the integri-
ty of its program officers. For example, Representative R. E. Bau man of 
Maryland denounced the peer review system in bitter terms on the floor of the 
House.17 
Gustafson then cites an excerpt from Representative Bauman's 
remarks which may be, by any standard, 'bitter* indeed. However, 
whether they are bitter or not is tangential to the issue. That 
Representative Bauman is a 'conservative' is likewise tangential. 
Central to the issue is a deep and serious division between points of 
view that cannot be dismissed by attaching labels of liberal/conser-
vative, bitter/favourably predisposed, and the like. 
Other exchanges between proponents and critics demonstrate 
just how serious the division is, and underscore that it is far from 
unequivocally a case of one side being right, and the other being 
wrong; rather, the situation involves two distinctly differing points 
of view, each bolstered by cogent arguments. From its own 
perspective, each side is 'reasonable': 
Mr Pressler. Now, concerning the quality of the meetings being a bit higher if 
they are held in confidence, I am not sure why that is true in governmental 
meetings. 1 wonder if you could give us an example of why that would be true in 
your (scientific peer review) meetings? 
Dr Sherman. It has to do with one particular aspect of human nature. Even 
though the system is based on project grants, it is nonetheless necessary in the 
assessment of the project proposals to assess carefully the quality of the in-
dividual scientist named on the application. Sometimes, from my own experience 
with the system, the discussions about the individual's qualifications can be ex-
tremely heated. Now, it would seem in terms of the right of privacy of the in-
dividual, just because he is applying for funds from the Federal Government, 
that he should not have to lay out or make open to the public all of the considera-
tions about his particular qualifications. The system can operate without jeopar-
dizing the right of the individual. 
Mr Pressler. If there was something being used against that individual that was 
not entirely true, he should have a chance of rebuttal or to correct any misinfor-
mation. Then people would have a way of knowing. That is the other side of the 
com.18 
Mr Schever. Recently we [the Congress] have discovered what a cleansing effect 
openness has. It seems to cure a lot of problems. There may be problems with 
openness in the scientific decision making process, but we have not anticipated 
that they would be very serious. Recently, the Congress has moved from secrecy 
to openness. It used to be that after we heard from people like you [Dr Sherman] 
in our hearings we would go into executive session and do our markups. When it 
was suggested that the markups be made in public, with people listening to us 
talking or negotiating, many feared that the system would break down. Many 
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thoughtful members felt that going to public markup sessions was an exercise in 
sheer idiocy. They feared that the majority and minority would not be able to 
compromise, and that we could never settle anything or report a bill out of com-
mittee. We changed this procedure and I think that everyone agreed that the 
system has been vastly improved. 
You have described the [peer] review system as one based on mores. Mores can 
change. They can yield to the pressures of changing time and conditions . . . In 
the past, the lifestyle based on these mores [that is, secrecy] promoted a degree of 
integrity, decency, and internal fair dealing . . . An awful lot of problems would 
be solved if we changed our system from one based on confidentiality to one bas-
ed on openness and fair treatment. I don't think that we are now aware of all the 
problems connected with an open system, but I am willing to bet that many of 
19 
these problems would not materialize. 
Although these quotations reveal the intensity of the differences 
between the two sides in the debate, they underestimate the signifi-
cant propositions on which both sides agree. We have detected at 
least five points of consensus, namely: 
(1) 'No method superior to peer review has been found forjudg-
ing the scientific competence of proposers. Scientific peers are bet-
ter able than others to judge the design of proposed work, the im-
portance of proposed work to the scientific field, and the past per-
formance of the proposer. Appropriate peer review procedures 
generally lead to the support of proposals in a high quality range. 
Using peer review procedures [NSF] has successfully fostered 
significant advances in basic science over the past 25 years.'20 
(2) 'Witnesses agreed overwhelmingly that some form of peer 
review should continue to be used to assist in the allocation of 
Federal funds for scientific research. Not a single witness suggested 
that peer review be abandoned, although several witnesses propos-
ed changes in the decision-making processes of [NSF] — some 
minor and some major in their potential effects.'21 
(3) 'While many witnesses avowed that peer review results in the 
support of high-quality research, some of which is truly innovative, 
there was not much confidence expressed that peer review con-
sistently leads to the support of innovative research if it challenges 
the mainstream of scientific thought or if it seems unlikely to suc-
ceed. Arguments and the weight of opinion to the contrary were 
rather persuasive.'22 
(4) 'The Subcommittee had ample opportunity during the hear-
ings to explore whether Congressional review of individual [NSF] 
grants should be required in addition to Foundation approval 
before Foundation's action becomes final . . . Opinion was over-
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whelmingly against Congressional review.'23 
(5) No one ascribed to the extreme position that 'applicants 
should know nothing about who reviewers were or what they 
said.'24 
Such substantial agreement on these propositions makes them no 
less true or false, however, than the propositions over which there 
is explicit disagreement. In either case, beliefs may be so deeply 
held by their proponents that, at least for them, they may be im-
mutable and irrefutable — utterly impervious to evidence. For 
those who are not so rigidly committed to either side as to dismiss 
either position a priori, the question is: What evidence, if any, ex-
ists or could be produced that bears on the various propositions 
and could alter the beliefs of proponents and critics alike? 
The Evidence 
In reviewing the evidence marshalled in support of each side of the 
debate characterized above, we shall restrict our attention to two 
studies: one conducted by Deborah Hensler,25 the other by Stephen 
Cole and his colleagues.26 The justification for this restriction is 
that, based on a review of materials on the NSF peer review 
system,27 these two contain the most comprehensive bodies of em-
pirical evidence which speak directly to some of the contentious 
issues in peer review. The review of each study will consist of 
describing its focus, data, and principal findings, followed by our 
assessment of its merits and shortcomings. Finally, we shall discuss 
the inferences about gaps in knowledge which can be drawn from 
the current literature on peer review — theoretical and operational 
gaps which invite further imaginative study to effect closure on key 
issues in the debate. 
The Hensler Study 
In 1975-76, Deborah Hensler sent a questionnaire to a 5 percent ran-
dom sample (n= 1552) of approximately 31,000 persons who had 
served as reviewers of research proposals submitted to NSF during 
fiscal year 1974. The identical questionnaire was also sent to a ran-
dom sample of 3256 applicants for NSF grants during the period (a 
16 percent sample framed by a population of 20,000 grant applica-
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tions). For both the reviewer and the applicant samples, the 
response rate exceeded 80 percent. 
Both the original questionnaire items and the resultant analyses 
of responses were designed to attempt to address several points of 
contention in the debate. An initial question concerns the similarity 
of backgrounds of reviewers and applicants. Are applicants being 
evaluated by those similar to themselves or by those who are 
significantly different? In terms of age, geographical location, in-
stitutional affiliation, and so on, the major difference Hensler 
finds between the two populations is that 'applicants are somewhat 
more likely [at a probability level less than 0.05] than reviewers to 
belong to a more recent academic generation and to be currently 
located at a non-PhD granting institution.'28 In general, applicants 
are being evaluated by their peers, if by 'peer' one means one who 
is similar in professional and demographic background. 
On appraising the peer review process, those participating as ad 
hoc mail reviewers (45 percent of the total respondents across all 
divisions [directorates] of NSF) saw the system as 'sound'; half saw 
it as an 'an acceptable peer review mechanism with some 
weaknesses', and only 4 percent saw it as 'a questionable peer 
review mechanism with many weaknesses'.29 In comparison, of 
those participating as panel review members, 60 percent saw the 
system as 'sound'; 34 percent as 'acceptable with some weakness'; 
and 5 percent as 'questionable with many weaknesses'. Analysis of 
the scaled and open-ended responses generally supports the conten-
tion that 'reviewers' assessments of the peer review process based 
on their experience during the past two years are largely positive.'30 
The issue of whether particularistic factors may intervene in the 
evaluation process and influence the reviewer's recommendation to 
fund was broached by three variants on a single question in the 
Hensler survey: Given two equally good proposals except for one 
marked difference, which proposal did the respondents think had a 
better chance of receiving peer review recommendation to fund? In 
the first case, one of the proposals was from a well-known institu-
tion; the other from a lesser-known institution. In the second case, 
one of the proposals was submitted by a young, as-yet not 
established principal investigator (PI); the other, by an older, well-
established PI. In the third case, one of the proposals featured ap-
proaches which were consistent 'with the mainstream of thought' in 
the discipline or research area; the other, a project which challeng-
ed the mainstream of thought. This last case, of course, concerns 
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one of the pivotal issues in the peer review debate: whether or not 
the system is biased against innovative ideas.31 
The responses to these three questions were unequivocal: 52 per-
cent of the reviewers and 61 percent of the applicants felt that the 
proposal from the well-known institution had a better chance of be-
ing funded; 29 percent of the reviewers and 16 percent of the ap-
plicants felt both had an equal chance; less than 3 percent of each 
group felt the proposal from the lesser-known institution had a bet-
ter chance. The responses to the other two questions were similar: 
the older PI and the 'mainstream' proposal,' respectively, were 
favoured. 
It is particularly instructive to compare the responses of ap-
plicants from (a) institutions that are among the top 20 in securing 
federal research funds32 with (b) those located at other PhD gran-
ting institutions. Whereas 28 percent of the applicants from the top 
20 believed that proposals from both the lesser and the well-known 
institution have an equal chance of being funded, only 14 percent 
of the applicants from the other institutions believe this to be the 
case. Even more revealing is that 39 percent of the 'top 20' ap-
plicants believe the proposal from the well-known institution has a 
better chance, whereas 63 percent of the applicants from the other 
institutions believe that the well-known institution fares better in 
the competition.33 
Finally, how do the respondents regard the confidentiality or 
openness of the peer review process? Hensler summarizes her 
respondents' views as follows: 
A substantial majority of reviewers and applicants approve of NSF's new policy 
of providing verbatim review comments to applicants. About two-thirds of the 
applicants surveyed indicate they personally would have found verbatim review 
comments useful the last time they submited a proposal to NSF. Respondents 
who favor a policy of providing verbatim reviews to applicants say the reviews 
help applicants to understand the reasons for reviewers' reactions, permit ap-
plicants to judge reviewers' competence and provide a possible basis for rebut-
ting reviews. A minority of reviewers — nineteen percent — would approve of a 
policy of identifying reviewers to applicants and thirty-five percent say they 
would refuse to continue as reviewers if such a policy were adopted. But close to 
one-third of the applicants would approve of such a policy. Among the ap-
plicants who have not also served as reviewers recently more than forty percent 
would approve of identifying reviewers. Applicants from more recent academic 
generations and those affiliated with academic institutions which are not among 
the top twenty m federal research funding are more likely to approve of identify-
ing reviewers to applicants, than others. Applicants with recent or previously 
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unsuccessful experience obtaining NSF funds are most likely to approve of iden-
tifying reviewers. Those who disapprove of identifying reviewers feel that this 
would lead to lower quality reviews, more difficulty securing participation of 
reviewers and cause bad feelings among colleagues in the scientific community, 
among other results.34 
Reactions to the Hensler Study 
While the Hensler survey was the first to document so extensively 
the perceptions of scientists who had participated in the NSF peer 
review process, the study was not without its limitations (as Hensler 
openly acknowledges). For example, the study was initiated by a 
NSF committee the composition of which is not specified in the 
report.33 Originally, the committee was interested in the views of 
three groups: NSF peer reviewers, recent applicants for NSF funds, 
and researchers who had served NSF neither as reviewers nor as re-
cent applicants. It is reported that 
after some consideration, the Committee decided that it was not feasible to 
survey the latter group. But by drawing from the Foundation's files of reviews 
and proposal actions, it was possible to select two independent samples of recent 
NSF reviewers and applicants.36 
We have no way of ascertaining on what grounds it was decided 
'not feasible' to survey the opinions of researchers who have 
neither served as reviewers for NSF proposals nor applied recently 
for NSF funds. Insofar as the Hensler study demonstrates dramatically 
the link between one's experiences with and perceptions of the NSF 
system, it would seem desirable to pursue this feasibility question. We 
shall argue later that it would seem not only highly desirable but im-
perative to survey the 'null ' group: those who, for whatever 
reasons, have chosen not to interact with NSF or whose interaction 
has not been sought by NSF. What are the demographic 
characteristics of those scientists not interacting with NSF? What 
are the reasons they give for not doing so? What reasons would 
NSF personnel give? A study of the attitudes of this null group 
would seem necessary before general conclusions about the equity 
of NSF's peer review system can be drawn.37 
Because the Hensler survey does not 'tell us all that we would like 
to know about NSF reviewers' and applicants' experiences with the 
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NSF review process and their attitudes toward this process',38 
future surveys (or other studies, for that matter) must augment our 
knowledge claims. To wit, we would like to know more about their 
experiences with NSF, but we should also know more about them 
qua working scientists, and in relation to their views of science. The 
Hensler study precludes inferences about NSF's peer review process 
not only by restricting the range of questions asked of the 
respondents, but also by restricting what we know about the 
respondents. Even if one retained the current set of questions asked 
about the process, other questions about the respondents should be 
asked. 
For example, much is made in Hensler's report of the finding 
that a substantial proportion of both reviewers and applicants feel 
that a proposal which is consistent with the mainstream of thought 
in an area stands a better chance of being funded; indeed, 53 percent 
of the reviewers and 60 percent of the applicants who have been 
recently declined for a NSF grant and who, in addition, have been 
previously unsuccessful in securing a grant, concur with this pro-
position. Given the data and the contention of Congressmen, 
among others, that the peer review system is generally unresponsive 
to new or innovative ideas, it would seem especially desirable to 
seek out and secure the views and experiences of those who can be 
identified as 'innovative'. 
If the measurement (if not the definition) of 'innovativeness' is 
fraught with difficulties, then calling for the study of those judged 
to be particularly innovative might merely seem to exchange one 
can of worms for another. Nevertheless, there now exists a growing 
literature in the social psychology of science39 which makes it possi-
ble to identify and to differentiate empirically 'more innovatively' 
minded from 'less innovatively' minded scientists. It would be ger-
mane to the debate to know the views of those scientists who may 
be classified as innovators. Are they as a group more sensitive to 
the perception of bias (or its absence) in the system? Are they even 
more sensitive to the lack of receptivity afforded innovative ideas? 
Are they less likely to apply for a NSF grant because of their 
perceptions, rightly or wrongly, of NSF? Or is it rather because of 
their particular innovativeness that they are able to play grantsman-
ship — that is, to clothe novel ideas in mundane or conventional 
terms?40 
Overall, the most serious deficiency of the Hensler study is its 
fundamental concern with attitudes — that is to say, with what 
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reviewers and applicants believe to be the operation of the NSF 
peer review system — and not with more direct evidence of how it 
actually operates (which the study never purported to establish). 
Lest our intent be misunderstood, we are not thereby disparaging 
the value of the study. What scientists believe about an institution 
that vitally affects them is key information. The fact that so many 
scientists would oppose the disclosure of names of reviewers is im-
portant information in its own right. It can inform those in power 
that strong opposition awaits if a policy of disclosure were in-
stituted. This finding does not indicate, however, to what extent 
and what forms such opposition might take, or whether the 
benefits of a new policy might so outweigh the disadvantages that 
the change would be worthwhile. 
It is not that the Hensler study is merely a survey of beliefs, but 
that it fails to penetrate to the heart of the debate, and consequent-
ly, does not aid in its resolution. To facilitate movement towards 
resolution, at the very least, other crucial beliefs would have to be 
exposed; at best, there would have to exist some other method(s) 
for assessing the actual state of the system. As they stand, the 
Hensler data do not prove that the NSF peer review system is either 
biased or unbiased, but that there are sizeable numbers of scientists 
whose experiences (that is, reviewers versus successful applicants 
versus unsuccessful applicants) predispose them to support one side 
or the other of the debate. 
The Cole, Rubin and Cole Study 
The Cole, Rubin and Cole study represents the most ambitious pro-
ject to date to determine the actual operation of the NSF peer 
review system, at least in its basic research programmes.41 Commis-
sioned by NSF on behalf of the National Academy of Sciences, the 
study by Cole and his colleagues (hereafter referred to as Cole) 
seeks to provide evidence that is independent of scientists' beliefs or 
attitudes about the presence or absence of biases in the NSF peer 
review system. The kind of evidence sought by Cole thus augments 
that yielded by the Hensler survey. Specifically, Cole conducted 
seventy in-depth interviews with scientists involved at ail levels of the peer review 
system, including program directors, former program directors, mail reviewers, 
review-panel members and supervisory-level NSF officials. We also scrutinized 
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more than 250 specific research proposals, read all of the peer review comments 
on those proposals and examined all o f the correspondence between the appli-
cant and the program director . . . In addition, we conducted a quantitative 
analysis of 1200 applicants to the NSF in the fiscal year 1975. (Roughly half of 
the applicants were ultimately awarded grants.) The purpose of the quantitative 
study was to identify those characteristics that were correlated with the receipt of 
a grant from the N S F . 4 2 
The characteristics chosen for analysis (basically a series of multi-
ple regressions) consist of nine 'social stratification' variables, in-
cluding rank of PhD-granting department, current academic rank, 
and three measures of publication and citation. These variables 
were then correlated with the ultimate disposition of a grant pro-
posal measured in the aggregate as 'percentage of applicants 
receiving grants' and 'ratings received on proposals' (trichotomized 
as high, medium, and low).43 
Taken together, analyses of these variables are intended to test 
the validity of two hypotheses which dominate the peer review 
debate. The first (the 'old-boy' hypothesis) lacks 'conceptual clari-
ty', according to Cole. Does old-boyism refer to 'investigators with 
a common view of their field', 'networks of friendships', or to 
'social position' ('level of eminence')?44 The second (the 'rich get 
richer' hypothesis) stipulates that particularistic factors (that is, 
those unrelated to the merit of a proposal) result in an unfair ad-
vantage (for example, for the more eminent and/or those located in 
high ranked departments) in gaining grant approval.45 
Based on their quantitative analyses, Cole interprets the evidence 
as a refutation of both hypotheses: 
The overall pattern o f our data suggests that scientists with an established track 
record, many scientific publications, a high frequency of citations, a record of 
having received grants from the NSF and ties to prestigious academic depart-
ments have a higher probability of receiving NSF grants than other applicants 
do. Nevertheless, the granting process is actually quite open and there is nothing 
approximating a scientific caste system.*6 
Of the variance that can be accounted for in funding decisions, the peer review 
rating (among the social stratification variables) is by far the best predictor.47 
. . . a scientist's past performance as measured by citations of his work and his 
recent NSF funding record does lead to a very slight accumulative advantage, but 
his academic aff i l iat ion does not appear to give him any advantage.48 
Not surprisingly, in summarizing the results of their study thus far, 
Cole suggests that 
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the scientific enterprise is an exceedingly equitable, although highly stratified, 
social institution in which the individuals who produce the work that is most 
favourably evaluated by their colleagues receive the lion's share of the rewards.49 
Reactions to the Cole Study 
We think the Cole study begs several questions that are vital to the 
peer review debate. To compound this error, the authors make 
some definitive-sounding extrapolations that seem unfounded by 
their data. 
First, to conclude that 'the peer review rating is by far the best 
predictor' of the probability of receiving a grant by no means sug-
gests that this rating is a good predictor. Indeed, '89 percent of the 
observed ratings is left unexplained by the nine variables.'50 This 
would indicate that factors other than 'social stratification' 
variables are at work. Yet no such factors are either employed in 
the analyses or conjectured in discussion of those analyses. Thus 
the finding that 'individuals who produce the work that is most 
favourably evaluated by their colleagues receive the lion's share of 
the rewards' circumvents the questions of why the work is 
favourably evaluated. No measure of its significance or in-
novativeness is presented; we are simply asked to believe that 
voluminous citation of articles denotes their high quality.51 (After 
all, proposals which seek to extend such widely-recognized work 
must be of sufficient merit to justify NSF's decision to fund.) If 
these results accurately describe peer review in the basic research 
programmes of NSF, then Cole must further show why this system 
is 'extremely equitable, although highly stratified'. They have not 
done this, their rhetoric notwithstanding. 
Second, what Cole recognizes in the data, but overlooks in the 
interpretation, is that evaluation of a producer is hopelessly intert-
wined with the evaluation of his or her product in science. If pro-
ducer and product cannot be separated analytically, then we must 
ask: Where in the distribution of peer review ratings does par-
ticularism tend to prevail? If high consensus is achieved in both 
tails of the rating distribution (as the data attest),52 then 
the critical region of peer review is in the middle. This is the grey 
area where particularistic factors (such as the applicant's present 
affiliation or institution of PhD) colour the perceived quality of the 
proposed research. Since performance or 'track record' (that is, 
reputation) is supposed to be an explicit factor in reviewing for 
NSF, particularism has been institutionalized as a (partial) ra-
tionale for making both favourable and unfavourable decisions to 
fund. The contradiction is legitimate; tension between universalism 
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and particularism is built into the peer review process. Why deny 
this fact, as Cole seems to do? And why present no data (for exam-
ple, from interviews) which might contain clues about the tension 
— namely, the extent to which perceptions of quality are coloured 
by particularistic considerations?" 
Third, if we ponder — as we did in our reaction to the Hensler 
study — the kind of data needed to advance the peer review debate 
beyond its present impasse, our thoughts return to the 
characteristics of reviewer and/or applicant which might influence 
the final decision to fund or not to fund a proposal. 
Recent studies of the cognitive-styles of inquiry of scientists 
reveals that one of the key dimensions distinguishing various styles 
and scientists from one another is the ability to make, as well as to 
appreciate, fine differentiations between people, objects, or institu-
tions.54 Persons who excel at this ability are called 'high differen-
tiators'. They, in short, have a high tolerance for ambiguity. As 
Gordon and Morse put it: 
High differentiators perceive their environment as a series o f discrete parts while 
low differentiators see their environment as highly homogeneous . . . The ability 
to differentiate manifests itself in two related ways depending on the nature of 
the stimulus, human or inanimate. In interacting with people the high differen-
tiator perceives and reacts to each as a unique individual possessing a combina-
tion of capabilities and inabilities. The low differentiator perceives people as be-
ing more or less alike and thus tends to suppress or ignore individual 
capabilities.55 
The point is that low differentiators would tend to see the per-
sonal characteristics of an investigator as irrelevant to a proposed 
investigation because they would see all investigators in a similar 
light. High differentiators, on the other hand, tend to see personal 
characteristics as very relevant. Specifically, then, does the sample 
studied by Cole contain an overabundance of low differentiators? 
Does a large sample tend to mask or damp out the effect of high dif-
ferentiators? Does the institutional or social process of rating pro-
posals induce even a high differentiator to act like a low differen-
tiator? That is, does the social process of rating proposals foster a 
'do-unto-others-what-might-be-done-unto-you' approach? In 
short, if we had a sample of clearly identified high differentiators 
and another of clearly identified low differentiators and we gave 
each the same set of proposals to rate, would their ratings be the 
same? Before one can reject the hypothesis that the characteristics 
of the rater/reviewer and those of the individual being rated are ir-
relevant to the ultimate disposition of a proposal, one must at least 
attempt to construct a kind of experiment to test the hypothesis. 
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Until this is done, the Cole data and analysis cannot be used to ig-
nore or deny the relevance of personal or cognitive attributes in the 
operation and understanding of peer review. 
Finally, we feel compelled to remark that despite Cole's claim of 
'complete autonomy from NSF in conducting' the research,56 the 
research they have reported betrays a commitment to show that 
even where peer review is not equitable within NSF, the inequity is 
for the good of science;57 put another way, inequity is functional 
for the maintenance of the system — and peer review is the tool of 
this handiwork. Though they began with good intentions, Cole and 
his associates may have done more to defend the status quo than to 
inform the debate on peer review: their evidence has yet to sustain 
the weight of their conclusions. We eagerly await their complete 
results. 
Further Reflections on the Debate 
Suppose that there existed a method of establishing 'conclusively' 
whether the peer review system was either biased or unbiased.58 If 
we take the Hensler findings at face value, then we must 
acknowledge that a significant number of scientists believe that the 
NSF peer review system is biased, while another significant number 
believe that it is not biased. One could then construct, in ideal-
typical fashion, the contingencies represented in Table 2, where the 
rows represent the beliefs or judgments of scientists as to whether 
the NSF peer review system is perceived as biased or unbiased. 
TABLE 2 
Beliefs Versus System States 
In Peer Review 
STATE OF S Y S T E M 
Unbiased Biased 
Unbiased I II 
BELIEF Correct Problematic 
OF  
SCIENTIST IV III 
Biased Problematic Correct 
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The columns represent the admittedly oversimplified case where the 
actual state of the system is either biased or unbiased.59 
Cases I and III represent the supposedly 'true' or 'correct' situa-
tions, where the system is either unbiased or biased and the percep-
tions or beliefs of scientists match the correct state of the system. 
Cases II and IV represent the more interesting and 'problematic 
cases' we can make this judgment, and claim that these two belief 
conditions demand special examination, even if we cannot deter-
mine the absolute state of the system. Suppose for a moment that 
the NSF peer review system is biased. What, if anything, would it 
take to convince the sizable number of scientists who believe that it 
is unbiased to think otherwise? A body of social psychological 
evidence and arguments suggests that on the whole scientists are 
conservative in their judgments,61 and that those who select a career 
in science partially do so because they have an overly developed 
need to believe in the orderliness of the world, if not in its ultimate 
rationality.62 Consider, too, the oversocialization argument: the 
vast majority of scientists are trained for normal, workaday science 
and not for great or extraordinary science.63 They are neither train-
ed or interested in challenging old theories,64 let alone prepared to 
invent novel or 'revolutionary' theories. At the same time, since 
strong evidence and arguments exist that the system of science is 
strongly elitist in its structure and orientation,65 Case II cannot be 
dismissed or ignored. 
To state the matter somewhat differently, Cases II and IV repre-
sent situations of denial or projection. Case II represents the situa-
tion of denying there is a problem when there is; Case IV represents 
the situation of asserting there is a problem when there is not. Case 
II entails the classic phenomenon of identifying with the aggressor, 
where in order to ease the painful admission of being the underdog, 
the underdog or victim overly identifies with the values of the 
aggressor. The question is: How many of those scientists saying that 
the NSF peer review system is unbiased are identifying, consciously 
or unconsciously, with the values of élite scientists? For analytical 
purposes, scientists are constantly being grouped into 'elite* versus 
'non-élite'. Given the endless jostling for position that goes on in 
academic life, plus the constant ratings of departments and institu-
tions to which scientists are subjected, we can plausibly assume that 
scientists themselves are aware of their relative standing.66 What 
does it do to the self-esteem of scientists to know they are located in 
an elite or non-élite department or institution? Can we expect this 
126 MITROFF & CHUBIN: PEER REVIEW AT THE NSF 
to have no effect on the operation of the system — or, at the very 
least, on their beliefs about the system? 
Indeed, the question that now emerges is whether scientists differ 
systematically by discipline, institution, or research area in their 
beliefs of the presence or absence of bias in the system. This ques-
tion fuels speculation on the relation between individual and social 
(systemic) innovativeness hypothesized earlier: Are individuals 
whose cognitive-style betrays a high propensity to innovate viewed 
as such by their colleagues? Does this research in fact reflect their 
innovativeness? Furthermore, do these innovators communicate 
more frequently with other innovators, and in this sense nurture 
one another? Finally, and most importantly, are innovators located 
in greater or lesser abundance at prestigious institutions? 
The evidence that élite scientists tend to associate and com-
municate with other élite scientists more frequently than they do 
with non-élites, and that elite scientists tend to be affiliated with 
elite institutions,67 would suggest that an examination of the in-
terplay of psychological, intellectual and social factors operating in 
the peer review process is in order. Above all, if sustained in-
novativeness and éliteness go hand in hand, the concentration of in-
novative ideas and high quality research proposals submitted by 
those in a select pool of institutions would need no remedy. 
However, the distribution of high innovators in the scientific com-
munity (as well as in the subpopulation of applicants for NSF 
funds) is unknown. 
This missing link in the debate — a control variable, if you will 
— signals a need to measure the cognitive styles and background 
beliefs of participants in the peer review process before one can in-
terpret either (1) the meaning of responses to a survey such as 
Hensler's, or (2) a quantitative analysis (such as Cole's) which 
sacrifices qualitative insights into individual differences for 
statistical significance. Finding this missing link is all the more 
necessary given Mitroff's findings from his Apollo moon study.68 
Nearly all of his scientists were extremely sceptical of the conven-
tional portrait of the scientist as a neutral, unbiased, objective 
observer of nature. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of those 
interviewed gave revealing reasons for why they thought scientists 
in their role as scientists should not be entirely unbiased. The ma-
jority view was that it was necessary for scientists to act as partisan 
advocates for their hypotheses and theories lest those theories suf-
fer a premature death. This means not that these scientists 
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neglected or refused to test critically their theories, but that their 
actual conduct of science is more complicated than that portrayed 
in conventional accounts. The relevance of these findings to the 
present discussion is this: Can we expect scientists' views on the 
general operation of science as an intellectual and social system not 
to influence their views regarding peer review? Were the moon 
scientists' views exceptional (they too, constitute an élite sample) or 
more the rule than previously thought? These are fittings topics for 
future studies, and in our opinion, vital for further assessment of 
the peer review system. 
What we now know better about the peer review debate from the 
Hensler and Cole studies is summarized in Table 3. In our judg-
ment, these data may be necessary, but are insufficient, to settle the 
principal issues. Although they enhance our understanding in 
dialectical terms, the data underscore the serious gaps that exist in 
our knowledge — gaps which must narrow if the debate is ever to 
approach closure. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The principal conclusion of this review is that the current data are 
inconclusive to resolve the debate represented in Tatole 1; never-
theless, some data do exist to support contentions on each side of 
the debate. 
Because issues such as those inherent in peer review expose ten-
sions in the workings of science as a social system, they call forth 
deep divisions of value. Such issues, therefore, may not be 
amenable to treatment (and hence, to resolution) via conventional 
methods. The debate instead calls for treatment of the issues from 
more than one theoretical point of view. Philosophers of science 
have long recognized that scientific data can neither be collected in 
the first place, nor analyzed in the second, apart from some prior 
theoretical point of view.69 That is, one does not collect data 
without having presupposed some hypothesis, theory, or model, no 
matter how implicit, unconscious, or informal it may be. 
We would assert that at least three models undergird the peer 
debate; (1) the Accumulative Advantage Model; (2) the Political 
Model; and (3) the Merit Model. The Accumulative Advantage 
Model derives from the 'Matthew effect ' , as explicated by 
Merton:70 one who has developed a good reputation based on past 
TABLE 3 
Relation of the Hensler and the Cole Studies to the NSF Peer Review Dialectic 
Evidence in 
Support or 
Denial of 
Assumptions 
Basic Assumptions and/or Contentions (see Table 1) 
PRO the Current System CON the Current System 
Assumption 1. Current system is open, free from bias 1. Current system is closed, contains bias 
Evidence: Supporting: similarity of characteristics of 
reviewers and applicants; vast majority of 
respondents see system as sound; believe they 
were treated fairly. 
Denying: extremely few respondents see current systems 
as possessing major flaws or believe they were treated 
unfairly. 
Status of 
evidence Weak on both sides of argument; insufficiency of beliefs per se to determine actual operation of system. 
Assumption 2. System encourages innovative ideas 2. System blocks innovative ideas 
Evidence: Denial: less than 7 percent of respondents 
believe a proposal which challenges 'main-
stream' has a better chance of being funded; 
roughly 20 percent believe both have an equal 
chance. 
Support: nearly half of" respondents believe a 'main-
stream' proposal has a better chance of being funded. 
Status Weak; insufficiency of data to establish operation of system. 
TABLE 3 (continued) 
PRO the Current System CON the Current System 
Assumption 
Status 
3. Programme managers do not manipulate 3. Programme managers do manipulate reviews 
reviews 
Not addressed explicitly in Hensler study; data collected, not reported by Cole 
Assumption 
Status 
Assumption 
Evidence: 
Status 
4. Proposal should not be blind reviewed 4. Proposals should be blind reviewed 
Not addressed explicitly by Hensler; institutionalization of particularistic factors into review process recognized by 
Cole. 
5. Reviewers should not be selected at random 5. Reviewers should be selected at random 
Support: only 15 percent of respondents at most 
believe in randomization; nearly 65 percent 
believe in some form of judgment sampling in 
conjunction with NSF staff 
Weak; insufficiency of beliefs to warrant procedural change. 
Support: roughly 31 percent believe in some form of 
randomization and judgment sampling 
Assumption 
Status 
6. System should be designed defensively 
Not tested for explicitly; charge of 'old boy-ism' refuted, according to Cole. 
6. System should be designed on presumption 
of honesty 
TABLE 3 (continued) 
PRO the Current System CON the Current System 
Assumption 7. Applicants should not know reviewers' 
identity 
7. Applicants should know reviewers' identify 
Evidence: Support: roughly 40-50 percent of respondents 
feel knowing name would make no difference; 
12-20 percent feel comments would be less useful 
Support: 30-40 percent feel comments would be more 
useful if one knew name 
Status Weak; again, insufficiency of beliefs to warrant procedural change. 
Assumption 8. There should not be formal appeal 
procedures 
8. There should be formal appeal procedures 
Evidence: Support: feeling that a formal process 
will further bureaucratize system 
Support: about 73 percent of applicants favour a formal 
appeals system as a remedy for mistakes 
Status Endorsement of idea by Hensler; no consideration of procedures. 
Assumption 9. NSF should fund less research at 9. NSF should fund more research at colleges and 
colleges and less prestigious universities less prestigious universities 
Status 'Rich get richer' hypothesis supported in part by Cole data: researchers at more prestigious institutions and with 
track record slightly favoured in the review process. 
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work accrues more advantages (that is, disproportionately) than 
those lacking such a good reputation. This cumulates over time so 
that the 'rich get richer'. The Political Model stipulates that certain 
elite scientists at elite institutions have disproportionately more ac-
cess (a) to other élite scientists and scarce scientific resources (for 
example, information and research funding) and (b) to governmen-
tal agencies such as NSF, where they exert influence on science 
policy and its implementation in their roles as gatekeeper, advisor, 
and peer reviewer.71 Finally, the Merit Model states that the work 
of a scientist is judged primarily on its merit, that research monies 
are awarded competitively according to universalistic criteria which 
favour, above all, the applicant's current ability to perform.72 
We hasten to add that merit is a component in each of these 
models, but is differentially weighted. Again, in terms of the 
universalism-particularism continuum, we predict that par-
ticularistic factors (that is, attributes of the scientist) tend to 
predispose reviewers to favourable evaluation of the scientist's 
work. This emphasis is typically an outgrowth of prior, and oft-
repeated, evaluation of that scientist's other work as meritorious. 
Unlike the Merit Model, both the Accumulative Advantage and 
Political Models recognize this 'contamination' of evaluations. 
Alternatively put, these models treat discrete research products 
(for example, a new proposal or book) as continuous in time or im-
bued with the quality (fixed at a certain threshold, it would seem) 
of its producer. In brief, evaluation of research is highly contingent 
on its source. Adherents of these two models would insist that sup-
porting such researchers — 'the best' — is functional for the 
system; therefore, favourable peer review of the research in ques-
tion should follow suit. Those operating on the Political Model 
would rely more on particularistic-factors than on merit of the 
specific proposal in recommending disposition. Reviewers 
enamoured of Accumulative Advantage would attend somewhat 
less to the credentials of the researcher and more to the substance 
of the proposed research. Finally, those utilizing merit as the chief 
criterion of funding support would resort to proposal details per se, 
far more than to characteristics of its author. These models, then, 
capture the tension inherent in the reviewer role — a tension which 
encompasses both the discharge of the particular reviewing task 
and the overarching mentality one brings to the task.73 
How, then, have these models been applied to studies of the peer 
review process? In Hensler's study, none of the three models 
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appears to be presupposed. That is, in the design, conduct and 
analysis of her survey, Hensler was essentially atheoretical. In con-
trast, the Cole study embraces the Merit Model. Cole exhibits a 
marked preference for (if not an a priori belief in) the Merit Model. 
We have no quarrel with this, as Cole makes the preference explicit, 
claiming later, as we have seen, that the data tend to support the 
Accumulative Advantage Model. However, this preference is 
troublesome if one suspects that something so complex as peer 
review requires simultaneous and explicit examination from a 
number of diverse and competing theoretical perspectives. Even 
stronger, the same set of data ought to be examined from the 
perspective of each model. Because each, in all likelihood, is partial-
ly correct, future studies must establish, for example, under what 
circumstances each model obtains. What we are advocating is a 
testing of the alternatives — new data collection and analysis — to 
expand the empirical base that impinges upon and must eventually 
mediate the debate. 
There are other aspects, however, to the peer review process and 
to the debate which we have not considered. Foremost among these 
is the role of the public in shaping the institutions which purported-
ly operate on its behalf. What does the public want from NSF 
management? Does this differ from what the scientific community 
wants? Do NSF practices produce the best science, and are they 
conducive to the optimal long-term development of knowledge?74 Is 
it not the responsibility of the scientific community and federal 
agencies such as NSF to invite interested lay parties to enter the 
dialogue among experts,75 especially when some of the most impor-
tant persons for whom the studies are being conducted are not 
scientists? 
If the crux of the peer review debate is the analysis of negotia-
tions between science and its environing communities and not sole-
ly negotiations within the scientific community,76 then science must 
promote research that illuminates both negotiating processes. Like 
our predecessors, we have emphasized the latter in this paper. The 
former, however, is an equally, if not more, vexing research pro-
blem that will not conveniently fade away. 
The study of scientific autonomy and self-governance is really 
the study of the science-government partnership. What we have 
recommended is that this study begin by linking the social 
psychology of the protagonists to their respective roles in the con-
duct of scientific inquiry. Only then will the debate over peer review 
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fulfill the promise of a dialectical policy analysis; only then will the 
debate prescribe changes of policy into practice. 
• NOTES 
A presentation based on an early version of this paper was made at the Second An-
nual Meeting of the Society for Social Studies of Science, held in Boston, 
Massachusetts, and Harvard University, 14-16 October 1977. The incisive comments 
of P. Thomas Carroll on that version were most helpful in rethinking and rewriting. 
t . See T. Gustafson, 'The Controversy Over Peer Review', Science, Vol. 190 (2 
December 1975), 1060-66; D. Shapley, 'House Votes Veto Power on All N S F 
Research Orants', ibid., Vol. 188 (25 April 1975), 338-41; Shapley, 'NSF Violations 
of Personnel Code Alleged', ibid. (31 May 1975), 915; J. Walsh, 'NSF and Its Critics 
in Congress: New Pressures on Peer Review', ibid. (6 June 1975), 999-1001; Walsh, 
'NSF House Appropriations Panel Gives Warning Tug on Purse Strings', ibid., Vol . 
189 (4 July 1975), 26-28; Walsh, "NSF Peer Review Hearings: House Panel Starts 
with Critics', ibid. (8 August 1975), 435-37; Walsh, 'Peer Review: NSF Faces 
Changes, the Question is H o w Extensive', ibid., Vol. 190(17 October 1975), 253-56. 
2. S. MacLane, 'Peer Review and the Structure of Science,' Science, Vol. 190 
(14 November 1975), 617. 
3. G. M. Lyons, The Uneasy Partnership: Social Science and the Federal 
Government in the Twentieth Century (New York: Russell Sage, 1969). See also J. 
Haberer, Politics and the Community of Science (New York: Van Nostrand 
Reinhold, 1969). 
4. Our mention of this caveat stems from two sets of experiences: firstly, in 
response to the first public draft of this paper, where colleagues rhetorically asked, 
'You're not against peer review, are you?'; and secondly, our inability to convince 
NSF programme managers that despite the recent studies o f their system, the 
'crucial experiment' had yet to be performed. We claimed that the present system 
had been legitimated, but not accurately appraised because (1) many of the right 
questions had not been asked, or if they had, the answers were not carefully weighed 
(for example, could not be quantified), or (2) the crucial data were not in the public 
domain, but with special consent could be made available for analysis. Consequent-
ly, the study whose findings could be used to alter policy and strengthen the opera-
tion o f the system never materialized. Our interpretation may smack of sour grapes, 
but we think the opportunity for internal self-scrutiny was lost (although congres-
sional critics were pacified — for the moment) . We do not think our argument fell 
on deaf ears; rather, no one was willing to handle a hot potato which had temporari-
ly cooled. 
5. For a review, see H . Zuckerman and R. K. Merton, 'Age , Aging, and Age 
Structure in Science', in M. W. Riley, M. Johnson and A. Foner (eds), A Theory of 
Age Stratification, Vol. 3, Aging and Society (New York: Russell Sage, 1972), 
292-356. 
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6. In general, referees and advisors are older, more eminent and published, and 
located at more prestigious institutions than the 'average' member of the scientific 
community. Sec N. C. Mullins, 'The Structure of an Elite: The Advisory Structure 
of the Public Health Service', Science Studies, Vol. 2 (1972), 3-29; L. Groeneveld, N. 
Koiier and N. Mullins, 'The Advisers of the US National Science Foundation', 
Social Studies of Science, Vol. 5 (August 1975), 343-54; M. J. Mulkay, 'The 
Mediating Role o f the Scientific Elite', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 6 (1976), 
445-70. 
7. Studies o f NIH peer review include G. M. Carter, 'Peer Review, Citations, 
and Biomedical Research Policy: NIH Grants to Medical School Faculty' (Santa 
Monica, Calif . : Rand Corporation Report R-1583-HEW, 1974); C. Henley, 'Peer 
Review of Research Grant Applications at the National Institutes of Health', Federa-
tion Proceedings, Vol. 36 (July 1977), 2066-68, 2186-90, 2335-38; NIH Grants Peer 
Review Study Team, 'Grants Peer Review: Report to the Director, N IH, Phase I, 
Vols. I-IIF (Bethesda, Md.: National Institutes o f Health, December 1976). 
8. A provocative formation o f this relationship can be found in J.-J. Salomon, 
'The Mating of Knowledge and Power', Impact of Science on Society, Vol. 22 
(January-June 1972), 123-32. 
9. By 'dialectic' we mean more than a mere polar opposition or conflict bet-
ween viewpoints. We mean that viewpoints are intensely opposed to one another, 
though the meaning of one is dependent on the other; that is, either viewpoint is 
completely self-contained but is defined, if only in part, through the other. Be this as 
it may, we are more interested at present in the operational use of the dialectic as a 
unique methodology for analyzing issues, rather than in quibbling about the various 
historical meanings of the term. 
10. C. West Churchman, The Design of Inquiring Systems (New York: Basic 
Books, 1971); P. Feyerabend, Against Method (London: New Left Books, 1976); G. 
Holton, Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1973); A. Kantrowitz et al., 'The Science Court Experiment, an In-
terim Report', Science, Vol. 193 (20 August 1976), 653-56; M. Levine, 'Scientific 
Method and the Adversary Model: Some Preliminary Thoughts', American 
Psychologist, Vol. 29 (September 1974), 661-77; R. O . Mason, 'A Dialectical Ap-
proach to Strategic Plarfning', Management Science, Vol . 15 (1969), B-403-14; R. K. 
Merton, Sociological Ambivalence (New York: The Free Press, 1976); D . Nelkin, 
'Thoughts on the Proposed Science Court', Newsletter on Science, Technology, and 
Human Values, No. 18 (1977), 20-31. 
11. Churchman, Feyerabend and Mason, ops. cit. note 10. 
12. ^lason, op. cit. note 10. 
13. 'National Science Foundation Peer Review, Volume I', A Report o f the Sub-
committee on Science, Research and Technology o f the Committee on Science and 
Technology, US House of Representatives, Ninety-Fourth Congress, Second Session 
(January 1976). 
14. For example, Gustafson, op . cit. note 1. 
15. Verbatim quotes have been purposefully included in Table 1 to indicate the 
depth and sincerity with which the respective parties hold their views. In all cases, 
the assumptions are direct or abridged quotes excerpted from the document cited in 
note 13. 
16. Churchman and Mason, ops . cit. note 10. 
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17. Gustafson, op. cit. note I, 1060 (our italics). 
18. Subcommittee, op. cit. note 13, 571 (our italics). 
19. Ibid., 579-80. 
20. Ibid., 2. 
21. Ibid., 25. 
22. Ibid.s'27. 
23. Ibid., 41. 
24. Ibid., 43. 
25. D. Hensler, 'Perceptions of the National Science Foundation Peer Review 
Process: A Report on a Survey of NSF Reviewers and Applicants' , Prepared for the 
Committee on Peer Review, National Science Board, and the Committee on Science 
and Technology, US House of Representatives (Washington, DC: NSF 77-33, 
December 1976); R. Abel, 'Applicants' and Reviewers' Assessments of the NSF Peer 
Review Process', International NSF draft paper (Washington, DC: NSF, November 
1976). 
26. S. Cole, L. Rubin and J. R. Cole , 'Peer Review and the Support of Science', 
Scientific American, Vol. 237 (October 1977), 34-41. This article is an interim report 
on the project, which is still in progress (see note 41, below). 
27. One of us (I .I .M.) was asked to undertake such a review for the Off ice o f 
Planning and Policy Analysis, National Science Foundation, under Contract N o . 
O M , Order No. 77-SP-0370. 
28. Hensler, op. cit. note 25, 15-18, quote on 17. 
29. Ibid., 23. 
30. Ibid., iv. Furthermore, as Hensler explains (considering both successful and 
unsuccessful applicants), principal investigators' 
evaluations of the appropriateness o f the review procedures used are related to 
disposition of the proposal. But even among those whose proposals were declin-
ed, half feel the procedures were appropriate. A majority of unsuccessful ap-
plicants feel that the decision to decline was unfair but a substantial proportion 
— forty-three percent — feel that [even this] decision was fair. About 84 percent 
o f declinees who thought the decision was unfair, say they would have appealed 
the decision if a formal appeals process had existed. Assessments o f ap-
propriateness o f procedures and fairness of the funding decision do not appear 
to be related to academic generation, institutional affiliation or region. 
However, those w h o have served as N S F reviewers or w h o have received N S F 
grants in the past are more likely to evaluate their most recent experience 
positively — even if they were turned down — than those with less successful ex-
perience dealing with NSF . . . A b o u t 73 percent o f the Pis , including both 
grantees and declinees, would favor N S F adopting a formal appeals system. The 
reason for supporting such a system which is volunteered most frequently is that 
it would provide a remedy for mistakes and misjudgments; the leading reason for 
opposing it is that it will further bureaucratize and burden the review process, 
(ibid., v-vi). 
31. As many writers have indicated, what is perceived as an innovative idea is 
relative to time and place in any research community. The line separating innovation 
from charlatanism or, in the lexicon o f the exemplary 'science studies' literature, the 
difference between transgressions of cognitive norms and true anomalies, is fine in-
deed. Our view is that 'excessively' innovative ideas will so challenge the 
paradigmatic foundations of a research area that the innovators and their ideas 
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will neither gain ready access to the literature nor approval of proposals to pursue 
their research programme. Mainstream thought, in short, can sustain only moderate 
innovation. T h e issue, in the context of peer review, is whether the agencies which 
administer the system and its resources are the guardians of the mainstream or a 
refuge for innovators. Surely they are a little of both; hence, the issue of bias and 
evidence are elusive at best. For related discussion, see below, plus T. S. Kuhn, 'Se-
cond Thoughts on Paradigms', in F. Suppe (ed.), The Structure of Scientific 
Theories (Urbana, III.: University o f Illinois Press, 1974), 459-82; M. J. Mulkay, 
The Social Process of Innovation (London: Macmillan, 1972); H. M. Collins, 'The 
TEA Set: Tacit Knowledge and Scientific Networks', Science Studies, Vol. 4 (1974), 
165-86; D. E. Chubin, 'The Conceptualization o f Scientific Specialties', 
Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 17 (Autumn 1976), 448-76, esp. 459-70. 
32. While Hensler does not specify these 20 institutions, the following ten US 
universities have been identified as receiving more than a third of all federal expen-
ditures in universities, producing about a third of all the doctorates, and providing 
37 percent o f the members of federal review panels in the 1960s: California, Caltech, 
Chicago, Columbia , Cornell, Harvard, Illinois, MIT, Michigan and Minnesota. See 
W. Hirsch, Scientists in American Society (New York: Random House, 1968), 106. 
33. These findings accord with previous perceptions, as Hensler (op. cit. note 
25, 50) observes that 'reviewers in general, and applicants who have also served as 
reviewers, are significantly less likely to perceive bias in the process than other ap-
plicants . . . . Applicants who have not been successful in obtaining N S F grants 
recently or in the past are most likely to think that process is biased.' 
34. Hensler, op. cit. note 25, 84. 
35. Ibid., 1. 
36. Ibid. 
37. It could well be the case that those who have either experienced the most 
'bias' (no matter how it is defined) or who attribute bias to the system may be those 
who have either (a) 'dropped out ' o f the system prior to the sampling period or 
(b) never 'dropped in' in the first place. Without sampling this group, such conjec-
tures simply cannot be evaluated; yet they cannot be dismissed out of hand. In this 
respect, Hensler can be criticized for a uniform lack of conjecture; she apparently 
feels no compulsion to explain why her survey generated the responses it did. 
38. This quotation appears in an earlier version of Hensler's report (op. cit. note 
25), dated September 1976, on p. 80. 
39. G. Gordon and E. V. Morse, 'Creative Potential and Organizational Struc-
ture', Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 12 (1969), 37-49; I. I. Mitroff , The 
Subjective Side of Science, A Philosophical Inquiry into the Psychology of the 
Apollo Moon Scientists (New York: Elsevier, 1974); E. V. Morse and G. Gordon, 
'Cognitive Skills: A Determinant o f Scientists' Local-Cosmopolitan Orientation', 
Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 17 (1974), 709-23. 
40. A prior question (underlying all of these) concerns the distribution o f in-
novativeness in the community at large, and whether the purposive sampling of 
scientists for the role of peer reviewer proportionately captures this characteristic. 
Given the profile o f reviewers developed in the works cited in note 6, one would 
think so. Indeed, one would think that innovators are overrepresented among 
reviewers; likewise, one would hope that innovators are overrepresented among the 
recipients of research funds. (As far as we can tell, there are no questions in the 
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Hensler study dealing directly with the topic of 'grantsmanship', although it is im-
plied by a few of her questions.) 
41. Cole et al., op. cit. note 26. The longer version of this report had yet to ap-
pear when we were preparing the final revision of this paper. It was published while 
the paper was in press: see S. Cole, L. Rubin and J. R. Cole, Peer Review in the Na-
tional Science Foundation: Phase One of a Study (Washington, DC: National 
Academy of Sciences, 1978). We have been unable to incorporate and respond to 
details o f the published report. An earlier draft of our paper benefitted from an un-
published preliminary version of the Cole report forwarded to I.I.M. as part of his 
review (see note 27). However, since it was the only public version available at the 
time, we have taken special pains to confine our comments here to the published in-
terim Scientific American report. 
42. Ibid., 36. 
43. Ibid., 37-39. 
44. Ibid., 37. 
45. Ibid., 38. 
46. Ibid., 40 (our italics). 
47. Ibid. 
48. Ibid., 41. 
49. Ibid. 
50. Ibid., 38. 
51. The use of citations as a measure or indicator of the perceived importance or 
standing of a scientist within his or her domain of research seems non-problematic 
to Cole, despite the reservations expressed by some investigators regarding the 
validity of the measure. See D. E. Chubin and S. D. Moitra, 'Content Analysis of 
References: Adjunct or Alternative to Citation Counting?' Social Studies of Science, 
Vol. 5 (1975), 432-41; N. Kaplan, 'The Norms of Citation Behavior: Prologomena 
to the Footnote', American Documentation, Vol. 16 (1965), 179-84. Do numerous 
citations to the work of a scientist truly reflect the long-term importance and 
significance of the work, or merely its short-term popularity? Does one cite a work 
to support one's own, or for more critical and rhetorical reasons? Even if it is 
presumed that the reviewer has knowledge of citation performance, without taking 
into account the reasons why scientists cite others, and why variations in citation 
behaviour exist across disciplines and research areas, can one confidently use cita-
tion counts as a 'common denominator' predictor variable? On this score, Cole 
finds — interestingly enough — that past citations contribute little to the explained 
variance of the funding decision, suggesting to us that citation may be an irrelevant 
criterion of performance because most reviewers are ignorant of an applicant's cita-
tion 'performance'. 
52. Cole et al., op. cit. note 26, 39. 
53. This is really an expression of our dismay over Cole's decision to report only 
the results of quantitative analyses. Such analyses can mask individual differences 
manifested in anecdotal accounts, such as interviews. For example, it would be in-
structive, if not indispensable, to know how NSF personnel view the system of 
science, and the rationality of the enterprise in which they are engaged. In the study 
of eminent scientists who investigated the moon rocks returned by the Apollo mis-
sions (see note 39), it was found that nearly the entire sample of forty-two scoffed 
at, antf in the most derisive of terms, the stereotypical view of the scientist and 
science itself as the 'open, free, unbiased exchange of pure ideas' that is so 
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commonly portrayed in college texts and in popular accounts of science. Surely it is 
important to know whether a respondent holds a conventional or a radical view of 
the workings of science before one can properly evaluate the respondent's attitudes 
towards the peer review system. Surely programme directors differ in discharging 
their duties. Are those harbouring a less conventional view of science more critical 
and sceptical of the operation of NSF peer review? 
54. Gordon and Morse, op. cit. note 39. 
55. Ibid., 42. In the typical situation used by Gordon to measure differentiation, 
a person is asked to rate ten of his most immediate colleagues, friends, associates, 
and so on, on a ten-point scale with respect to (a) their productivity, (b) their 
creativity, and (c) how easy it is to get along with the individual being rated. Low 
differentiaiors tend to rate all ten persons identically; in other words, low differen-
tiators make use of only a small portion of the total ten-point scale, whereas high 
differentiators tend to make significantly more use of the whole scale. High dif-
ferentiators tend to view people as different and unique; low differentiators view 
them as the same. 
56. Cole ct al. , op. cit. note 26, 34. 
57. To this end, we are surprised that the Cole study was not couched in terms of 
the Ortega hypothesis which the Coles (J. R. Cole and S. Cole, 'The Ortega 
Hypothesis', Science, Vol. 178 [27 October 1972], 368-75) investigated a few years 
ago. The Coles' rejection of this hypothesis (that all scientists contribute through 
their modest research efforts to the incremental progress of science) raises questions 
as to the concentration of funding support among a small portion of the research 
community. S. J. Turner and D. E. Chubin, in 'Another Appraisal of Ortega, the 
Coles and Science Policy: The Ecclesiastcs Hypothesis', Social Science Information, 
Vol. 15 (1976), 657-62, argue that to equate the distributions of scientific talent, pro-
ductivity, and reward is little justification for a science policy that deliberately con-
centrates resources among the elite that populates one tail of those distributions. 
Rather, they question the efficiency of a policy that would waste the talents of train-
ed personnel without modifying the organizations that train and employ them 
(though we realize this is far easier said than done). T o sustain the research of more 
scientists could calculably enhance their contributions. Yet no experiments in the 
democratization of research allocation have been carried out. Thus the proposition 
remains untested, and for us at least, the Ortega hypothesis, like the 'old boy' and 
'rich get richer' hypotheses to which it is intimately related, has been gratuitously 
laid to rest by the Coles. 
58. An 'unbiased' system would obviously not be one that randomly funds pro-
posals; rather, it would fund primarily according to merit, which might be defined 
as innovative, feasible, relevant, or some combination thereof. In the discussion that 
fol lows we assume that a lack of bias is both desirable and attainable. 
59. We purposefully use the term 'admittedly oversimplified' because the actual 
situation may be too complex to admit of the two exclusive categories, 'biased' or 
'unbiased'. The actual state of the system may be neither biased nor unbiased, or it 
may be a condition of both — that is, a complicated mixture of partially 'biased' 
and 'unbiased' elements. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this analysis, it suff ices to 
consider the 'idealized' cases in Table 2. 
60. Notice that we do not say that Cases II and IV necessarily represent 'incor-
rect cases', since the difficulty in knowing the 'true' state of the actual system also 
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makes it difficult to know or assess 'error'; the term 'problematic' is more ap-
propriate than such decisive terms as 'truth' or 'error', since complex social systems 
may not admit of such rigid or precise determinations. 
61. P. Feyerabend, op. cit. note 10; A. H. Maslow, The Psychology of Science 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1966); D. C. McClelland, 'On the Dynamics of 
Creative Physical Scientists', in L. Hudson (ed.), The Ecology of Human In-
telligence (Harmondsworth, Middx.: Penguin Books, 1970); Mitroff, op. cit. note 
39. 
62. McClelland, op. cit. note 61. 
63. On this issue, Kuhn and Lakatos appear to agree. See S. S. Blume, Toward a 
Political Sociology of Science (New York: Free Press, 1974); T. S. Kuhn, 'The 
Essential Tension: Tradition and Innovation in Scientific Research', in C. W. 
Taylor and F. Barron (eds). Scientific Creativity, Its Recognition and Development 
(New York: Wiley, 1963), 341-54. 
64. Mitroff , op. cit. note 39. 
65. Mulkay, op. cit. note 6. 
66. Scientists are not only aware of their relative position (for example, depart-
ment or institution rank), but they tend to aggrandize their position relative to their 
perception of other departments and institutions. Sec T. Caplow and R. J. McGce, 
The Academic Marketplace (New York: Basic Books, 1958). 
67. For a review, see Mulkay, op. cit. note 6; M. J. Mulkay, 'The Sociology of 
the Scientific Research Community' , in I. Spiegel-Rösing ánd D. de S. Price (eds), 
Science, Technology and Society: A Cross-Disciplinary Perspective (Beverly Hills: 
Sage, 1977), 93-148; and P. Bof fey , The Brain Bank of America (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1975). For a discussion of the institutional 'halo effect' which blurs 
the empirical distinction between prestige of institution and scientist's reputation (as 
a proxy for performance, quality of research, and so on), see H. Zuckerman, 
'Stratification in American Science', in E. O. Laumann (ed.), Social Stratification: 
Theory and Research for the 1970s (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970), 235-57. 
68. Mitroff , op. cit. note 39. 
69. See, for instance, Churchman and Feyerabend, ops. cit. note 10. 
70. R. K. Merton, 'The Matthew Effect in Science', Science, Vol. 159 (5 January 
1968), 56-63. 
71. Mulkay, op. cit. note 67; Boffey , op. cit. note 67; Salomon, op. cit. note 8. 
See also D. K. Price, The Scientific Estate (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press, 
1965; and D. S. Greenberg, The Politics of Pure Science (Washington, DC: New 
American Library, 1967). 
72. J. R. Cole and S. Cole , Social Stratification in Science (Chicago: The 
University o f Chicago Press, 1973); J. Gaston, Originality and Competition in 
Science (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1973); Gaston, The Reward 
System in British and American Science (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1978). 
73. To quote an anonymous referee (for an earlier version of this paper) on 
decision-making behaviour: 
My hunch is that, as the uncertainty of peer evaluation increases, more and more 
of the elements of the dialectic are brought to bear so that in some cases, after 
'objective' criteria have been used and are found not to distinguish between pairs 
of proposals, other more subjective and politically, controversial premises are 
used . . . and I think for quite defensible reasons. 
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74 We thank an anonymous referee lor reminding us to call attention to these ques-
tions. 
75. This is the spirit oi the proposed Science Court — the involvement of various 
publics in scientific decisions which arc 'too important to be left to the scientists'. But 
another anonymous referee observed: 
Basic to the Science Court concept is the idea of scientific judgment. Its purpose 
is not simply 'presentation and review' of the issues, but indeed, a verdict that 
reflects the assessment of a 'scientific judge' . . . I have argued this out with Kan-
trowitz suggesting that he maintain the 'presentation and review' procedure and 
minimize the importance of the verdict, but he claims that would change the in-
tention in a fundamental way. 
See D. Nelkin, 'The Political Impact of Technical Expertise', Social Studies of 
Science, Vol. 5 (February 1975), 35-54, and op. cit. note 10. 
76. As Dorothy Nelkin, reflecting on the recombtnant-DNA debate, has recently 
argued: see her 'Threats and Promises: Negotiating the Control of Research', 
Daedalus, Vol. 107, No. 2 (Spring 1978), 191-209. 
Ian Mitroff's latest book is Methodological Approaches to Social 
Science (Jossey-Bass, 1978) coauthored with Ralph H. Kilmann, 
Graduate School of Business, University of Pittsburgh. 
Daryl Chubin has just completed a book manuscript entitled 
Viruses and Cancer: A Social Study of Growth and 
Specialization in Biomedical Research, coauthored by Kenneth E. 
Studer, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Virginia 
Commonwealth University. Their most recent publication is 
'Knowledge and Structures of Scientific Growth: Measurement 
of a Cancer Problem Domain', Scientometrics, Vol. 1 
(January 1979), 171-93. 
Authors' addresses (respectively): Interdisciplinary Department of 
Information Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania 15260, USA; Department of Social Sciences, 
Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia 30332, USA. 
R ( J S T U M R O Y : 
Alternatives to Review by Peers: 
A Contribution to the Theory of Scientific Choice 
Minerva, 22 (1984) 316-328 
IN THE mid-1960s a series of papers by Michael Polanyi, Dr Alvin Weinberg 
and others opened the discussion of "scientific choice".1 The term 
"scientific choice" referred to two rather disparate choices. The first was the 
choice among subfields of science with respect to allocation of resources. 
The second was the choice among different possible performers of research 
as to which should be supported. Since those happy days for science, the 
former question, possibly the most critical issue of science policy, has 
virtually disappeared from the range of concerns of the makers of science 
policy. In 1977, in the wake of President Carter's push for "zero-based 
budgeting", whereby the allocations made for the next budgetary period 
would disregard the pattern of allocation of the previous budgetary period, I 
suggested to Dr Philip Handler, then president of the United States National 
Academy of Sciences, that the Academy create a committee to reflect on the 
desirability of a "zero-based budget" for science and engineering. Dr 
Handler's response was that such a task was impossible since it would arouse 
bitter conflicts among scientists. Under present practices, the support of 
American science research is frozen into a more or less fixed pattern of 
distribution of support for engineering, applied scientific research and pure 
scientific research, and among different subfields; if the pattern were once 
appropriate, it appears less and less so every day.2 
The issues raised in the discussion of scientific choice reappeared in the 
1970s in connection with "peer review". Unfortunately, the entire focus of 
the argument was shifted from the important problem of the best way to 
distribute the total funds for the support of research, to an analysis of one of 
the less significant methods of deciding how funds should be allocated. The 
persons who discussed "scientific choice" seemed to take for granted that 
allocations would be decided on the basis of review by peers. Some of the 
criticisms focused on the possible miscarriage of justice to individuals. The 
debate about the merits and defects of review by peers diverted attention 
' Polanyi, Michael, "The Republic of Science: Its Political and Economic Theory", Minerva, 
I (Autumn 1962), pp. 54-73; Weinberg, Alvin M. , "Criteria for Scientific Choice", Minerva, I 
(Winter 1963), pp. 159-171, and "Criteria for Scientific Choice II: The Two Cultures", 
Minerva, III (Autumn 1964), pp. 3-14; Maddox, John, "Choice and the Scientific Commun-
ity," Minerva, II (Winter 1964), pp. 141-159; Carter, C. F., "The Distribution of Scientific 
Effort", Minerva, I (Winter 1963), pp. 172-190; Toulmin, Stephen, "The Complexity of 
Scientific Choice: A Stocktaking", Minerva, It (Spring 1964), pp. 343-359. 
2
 Shapley, Deborah and Roy , Rustum, Lost at the Frontier: American Science and 
Technology Policy Adrift (Philadelphia: ISI Press, 1984). 
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from the more important issue of what different systems are available for the 
distribution of research funds. 
Defects of the Present System 
The many government agencies which use the system of review of 
proposals by peers, and which have sponsored many attempts to validate 
their system,3 have not supported a single study to compare such review with 
other systems of allocating funds for research by scientists of similar 
qualifications; there has been no comparison with the "strong-manager" 
method used by the United States Department of Defense, or with the 
formula system. No effort has been made to examine the "efficiency" of the 
system in terms of the costs and time required for each grant, or the efficacy 
of the system in supporting genuine innovation.4 
Even without systematically analysed comparative data, the failures of 
review by peers as a way of deciding which projects and which scientists 
should receive grants seem to be very evident. Yet virtually no senior official 
has commented on the glaring deficiencies of these procedures. Let us 
examine a recent example. In 1983 the Department of Defense started a new 
programme making available $30,000,000 annually to provide some large 
items of research equipment to universities. The Department of Defense 
deviated from the procedures used by many of its own subdivisions, which 
could presumably have selected for those universities working with the 
Department the articles of equipment most needed. Instead, in an effort to 
gain public favour, it issued an invitation for proposals to all universities, 
whether or not there were research groups with significant support from the 
Department of Defense in those universities. This resulted in a fiasco. Over 
2,200 proposals were received for a sum of $625 million. The success ratio 
was less than 1:60. The time required for the preparation and submission of 
each proposal may be estimated at one month's work of one person. Thus, 
2,200 scientists spent one month—or nearly 200 years of scientific work were 
diverted from research. Fortunately, scientific peers were not used to 
evaluate the process; but any estimate of the total expenditure of time must 
come to perhaps one more year of one scientist's work for each grant made. If 
we include an average figure of 100 per cent for overhead costs, the cost 
therefore was equal to 400 average salaries at $40,000 per scientist per year, 
and the allocation of $30,000,000 cost about $16,000,000. This example does 
not include the administrative costs of a typical review by post, or of panels 
3
 Cole, Stephen and Cole, Jonathan, "The Ortega Hypothesis: Criterion Analysis suggests 
that only a Few Scientists contribute to Scientific Progress". Science. CLXXVIII (27 October, 
1972), pp. 368-374; Cole, S. and Cole, J. R. and Simon, G. A., "Chance and Cpnsepsus in 
Peer Review", Science, CCXIV (20 November, 1981), pp. 187-255. 
4
 Roy, Rustum, "Peer Review of Proposals: Rationale. Practice and Performance", Bulletin 
of Science, Technology and Society, II, 5 (1982), pp. 405-418; Roy, Rustum, Testimony at 
-Hearings on "NSF Peer Review" before the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on 
Science and Technology, No. 32 (29 July. 1975), pp. 684-693. 
143 ROY: ALTERNATIVES TO REVIEW BY PEERS 
of peers. The entire operation, moreover, further exacerbated the differ-
ences between the successful and the unsuccessful applicants, since the 
unsuccessful universities wasted their efforts, while those with the more 
successful applicants gained even more. 
The failure of the system of review by peers is not that it fails to provide 
financial support for most good scientists. No system could fail to do that! 
The unnecessary waste of limited resources of scientific talent is the single 
most telling failure of the peer-review system. 
There is no single system of review by peers. There is an infinity of systems 
in which the influence of the scientific "peer" varies from almost nothing 
more than the passive lending of a name for legitimation, to almost complete 
control. I will consider only four major categories of review by peers: 
reviews submitted by peers, plus an assessment by an assembled panel, plus 
a site visit; reviews submitted by post, plus an assembled panel; standardised 
postal reviews, usually with quantified ratings or preferences within 
prescribed categories; and postal advice or comments without ratings. 
Only the most sanguine advocate unfamiliar with the literature would 
claim that there is any basis for expecting a correlation between a scientist's 
ability to present an essay and the actual future production of the "best 
science".5 The weak links in a "theoretical" sense are that we have no 
definition of what constitutes the "best science". With the total confusion 
between the terms "basic" and "applied" and over the value of relevance, 
and the very major psychosocial differences in perceptions and values, 
between—let us say—civil engineers and theoretical physicists, the entire 
system of review by peers is one of reinforcements of the idiosyncracies or 
the ruling paradigms of any group which is constituted and supported as a 
unit. 
We have no definition of a peer. According to current practice—strongly 
departing from the judicial model—a peer is defined as one who works in the 
same narrow subspeciality of scientific research. For example, proposals in 
microwave plasma synthesis exclude those working in radio-frequency 
plasmas, or those working in chemical vapour deposition synthesis. The 
working definition of peers in the present peer-review system certainly 
means as narrow a group of specialists as can be found to match the 
subject defined in the proposal. 
But is not a better definition of a peer, a person of equal "rank" and 
"experience" in science, drawn not only from the narrow speciality, but 
explicitly including the neighbouring fields? Dr Weinberg's insight that the 
best science would be that which affected a wide group of fields indicates 
that peers be explicitly defined to include some from neighbouring fields. 
Not a single agency of the United States government does this. 
In the present system, the simplest precautions against conflict of interest 
5
 Peters, D. P. and Ceci, S. J., "Peer Review Practice of Psychological Journals", The 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, V, 2 (1982), pp. 187-255; Harnad. Stephen, "Peer Commen-
tary on Peer Review"; followed by 56 comments, ibid., pp. 185-186, 196-225. 
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are ignored. The system flies in the face of the most elementary knowledge 
of human nature and presupposes a level of objectivity, disinterestedness 
and honesty, such as never obtained in any human group. Proposals, possibly 
with the literature thoroughly surveyed, the investigator's best ideas clearly 
expounded, and experiments specifically laid out, are sent to the set of 
colleagues who can most adequately evaluate the proposal but who also 
could use this same information in their own research. Moreover, in the 
present climate of opinion, a colleague who knows that he or she has the 
certain power to doom that proposal by a check mark in the "Fair" or 
"Good" category—even if accompanied, albeit inconsistently, by written 
praise—might well be inclined to use it. Both applicants and assessors know 
that this could give the reviewer enough time to perform the same or similar 
research. Applicants in rapidly developing fields, therefore, often employ 
the stratagem of applying for funds only for work that is already complete 
and is nearing submission for publication. 
The system of peer review ignores the crucial role of "change" and 
serendipity in science. Against all historical evidence, the system is based on 
the idea that genuine discovery can be planned in advance in an essay which 
meets with the approval of distant colleagues. Obviously, some outstanding 
work is done by persons who receive grants through peer review of their 
applications—after all, any system will deliver a good fraction of its funds to 
the best scientists. This is no vindication of the system. 
The defects of the system of review by peers may be summarised as 
follows: It disregards the multiplicity of systems of assessment and the 
possibility of combining their best features. It involves an enormous waste of 
the finite resource of the time of scientists and is inherently unfavourable to 
innovation. The schedule inherent in the process—often requiring some 
months to write an elaborate proposal and a waiting period of between six 
and twelve months—does not correspond with the actual schedule according 
to which creative scientists work, where the period from gestation of an idea 
to trying it out is much shorter. The intellectual momentum is thus often lost. 
The process encourages "competition" instead of co-operation and col-
laboration as the most effective mode of achieving the best scientific results. 
Alternative Systems of Allocating Funds for Research 
The only alternatives to the system of review by peers are not lotteries or 
the granting of equal amounts of financial support to every "qualified" 
scientist, although such experiments may be worthwhile. Scientists do not 
seem to wish to consider the more serious alternatives. Scientists who 
defend the status quo say that the peer-review system is the source of the 
success of American scientists, as demonstrated by such achievements as the 
winning of Nobel prizes.6 Many scientists who are reasonably well sup-
6
 Committee of Scientific Society Presidents, Testimony at Hearings on "NSF Peer Review" 
before the US House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Science and Technology (July 
1975), p. 1,0%; also pp. 1,081. 1,088. 
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ported find it difficult even to consider alternative systems in an objective 
and open manner. For those entering research after 1950, the system of peer 
review has become synonymous with support for their own scientific 
research. Some regard any criticism as a threat to the continued support of 
their research—hence there has been no scientific inquiry into or discussion 
about alternative systems. The National Academy of Sciences which has 
often risen to the defence of the system of peer review has never considered 
the possible alternatives. 
The fact is that scientific research has been supported by an enormous 
variety of institutional arrangements all over the world; the system of peer 
review is only one of these. Alternatives do not need to be invented—they 
already exist in abundance. 
In most countries, the existing systems tend to make "block" grants to 
universities, laboratories or departments. In Great Britain, for example, the 
University Grants Committee provides grants to run over a number of years 
for universities; these include sums for the maintenance of departmental 
research activities such as costs of new equipment and salaries for research. 
Graduate students are supported again from block grants to departments, 
from the Science and Engineering Research Council. Finally, the latter 
body—and other ministries—also makes grants for special research projects 
on the basis of one-page general proposals. In Japan "laboratory-sized 
groups" under a senior professor, with some younger teachers and students, 
are supported for five- to ten-year periods, on the basis of site-visits and 
review, while students are supported directly by the Ministry of Education. 
In South Africa, an interesting variant of review by peers focuses exclusively 
on the most recent research by the individual professor, without requiring 
any proposal describing the research which the professor intends to carry out 
in the immediate future. 
In the United States itself much more money for research is actually 
distributed by the "strong-manager" system used by the Department of 
Defense and other agencies which support "mission-oriented" basic re-
search than by the system of review by peers. In the academic world of the 
United States, a system for the support of research—review by peers— 
became firmly established as a result of the involvement of the major 
universities in military research during the Second World War: with the best 
of intentions, it turned out to favour those universities. In some disciplines— 
notably the applied sciences—scientists frequently receive part of the 
support for their research through the "strong-manager" system and part 
from agencies which depend on review by peers. Such persons are 
particularly well placed to compare the systems. Interestingly enough, the 
fields which are further removed from application, such as theoretical 
physics and chemistry, radio-astronomy, and many parts of the life sciences, 
have never experienced any system of support other than the peer reviews 
employed by the National Institutes of Health and the National Science 
Foundation. Nevertheless, many leading scientists of the United States are 
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beginning to be exasperated by the waste of time required by the system of 
review by peers. 
Three alternatives to that system are worthy of consideration. They differ 
in the extent to which they diverge from the present procedures. All three 
can be tried simultaneously within a single major grant-awarding body. 
These alternatives share certain major principles or presuppositions. First, 
past success is the best basis for the prediction of future performance. 
Second, the support of small groups or individuals on a continuing basis for 
the appropriate length of time—let us say, for seven years—increases the 
probability of success and the efficiency of the system. Third, the most 
innovative science is done in the context of attaining a broadly defined 
objective, yet carried out with the minimum of close supervision of the 
goals, methods or budgetary categories of individual projects. Fourth, 
co-operation between the very best specialists and the bringing together of 
their very best experimental capacities js a necessary condition for the 
advancement of knowledge in fields at the frontier of development. The 
failure of the universities to make institutional provision for interdisciplin-
ary research is, therefore, seriously damaging to them.7 Fifth, the advance-
ment of scientific knowledge which goes hand in hand with the advancement 
of the public interest is the most valuable. 
All the systems for the allocation of funds for research must reconcile two 
apparently contradictory requirements: greater freedom for the investigator 
and greater accountability, not merely for honesty in expenditures but for 
the goals of research. 
A Formula for Support based on Productivity assessed by Peers 
Why should the public support research with no specific mission or goal? 
Such research carried on at universities has the several functions. It makes 
new knowledge available to the world at large by publication. It trains 
students at an advanced level by apprenticeship in research. It establishes a 
capacity for research—including trained scientists, advanced knowledge and 
scientific instruments—enabling the university to participate in the more 
telestic research, i.e., research linked to a purpose or mission and supported 
by agencies such as the Department of Energy, the Department of 
Transportation, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and 
the Department of Defense. It makes possible research done in support of 
the private industrial firms which produce a major part of the wealth which 
goes to the support of research. 
In keeping with the view that the best guide to the prediction of success is 
past achievement, financial support should be proportional to the past 
productivity of the scientist in these four functions. The grants should not be 
to individuals but to a group, usually of the size of a department or an 
7
 Roy, Rustum, "Interdisciplinary Science on Campus: The Elusive Dream", Chemical 
Engineering News. LV (29 August. 1977), pp 28-^0. 
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interdisciplinary laboratory. The arrangement would work as follows: a 
governmental body concerned, for example, with chemistry, would main-
tain records submitted annually by every institution of higher education 
conducting research or graduate education or both. The data supplied would 
include information on the "productivity" of the institution with respect to 
the four functions, including the number of papers published, mainly in a set 
of journals agreed by the staff of the department or laboratory. Each 
member can only be counted as one, although his or her work may be split 
over two or more units, with no double counting of product permitted. At a 
later stage, citations might be used as a measure of scientific productivity, 
but for the first stage, there is little difference between using papers and 
using citations as a measure of productivity when one aggregates the 
publications of 20 to 40 persons over three to five years.* The university 
would provide the numbers of advanced degrees granted, in each unit, each 
year. A simple scheme of weighting different degrees would reflect the 
amount of effort used to produce them. The measure of the value of the 
particular scientific capacity of the unit for serving practical or mission-
oriented ends is the amount of financial support received from mission-
oriented government agencies. The effectiveness in the performance of the 
fourth is the total financial support for research received from private 
industry. These data would of course be available for each year; the 
measures used would be a rolling average of the preceding three or four 
years. 
The combined formula: The actual formula using the data provided would 
be as follows, where all numbers represent rolling three-year averages: 
Total sum to be granted to unit = A x number of publications + B x 
weighted number of advanced degrees + C x sum received for research 
from mission-oriented agencies 4- D x sum received for research from 
private industry. 
The weighting factors—A, B, C, D—would be adjusted by each agency so 
that the total of money distributed to all institutions would equal the total 
budget. The relative values of these factors becomes a flexible device for 
making policy. The weighting scheme is easily understood by high adminis-
trators and legislators. For example, if it were desired to encourage 
collaboration between university and industry, it would only be necessary 
for the legislative body to increase the weighting of D; this signal would 
immediately be perceived and acted upon throughout the country. Like-
wise, if there were shortages of qualified persons in one area, and a surplus 
in another, the legislature would simply rule that, for example, factor B 
would be tripled in the field of shortage and halved in the field in which there 
was a surplus of trained persons. 
" Roy, Rustum, Roy, N. R.. and Johnson. G. G. , "Approximating Total Citation Counts 
Irom First Author Counts and írom Total Papers". Scientometrics, V, 2 (1983), pp. 117-124. 
148 ROY: ALTERNATIVES TO REVIEW BY PEERS 
Allocation of academic unit's research allotment to individuals from grants to 
unit: One of the immediate objections to this scheme by productive scientists 
is the concern that it will reward the lazy members of the unit. This must be 
guarded against and it is simple to do so. Many American universities 
already do what is proposed here in the reallocation of the "return of 
overhead" to departments and research units. Each unit will be required by 
the granting body to provide an "acceptable plan" so that individual scientists 
will benefit from their own productivity. Typically, such a plan might 
propose that 5 to 10 per cent of the funds will be retained at the college level 
for major equipment or projects for which any unit or individual can 
compete. Similarly 10 to 15 per cent of the funds might be retained at the 
departmental or unit level for commonly used equipment and technicians, 
etc. The 75 to 85 per cent would then be divided up within the department 
using the same—or slightly modified—formula so that the most "produc-
tive" members of the department would receive the greater part of this 
genuinely "unearmarked" support. 
Summary: This "formula" is, of course, very different from the many other 
such schemes proposed, in that it takes account of "productivity" in the field 
in which support is given, and in that it is flexible. Representative George 
Miller of California, chairman of the House of Representatives Subcommit-
tee on Research, introduced his "formula funding" bill in 1968; his formula 
did not involve any measures of productivity at all.9 In contrast, my formula 
draws on the most intensive and defensible review by peers and hence 
should immediately command the support of all those who believe in 
assessment by scientific peers. Review by peers is present through the fact 
that the vast majority of the publications occur in journals in which the 
referees are scientific peers. A published paper has undergone peer review 
which has assessed the quality of completed research. Although peer review 
of completed research has itself been attacked,10 it is less vulnerable to 
criticism than the system of review by peers of proposed research projects. 
In any case, counting all publications instead of publications reviewed by 
peers in technical fields would make hardly any difference in the distribution 
over the country as a whole. The award of advanced degrees, except in some 
master's degrees, has been subject almost always to collective judgement by 
the department or the committee of examiners. A successful application for 
grants for research from "strong managers" in a mission-oriented agency is 
also conducted after a much more stringent review by highly qualified peers 
than any postal review of a proposal. Finally, by far the most stringent 
review by a peer is that which occurs when a research-manager in an 
industrial laboratory allocates $50,000 to support research at a university. 
The formula which I propose here can deal with the situation of the new, 
usually young member of the unit in several ways. Any unit which appoints 
* Representative George P. Miller, author of HR 35, Testimony at Hearings before US 
House of Representatives, 91st Session of Congress (February 1969). 
10
 Peters, D. P. and Ceci, S. J., op. cit.; Hamad, S. , op. cit. 
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new members should receive one extra share for each new member equal to 
the average allocation for research for each member of the unit. If the newly 
appointed person is a replacement, there is presumably already enough 
money to pay the salary and the expenses of the research. This averaging 
scheme in my view is less perturbing to the pattern of any particular 
university than a fixed award for young scientists. An award of $50,000 per 
year for a new assistant professor who has recently been awarded the 
doctorate might not be unreasonable at the major universities, but it could 
cause jealousy at some others. 
A comparison of the scheme I propose with the existing system of awards 
on the basis of review by peers shows that the proposed scheme rests on a 
clear principle. It is a proportional award by ihe representatives of society 
for delivering the "products" those representatives desire. Moreover, it is 
based on recorded, quantifiable performance, not on promises made in an 
essay. The "best science" is defined as that which honours both scholarship 
and the public interest, and is "quantified" in the four terms of the formula. 
There are, moreover, different sets of peers for different evaluations. In 
most of these, the particular group of peers is much more broadly cognisant 
of other fields of the national interest, or industry's wants, than in the 
prevailing system of peer review. In addition, conflict of interest is virtually 
eliminated. Whereas in the system of peer review, a single negative review 
by one of the peers can block the entire research of a senior scientist with less 
than six months' notice, no single person can affect the immediate future of 
any individual drastically. 
This elimination of conflict of interest goes far to remove the corrosion of 
the integrity of the community caused by the present system. It goes much 
further than the commendable though mild effort by the National Institutes 
of Health in the warning statement which its reviewers are asked to note, but 
not even to sign and return. Because the recipient is not constrained by any 
proposal, or in ány fashion in the National Science Foundation, the National 
Institutes of Health or among his colleagues, he can follow any unforeseen 
lead or any unexpected opening. He can chose to do the most risky 
experiments in his genuinely atelistic work, i.e., work without a particular 
goal in view, by balancing it with work for a mission-oriented agency and 
industry. Dr Weinberg's proposal made 20 years ago that atelestic research 
should be an "overhead" on mission-oriented research will have been 
realised.11 
The magnitude of an individual's research grants will vary gradually over 
time, guaranteeing every scientist a certain proportion of the stable 
allocation of funds to do some of the difficult work requiring five or more 
years, which is now shunned for the quick production of papers. The 
beneficial feature of the formula is that it provides no sharp line of 
demarcation with respect to quality of individuals or universities. Thus it 
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corresponds much more accurately to the realities of the distribution of 
talents. This schema has the merit of rewarding productivity of the same 
"commodities" wherever they are produced. A wider range of universities 
will get some money on a steady basis, even if the total sum is not large. 
It is not by any means obvious that this funding scheme will by itself 
increase co-operation. It will, on the other hand, certainly diminish 
dishonesty, which as Dr Yalow has pointed out may be as harmful as 
anything else to the scientific community. It will make co-operation a little 
more likely.12 
A Simpler Formula for Matching Support 
A simpler version of the formula proposed above has been advocated in 
the various'schemes proposed by others for "matching" funds. Thus, Dr 
Weinberg's idea would provide basic research funds to a unit or an 
individual in direct proportion to the mission-oriented research done by that 
unit or individual; in the formula which I propose it would consist only 
of the third term. Similarly, the report of the commission on industrial 
innovation, under the chairmanship of Jordan Baruch and appointed by 
President Carter, proposed that universities should receive five to seven 
times the amount provided by industry.13 In effect, this proposal is 
represented by the fourth term of my formula. I believe a case can be made 
for using Dr Weinberg's rationale and reducing the formulae to a matching 
grant proportional to C times total support by mission-oriented agencies 
plus D times support by industry. This would, however, limit the general 
applicability of the formula since certain less applied fields would be at a 
severe disadvantage. 
Support Based on Peer-Evaluation of Performer's Past Achievements 
The system based on performance can be applied to individuals. In this 
variant, support would be provided on the basis of the entire, fairly recent 
achievement in research of the individual. This is the system now being used 
by the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research of South Africa. 
The peers who are selected to evaluate the scientific achievement of any 
individual must rigorously exclude any possible conflict of interest. In the 
case of American academic scientists, this would exclude other American 
academic scientists. Industry and government scientists who cannot possibly 
be supported from the same source provide a much larger pool of candidates 
12
 Yalow, Rosalyn S., "Is Subterfuge Consistent with Good Science", Bulletin of Science, 
Technology and Society, II, 5 (1?82), pp. 40l^t04. 
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 Baruch, Jordan, Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Industrial Innovation, United 
States Department of Commerce (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. Septem-
ber 1979). 
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who are less likely to be biased. The reviewing group should be drawn by 
random-number selection by computer from a qualified set selected for each 
subdiscipline, and should include one or two from related disciplines. The 
qualified sets of reviewers would be revised annually by a committee of the 
National Research Council. In general, it might be valuable to have small 
groups of individuals in roughly the same field all evaluated by the same 
group; this would provide a basis for comparative judgements. The best 
group of peers is obvious: it is the group of scientists in the same general 
fields in the many similar institutions in foreign countries. 
The data presented to the assessors would be a curriculum vitae, 
up-to-date bibliography, and perhaps a two-page statement by the indi-
vidual being assessed summarising his or her recent achievements in 
research. Again, this kind of judgement is hardly alien to academic 
traditions. It is made daily in appointive decisions in universities and 
industry. The peers would rank their evaluation of the quality, quantity and 
the originality of the research and its value to society. The actual budget 
allocations could be left to the managers since this would be dependent on 
the subfield of study. 
International Evaluation by Peers of Established Groups 
This is a variant of the scheme for individuals applied to departments or 
other research units. It is in widespread use now in many parts of the world. 
In its ideal form, unfortunately, it cannot cope with large numbers of 
institutions. For example, to allocate funds among half a dozen bioengineer-
ing groups, each group would prepare a statement of recent achievements 
and provide the data on its productivity over the preceding five years. The 
international group of assessors would both evaluate each group's "produc-
tivity", compare the productivity of the groups in the set, and point out 
possible overlaps, gaps, etc. Ideally, the peer group would visit each of the 
units, assess its capacity "on the ground" and provide a much more precise 
recommendation regarding the relative merits of each unit working on the 
subject to the grant-awarding body. Whenever such assessments have been 
used, they have been regarded as eminently fair. 
Clearly it is impractical to have the same group of assessors visit 100 or 
even 25 institutions. A postal review alone could perhaps be done for 20 or 
25 by the same set of assessors, but several sets of assessors may be needed 
when large sets of institutions must be evaluated. Visits to sites by an 
international peer group are clearly the best way to evaluate the smaller sets 
of specialised research institutes, such as water research institutes and 
materials research laboratories. It is again a mark of the conservatism of the 
management of American research institutions that this has never been 
done. It is a pity, since the international nature of the reviewers would very 
properly reflect the realities of modern science. 
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An Optimal Review of Proposals by Peers 
Since the smaller the change the more likely its adoption, I include for 
completeness an alternative to the present system, modifying it in simple 
ways which would eliminate some of the major objections to the present 
system and which would not be more costly. 
From the outset, it should be made clear that the system seeks to evaluate 
the proposer and the ideas, and that each will be weighted equally or that 
greater emphasis will be laid on the former. Hence, the proposal should 
present in detail the recent research achievements of the programme and 
provide a short general indication of the work to be attempted. The review 
form must explicitly explain the two different evaluations being requested. 
Two simple sets of precautions will avoid conflict of interest by selection 
of assessors from industry and government, as I have already recommended, 
for all academic applicants. One can very easily avoid manipulation of the 
selection of referees by the manager of the programme by using a 
randomised selection from a qualified set of referees designated by the 
National Research Council or a similar body. A simple legislative enactment 
would solve this problem once and for all. For judgements regarding the 
allocation of public funds, the proportion of peers drawn from industry, 
governmental and academic laboratories should reflect roughly the national 
percentages of working scientists in the particular discipline throughout the 
country. 
The instructions to assessors should be very clear—as they are not today. 
They should be designed by experts in the preparation of questionnaires. 
The instructions should include the probabilities of the outcome associated 
with each level of rating. Thus the assessor should be informed that, say, an 
average rating of B— results only in a 5 per cent probability of support. A — 
in 75 per cent and an A+ in 95 per cent probability of support. Similarly the 
exact weighting to be placed on the applicant's achievements in research and 
on his proposed research should be indicated unambiguously. 
Once the assessments are received, they should be sent to the applicant 
for technical rebuttal, to be completed within exactly two weeks and with 
only one cycle of such rebuttal permitted. This avoids absurd errors in the 
referees' judgements.14 The Dutch government uses this system. 
It is clear that we have absolutely no guarantee that a "principal 
investigator" will actually do the research he has proposed and whether it 
will be "successful", and if so, whether it will be of any value to science. 
Hence, it is absurd to have a sharp disjunction between successful and 
unsuccessful applicants in the distribution of funds. The budgets should be 
14
 Recently one of our proposals was classified as border-line and turned down by the 
National Science Foundation, although one of the reviewers' main reasons for a lower rating 
was that in an interdisciplinary proposal we had not included Professor X., the best known 
person at Pennsylvania State University. The reviewer might have had a (joint had Professor X. 
not been dead for over two years. The National Science Foundation. while embarrassed. had no 
way to correct the error because the process by then had moved to the next stage. 
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reallocated to diffuse the boundary by taking the bottom 15 to 20 per cent of 
the successful applicants and cutting their budgets by, let us say, 25 per cent 
and awarding partial support—from 33 to 50 per cent of their requested 
sum—to 10 to 15 per cent of those just below the present dividing line. 
Getting something started, or maintaining something already under way, is 
often invaluable to morale and very economical. 
In the United States where different major agencies which support 
research use different systems, it would be a worthwhile experiment to 
employ both the schemes within the same agency in different divisions. 
After some years, the parts of the scientific community which have had 
experience of both schemes could be surveyed for their preference. 
Meanwhile, studies of the preferences of scientists who have already been 
supported by both systems might be undertaken immediately to justify the 
experiment. 
Conclusion 
The questions of scientific choice which were left unresolved when the 
rapid expansion of academic science in the United States began in the early 
1960s have come back to trouble the scientific community. There is now 
widespread dissatisfaction with the process of review by peers as one of the 
major systems for the allocation of public funds for research. While earlier 
criticisms had been brushed off by the assertion—unsupported by facts—that 
no other systems existed, the present situation cannot be so easily dismissed. 
A serious examination of other national and international arrangements 
shows that a wide variety of procedures are in use and there is no research 
which shows that one system is either more productive scientifically, or more 
cost-effective in bringing about valuable scientific research. New systems 
which may be considered should avoid the major defects of the system of 
peer review as now practised: the enormous waste of scientists' time, the 
great potential for conflicts of interest, and the inherent bias against 
innovation. 
The principal system which I have proposed here combines the best 
elements of peer review with the simplicity and efficiency of the use of a 
formula. Moreover, this formula based on peer review of performance 
incorporates all the elements for which the academic scientific establishment 
should be accountable to its patron, which is the public treasury. A final 
virtue of the proposed system is that it provides simple and convenient 
procedures through the use of numerical weighting factors for the policy-
maker to guide the support of scientific research as a whole. 
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Peer Review of Interdisciplinary Research Proposals 
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T h e peer rev iew of research resul ts s u b m i t t e d for 
journa l pub l i ca t i on raises e l ementa ry issues of 
fa i rness and re l iabi l i ty . ' Peer review of proposals 
to p e r f o r m research in t h e future , however , is 
even m o r e problematic . For many reasons, judging 
u n t e s t e d ideas is i n h e r e n t l y more unce r t a in t han 
e v a l u a t i n g c o m p l e t e d work . Research has a way 
of evo lv ing in d i r ec t ions tha t are uncha r t ab le in 
advance—cer t a in data m a y prove una t ta inable , 
n e w discover ies by t h e researchers or by others 
m a y p o i n t to r eo r i en ta t ion , or personnel m a y 
change . In a 1974 s tudy , Grace Carter found that 
ratings of Nat iona l Ins t i tu tes of Health (NIH| initial 
g i a n t app l i ca t i ons w e r e correlated w i t h inde-
p e n d e n t ra t ings of t he i r later reappl icat ions by a 
t h i n 0.4 (i.e., on ly 16% of the variance was ac-
c o u n t e d for by t h e o t h e r ratingl.1 While th is figure 
i nc ludes unre l i ab i l i t y due to an independent re-
ra t ing, it a lso re f lec t s changes in the percept ion 
of t h e v a l u e of spec i f ic projects as research pro-
gresses. O n e N a t i o n a l Science Foundat ion (NSF) 
proposal reviewer m a d e special note of "exemplary 
s ta f f ing p l a n s " of a proposal he evaluated. 3 Iron-
ically, t h a t s a m e pro jec t changed staff repeatedly 
to t h e e x t e n t t ha t i t was not possible even to 
i den t i fy a project leader . In essence, then , peer 
rev iew of proposals is a diff icul t business . 
Peer r ev iew as a process has engendered strong 
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charges and defenses . 4 R u s t u m Roy, for example, 
a rgues t ha t peer r ev iew of proposals has n o con-
cep tua l basis, w a s t e s resources, and impedes in-
nova t ive research. 5 Sett ing aside such to ta l ob-
jec t ions to the process , Harvey Brooks makes a 
wel l - reasoned case tha t peer review is be t ter in 
s o m e respec ts t h a n in others, and for s o m e tasks 
t han for o thers . 6 Pee r review of proposals is better 
for eva lua t ing w i t h i n defined fields than across 
fields; better for collecting expert opinion on w h i t 
Brooks calls t he " t r u t h " dimension ( the pursu i t 
of knowledge for i t s own sake) than differentiating 
along a "ut i l i ty" d imension (research to be applied 
toward a specif ic end). According to th i s view, it 
fo l lows t h a t peer review is less sa t isfactory for 
applied or policy research than for basic research. 
Furthermore, " the broader the intellectual territory 
covered, t he less consensus there wi l l be on the 
r a n k i n g . " ' 
These at t r ibutes of peer review point to potential 
d i f f icul ty in i ts u s e to evaluate crossdiscipl inary 
research proposals. Such proposals involve mult iple 
skil ls focused o n a scientif ic research problem. 
T h u s , these proposals present subs tan t i a l diffi-
cul t ies in i den t i fy ing an appropriate " p e e r " group. 
It is l ike ly to be d i f f icu l t to ident i fy peers whose 
exper t ise fu l ly encompasses the proposed cross-
disc ip l inary research. If located, they are apt to 
have a s t rong personal stake in the o u t c o m e of 
the eva lua t ion in the event that t he n u m b e r of 
researchers concen t r a t i ng in the area is smal l . If 
such a peer group canno t be gathered, review by 
persons n o t fu l ly fami l ia r wi th the d o m a i n can 
prove especially perilous. Recognizing such issues, 
program m a n a g e r s m a y hesi tate to u n d e r t a k e re-
view of proposals t ha t lack an es tab l i shed peer 
group. Crossd isc ip l inary proposals m a y t ru ly "fall 
be tween the cracks" of the disciplinary programs." 
156 PORTER «Sc ROSSINI: INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH PROPOSALS 156 
O n e of the m o s t s t r ik ing observat ions abou t 
p e e r r ev iew of p roposa l s is the extent to w h i c h 
t h i s process is u n q u e s t i o n i n g l y accepted in the 
absence of m u c h empir ical data on how it performs. 
C o l e e t al., in a l a n d m a r k study, cont ras ted N S F 
peer rat ings wi th independen t sets of raters.9 T h e y 
f o u n d that the fa te of individual grant applicat ions 
w a s abou t half d e t e r m i n e d by character is t ics of 
t h e proposal , abou t half by "no ise" in t h e r ev iew 
p roces s . We k n o w of n o empirical data, howeve r , 
o n s u c h crit ical i s s u e s as the effect of r ev iewer 
he t e rogene i ty 1 0 or t h e character is t ics of t h e pro-
p o s e d research on expec t ed ratings. T h e i n t e n t of 
o u r ar t ic le , therefore , is t o provide such ev idence 
o n o n e sample of crossdisc ip l ina ty pro jec ts . 
Study Design 
T h i s s tudy draws o n 2 5 7 sanitized rev iews of 38 
p ro j ec t s f r o m f ive d i f fe ren t Nat ional Sc ience 
F o u n d a t i o n p rograms : Neurobiology, Environ-
m e n t a l Geosc iences , Archeology, E a r t h q u a k e 
Hazard Mitigation—Societal Response, and Science 
a n d Techno logy t o A i d the Handicapped. T h e s e 
encompass basic, applied, and policy research. T h e 
s a m p l i n g was p u r p o s i v e ra ther than s ta t i s t i ca l ly 
r ep re sen t a t i ve or r a n d o m . We worked w i t h pro-
g r a m managers to i d e n t i f y projects they perce ived 
as in te rd i sc ip l inary (and added a few p rob l em-
o r i e n t e d discipl inary pro jec ts for compar ison) . 
R o y l ists four d i m e n s i o n s basic to cons ider ing 
pee r rev iew of p r o p o s a l s " : 
(1) T h e candidate set of proposals—(a) in response 
to a n RFP versus (b) unsol ic i ted , w i th a deadl ine , 
v e r s u s |c) n o " s e t " a t all |a program cons iders 
p e r t i n e n t proposals as t hey come in); 
(2) Reviewers—how m a n y and who selects t h e m ; 
(3) T h e review m e d i u m — m a i l (advisory only), 
m a i l (binding], panel , s i t e visit, or c o m b i n a t i o n s ; 
a n d 
(4) T h e degree of i n t e r a c t i o n with the pr inc ipa l 
inves t igator |PI), ranging f rom none to substant ial . 
In t h e s e te rms, t h e 38 NSF projects for w h i c h w e 
had reviews cross all candidate set types. For some, 
pee r eva lua t ion i n c o r p o r a t e s explicit c o m p a r i s o n 
a m o n g a set of p roposa ls ; for others, a proposal 
is cons ide red a lone . T h e evaluat ions range in 
n u m b e r of reviewers f r o m 1 to 17 (with n o specific 
i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e i r select ion]; the mean n u m b e r 
of r e v i e w s per p roposa l varied from 5.9 to 8.1 for 
the five programs. T h e s e reviews incorporate mai l 
or m a i l / p a n e l combinat ions . In a few cases, t he 
review process includes feedback of init ial criti-
c isms t h r o u g h the program managers for principal 
i nves t iga to r response. 
C o m p l e m e n t i n g the proposal reviews, we were 
able t o s e c u r e informat ion f rom the Pis on the 
na tu r e of t h e actual research p r o c e s s . " In partic-
ular, w e d r a w on this to de t e rmine h o w inter-
d i sc ip l inary each project was, based on a weighted 
f u n c t i o n of t h e Pis ' and ou r o w n judgments , on 
the n u m b e r of disciplines represented on the proj-
ect t e a m , o n the percent of staff f rom outside the 
Pi's general disciplinary category (i.e., engineering, 
life s c i ences , physical sciences, social sciences, 
or p ro fe s s iona l fields), and on t h e range of skil ls 
used i n t h e project . 
Results 
The p r o p o s a l s studied were all funded and thus 
had h i g h ra t ings on the NSF scale of one to five 
(with o n e being excellent and five being poor]. 
Also, b e c a u s e the projects in t h e sample were 
selected for the i r in terdiscipl inary character, we 
or iginal ly believed that the re w o u l d be few dif-
ferences in t h e sample in t e rms of such charac-
ter is t ics as type of project or special ty of reviewer. 
As T a b l e 1 indicates, we found s o m e ra ther sig-
n i f i can t dif ferences , however. T h e s e can be sum-
mar ized by no t ing that rev iewers favored basic 
sc ien t i f i c research conducted in an academic 
set t ing. 
T h e first l i ne of Table 1 condenses in format ion 
on h o w ra t ings differed among the five NSF pro-
grams u n d e r s tudy. Each of the t w o Engineering 
P rograms (Ear thquake Hazard Mi t iga t ion and Sci-
ence a n d Technology to Aid the Handicapped] 
averaged a ra t ing of 2.05. A m o n g the sciences, 
the s ing le archaeology proposal for wh ich we had 
n u m e r i c a l ra t ings scored m o s t favorable at 1.14, 
fo l lowed b y the neurobiology proposals at 1.42, 
and geosc i ence at 1.68. Engineering proposals re-
ceived m o r e reviews (mean n u m b e r of reviews of 
each = 7.5) t h a n did the sc ience proposals (mean 
= 6.0). 
In a m u l t i p l e regression of peer ra t ing on the 
var ious fac to r s examined, the program variable 
appeared as the strongest predic tor (p < .001), 
domina t ing other factors, including which proposal 
was be ing ra ted . In other words, m o r e of the var-
iability in rat ing was accounted for by the program 
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Table 1. Peer Rating Contrasts 
More Favorable Less Favorable Statistical 
Dimension Type Mean (±S.D.) |N | Type Mean [ — S.D.) IN) 
Significance 
Level 
NSF Program Scientific 1.50 1-0.69] |102) Engineering 2.05 1-0.96) (149) 0.0001 
PI Affiliation Academic 1.65 (±0.80) (165) Non-Academic 2.18 (±0.98) 1 86) 0.0001 
PI Disciplinary 
Category Scientific 1.75 (-0.86) (189| Engineering 2.07 (-0.981 1 62| 0.02 
Reviewer Disciplinary 
Category Scientific 1.75 ( -0 .87) (128) Engineering 2.12 1-0.97) I 70) 0.01 
Project Type Basic Research 1.56 1-0.43) ( 17]' Applied or 2.00 (±0.50| ( 2 i r 0.01 
Policy 
Research 
Disciplinary Match 
Between Reviewer Same or 
and PI Similar 1.69 1-0.83) (199) Different 2.22 (±0.99) ( 69) 0.0001 
Note: Scale is the NSF tating f r o m 1 - excellent to 5 » poor. 
Scale is naturally compressed as al] of these proposals were funded. 
* N u m b e r of projects on a project-based comparison instead of a review-based one as in the other four contrasts. 
to w h i c h t h e proposal h a p p e n e d to be submi t t ed 
t h a n by perceived d i f ferences in mer i t among in-
d i v i d u a l (funded] proposals . Stated another way, 
the f u n d i n g cutoff varies significantly by program. 
T h e pe r son submitt ing a crossdisciplinary proposal 
m i g h t d o wel l to compare t h e typical peer ra t ing 
prof i l e f o r each program t h a t migh t evaluate the 
p roposa l s . 
Swi t ch ing to stepwise regression, we considered 
w h e t h e r o ther variables a u g m e n t the program 
var iab le as a predictor of a proposal ' s peer raring. 
T w o o t h e r variables e n t e r t he regression signifi-
c a n t l y — w h e t h e r or n o t t h e PI is academic and 
the s i m i l a r i t y of PI and r e v i e w e r d. .e ipl ines. Each 
of t h e s e is discussed b e l o w , w i t h academic PI 
be ing t h e strongest p red ic tor . Wh . both of t h e s e 
va r iab les are entered i n t o t h e equation, program 
is n o longer a s ignif icant predictor. The inter-
c o r r e l a t i o n among the p red ic to r s is also discussed 
f u r t h e r . 
T h e second line of T a b l e 1 summar izes infor-
m a t i o n o n ratings by organiza t iona l aff i l iat ion of 
the Pr inc ipa l Investigator. G i v e n the peer ra t ings 
p ro f i l e t h a t favors basic sc ien t i f i c research con-
d u c t e d in academic se t t ings , w e would have sus-
pected t h a t proposals f r o m Pis nested in established 
d i s c ip l i ne s would h a v e ra ted better than those 
f r o m cen te r s . Forty- three percen t of the ra t ings 
p e r t a i n e d to Pis associated w i t h academic depart-
m e n t s . T h e s e rated q u i t e favorably (mean = 
1.73). Interest ingly, p roposa l s f rom academic cen-
ters or composi te center /depaj tment arrangements 
fared at leas t as wel l (mean = 1.50). T o s imp l i fy 
fur ther compar i son , w e combined all a cademic 
proposals in Table 1. Four other groups of proposals 
(from public or quasi-public organizations involved 
in fund ing , or i n us ing research; f rom large or 
smal l con t rac t research organizations) each av-
eraged over 2.0. W e conclude that ei ther academic 
Pis k n o w h o w t o prepare better proposals, or re-
viewers favor academics , or both. 
Similar p a t t e r n s emerge when we consider the 
discipl inary category of the PI or of t he reviewer . 
"Science" rates better than "engineering." By type 
of project , basic research (mean rat ing 1.56 for 17 
projects! does be t t e r t han applied (mean ra t ing 
1.98 for 13 projects) or policy research (mean 2.04 
for 8 projects). Applied and policy research are 
combined as a ca tegory in Table 1. Di f fe rences 
by rev iewer af f i l ia t ion (i.e., academic or no t ; re-
searcher or research user | did not reach s ta t i s t ica l 
significance. Nor did review characteristics interact 
significantly wi th corresponding PI characteristics. 
O n e m i g h t have expected academic reviewers t o 
be m o r e favorable toward academic Pis, and non -
academic rev iewers to favor non-academic Pis. 
T h e rev iew data did n o t show such inc l ina t ions . 
N o t surpris ingly, the factors discussed are 
heavi ly in te r re la ted . Examinat ion of cor re la t ions 
among these variables finds ail of t hem significant, 
ranging in magn i tude f rom 0.22 to 0.74. "Program," 
in par t icular , associa tes w i th whe the r the PI (r = 
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0.41) and r e v i e w e r (r = 0.42) axe a c a d e m i c (i.e., 
t he engineering programs are more l ikely to engage 
non-academics ) ; and wi th whe ther t h e PI (r = 
0.48) and r e v i e w e r |r = 0.52) are sc ien t i s t s or 
engineers . T h e k e y finding is tha t p ro jec t s that 
are " sc ien t i f i c , bas i c research in a c a d e m i c un i t s " 
are t h e h i g h e s t ra ted , while those t h a t are "en-
gineer ing, app l i ed or policy research i n non-aca-
d e m i c u n i t s " are r a t ed lowest. Projects w i t h other 
c o m b i n a t i o n s of character is t ics are r a t ed be tween 
those ext remes . T h e key determining factor seems 
to be w h e t h e r or n o t the project has an academic 
PI. However , in t h i s s tudy the c o n n e c t i o n s dem-
ons t r a t ed a m o n g the variables i n f l uenc ing peer 
ra t ing are co r re l a t iona l , not causal. O u r s tudy also 
does no t address t h e issue of w h e t h e r s o m e pro-
posals are " b e t t e r " t h a n others in a s e n s e inde-
p e n d e n t of t h e ra t ings . Stated another way , some-
one could argue t h a t the proposals by t h e academic 
Pis are rated m o r e favorably than those f r o m non-
academics b e c a u s e they ate inheren t ly superior, 
n o t because of a n y favori t ism. 
T h e case w i t h respect to discipl inary m a t c h 
b e t w e e n PI and r ev iewer is more sharp ly defined. 
A s s h o w n o n the las t l ine of Table 1, reviewers 
favor t ha t w h i c h is familiar. We cons idered in-
f o r m a t i o n o n r ev iewer and PI af f i l ia t ion to judge 
whe the r their disciplines were the same (e.g., both 
chemis ts ) , s i m i l a r (e.g., physiologist and anato-
mist) , or d i f fe ren t (e.g., engineer and sociologist). 
T h i s l ine co l lapses categories of " s a m e " and 
" s i m i l a r " ( m e a n s of 1.68 and 1.71). T o conf i rm 
th is finding, w e examined the similarity of genera] 
d isc ip l inary ca tegory (e.g., social sc ience, engi-
neering) of PI and reviewer using a non-judgmental 
coding. Everyone w a s assigned a three-digi t code 
for d isc ip l ine and these codes were located in 
genera l d i sc ip l ina ry categories, (following the Na-
t ional Research C o u n c i l ' s groupings u sed in the 
s tudy of doc tora l sc ien t i s t s and engineers). Where 
rev iewer and PI w e r e affiliated w i t h the same 
general d i sc ip l ina ry category, peer ra t ings were 
be t te r (mean = 1.73); where they differed, peer 
ra t ings were s ign i f ican t ly worse (mean = 2.08; 
p = 0.008). 
T h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of this favor i t ism for the fa-
mi l i a r are cr i t ica l lor interdiscipl inary research 
| IDR| . First, th is e f fec t is extremely s t rong for it 
to appear in a s a m p l e of a constr ic ted range of 
ra t ings . Second, t h i s effect will work against sup-
por t for IDR in t h a t such research is i nhe ren t ly 
less l ike ly to be r ev iewed by persons fami l i a r wi th 
-the ful l scope of the planned work. Our conclusion 
shou ld cau t ion against t he general ly accepted 
s t ra tegy of choosing review teams , each of which 
is f ami l i a r w i t h on ly one of the aspects of t he 
project . T h e s e resul ts imply t ha t such a review 
s t ra tegy wi l l generate poorer ratings, on average, 
t h a n w o u l d c o m e f rom a review t eam on which 
each m e m b e r was famil iar w i t h the whole scope 
of t h e proposed research. 
O u r final inquiry was w h e t h e r there was a cor-
re la t ion be tween project in terdiscipl inar i ty |based 
on a factor analysis as noted under "Study Design") 
and ra t ing . T h i s query is cons t ra ined by the sam-
pl ing of p r edominan t ly IDR projects . We did ob-
serve a corre la t ion be tween rat ing and degree of 
projec t in terdisc ipl inar i ty in the direct ion of more 
in te rd i sc ip l ina ry projects be ing downgraded. In a 
sp l i t - sample analysis, this conclus ion shows a 
s ign i f i can t associa t ion for one set of 20 projects 
(r = 0.50, p = 0.02), bu t non-significant association 
for t h e o t h e r subsample (r = 0.16, p = 0.26). 
However , t h e correlat ion is s ignif icant for the 
s ample as a who le (r = 0.29, p = 0.05). This 
partial support for the hypothesis that IDR projects 
t end to ra te less favorably suggests fu r the r study 
of a representa t ive sample of bo th disciplinary 
and in terd isc ip l inary proposals (preferably in-
cluding non-funded as well as supported proposals). 
Discussion 
Researchers engaged in certain areas, such as the 
neurosciences, appear to mee t less resistance from 
the i r peers (proposal reviewers and professional 
reward evaluators | for performing interdisciplinary 
research t han do those in more t radi t ional dis-
c ip l inary areas. Some research areas appear more 
" o p e n " to us ing techniques, and even substant ive 
exper t i se , no t historical ly wedded to t h e m . Of the 
c o m m e n t s w h i c h we saw, reviewers rarely crit-
icized crossdisciplinary features of proposals. (One 
e c o n o m i s t reviewer did faul t a proposal for in-
c luding non -economic aspects.) M o t e typically, 
sugges t ions were m a d e to add a par t icular skill 
to the project team. O n occasion, reviewers would 
ind ica t e re luc tance to evaluate the proposal other 
than in their own domain of expertise. Our general 
sense w a s tha t neurosc ient i s t s and aicheologists , 
in particular, did not need to justify their inclusion 
of " o u t s i d e " skil ls . T h e character is t ics of the re-
search p r o b l e m s seemed to require certain skills, 
and the researchers tried to provide t h e m . On the 
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o t h e r h a n d , in earlier work , w e encountered ac-
a d e m i c d e p a r t m e n t s t ha t presented ser ious ob-
s tac les t o the i r m e m b e r s t ry ing to i nc lude skil l 
areas b e y o n d thei r d i sc ip l ine ' s expert ise in the i r 
r e sea rch . 1 3 
If t h e s e findings genera l ize across NSF, t h e n 
s o m e of t h e fears expressed formally and informal ly 
by m e m b e r s of t he r e sea rch c o m m u n i t y h a v e 
meri t . Brooks reports tha t peer evaluations in areas 
o t h e r t h a n basic resea tch are m u c h less sat isfac-
tory.1 4 Roy cites peer r e v i e w as " f u n d a m e n t a l l y 
and i n e l u c t a b l y a n t i - i n n o v a t i o n . " l s Grover Whi te -
h u r s t n o t e s variat ion across fields in i m p l e m e n -
t a t i o n of peer r e v i e w . " P re sen t data suggest t ha t 
peer r e v i e w of NSF proposa ls favors research t ha t 
is p e r f o r m e d by academics , in the sciences, and 
t h a t fa l l s comple te ly w i t h i n the reviewer ' s o w n 
d o m a i n of expert ise. Well -es tabl ished research 
areas a re t h u s favored over nascent ones . Com-
p e n s a t o r y m e c h a n i s m s t o counte rba lance these 
i n c l i n a t i o n s may be w a r r a n t e d . 
O u r m o s t in t r iguing finding offers a c lue as to 
w h y in te rd i sc ip l ina ry proposals are downgraded . 
It is r ea sonab le for a r e v i e w e r of proposed research 
t o f avo r t h a t wh ich is m o r e familiar personal ly . 
In s u c h a case, one is ap t to unders tand be t te t 
w h a t is p lanned; one m a y k n o w the researchers 
p e r s o n a l l y or by r epu ta t ion , and hence apprec ia te 
the i r exper t i se ; and o n e can feel more secure in 
m a k i n g s t rong r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s . O n e program 
m a n a g e r s u m m a r i z e d h i s experience as d e m o n -
s t r a t i ng t h a t reviewers o f t e n considered proposed 
work f r o m the "s tandpoint of only their discipline." 
T h e m a r k e d tendency of reviewers to rate proposals 
f r o m Pis f r o m t h e r ev i ewer ' s own discipl ine more 
favorably suggests that IDR should not be reviewed 
t h e s a m e way as d isc ip l inary projects. 
In v i e w of th i s se r ious concern, cons idera t ion 
s h o u l d be given to a l t e rna t ive strategies for re-
v i e w i n g IDR proposals . O n e proposed approach 
of c o m p o s i n g a rev iew t e a m that inc ludes a re-
v i ewer w h o k n o w s o n e aspect of t h e proposed 
research , ano the r w h o is expert in a second area, 
and so on, impl ies a se t of reviewers e a c h unfa-
mi l i a r w i t h m u c h of t h e w o r k . " According to our 
p r e s e n t findings, t ha t m e a n s an expected down-
grading of the proposal in comparison to one of 
e q u i v a l e n t mer i t , b u t fo r which ind iv idua l re-
v i e w e r s can better grasp t h e full scope of t h e re-
search involved. 
T o give in te rd i sc ip l inary research proposa ls the 
s a m e oppor tun i ty as discipl inary proposals for a 
good ra t ing, one has severa l choices. O n e opt ion 
is to lower r a t ing standards, but that is difficult 
to jus t i fy w i t h i n programs. NSF's current policy 
places a p p l i e d research projects in basic research 
programs. W h e n basic and applied research pro-
posals fal l w i t h i n one program, peer reviews are 
l ikely t o f a v o r t h e basic science proposals. O u r 
results f u r t h e r suggest tha t interdisciplinary re-
search p roposa l s w i th in such a program will be 
at a c o m p e t i t i v e disadvantage. In essence, using 
peer r e v i e w to choose among different types or 
areas of r e s e a r c h is ill-advised. 
P rogram managers , on occasion, collaborate to 
consider f u n d i n g a proposed project that is too 
large or b r o a d in scope to be supported by a single 
NSF p r o g r a m . When this happens, somet imes 
" t u r f " i s s u e s arise. The obvious solut ion to such 
i ssues—cross-program review—entai ls addit ional 
jeopardy for the proposer (e.g., even more reviewers 
expert in o n l y par t of the proposal, or mul t ip le 
panel rev iews] . 
A n o t h e r possibi l i ty is to seek reviewers w h o 
are expert across the breadth of the proposed work. 
As M a r t h a Russel l notes, ' T o the extent t ha t 
reviewers h a v e a holistic perspective of knowledge 
creat ion a n d use, they can offer their best guesses 
as to the success of the proposed (interdisciplinary] 
research a n d thereby assist in screening projects 
wh ich a re l ike ly to be p r o d u c t i v e . " " Such re-
viewers m a y be difficult to secure for " f r o n t i e r " 
research, and there is danger of inbreeding in cases 
where o n l y a smal l number of potent ial reviewers 
share i n t e r e s t s ful ly. 
Panel m e e t i n g s offer an advantage in a l lowing 
discussion t o help each of the members understand 
u n f a m i l i a r aspec ts of a proposal under review. 
T h e r e m a r k s of some panel is t reviewers suppor t 
such a s t r a t egy as they report "changing the i r 
mind af te r discussion." However, panels are costly 
and m u s t be cons t i tu ted t o address sets of pro-
posals. N o v e l in terdiscipl inary research is l ikely 
to fall o n t h e fringe of panel expert ise and hence 
to face a poore r expected ra t ing than more ma in -
s t ream, d i sc ip l inary research, wi th ail o ther con-
di t ions b e i n g equal. 
We sugges t tha t incorporat ion of feedback in 
the m a i l r ev iew process could help remedy the 
p rob lem of restr icted reviewer expertise. Roy re-
ports t h a t n o subs tant ia l feedback m e c h a n i s m is 
f o rma l i zed in any U.S. grant ing agency.19 We sug-
gest e x t e n d i n g the provision that is s o m e t i m e s 
used of p rov id ing the PI an oppor tuni ty to respond 
to the c o n c e r n s of reviewers before a final f u n d i n g 
dec is ion is reached. Explicitly, we advocate a 
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" D e l p h i " process . 1 0 Mail reviewers wou ld com-
m e n t on a given proposal but no t provide a nu-
mer ica l rating. T h e s e comments would be provided 
a n o n y m o u s l y to the PI and to the o t h e r reviewers . 
T h e PI and rev iewers would be given a n oppor-
t u n i t y t o exp la in t h e proposed research m o r e sat-
i s fac tor i ly . O n l y a f t e r receiving these c o m m e n t s 
a n d a m p l i f i c a t i o n s wou ld reviewers m a k e a nu-
m e r i c a l ra t ing . Such a process shou ld improve 
r e v i e w e r s ' pe rspec t ives on the fu l l project and 
r e so lve c o n c e r n s ar is ing f rom un fami l i a r i t y w i t h 
ce r t a in aspec ts . 
T h i s s tudy offers empirical ev idence tha t re-
v i e w e r s of r esea rch proposals lean toward certain 
t ypes of research . It d o c u m e n t s a t endency to 
favor t ha t w h i c h e m a n a t e s f rom one ' s own dis-
c ip l ine . We need t o devise ways to avoid discrim-
inat ing against crossdisciplinary proposals that lack 
an es tab l i shed peer group. Perhaps t h e funding 
agenc ies shou ld cons ider the deve lopmen t of new 
m e c h a n i s m s o t h e r than tradit ional peer review 
to support at least some interdisciplinary research. 
Russe l l , for example , describes a s t r uc tu r e of re-
s ea rch advisory and managemen t c o m m i t t e e s to 
balance disciplinary and interdisciplinary research 
ac t iv i t i e s in the agr icul tura l expe r imen t s ta t ion 
con tex t . 1 1 I n s t i t u t i o n a l grants and f o r m u l a allot-
m e n t s ce r t a in ly h a v e problems, b u t they could 
be c o n s t r u c t e d so as to nourish in terdisc ipl inary 
resea rch . C o m b i n a t i o n s of peer review and other 
e l e m e n t s m a y offer advantages. 
Crossd i sc ip l ina ry and, especially, interdiscipli-
n a r y r e sea rch are vital for scient i f ic and tech-
nological innovat ion. For such research to succeed, 
it m u s t su rv ive the peer review process . 
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Peer ratings can be defined as the set of evaluations obtained by having 
each member rate every other member of a work group, using a specific 
set of rating scales. A considerable amount of research has been conducted 
on peer ratings and peer evaluations in general (Brief, 1980; Kane & Lawler, 
1978, 1980). However, virtually no research has been reported on how people 
react on learning they have been either poorly or favorably evaluated by 
their peers. What effects do these ratings, or other types of peer evalua-
tions (especially when they are negative) have on subsequent interactions, 
feelings, performance, and any future evaluations? 
There is a theoretical basis for anticipating problems following an indi-
vidual's receiving negative evaluations from peers. Balance, or consisten-
cy theories (Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955; Rosenberg, Hovland, McGuire, 
Abelson, & Brehm, 1960), for example, would suggest that learning some-
one has evaluated an employee more poorly than he/she would evaluate 
himself/herself will lead to "source derogation" (Tannenbaum, 1978), or 
the lowering of the employee's opinion of the rater and any subsequent 
evaluations of that rater. The notion of reciprocity in social exchange 
(Adams, 1965) also suggests that one would "repay" a peer for a poor rating 
by later giving poor ratings to that peer. Finally, consistency theories would 
lead one to expect other outcomes following source derogation. For exam-
ple, there is reason to believe that learning of poor peer evaluations will 
result in those peers becoming less interpersonally attractive (Kiesler & De 
Salvo, 1976), which tends to reduce cohesiveness among group members 
' T h e au tho r s wish to t h a n k D e a n Mcin tosh f o r extensive comments o n an earlier version o f this paper. 
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(Zajonc, 1962). This reduction in cohesiveness can have serious consequences 
for the performance of interacting groups (Stogdill, 1972). 
There also are empirical data to indicate that people retaliate against peers 
af ter receiving negative ratings. Koeck and Guthrie (1975), for example, 
reported that subjects lowered subsequent personality ratings of peers by 
giving them more negative ratings after learning those peers had rated them 
negatively. They did not, however, raise subsequent ratings af ter learning 
that peers rated them positively. Bernardin (1980) found similar results of 
retaliation for poor supervisory evaluations, citing a relationship between 
the ratings a supervisor gives a subordinate and the subordinate's descrip-
tion of the supervisor's leadership style. This potential for retaliation prob-
ably is more serious in the case of peer ratings, however, because the ratee 
may well have the opportunity to repay the ra ter in kind. 
Thus, there is some reason to expect that learning of negative peer ratings 
will lead to retaliation during subsequent evaluations, lower group cohe-
siveness, and perhaps will even cause poorer performance for interacting 
groups. Nonetheless, no research is known that has directly examined any 
of these possibilities. It also should be noted that people may react to peer 
ratings in ways much different f rom those discussed above. Negative ratings, 
especially if one feels them to be unjustified, could be viewed as an attack 
on self-esteem. A number of studies reviewed by Kormán (1970) suggested 
tha t persons might react to such an attack by working even harder to dem-
onstrate their competence. This is, after all, what would be hoped for as 
a result of negative evaluations. Conversely, it is possible that positive peer 
evaluations could produce too much cohesiveness, which, if the group was 
not particularly motivated to perform well, could result in less task ori-
ented interaction and consequently poorer performance (Stogdill, 1972). 
These outcomes must be acknowledged as possibilities, although they seem 
less likely, given the research results reviewed above. 
The present study is a laboratory experiment tha t investigated effects of 
peer evaluations on group behavior and performance. The following gen-
eral hypothesis is tested: 
Knowledge of peer ratings will affect ratings of group cohesiveness, 
satisfaction, group interactions, and group performance (both perceived 
and actual) on a subsequent task. 
It thus is predicted that there will be positive effects for individuals who 
learn that their peers have rated them positively (i.e., various rating "scores" 
will improve) and negative effects for individuals w h o learn that their peers 
have evaluated them negatively. Furthermore, following the results reported 
by Koeck and Guthrie (1975), it is predicted that the effects following neg-
ative peer ratings will be relatively stronger than the effects following posi-
tive peer ratings. 
Method 
Subjects and Procedures 
A total of 143 undergraduate students (68 female) participated in a lab-
oratory experiment in partial fulfillment of course requirements. All subjects 
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worked in one of 34 small groups of 3 to 5, depending on the number re-
porting for a particular session. Preliminary analyses indicated no effects 
for subject sex, the sex composition of the groups, or any sex x condition 
interactions. In addition, there were no effects for group size. Thus all results 
are presented for the total sample. 
On reporting, subjects were given a general description of the procedures 
to be followed and were told that they would be working as a group on 
two tasks. Following each task they would be asked to complete a ques-
tionnaire that included an evaluation of every other member of their group 
by name. They also were informed that each person would be shown the 
evaluations, but only the mean rating received, so that individuals could 
not tell how any one person rated them. (Of course, in smaller groups, a 
group member receiving negative feedback would know that no peer could 
have rated him or her as an outstanding performer.) Subjects also were 
informed that two persons would be observing their group from behind 
a one-way glass, but the observers' only role was to record group interac-
tions. After questions were answered, subjects were asked to sign informed 
consent forms. There was no penalty for refusal to participate. Alterna-
tives were available for students to satisfy this portion of their course re-
quirement. 
The two group problems were variations of a truck routing task developed 
by DeNisi and Pritchard (1978), which required subjects to map a cross-
country route to maximize, within certain constraints, the value of the cargo 
trucked. The two variations were pretested to insure equivalence. This par-
ticular task was appropriate for the present study because several distinct 
pieces of information had to be considered, and up to five people each had 
to assume a real role within the group. The task also required coordina-
tion among group members so that members had continuous interaction. 
It therefore was impossible for any one person to perform the task alone, 
and it was difficult for any one member to be disassociated from the out-
come, which clearly is a group product. Finally, based on extensive pretesting 
of the original task, subjects had no feel for the number of points (measuring 
the value of the cargo) that were needed to represent good or poor scores. 
Thus, there was little potential for task-generated feedback that could in-
terfere with the manipulated peer feedback (discussed below). Peer rating 
feedback was given after subjects completed all measures following the first 
task, and till peer feedback was false. No feedback was given following 
the second task. Instead, after completing the questionnaires and the peer 
ratings forms a second time, subjects were debriefed and dismissed. 
Measures 
1. Task and Socioemotional Behavior. Bales' (1950) interpersonal pro-
cess analysis (IPA) form was used for assessing group interaction during 
each task. Two independent observers, blind to feedback conditions, rated 
each group on all 12 of Bales' categories for each task, recording evaluations 
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on 7-point scales for each category. Individual categories were combined, 
according to Bales' suggestion, to form two general dimensions of interac-
tion—task and socioemotional behavior. Ratings for these general dimen-
sions were computed by taking the average of each observer's ratings of 
all 12 categories for both tasks. These were taken to be the total set of ob-
servations (24) for that rater. This was done so that any reliability coeffi-
cients computed would be based on a reasonable number of observations. 
A separate reliability coefficient then was computed for each group by cor-
relating the 24 ratings made by the two observers assigned to that group. 
The range of reliability coefficients across the 34 groups was between .81 
and .95, and the average was .92. 
2. Satisfaction. Group members were asked to assess their satisfaction 
with the participation and the contribution of the other members, the group 
solution, and overall satisfaction with group members. Each item was rated 
on a 7-point scale with higher ratings indicating greater satisfaction, and 
the responses to the four items were averaged to form a single measure 
of satisfaction. The internal consistency of this measure (coefficient alpha) 
was computed to be .84 and .87 for the two administrations, respectively. 
3. Group Cohesiveness. Subjects completed a 4-item cohesiveness scale 
similar to that used by Terborg, Castore, and DeNinno (1976). Each item 
was rated on a 7-point scale with the items averaged to form a single measure 
of cohesiveness. The internal consistency of the scale (coefficient alpha) 
was .85 for both administrations. 
4. Perceived Performance. Subjects rated their perception of the group's 
performance on a single 7-point scale with higher ratings indicating more 
effective performance. 
5. Peer Ratings. Subjects rated the overall task performance of each of 
the other group members, by name, using a single 7-point rating scale 
(1 = very low; 7 = very high). The ratings given by the subjects to peers were 
averaged separately for each task, and the average ratings given by a sub-
ject served as a dependent measure. 
Ratings of group interaction were obtained from the two independent 
observers, but all other measures came from the subjects themselves. Ob-
jective task performance was the actual dollar value of the cargo collected 
by the group on its route, expressed in points. 
Conditions 
Groups were randomly assigned to either positive (17 groups, n = 10) or 
negative (17 groups, /i = 73) peer rating feedback conditions. After sub-
jects completed peer ratings for the first task, an experimenter collected 
them and left the room, telling the subjects that their ratings would be aver-
aged and returned to them. While the experimenter was absent, subjects 
were told to complete the other parts of the questionnaire (i.e., the satis-
faction, cohesiveness, and perceived performance items) and were instructed 
not to discuss the peer ratings or the questionnaires. They were told that 
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this was to insure that each subject recorded only his or her impressions 
in the questionnaires. Observers were asked to watch and listen for an> 
such discussions and to remind subjects of the instructions (using micro 
phones from behind the one-way glass) if anyone did begin to discuss the 
questionnaires or ratings. No one discussed either with fellow group 
members. 
The experimenter returned to the room and gave each subject the false 
average peer rating (for overall performance) in a sealed envelope. Sub-
jects were instructed to read but not discuss the feedback and were quickly 
given instructions for the second task and told to begin work. The sealed 
envelopes did not contain the subject's true average peer ratings. Instead, 
all persons in positive feedback groups were informed that they had received 
an average rating of about 6.0 (7.0 was the highest rating). All those in 
negative feedback groups were informed that they had received an average 
rating of about 2.5 (1.0 was the lowest rating). 
No feedback was given following the second task, although subjects did 
complete the peer ratings and the other questionnaire measures. In addi-
tion, subjects were asked to recall the average peer rating that they had 
received following the first task, as a form of manipulation check. All were 
able to recall their average rating within .1 of a point. Discussions with 
subjects during debriefing indicated that they did believe the feedback 
received. 
Results 
It was hypothesized that knowledge of peer ratings would affect group 
member interactions, perceptions, performance, and subsequent peer ratings 
and that the nature of these effects would depend on the sign of the peer 
ratings. A series of analyses therefore was conducted considering the sign 
of the peer rating feedback (either positive or negative) and time (after task 
1, before feedback; or after task 2, following feedback) as independent var-
iables, and the following dependent variables: task and socioemotional be-
havior exhibited (rated by observers), cohesiveness, satisfaction, perceived 
performance, actual performance (total points collected), and average peer 
rating given. Table 1 presents the means (and standard deviations) for all 
dependent variables, broken down by time and sign of peer rating feedback. 
Because the various dependent variables were correlated, a multivariate 
analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) was conducted. It revealed a multi-
variate effect for the sign of peer feedback (F=4.53, p< .01). A series of 
univariate analyses of covariance (ANCOVA) was then conducted on time 
2 ratings with time 1 ratings as covariates, following Huck and McLean 
(1975), after an initial test indicated that common slope could be assumed 
(F< 1). The ANCOVA results indicated significant (p< .05, or better) peer 
feedback effects on perceived performance (F=7.32, w2 = . l l ) , cohesive-
ness (F=6.24, w2=.10), satisfaction ( F = 10.65, w2=.16), average peer 
rating given (F= 16.50, w2 = .20), and rated task behavior (F= 5.62, 
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Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations for All Variables at Time 1 
and Time 2 for Positive and Negative Feedback Groups 
and the Results of Several Comparisons 
Negative Feedback Pasitive Feedback  
Time 1 Time 2 Time 1 -Time 2* Timet Time 2 Time 1-Time 2» 
Observer measures 
Socioemotional behavior 2.84 2.56 < 1 2.75 2.75 <1 
(1.08)b (.56) (86) (.50) 
Task behavior 4.76 4.52 < 1 5.20 5.28 <1 
(.72) (.50) (.75) (.68) 
Perceptual measures 
Perceived performance 6.21 5.64 5.28** 6.24 6.74 <1 
(.89) (.81) (1.46) (.82) 
Cohesiveness 5.39 4.95 4.18* 5.70 5.95 1.02 
(.92) (.42) (.79) (.77) 
Satisfaction 5.63 5.09 3.85 5.77 5.81 <1 
(1.02) (94) (1.04) (.88) 
A verage peer rating 5.33 4.42 6.08** 5.64 6.20 7.42' 
given (1.40) (1.09) (1.13) (.81) 
Actual performance 39.00 37.50 2.81 40.56 40.94 <1 
(3.62) (4.94) (5.24) (3.97) 
•These are the results of simple effects analyses comparing ratings at time 1 and time 2. 
^Standard deviations are shown in parentheses, 
•p < .05 
• • p c . 0 1 
to2 = .09). Thus, knowledge of peer ratings did affect most of the depen-
dent variables of interest, although rated socioemotional behavior and ob-
jective performance did not seem to be affected. 
To test the exact nature of these effects over time, for subjects learning 
of positive and negative peer ratings, a series of simple effects analyses, 
comparing time 1 and time 2 means within feedback groups, was conducted. 
Winer (1975) suggests that this type of analysis is more appropriate than 
simple r-tests, given the evidence of sign of feedback X time interactions, 
and the tests were conducted using formulae provided in his book. As pre-
dicted, subjects learning of positive peer ratings raised scores on all per-
ceptual measures from task 1 to task 2, collected more points on the sec-
ond task, and were rated higher on task behavior for task 2. However, only 
one change was significant (average peer rating given: F = 7 . 4 2 , p c . O l ) . 
Also as predicted, subjects learning of negative peer ratings lowered scores 
on all perceptual measures from task 1 to task 2, collected fewer points 
on the second task, and were rated lower on task and socioemotional be-
havior for task 2. These changes were significant for perceived performance 
( F = 5 . 2 8 , p < .05,) cohesiveness (F=4.18, /?< .05), and average peer rating 
given (F=6 .08 ,p< .01 ) . Thus, these results support the predicted stronger 
effect of learning about negative peer ratings. 
Discussion 
The results from this study seem to raise some doubts about the use of 
peer ratings for feedback, but the limitations of the present study are 
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recognized. Perhaps foremost among these is the short time perspective 
studied. It is suspected that performance following negative peer ratings 
would deteriorate over time, but there are several other possibilities. Negative 
ratings conceivably could motivate a worker to try even harder in order 
to improve the ratings received; thus performance might actually improve 
over time. It also is possible that, over time, group members might become 
accustomed to poor peer ratings and ignore them completely. A different 
limitation of this study arising from the short time perspective is that in 
existing work groups, cohesiveness and satisfaction generally have had time 
to develop more fully than in this study, and workers might be less suscep-
tible to changes following negative peer ratings. One could argue, however, 
that learning that close and trusted peers have given negative ratings might 
have an even greater debilitating effect on the group. In any event, given 
more time together, the apparent deterioration in group-member relations 
might well lead to a decline in actual performance. There is a clear need 
for further research with a more realistic time horizon. 
Other limitations to the external validity of the present study stem from 
the manipulation of the peer feedback. Negative peer ratings were opera-
tionalized here as a mean rating of about 2.5 on a 7-point scale, but rarely 
would one peer rate another so poorly. Thus, it is possible that the relatively 
strong effects found for negative peer feedback were due to the extreme 
nature of the feedback received. Nonetheless, such a reaction would indi-
cate that subjects did believe that such low ratings were possible. Of course, 
in existing groups, negative ratings probably are defined more by group 
norms than by scale points, and what seems to be a much more positive 
rating could actually be viewed as quite severe by group members. 
In general, even given these limitations, the results of the present study 
suggest the need for further research on peer ratings and peer evaluations 
in general. This research needs to go beyond demonstrating significant rela-
tionships between peer evaluations and some criterion measures. This study, 
performed in a controlled setting, found that knowledge of how one's peers 
have rated a person had a definite impact on group behavior (especially 
when those ratings were negative). This finding cannot be ignored simply 
because the setting was somewhat artificial. Instead, field research needs 
to be conducted utilizing designs that allow assessment of effects over longer 
periods of time so as to understand how group interactions and patterns 
of behavior might be affected by feedback from peers. 
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MARTIN RUDERFER: 
The Fallacy of Peer Review: 
Judgement without Science and a Case History 
Speculations in Science and Technology, 3 (1980) 533-562 
Peer review, the process of judging the contributions that make up the archives of science, is 
not now justifiable as a scientific endeavour. Yet this process, via the archives of science, is 
a key factor in determining man's ability to cope with the growing global problems of the 
population explosion stimulated by past scientific progress. There exists an urgency to 
improve peer review in order to guarantee the technological growth rate vital for long-term 
survival. However, a science of peer review has thus far been precluded by the secrecy 
imposed on the primary raw data — review histories. To begin to rectify this, a case history 
of an erroneous rejection is presented in detail. The rejected paper, which claimed to correct 
a published dispute involving atomic timekeeping, was published in SST in 1979 along with 
a fol low-up paper confirming and extending it. The case history leads to the hypothesis that 
the probability of rejection increases with the degree of innovation in a publishable work. 
This is validated by the follow-up paper which shows the rejected paper to require a 
paradigm shift to correct a widespread misinterpretation of rotating clock behaviour now 
erroneously attributed to special relativity. This results in a simple unification of rotating 
clock behaviour in a tomic timekeeping, the Sagnac e f fect and the Hafele-Keating 
experiment. The ability o f this case history to clearly delineate origins of human error in 
review processes demonstrates the need for publication of many more and the desirability 
of stressing erroneous rejection in peer review at least as much as the traditional emphasis 
on erroneous acceptance. This one case also supports the urgency required for improving 
the accuracy and speed of peer review and recommends a number of specific means for 
accomplishing this. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The spectacular growth of m o d e m science fo l lowing the invention of 
printing attests to the supremacy of the printed word in man's pursuit of 
knowledge. The archives of science nurtured the rapid rise of technology in 
the last few centuries. 
Demands on reports for research journals — the roots of these archives — 
are among the most exacting in all the fields of literature: extensive preliminary 
research, precise explication, maximum objectivity and rigour, absence of bias 
and error, novel or utilitarian content, all presented with optimum economical 
clarity. It is consequently not surprising that the decision of what to accept or 
reject has always been difficult. 
For the last three centuries the principal method of judging potential 
contributions has been peer review, commonly known as the referee system, 
wherein acceptance or rejection is decided by an editor based on reports of 
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anonymous referees of ostensible expertise. Yet, although author reports are 
required to approach the peak of scientific methodology, referee reports which 
judge them have had no such explicit restraint — maximum secrecy, 
unprescribed rigour, lack of precise judgement standards, cursory investigation 
and no guaranteed impartiality. Credibility of referee reports rests mainly in 
the belief, o f t en just a hope, that the referee is truly a peer for the material 
being judged and that such peer knowledge has been adequately applied. ( 1 ) 
No matter what justification is cited for peer review, an ironic truth remains: 
The scientific method is not being rigorously applied in the process of selecting 
those examples of the scientific method deemed worthy of preservation. 
If this seems harsh, consider the effect of a referee error that results in a 
firm rejection. The only recourse for the author is to submit again elsewhere. 
The chances of subsequent acceptance are best if his thesis is evolutionary, for 
the error is then more likely t o be localised, i.e. peculiar to the referee. If his 
thesis is revolutionary, the error is probably more widespread,»!.e. peculiar to 
established doctrine, and the probability of publication within his lifetime is 
minimal. Although uncommon, revolutionary ideas have played a prominent 
role in the development of science. There is no specified error-correction 
mechanism in peer review for insuring that any valid development, evolutionary 
or revolutionary, is not disregarded for an excessive period or is forever 
overlooked. 
Rejection errors have far reaching adverse consequences for the research 
community. T h e y result in needless additional time and effort caused by re-
submissions, increase the total referee load on the journals, reduce the time 
spent by authors and referees on primary projects and, especially, have 
disastrous psychological effects on authors. Mayer and Boltzmann, for example, 
were so depressed by rejection it was a contributing factor in their attempted 
suicides.'2 > Boltzmann succeeded but Mayer only broke his legs, was confined 
to a mental institution for a while and was finally recognised for his work on 
energy conservation after a loss to society of about 15 years. At the other 
extreme is a recent case known to the author of complete abandonment of 
research because of disillusionment with the review system.'3 > Between these 
extremes lies a spectrum of psychological effects which rob society of the full 
potential of many of its most creative members. Measurement of the total cost 
of review errors has been ignored for too long. 
Gross inequities from rejection errors are inherent in the open-loop nature 
of the present review system. This is contrary to the existence of closed-loop 
negative feedback systems in almost every facet of society for correcting major 
errors, viz. separation of executive and judicial functions; law enforcement; 
elections; elaborate court systems for redress; arbitration; open refereeing, as 
in sports contests; ombudsmen, forums; etc. The lack of any prescribed error-
correcting mechanism built into the referee system brands it as one of the most 
autocratic in society today. 
An author may spend months, years and even a lifetime in preparing a 
manuscript, ye t under the present system it may be arbitrarily rejected by a 
referee after a cursory reading, akin to the flick of the wrist used by some 
Nazis in deciding acceptance or rejection for survival. Arbitrary action is not 
precluded by the present system; in science what is not expressly impossible 
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should be deemed feasible. How of ten it has actually occurred is immaterial; 
what is significant is that there is no sure recourse to authors to correct a 
defective rejection or, in the case of deliberate malpractice'1 -4'5>, any form 
of redress. 
The absence of negative feedback is further aggravated by the high 
positive feedback inherent in the dissemination of scientific ideas. When 
published research in a new area stimulates further interest, this leads t o further 
publications, still further interest, etc. Although such a snowball effect is useful 
in rapidly exploiting breakthroughs, the net long-term effect of such a 
happenstance type of growth has never been fully evaluated, especially in 
regard to the consolidation of tacit unrigorous assumptions that may unknow-
ingly usurp other, more superior, courses of develoDment. Moreover, it is also 
well known that the overall effect of positive feedback in any system is rapid 
uncontrolled growth and long-term instability. The incredible short term gains 
man has achieved in the relatively brief life of modern science are now 
beginning to spin off numerous long-term problems, especially f rom the 
population explosion it has stimulated. The crucial role of the referee sys tem in 
delaying the response time of the science establishment to meet the challenges 
to society induced by past technological successes has already been noted.'6> 
The most damning indictment of the present referee system is that the 
haphazard growth it has fostered has thus far provided no capacity t o reliably 
ensure a stable final state toward which science, and hence civilization, is 
headed. In short, there is no positive proof or assurance that modern science 
cannot selfdlestruct. It is primarily for this reason that it is timely to place 
the present error-prone open-loop referee system under the microscope. 
2. QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION OF PEER REVIEW 
The application of the scientific method — reasoning based on experience 
— to peer review has always been hampered by the lack of adequate raw data. 
Every established science is based on measurement of some observable object 
or phenomena in nature. In a science of peer review, the relevant phenomena 
are the details of the review process itself, specifically the total communi-
cations involved — submitted reports, review reports and all other interchange 
of information affecting the final decision. However the secrecy heretofore 
imposed on reviews has precluded dissemination of such data for quantitative 
evaluation. As a result, prior discussions, criticisms and studies of peer review 
and suggestions for improving it'1 -3"13>, although of ten incisive, are anecdotal, 
subjective and/or limited. 
T o rectify this a sufficient number of case histories must be fully exposed 
to view so that the variegated factors contributing to review decisions can first 
be systematically analysed and measured. It is only then that ways to improve 
the review process can be realistically instituted with confidence. With this 
objective in mind, such a case history is presented below. However it is first 
useful t o explore the kinds of information required from such data. 
Despite the scattered published criticisms of peer review, the prevailing 
view is that it works. But to what precision? In an outstanding quantitative 
study from analysis of the records of 14 ,512 manuscripts submitted to The 
Physical Review from 1948 to 1956 , Zuckerman and Merton' 7 8 * concluded, 
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"The referee system here apparently does what it is supposed to do: Sift out 
the good papers from the bad." In other words, for this "low-rejection journal" 
the system worked somewhat better than chance. Reassuring as this may be, it 
is not unexpected. The success of modern science implies that its review system 
must have thus far been statistically effective to s o m e significant degree. But if 
the actual rejection error rate on publication decisions in this sample is 
expressed as 1 in 10", what is the precise value of n? 
The upper l imit to n is log 1 4 , 5 1 2 = 4.2, but its actual value is n o t possible 
to ascertain from such a contemporary study. S o m e revolutionary ideas have 
been widely rejected after publication for 25 and 5 0 years, as for Maxwell's 
electromagnetic theory and Wegener's continental drift theory, respectively, 
so the possible rejection of just o n e revolutionary unpublished advance in the 
sample cited cannot be reliably determined for at least a comparable period. 
The Zuckerman and Merton analysis provides a lower limit to n of the 
order of 1 in accord with a 20 ( 5 ) percent rejection rate for single (multiple) 
authors. ' 7- 8 > This and the upper limit of 4.2 may be far too low to insure that 
key ideas are not passed by for excessive periods. 
Premature rejections belie the vaunted exhaustiveness of science. How 
many other key innovations essential to our long-term survival, as those of 
Carnot, Gibbs, Goddard, Mendel and others'6 ' , have long been ignored for the 
wrong reasons? What is the distribution of number of such rejections versus 
delay in acceptance? The history of innovation indicates that it must be quite 
skewed with a tail that may asymptotically approach zero. This is in contra-
diction with the prevalent view stated, e.g. by Cole and Cole' 1 4 > that if a 
"scientist who makes a discovery had not made it, it would have been only a 
matter of time — probably a relatively short period — before the discovery 
would be made by another scientist". This popular notion is actually 
unverifiable and therefore untenable as a working hypothesis for a study of the 
review process. There is no evidence that n is ideally infinite over the still 
uncertain life span of modern science; rather, the life span must be generally 
assumed to be interrelated with n. Its measure is a vital one for exploring means 
to insure long-term survival. 
The current pressure on technology to solve the problems wrought by the 
population explosion in this century also demands increasing attention to time 
factors in the review process. Population growth has heretofore been governed 
primarily by immutable biophysiological factors; growth of knowledge is 
governed by unrelated and little understood psycho-social factors. The usual 
answer to the Malthusian doomsday predictions is the expectation of new 
advances by the "technological optimists".'1 6 ' But if the disorganising effects 
to society of the population explos ion reach the stage wherein they physically 
impair the ability to solve technical problems, a worldwide catastrophic 
situation develops. The current state of civilization suggests that such a process 
may have already begun and that the possibility of eventual self-destruction 
cannot be positively eliminated. 
It is consequently fail-safe t o insure that the technological growth rate 
exceeds the growth rate of the disorganising effects of the population 
explosion. To guarantee the required technological solutions w e need to 
minimise unnecessary delays in the growth of knowledge. What are the causes 
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of delays in the dissemination process in quantitative terms? To what extent 
can these be eliminated without a sacrifice in judgement precision? 
The psycho-social factors affecting the review process and its 
consequences for authors also demand measurement. Can good and bad 
reviewers be predicted in advance by some suitable criteria? If so, would a 
cadre of professional reviewers, comparable to judges in the legal process, be 
useful in some way? Just how do authors react to the frustration from bad 
reviews and the powerlessness to deal with them? To what extent does this 
affect total scientific output? 
It is only by exposing the review process to public view that such 
questions may begin to be answered properly and a science of peer review 
established. It is in this vein that the following review history is presented in 
detail. 
3. CASE HISTORY OF A REVIEW REJECTION 
Although contemporary cases of improper rejection have been discussed 
in the l i terature'4-1 6 1 the secrecy imposed on the review process has precluded 
full disclosure. Since the journals have refrained from publishing complete 
review histories, the only available source is from authors. Hence it is not 
unexpected that the following case history derives from a personal experience. 
The relevant paper, entitled "One-Way Doppler Effects in Atomic Time-
keeping", was submitted to Science in February 1976 and was finally rejected 
in April 1 9 7 7 . In July 1978 it was sent to Speculations in Science and 
Technology (SST) as a contrary example to public statements stimulated by its 
inception that established journals eventually publish all relevant ideas. The 
paper was published' 1 7 1 as it was when finally rejected by Science. It is accom-
panied by a short introductory history'1*1 and a follow-up study' 1 9 > 
confirming and extending the original paper. All page numbers in parentheses 
which follow refer to these SST papers. Also see "Errata" to these. ' 2 0 ' 
The total information transfer between author and Science editor are 
included in the Appendices A through S at the end of this report and are 
identified in Table 1 preceding the appendices. The dates of receipt of 
manuscripts by Science were stamped on the original and were properly 
acknowledged. 
The rejected paper was stimulated by a prior paper in Science' 2 1 1 by 
Cannon and Jensen entitled "Terrestrial Timekeeping and General Relativity — 
A Discovery". Their discovery consisted of a dramatic equalisation in the rates 
of six coordinated worldwide atomic clocks from application of a terrestrial 
clock-velocity correction. Subsequent cri t ic ism' 2 2 , 2 3 1 and the failure to affirm 
their discovery with uncoordinated clocks caused Cannon and Jensen' 2 4 1 to 
retract their explanation of the equalisation and to designate it as an artifact 
of the data. The rejected paper claimed to offer an alternative explanation of 
the Cannon-Jensen finding which was consistent with prevalent theory but was 
applicable only to coordinated clocks (pp.401-2), extended the effect to the 
solar frame and clarified three unexplained ef fects reported by Sadeh and 
associates. 
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4. DISCUSSION OF REFEREE REPORTS 
There were nine reviews of the paper (Q,S). The two referee reports (C,D) 
received by the author with the first rejection and the two (M,N) with the third 
rejection are now discussed. Reports of the other five reviews are not available 
for analysis except for verbal reports that one rated the paper as "excel lent" 
(F,G) and that another was generally negative (I). 
Report C. This referee made t w o fundamental errors. In his first paragraph 
he referred to a published criticism'2 3 > relevant only to the frequency 
discrepancy of the RGO clock at Greenwich Observatory which is specifically 
excluded from the analysis, as detailed in E, and which is irrelevant t o the 
Cannon-Jensen finding based on the other six clocks. In the second paragraph, 
the "synchronization procedures" refer to the lack of absolute calibration of 
the six clocks to the international second. This affects only the Cannon-Jensen 
theory which requires absolute accuracy and not the finding itself which is an 
experimental result and hence exists apart from any theory. The adjustments to 
the atomic clocks by the time laboratories to slave them to the master UTC 
clock maintained by the Bureau International de 1'Heure is exactly what is 
required to test for the proposed explanation, as discussed (p .402) and 
elaborated in E. This rejection is a graphic confirmation of the lack of scientific 
rigour in the judgement process. 
Report D. In his paragraph (a) the referee alludes to "imprecision and 
inconsistency" without proper justification. He erred in stating that the 
product of frequency and time in equations (6) (p.389) indicates that 
frequency is a constant. Constancy of phase, i.e., fT = fjT t , where f is frequency 
and T is one-way travel time between transmitter and receiver, is demanded by 
the Lorentz transformations, as cited just below equation (8) (p.390) . These 
only require f/f; = T/Tj. The frequency change in equation (11) (p .390) is the 
well-known (classical) change due to phase modulation for a relatively moving 
observer, as stated. It is evaluated for an observation of a one-way propagation 
over a given duration T which therefore merely serves as a boundary condition. 
Because the referee may have been confused by the brevity of the original 
derivation it was expanded as noted in E. 
The paragraph added to the paper (p.400) to quantitatively evaluate the 
referee's implication in (b) that the neglect of Sun's gravitational potential 
falsifies the paper showed this cause for rejection to be unfounded. 
In (c) the error of referee C is repeated for the same reason the Cannon-
Jensen theory was rejected — inadequate absolute clock accuracy — despite the 
discussion disclaiming the relevance of absolute accuracy in the rejected paper 
(pp.401-2) . The discussion in E and in the follow-up paper (p.406) may be 
further clarified as follows: A systematic difference between two clock rates, 
as from any physical cause, results in an ever-increasing difference in clock 
readings which must eventually become sensible. However, random drift of 
clock rates over a long period results in essentially no difference in clock 
readings. Thus, if the magnitude of a randomly varying rate initially exceeds a 
systematic rate difference, the latter must still become observable over a 
sufficiently long period. Randomness of clock rate is maximised by the practice 
of the time laboratories to compare and adjust the individual UTCj clocks to 
the average (UTC) of a large number of free-running clocks. Any long term 
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systematic differences between the six clock rates must then eventually assert 
themselves by difference in clock readings and/or the rate corrections they 
entail. Absolute clock accuracy is not directly involved. 
Report M. This referee appears to be the same as referee D. His refusal 
to discuss the issues despite the reply (E) to his initial objections and the 
revisions initiated by them, or to provide any attempt at further falsification, 
is an example of arbitrary rejection. 
Report N. This rejection has two main errors: (i) The offered explanation 
is nowhere based on a one-way anisotropy in the speed of light, as claimed by 
the referee. Isotropy is assumed to be constant throughout, as discussed 
(p.389) . (ii) His formal theory is incorrect and hence inappropriate, as detailed 
in P, due to his confusion of one-way travel time T as a general time 
coordinate. This is affirmed by his statement "T = t is the coordinate time in 
the frame of the stationary clock." The meaning of t is made clear at equation 
(1) (p .388) early in the paper, contrary to his statement further below, "t is 
not made clear until p .12" (p.394) , at which point he could have ascertained 
his error. Also see P. The last comment is a misconstrued version of objection 
(b) of D which was evaluated and inserted in the manuscript, as discussed in P. 
5. GENERAL COMMENTS 
The immediate consideration, which precedes any final judgement, is the 
rejections for the wrong reasons. The four reviews of the three referees plus the 
one satisfactory response yield a minimum error rate of 3 /4 for the review 
history. This is intolerably high for a presumed scientific process involving 
technical matters which are inherently resolvable. Such a large deviation from 
the above-chance accuracy of the average review process in physics'7 8 ' 
indicates that there is something radically wrong with the way manuscripts 
are now judged. We can of course arbitrarily assign errors in any isolated 
instance to indifference, laxity, chance, prejudice, politics, author status or 
even malpract ice ' 1 - 4 - 5 ) , but this would involve only errors of similar arbitrari-
ness. The availability of case histories presents the opportunity to seek the root 
causes of erroneous rejection. 
In this case the most prominent element common to the rejections is the 
pre-occupation with theory. This is undoubtedly due to the unconventional 
form of the Doppler effect applied since a travel time formalism is not the 
common text-book explanation. Nevertheless, the travel t ime form applied, 
equation (13 ) (p.391), is justified for constant radial and transverse velocities 
and is more rigorously affirmed to the required precision in the follow-up 
paper (p .417) . The necessity for an unconventional formalism is obvious in 
retrospect: (i) The use of a one-way coordination signal automatically 
prescribes one-way propagation theory. However, this little known area has still 
not entered the main stream of physics, (ii) The constancy required by 
conventional theory in the rates of (uncoordinated) worldwide atomic clocks 
in the geocentric frame independent of Earth's rotation (p .385) obscures the 
possibility that other effects of clock rotation may exist. These combined with 
the supposed published resolution of the Cannon-Jensen finding largely 
account for the high error rate in this case history vis-a-vis the average. This 
preoccupation with conformance to conventional theory thereby suggests the 
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following working hypothesis, termed here the Innovation Theorem: 
The probable delay in acceptance of an innovation increases with its departure 
from the conventional norm. 
The history of innovation in science, technology and other areas, as 
politics and religion, generally support such an hypothesis. The familiar.wide-
spread hesitancy to adopt radical ideas inexorably points to a deeply ingrained 
property of the average human mind. Resistance to innovation in science has 
been sporadically noted but was never systematically considered until 1 9 6 1 
by Barber 1 2 5 1 . Applied to the review process it suggests that rejection error 
rate must increase for manuscripts which are rated on an increasing scale from 
evolutionary to revolutionary. 
The enormous success of the scientific method is primarily due t o its 
ability to negate resistance to change by the test of experience for resolving 
the conf l icts precipitated by dogma, tradition, preconceptions and the like. 
Only one conclusive experience has o f t e n been sufficient to overcome the 
ingrained resistance to a new approach, e.g. the 1919 eclipse observations led 
rapidly t o the wide acceptance of Einstein's theory; Hertz's experiment 
quickly overcame the deep 25-year rejection of Maxwell's theory1 2 6 3; and the 
discovery of the mid-Atlantic ridge soon settled the theoretical objection to 
Wegener's continental displacement mechanism despite the other supporting 
evidence he had col lected 1 2 7 1 . In other cases, preoccupation with theory has 
delayed consideration of well-founded experiment, e.g. Ohm 1 2 • 2 5 1 . 
The referees similarly neglected the observational aspects that may have 
modified their preoccupation with theory: (i) The equalisation of clock rates 
was too significant to summarily ignore (pp.396-7). (ii) The clarification of the 
one-way e f fects reported by Sadeh et a l 1 2 8 ' —a diurnal variation with a super-
posed sunrise effect and a variation with clock separation — were based only on 
conventional theory, (iii) The extension to the solar frame for which a 
laboratory experiment was proposed (p .401) was based on the verified Sagnac 
effect. This same preoccupation with theory manifested itself in the five SST 
reviews of the follow-up paper, but the weight of added evidence tempered 
recommendation of outright rejection. 
6. CONFIRMATION OF THE REJECTED PAPER 
In the hindsight of the delayed acceptance of innovation, as for Maxwell, 
Wegener and Ohm, it is difficult to comprehend why their innovations were 
not at first provisionally accepted instead of being firmly rejected. The 
fo l low-up 1 1 9 1 of the rejected paper supports the working hypothesis that initial 
rejection of valid innovation relates to its departure from accepted ideas. 
The present theory of relatively rotating clocks stems from Einstein's 
1905 introduction of special relativity. This is widely assumed to explain the 
Hafele-Keating experiment comparing t w o relatively rotating clocks. Atomic 
timekeeping and the long known Sagnac effect also involve rotating clocks. 
(Although the Sagnac ef fect has been expressly confirmed only with oppositely 
directed light rays in a rotating mirror system, Ives rigorously showed 1 2 9 1 that 
the substitution of rotating clocks for mirrors and light rays gives identical 
results.) The difference between the three techniques is trivial: differential 
rotation derives from f ixed atomic clocks at different latitudes in atomic 
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timekeeping, f rom oppositely rotating clocks in the Sagnac experiment and 
from differential rotation of atomic clocks at the same latitude in the Hafele-
Keating experiment. The difference in clock rates then all derive, to second 
order, from equation (25) (p .399) which has its relativistic origin in equation 
(2 ) (p.388): 
t£ - tj = ( 0 I - 0 I ) / c 2 - (VI 2 - V J 2 ) / 2 c 2 + t u v ( 1 ) 
where i j are rotating clocks, t is clock rate, <j> is the gravitational potential, 
c is the speed of light, VJJ is geocentric rotational velocity and u is Earth's 
orbital velocity. The Vjj (uv) term is the kinematic effect in the geocentric 
(heliocentric) frame. For oppositely rotating clocks with ground speed v at 
Earth's surface corresponding to oppositely directed light rays in the usual 
Sagnac experiment, Vj = Í2R - v and v; = Í2R + v, where is angular velocity 
of Earth and R is distance of clocks to Earth's axis. Then the difference in 
clock readings due to the geocentric kinematic effect (i.e. neglecting the <*> and 
uv terms) after one revolution in time At = 2ÍT/Í2 is, since t j j = A t j j / A t , 
( t i - t j ) A t ~ A t j - A t j = 4?rRv/c2 (2) 
This is a c o m m o n expression for the first-order Sagnac effect .*2 9 ' In the 
Hafele-Keating experiment, clock j is flown around the world at average ground 
speed v and clock i is stationary on Earth. Hence Vj = Í2R and Vj = Í2R + v. 
Then equation (1) similarly yields, after one revolution of clock i in time 
At i = t0 = 2ir/S2 at which time clock j registers time At ; = r 
T - T0 = -(2i2Rv + v 2 ) r 0 / 2 c 2 (3) 
This is exactly the kinematic relation tested by Hafele and Keating.*30> 
Moreover, they noted (last paragraph) that a more precise evaluation should 
yield effects of Moon and Sun beyond their measurement precision. These 
include gravitational and kinematic effects, the solar contribution to the latter 
being identifiable with the last (uv) term in equation (1). This is small but is 
evaluated and listed for reference in the rejected paper as "sidereal corrections" 
(Table 1, p .395) . Over the six year period of the follow-up analysis these 
became measurable by the relative mean drift of the clocks (Fig.5, p.410) and 
by the long-term drift of all the clocks combined due to interaction with the 
geocentric e f fect (Fig.4, p.409). Furthermore, these are inherently verifiable 
directly by the proposed double-disc Sagnac experiment (p.401). 
Although this simple unification of rotating clock behaviour is obvious 
in retrospect, the Hafele-Keating experiment was not brought up by the author 
(except in P) or by the refreees, nor has its straightforward relevance to atomic 
timekeeping, the Cannon-Jensen finding or the Sagnac effect been heretofore 
recognised. The reason becomes apparent from the derivation in the follow-up 
paper (p.417) that classical transverse aberration suffices to explain all the 
results. To the precision of the data, the kinematic terms in equation (1) are 
properly explained by classical, not relativistic, transverse aberration. In effect , 
a paradigm shift in the interpretation of rotating clock behaviour is required. 
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This misinterpretation of existing theory resulted in the following: (i) 
The only available heuristic route to explore the Cannon-Jensen finding became 
the unconventional consideration of one-way propagation effects, (ii) Because 
the most advanced one-way theory, that of Ives (pp. 388-9), was based on the 
largely ignored Lorentz-ether formalism, a further unconventionality resulted. 
(iii) The supporting connection to the Sagnac effect which followed from Ives' 
little known rigorous analysis129 > added another element of unconventionality. 
(iv) The findings are not a result of Lorentz invariance, as conventionally 
assumed in the rejected paper, but are ultimately shown in the follow-up paper 
(p .418) to be properly described as not in conflict with Lorentz invariance. 
(v) The obvious connection of one-way theory to the Hafele-Keating 
experiment was denied by the latter's premature widespread affirmation of 
relativistic clock behaviour combined with the neglect of one-way propagation 
fostered by Einstein's definition of simultaneity, (vi) All these coalesced to 
reduce the probability of acceptance by the referees. Thus the final resolution 
of rotating clock behaviour stimulated by the Cannon-Jensen finding involved 
a series of considerations leading inevitably to rectification of a prevalent 
misinterpretation which, however, served to block the dissemination of the 
very considerations by which it could be eventually rectified. This required 
paradigm shift becomes the basic origin of the review rejection and shows the 
original paper t o be more revolutionary than evolutionary. 
Extension of equation (1) beyond Moon and Sun to the Galaxy is also 
found in the fol low-up paper to show the absolute motions of Sun and Galaxy 
to be within reach (Fig.8, p .414) . This should allow, in time and by tightening 
of the UTC coordination process, a more accurate measure of these motions 
than by the diff icult astronomical methods. The small solar gravitational e f f ec t 
(p .400) must, of course, be included in any complete evaluation of annual 
residuals from ellipticity of Earth's orbit. For a clock on Earth or Sun with 
respect to a clock at rest in the universal frame, the kinematic effect in 
equation (1) also explains the relatively large drifts between the various time 
standards (pp.415-6) . This is of practical importance in astronomy where 
Earth, solar and atomic time scales have up to now been coordinated 
empirically. The suggestion of an acceleration origin of the still unexplained 
large quasar emission line-widths (Ref.12, p . 4 2 0 ) follows from equation ( 1 2 ) 
(p .391) , which was not otherwise applied in the analyses. The data also allows 
a long-distance upper limit to departure from the isotropy of c, as assumed by 
Einstein and in the analyses, which is determined by the residuals in Fig.8 
(p .414) after all other annual ef fects are deducted. 
Most important, the ability of second-order aberration to measure 
absolute motion of relatively rotating clocks is a validation of an absolute 
reference frame for light propagation (p.418) which provides a direct confirm-
ation of the Lorentz (relativistic) ether (pp.391-2) . This is supported by the 
recent measurement of the anisotropy in the cosmic background radiation 
which has been claimed to demonstrate existence of a "new ether"131 >. 
However, there is nothing new about it since there can only be one such ether 
frame at rest in the universe — the Lorentz ether already known to be identifi-
able with the cosmic reference frame for acceleration (p.392). 
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Besides confirming the rejected paper and clarifying clock behaviour, the 
follow-up paper indicates how applications may directly proliferate from 
innovation and hence that these are delayed by improper rejection. This case 
history thereby links the probability of self-destruction of science from a 
deficient growth rate directly to the mental inertia inherent in the minds of 
men as summarised by the Innovation Theorem. 
7. TIME FACTORS IN THE REVIEW PROCESS 
In view of the increasing need for urgency in solving today's technological 
problems, opportunities for decreasing unnecessary time delays are of interest. 
Accordingly, the time factors in this review process are summarised in Table 2 
(at the end of this paper). 
The greatest delays were incurred by the reviews themselves which 
accounted for 75.5 percent of the total t ime to reach a final decision. The t ime 
for a single review response averaged to 1 0 9 days, which includes the two-way 
transit t ime between editor and referees. Since the review cycle represents the 
greatest opportunity for time reduction, it would be useful to know the 
distribution of "dead t ime", i.e. time delays not affecting review quality, due 
to editorial office, referees and transit. Such data are intrinsically determinable 
by the journals and demand systematic analysis. 
The major cause of the 433 days required to reach a decision is the large 
number of reviews which, in turn, was aggravated by the low review precision. 
This case history thereby suggests that an increase in review precision presages 
shorter review times and reduced load on the journals and research community 
with its attendant financial, psychological and social benefits . 
The total time for a review may be small compared to the delay in final 
publication caused by a rejection. Due to the nature and period of the subject 
review, there were n o plans to repeat such an exasperating experience. 
Publication of the two papers would have been indefinitely delayed were it not 
for the circumstances associated with the inception of SST (p.386) and 
insistence of the editor of SST on further corroboration. 
The high delay per response by reviewers suggests a general disregard for 
urgency in present review practice. Due to the sequential proliferation of 
discoveries, which depend on prior discoveries dependent on still prior 
discoveries, etc., the development of science is exponentially stretched out by 
unnecessary delays. That a marked reduction in total publication t ime is 
feasible has been demonstrated by the Journal of Clinical Psychiatry'32> and 
in physics by Azbel<9) in his comparison of JETP Letters and Physical Review 
Letters. He attributes the greater speed of JETP to editorial requirements for 
greater review precision and shorter response time. In reply, the editors of PRL 
state'1 0 ' that publication delay time "can be reduced substantially only by 
increasing our costs — and our page charges — significantly and we choose not 
to do so" (italics added). If this direct affirmation of a l o w priority for urgency 
is merely a matter of cos t to the journals, why is it n o t also evaluated with 
respect to the inordinate cost of slower technological growth' 1 5 ' to society? 
Can we put a price on increasing the probability of civilization's survival and 
the attendant improvement in the quality of life? In this light the solution is 
self-evident: since soc ie ty is the chief beneficiary it should provide the 
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necessary funds. However, the isolation of the internal workings of the science 
establishment from public view has thus far obfuscated the fact that return on 
any investment in speeding the dissemination process can be matched by few, 
if any, other investments of our resources at present. Society spends large sums 
for research and development of specific projects initiated by scientists but 
negligible amounts on the publication bottleneck, the major path for 
dissemination of the knowledge so obtained which, in essence, determines the 
return to society on its initial investment. It is the anachronism of our times 
that, because of cost, many of the technological offsprings of the science 
process, e.g. modern communications, computers, fast publication techniques, 
psycho-social advances, opinion surveys, advanced management methods and 
priority mail, among others, are not being maximally employed to further 
enhance the process that gave birth to them. The present state of research 
publication may be generally compared to the proverbial shoemaker without 
shoes. 
8. TOWARD A SCIENCE O F PEER REVIEW 
Peer review is such a multi-faceted, strictly human endeavour that the 
perennial question, "Does peer review work?" invariably results in a dialectic 
controversy. The most ef fect ive known approach to minimize this is an 
operational one — reasoning based on measurement — which requires the 
question to be reframed as "precisely how well does peer review work?" This 
stress on measurement switches the basic emphasis from disagreement t o 
agreement. Once the parameters of peer review are properly measured, ways t o 
improve it become self-evident through tests, further refinement, further tests, 
etc. — the prototype of the scientific method. This demands that we begin with 
study of the basic phenomena themselves, review case histories. The one 
presented here graphically confirms the need for publication of many more to 
enable a start in this direction. Nonetheless, it is also imperative to determine 
what we now glean from this one case. 
An expressly recognised goal of review is to preclude defective work; a 
heretofore neglected goal stressed herein is the necessity t o also preclude 
erroneous rejection of publishable work. Erroneous acceptance is minimized 
by the current practice of parallel reviewing and although it is desirable to 
contain it, acceptance errors are ameliorated by the back-up practice of 
assigning high priority to correction of published errors. It may be further 
ameliorated by publishing referee comments, e.g. as by SST when warranted. 
However, erroneous rejection leads to conflict , which necessitates sequential 
reviewing, but this has no back-up error-correcting mechanism other than the 
unsatisfactory, lengthy and uncertain one of submission elsewhere. It is 
erroneous rejection that results in gross inequities in the review process, causes 
the most friction and dissatisfaction to authors and journals and produces the 
most serious consequences for society by slowing technological growth rate. By 
merely up-grading the precision of sequential reviewing a much improved 
system is obtainable with minimal disturbance to the present system. 
The primary parameter of sequential reviewing is the fraction p of 
contested manuscripts per review cycle (which may include one or more 
parallel reviews). Let Ns be the number of submitted manuscripts and N be the 
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number subjected to review. Then N s - N is the number rejected primarily for 
nontechnical reasons, as nonconformance to editorial standards. After m 
sequential review stages the number that remain contested becomes P i P 2 . . . 
pm N. If <p> is a mean value for all stages, the lower limit to n defined above 
in the introduction is then given by 
<p>m = 10"n (4) 
For (p) = 0 .01 , n = 2m. For m = 2 (3), the occurrence rate of unresolved 
conflicts is 1 out of 10" ( 1 0 6 ) reviewed manuscripts. Such examples clearly 
define the goal of sequential reviewing: (i) The value of p must be minimized, 
(ii) Use m stages to obtain any desired maximum rejection error rate, i.e. 
desired minimum value of n. (iii) Prevent p from degenerating between stages. 
The lack of attention to rejection error in present peer review is not 
conducive to a minimum value of p or its uniformity between stages. The result 
is a high confl ict rate, e.g. as in Physical Review Letters19 A0) • An intrinsic 
cause is suggested by this case history to lie embedded in the properties of the 
human mind, as summarised by the Innovation Theorem. Since minds are 
immensely varied and their modes of operation are still unknown, broad 
generalisations, theories and panaceas for improving peer review do not yet 
have an adequate operational basis. The alternative is the empirical one of 
identifying each specific source of human error and devising appropriate means 
to minimize it. This approach demands intimate knowledge of review details, 
as afforded by case histories. Heuristic conclusions deriving from this one case 
history include the following: 
1. The decision to reject was not based on a technical resolution of the 
conflict but on the prevalent criterion of consensus of the referees. This 
criterion was not fail-safe because the basic issues were by-passed. N o decision 
should ever be forced when technical disputes remain unresolved. Elimination 
of this major source of rejection error is simply obtained by formally defining a 
contested review to be considered complete only when there is agreement 
between author and reviewers. Decision to accept or reject is then automatic 
and anticlimactic. 
2. Such a definition shifts the traditional emphasis on erroneous 
acceptance, which has built-in error correction mechanisms, to at least equal 
emphasis on erroneous rejection, which has substantially none. Preoccupation 
with erroneous acceptance stems from the birth of modern science when there 
were no precedents for publication norms except the empirical need to 
establish order and rigour.'7 > Today the norm of scientific methodology is 
well entrenched but the old tradition lingers on. Must we wait for a worldwide 
crisis to realize that the needs of yesterday are reversed by the needs today for 
a growth of science independent of its own dogma, traditions and pre-
conceptions and a concomitant need to publicly acknowledge all unfalsifiable 
innovations and dissident views as rapidly as possible? To expedite the desired 
resolution of author-reviewer disagreement we need only institute appropriate 
specific measures, such as : 
(a) If public recognition and education by the journals for the 
consequences of erroneous rejection increase general awareness of authors and 
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reviewers for the necessity to attain agreement, a spontaneous improvement in 
review precision and speed should ensue. 
(b) More circumspect and rigorous argument is encouraged if all reviewer 
comments are subject to the possibility of publication. The role of anticipation 
of rejection in enhancing author performance, c o m m o n l y advanced to support 
peer review, is thereby extended to reviewers. Occasional publication of 
selected examples for tutorial purposes may serve t o additionally educate the 
science community . A special journal, as suggested by Commoner' 1 2 >, may 
be warranted. 
(c) Investigate the possibility of classifying the significance of all 
manuscripts from evolutionary to revolutionary on a scale of, say, 0 to 10 , and 
assign a suitable weighted mean R derived from author, reviewer and editor 
estimates. Besides the value of R as a caution f lag for properly resolving the 
more innovative approaches, determination of the potentially useful p-R 
distribution funct ion may be facilitated. 
(d) The inherent role of the editor as adjudicator is too often degraded to 
a clerical role, as in this case history, so that reviewers are tacitly assigned the 
dual role of prosecutor and judge. In a dispute the reviewer is no longer a 
"referee" but a contestant and should be so regarded. If the editor, or a 
designated impartial arbitrator, does not exercise a supervisory role, e.g. akin to 
a referee in a sports contest, the result is an increase in the incidence of 
arbitrariness, as in M, and rejection for the wrong reasons, as in C, D and N. 
(e) Because of the express need to resolve a dispute, it is expedient to 
require reviewers t o indicate whether and/or h o w author errors may be 
corrected to allow acceptance where possible. Suggestions from reviewers are 
not the rule, but are often very useful to authors, even for language usage as 
by N. Besides quickly resolving a dispute they induce respect for peer 
review'3 3 > and should be made mandatory by editorial dictum. 
(f ) For a more serious dispute the simple expedient of explicitly delineat-
ing and narrowing the boundary of a disagreement provides a useful resolution 
vector. (Of course, all prior information must be meticulously forwarded to 
reviewers and authors.) In the case history five reviews were not made available 
to the author and there was no attempt in the final review stage to relate to the 
prior reviews. One reviewer (M) reneged and the other (N) went o f f in a 
different direction. Delineation of the boundaries of a dispute may be forced 
by editorial edict, as by demanding authors and reviewers to indicate agreement 
or disagreement on all segments of reports on suitable forms that must be 
returned with comments . 
(g) In the event of an impasse a "closed-loop" review may be instituted 
by requiring author and reviewer to communicate directly, with copies sent to 
or through the editor. Speedier resolution is facilitated by the higher 
information transfer rate, but close supervision by editor or arbitrator is 
essential to prevent degeneration, e.g. as for a boxing match vis-a-vis a bar-room 
brawl. An example of a successful application is ment ioned in 0 . Useful author-
reviewer dialogues with maintenance of anonymity have also been instituted by 
Ches t ' 1 3 ' . The still higher information transfer rate allowed by telephone 
suggests a further extension worth investigating. 
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3. Periodically publish summaries from data gathered from authors and 
reviewers t o enable public analysis of review precision, variation with time and 
interjournal comparisons. Such data provide the essential feedback to test and 
further improve peer review. Request essential data on all important time 
factors f rom reviewers on properly designed forms and periodically publish 
analyses of these. 
These tentative conclusions from one case history are cost effective for 
the journals t o the extent they reduce the values of p and m. Additional 
measures for improving peer review and its study are possible which require 
investment by society. However, these are justifiable by the long-term benefits 
that may accrue. 
The probability that <p) = 0, and correspondingly that n = is remote so 
there undoubtedly must remain some contested manuscripts for which there is 
no author-reviewer agreement within a reasonable period. (The cut-off point 
that defines "reasonable" must be set by practical considerations, as the value 
of R, duration, number of reviews, space limitations and/or cost.) Because 
these contested remnants may involve fundamental issues, it is not mete to 
relegate t h e m as heretofore, to the oblivion of journal files. Some may be 
suitable for mandatory publication with comments , but it may be appropriate 
to form an independent council, akin to an appeals court in jurisprudence, to 
openly review all remaining unresolved cases. Publication of the council 
proceedings, perhaps in a special journal, provides a reference that may be 
indispensable for preservation of unfalsifiable dissident views that occasionally 
erupt into major paradigm shifts. Such an appeals function also insures that no 
inequity of the review process need ever be ignored or denied; it provides the 
missing negative feedback for closing the loop in the process of peer review. 
The e f f icacy of an appeals council is likely to be intimately related to the 
choice of peers. This addresses the perennial problem of selection of peers in 
general. The problem is perspicuous from the revelation that a 10 to 20 percent 
elite group of scientists accounts for 8 0 to 9 0 percent of published 
research.1 3 4-3 5 1 It is obviously impractical for the large output of this small 
group to be reviewed only by itself. For a random assignment of reviewers 
based only on professional knowledge, as approximated in current practice, 
how is it then possible to provide a proper peer match for the evident creativity 
of this indispensable elite group (or any other subset)? The resulting mismatch 
is undoubtedly responsible for much of the discontent with peer review. For a 
start, it is already known that general intelligence as measured by IQ is not 
significantly correlated with success in research1 3 4 1 , that IQ and creativity 
are not significantly correlated and that the factors involved in IQ (creativity) 
are mainly determined by left (right) brain function. Since creativity is 
measurable with a reliability equivalent to that of IQ 1 3 6 1 , it appears feasible to 
begin to understand and investigate at least one important factor involved in 
peer matching other than professional expertise and, eventually, to extend this 
to other measurable attributes that may be involved. With development of 
suitable tests, the ultimate establishment of a core of relatively few properly 
trained professional reviewers may be the most cost-effective and ideal way to 
solve a large part of the review problem. 
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The long ignored psychological, e f fec t s of rejection and the attitudes and 
needs of authors and reviewers are n o w determinable by professionally 
designed opinion polls. A test of the Innovation Theorem suggested by this 
case history and the related psychological origins of resistance to innovation is 
another neglected area; the possibility of rating already published work on a 
fairly accurate evolutionary/revolutionary scale R allows evaluation of its 
important distribution function versus acceptance delay to permit measure of 
n and its significance as an overall measure of resistance to innovation in peer 
review. 
In summary, the basic conclusions from this study of a case history are: 
(i) The status of peer review as a scientif ic endeavour is in a very primitive 
state, (ii) It is imperative and feasible to vastly improve it. 
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Table 1 — Review Chronology 
Time (days) 
Date Appendix Content Route* Accum-
 n . 
ulated U e l a y 
1 8 Feb. 1 9 7 6 A Letter and MS au to ed 0 
2 3 Feb. - Received by Science 5 5 
6 May B Letter + C + D ed to au 78 7 3 
C Report o f referee —' 
D Report of referee 
17 May E Letter and MS au to ed 89 11 
2 1 May - Received by Science 9 3 4 
2 0 August F Te lephone call au to sec 184 91 
1 October G Telephone call au to ed 226 42 
15 October H Letter of rejection ed to au 2 4 0 14 
21 October I Te lephone call au to ed 2 4 6 6 
2 2 October J Letter and MS au to ed 2 4 7 1 
9 November - Received by Science 265 18 
11 Feb. 1 9 7 7 K Letter au to ed 3 5 9 94 
"Á February L Letter + M + N ed to au 3 7 2 13 
M Report of referee 
N Report of referee 
2 6 February 0 Letter + P au to ed 3 7 4 2 
P Reply t o N 
11 March Q Letter ed to au 3 8 7 13 
1 6 March R Letter au to ed 3 9 2 5 
2 6 April S Letter ed to au 4 3 3 4 1 
* au - author; ed - editor; sec - editor's secretary 
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Table 2 — Summary of Correspondence Time Delays 
Response Appendix Delay 
(days) 
Delay 
Totals 
(days) 
Fraction 
of Total 
(%) 
Average delay 
per response 
(days) 
MS in transit: A 
E 
5 
4 
J 18 27 6.2 9 
Review reports: A-B* 
E-H* 
7 3 
147 
J-L* 107 327 75.5 109 
Author letters: B-E 
H-J 
L-0 
11 
7 
2 
Q-R 5 25 5.8 6 .3 
Editor letters: O-Q 13 
R-S 41 54 12.5 27 
Totals: 4 3 3 433 100.0 
* Less manuscript (MS) transit time 
Appendix A 
The Editor, 
Science. 
Dear Sir, 
On 2 June 1975 I submitted an MS attempting to correct the article by 
Cannon and Jensen (188, 317) . This was justifiably rejected in your letter 
of 29 July. 
I have since examined their article in more detail, as well as the Technical 
Comments y o u recently published, and have discussed with Cannon and Jensen 
their original article. I find that there is a satisfactory explanation of their 
findings, including their subsequent negative result, which has been overlooked. 
This is discussed in the enclosed MS entitled "One-Way Doppler Effects in 
Atomic Timekeeping", which is hereby submitted for publication in Science. 
My approach is based on research I have been conducting over the past 
15 years on the one-way velocity of light and its interpretation. This is a little-
explored area, but it is directly relevant to the findings of Cannon and Jensen. 
It not only accounts for their work, but also clarifies certain observations by 
Sadeh. and associates which, to my knowledge, have not yet been satisfactorily 
explained. 
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Only those knowledgeable in atomic timekeeping would be appropriate as 
referees, such as the reviewer(s) of the Cannon and Jensen reports. (Material 
deleted ) Of course Cannon or Jensen would be appropriate unless you consider 
a possible conf l i c t of interest to be an objection. 
For the convenience of the reviewers I am also enclosing reprints of cited 
articles of mine and copies of computational notes. 
Sincerely yours, 
Martin Ruderfer. 
Appendix B 
Note: All letters from Science have been paraphrased. 
6 May 1 9 7 6 
Dear Dr Ruderfer, 
Your paper on "One-Way Doppler Effects in Atomic Timekeeping" has 
not been accepted and the referee's comments and your manuscript are 
enclosed. 
Yours truly, 
Editorial Staff . 
Appendix C 
Note: By the kind permission of the referee, this report is reproduced 
with the exact wording of the original. 
The author is apparently unaware that Cannon and Jensen handling of 
the atomic c lock data was incorrect. This was pointed out in a letter to Science 
which I reviewed and which was from Greenwich Observatory scientists. 
Cannon and Jensen were apparently unaware of synchronization 
procedures which made their data analysis incorrect. Thus, Ruderfer's 
explanation of "their findings" (top of page 3) [bottom of p .387 and top of 
p . 3 8 8 ] does not in my opinion deserve publication. 
Appendix D 
Note: This referee refused permission to reproduce his comments exactly. 
The following is a paraphrased version of the original report. 
The referee rejected the paper for unmentioned objections but, for 
brevity, cited only these typical instances: 
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(a) The derivation is so imprecise and inconsistent it becomes without 
meaning. As an example, on [ p . 3 8 9 ] phase is indicated to be constant because 
it is given as frequency X time in equation (6), but in equation (10) "frequency 
suddenly becomes time-dependent". Also T is treated as t ime dependent in 
equation (10 ) but it is later treated as an "inconsistent constant" in equation 
(11 ) upon removal from the integral. 
(b) In the extension of the analysis on [ p . 3 9 8 ] to include the results of 
Earth's orbital motion, the e f fec t of Sun's gravitational mot ion is neglected. 
Essential relativistic rate variations at a clock fixed on Earth are thereby 
omitted, resulting in a "seriously incomplete" analysis. 
(c) There is insufficient accuracy in the experimental data to detect the 
ef fects predicted; the author misconstrued "accuracy, precision and stabil ity" 
as used in timekeeping. Predicted rate effects are of the order of (3 to 7) X 
X 10"1 3 , but UTCi cesium clocks have an intrinsic accuracy of only 2 X 10"12 
as stated by Allan, et al, Science, 191, 4 9 0 (1976) in rebutting the Cannon-
Jensen report. This is about an order of magnitude short of that necessary to 
measure the effects of the author. The same rebuttal more seriously notes that 
the UTC; time scales are intermittently adjusted in coordinating them to UTC 
so that each clock rate is not founded "on any fundamental physical process, 
as required by theory". 
Appendix E 
The Editor, 
Science. 
Dear Dr Abelson, 
Thank you for including the referees' comments with your 6 May return 
of my MS "One-Way Doppler Effects in Atomic Timekeeping". 
Both referees have improperly rejected the MS. The one submitting the 
6-line comment (which I shall refer to as referee [C] ) was grossly in error. 
The other [ D ] suggests to me the need for additional clarification in the MS. 
I have therefore revised the MS accordingly, including some cosmetic improve-
ments, and am herewith resubmitting with the following comments. Except 
for the two revised pages substituted for page 7 [pp .390 -1 ] and the added 
insert for page 19 [ p . 4 0 0 ] , all other changes are marked in red. 
The discrepancy in Cannon and Jensen's data handling to which referee 
[ C ] appears to be referring is in regard to one station (RGO). I was aware of 
this discrepancy, which the referee could have ascertained if he had read the 
MS through, because I: (1) discuss this on page 14 [ p p . 4 0 1 - 2 ] ; (2) refer to 
the Greenwich Observatory report which [ C ] reviewed (ref. 26); (3) explicit-
ly exclude the RGO data from my analysis; and (4) was appraised of the cause 
of the discrepancy in m y discussions with Cannon and Jensen. The 
"synchronisation procedures" mentioned by [ C ] consider only the absolute 
calibration of a station's proper time to the international second (SI); this 
process is unrelated to the one-way synchronisation process I discuss, which 
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applies only to the synchronisation of any two remote time scales irrespective 
of their absolute calibration. I make this clear in the t o p paragraph on page 22 
[ p . 4 0 2 ] , I trust that review [C] will not influence any further review by being 
given weight as a prior rejection. 
The comments of referee [ D ] are more relevant but, unfortunately, reveal 
a misunderstanding of portions of the MS. The following comments correspond 
to his headings. 
(a) My paper does not "derive a number of well-known effects", but deals 
with e f fects that have not been systematically exploited heretofore. T h e only 
truly "one-way" effects that are well-known are the conventional Doppler shift 
and aberration relations. The effects of n, dn/dt and the double-disc Sagnac 
experiment which I discuss have not appeared elsewhere to my knowledge — 
and I have been specifically searching for such one-way effects in the literature 
for over 15 years. Perhaps they have been mentioned in some remote place; if 
so, they certainly are not "well known". The only well-known refractive e f fec t 
in the literature related to time dilation is the refinement by Lorentz , 
confirmed by Zeeman, of the Fizeau and related experiments, e.g. D.A. Evans, 
Int. J. Theor. Phys., 2 , 313 (1969) . This is a two-way effect. The one-way 
refractive effects I discuss disappear in a two-way measurement. 
The referee appears to be unfamiliar with phase modulation theory and its 
accompanying concept of instantaneous frequency, which is the physical origin 
of the frequency shift Af that I derive. This accounts for his confus ion 
regarding the frequency and travel t ime variables. Note that I verify the f o r m of 
the Doppler effect I derive by showing its consistency with the conventional 
form by the examples I give for recessional and transverse motion. What the 
referee's remarks do indicate, however, is that the derivation is too succinct . 
Accordingly, I have revised page 7 and have replaced them with pages 7 (rev.) 
and 7a (rev.) [pp . 390 -1 ] . 
(b) I neglect the ef fect of Sun's gravitational potential (as well as those of 
other solar bodies) because they are negligible here. I have therefore added a 
paragraph (p.19a) [ p . 4 0 0 ) to dispose of this objection explicitly. 
(c) I have fol lowed Cannon and Jensen's use of clock "reproducibility" 
which is appropriate in my application. The referee's concern with absolute 
calibration of proper time to SI has been extensively discussed in your 6 
February issue (191, 4 8 9 4 9 1 ) . Although this may be pertinent to Cannon and 
Jensen's theory, it is irrelevant to the testing of the one-way synchronisation 
effects I discuss. I spent considerable space explaining this in the Discussion 
section. Why has [ D ] overlooked this? I suspect he did not read this far. 
T o illustrate that the "inherent accuracy" of clocks is irrelevant, consider 
the synchronisation of any watch to any wall clock. To do this, it is only 
necessary to periodically reset the t ime on the watch t o that of the wall clock. 
The time difference between the t w o is then only dependent on the resetting 
precision and is not directly related to the absolute precision of the t w o clocks. 
This is precisely what is done by the time laboratories in synchronising the 
UTCi to UTC, as has been noted in ref. (6), in the adjacent article by Allan, et 
al, and in my MS. Only the difference between these is required to test the 
predicted one-way Doppler effects, as I discussed. Paradoxically, [D ] a lso notes 
that "the UTC; time scales are periodically adjusted to coordinate t h e m with 
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UTC", but wrongly cites this as prejudicial to m y findings by stating these time 
scales are n o t "based on any fundamental physical process, as required by 
theory". This m a y apply to the Cannon-Jensen theory, but emphatically does 
not to one-way synchronisation, as I explained in the MS. This further confirms 
that [ D ] may n o t have read m y Discussion sect ion. 
The referees' comments are undoubtedly due at least partly to the 
heretofore obscuri ty of one-way theory, its application and its interpretation. 
Nevertheless these apply directly to the Cannon-Jensen and Sadeh-Au data and 
to the theory of noninertial flat-space phenomena. Although one-way theory 
has been around for some t ime, it has still n o t entered the mainstream of 
current thinking. When the paradigms of the establishment are challenged the 
worst failings of the referee system surface, but the potential for advance is 
maximum. I therefore hope that any further review will properly consider the 
matters I have raised. 
Since the t w o copies of the computational notes and reference reprints 
are still in your possession, I trust that they will be forwarded with the MS in 
any further review, in addition t o the comments above. 
Sincerely yours , 
Martin Ruderfer. 
Appendix F 
The author telephoned the secretary to the editor on 20 August 1976 and 
was informed that the editor is out of the country and would return on 30 
August. In reply t o a request for status of the paper, the secretary stated one 
reviewer reported the paper to be "excellent" and a second was negative. The 
paper was sent to a third reviewer whose report is overdue. 
Appendix G 
The author telephoned the editor on 1 October 1976 to inquire on the 
status of the paper. The editor confirmed that one reviewer cited the paper as 
"excellent" and that the second was equivocal. T h e paper is still in the hands 
of a third reviewer who is being prodded to reply. 
Appendix H 
15 October 1 9 7 6 
Dear Dr Ruderfer, 
Your paper, "One-Way Effects in Atomic Timekeeping", is not accepted. 
The pressure of papers is very large and even when publication is merited, we 
o f ten decline such papers. 
Yours truly, Editorial Staff. 
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Appendix I 
The author telephoned the editor on 21 October 1976 to clarify the letter 
of rejection [ H ] , which did not contain the comments of the three previous 
reviews. The editor reported that the third reviewer commented that the paper 
was too diffuse, rambled, did not really contribute anything new and that he 
could not decide what was being shown. The author replied that such a 
rejection was too vague and was additionally inadequate because the paper 
involved correction of a double error in the record — the original published 
paper and the published comments on it. The editor responded that it was not 
certain that there was an error to be corrected, that he had to go by the 
consensus of referees and that the paper could always be submitted elsewhere. 
The author contended that this was not a certain solution since if he died 
before receiving an acceptance, the errors may never be corrected in the 
literature. The editor then agreed to a further review. 
Appendix J 
22 October 1976 
The Editor, 
Science. 
Dear Dr Abelson, 
Thank y o u for the opportunity to discuss with you the status of m y 
submission "One-Way Doppler . . ." in my call on October 21. In accordance 
with our discussion I am enclosing the MS for further review. 
As I mentioned, one of the problems in the review of my MS is the 
heretofore obscurity of one-way theory which I claim is directly relevant t o 
the Cannon-Jensen and the Sadeh-Au findings. This unfamiliarity has interfered 
with the review — the referees have substituted unsubstantiated opinion for 
proper technical evaluation. The point they seem to have ignored, and one 
which is of primary concern to your office, is that if my thesis is correct the 
published considerations of the Cannon-Jensen report is in serious error and 
should be forthwith corrected in the printed record. The only other viable 
alternative is t o unequivocally show that my approach is wrong. 
If further reviewers are informed of this need, it may stimulate a more 
careful and diligent review. Since the matter is purely a technical one, the 
question is resolvable. As I indicated, I am willing to communicate directly 
with any referee, with copies sent to your off ice , to reach a mutually agreeable 
decision in the event there are any questions that require clarification in order 
to reach such a decision. 
Sincerely yours, 
Martin Ruderfer 
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Appendix K 
11 February 1977 
The Editor, 
Science. 
Dear Dr Abelson, 
It is almost four months since I resubmitted my MS "One-Way Doppler 
. . . " for further review and one year since m y original submission. 
Is there some problem with the present review and can I assist in any way? 
Because the MS has raised the question of a serious error published in 
your journal relating to the original Cannon and Jensen report and the further 
re-enforcement of this error in your Technical Comments section, such delays 
are deleterious to the best interests of scientif ic progress. 
I trust that this matter can be resolved to our mutual satisfaction soon. 
Sincerely yours, 
Martin Ruderfer. 
Appendix L 
24 February 1977 
Dear Dr Ruderfer, 
Your paper, "One-Way Doppler Effects in Atomic Timekeeping", has not 
been accepted. The manuscript and referee's comments are enclosed. We hope 
this may help you in the modification of the paper for resubmission somewhere 
else. 
Yours truly, 
Editorial Staff . 
Appendix M 
Note: This referee refused permission to reproduce his comments exactly. 
The following is a paraphrased version of the original report. 
The referee states that he still cannot find anything to recommend 
publication and feels that additional resubmission should not be encouraged. 
Appendix N 
Note: This referee refused permission to reproduce his comments exactly. 
The following is a paraphrased version of the original report. 
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The referee recommends against publication, stating the author attempted 
to explain the Cannon-Jensen discovery to be due to anisotropy in the one-way 
speed of light despite the Cannon-Jensen retraction of their claims and the 
three criticisms of their paper published in Science showing their discoveries 
to be without experimental support. 
To demonstrate that the submitted paper has neither experimental nor 
theoretical support the referee offers this theory: For <p = 2irfT as the phase of 
the stationary clock at its location, the phase at some position x is 2rr(fT - x/X). 
At the receiving clock at Xj = x(T) the phase is 
<t>, = 2rr [ fT-x (T) /X] 
for propagation in the x-direction. The received variable frequency wave by the 
moving clock should be 27r J 0 t LdTj, not fjTj, since dT( is "the elapsed proper 
time on the moving clock". Equation (7) becomes 
2 j r [ f T - x ( T ) / X ] = 2TT f.dT; 
On substituting the Einstein time dilation relation this becomes, using fX = c 
f [T - x(T) /c ] = / / f j (T)( l - v 2 / c 2 ) » dT 
where v is relative velocity. Equations (9) and (10) are incorrect because the 
author's differentiation for an observer travelling with a wave front of constant 
phase is impossible due to the constant phase wavefront travelling with speed c 
with respect to the stationary observer, since clocks cannot travel at speed c. 
Moreover, the last equation may be differentiated with respect to T to 
give 
fi = f ( l - x / c ) / ( l - v 2 / c 2 ) " 
to obtain the correct Doppler signal fj - f received by the moving clock, noting 
that the "change" df occurs in equation (10). Because the emitted frequency of 
the stationary clock is f ixed, f cannot change so df has no meaning. 
Also f / T has been treated as a constant in equation (11) and the received, 
instead of emitted, frequency is misinterpreted as f. This is illogical, because 
the integral is over dt and it is not possible to distinguish "between dt and dT. 
T = t is the coordinate time in the frame of the stationary clock." 
The correct Doppler shift replacing equation (11), including longitudinal 
and transverse cases, should be 
Af = f, - f = f r - f t = f , [ l - ( 1 - x / c ) / ( l - v 2 / c 2 ) * ] 
Equation (13) is thus incorrect, there are a number of errors in the 
derivation, and T is not rigorously defined, e.g. for an emitted spherical wave 
and a circling receiver, the source-receiver distance is constant and hence T = 0. 
No Doppler shift is predicted so the transverse Doppler shift seems to be 
overlooked. 
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Because the referee believes equation (13), on which the author bases his 
discussion, is incorrect and there are a number of errors in the derivation, he is 
of the opinion that the discussion is not convincing. 
The refractive effects are a "subsidiary issue" not useful to the author for 
establishing existence of one-way effects . 
There appears to be no good reason for writing equation (20). 
The author's reference on line 2 above equation (16) to t as the "time 
measured by the stationary clock" is not clear as clocks on Earth's surface are 
all stationary in Earth's reference frame. "The meaning of t is not made clear 
until [ p . 3 9 4 ] . " 
"Phenomenally" should be replaced by "phenomenologically"; "rigidly" 
should be replaced by "rigorously"; and T x ' on [ p . 3 9 3 ] is the systematic 
error, not the uncertainty in T'. 
In the [ p . 4 0 0 ] discussion, Sun's effect is not locally detectable, by the 
principle of equivalence, in a freely falling (locally inertial) frame, as Earth. A 
second-order Doppler effect due to Earth's orbital motion, overlooked by the 
author, cancels the term g 5 h/c 2 . 
Appendix 0 
26 February 1977 
The Editor, 
Science. 
Dear Dr Abelson, 
Thank you for the inclusion of the latest referees' reports with the return 
of m y MS "One-Way Doppler . . ." and for your continued cooperation in 
trying to resolve the correction of the Cannon-Jensen reports brought up by 
the MS. 
The short review is of no value in settling the technical problem; the 
referee is apparently reluctant to tackle the issues and is passing the buck. The 
longer review appears to be an attempt to resolve the matter; however in a 
technical sense it is inane and ineffective. For your reference I enclose my 
comments on this review. 
This matter would be ludicrous if it were not so serious — the advance-
ment of science and technology is the key to man's future survival. The 
scientific journals require rigorous adherence to scientific principles in 
submitted manuscripts, yet they consistently neglect to apply equal rigour in 
judging them. To editors, reviews by one or two referees without further 
verification are sufficient cause for arbitrary rejection. But no scientific matter 
can properly be decided by the political expedient of popular vote. Would you 
allow any author to justify a theory or conclusion with the statement that it is 
the most popular? When is something to be done about putting science into the 
judgement of technical submissions? 
I offered one way in our telecon and in my letter of October 22, 1976 — 
a closed-loop review. If the referee had contacted me first I would have pointed 
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out his error and he would have been forced to respond more accurately. 
Closed-loop operation is the way nature and man minimize errors in all types 
of systems. Why not in the judgement of manuscripts, particularly for the few 
revolutionary ones vis-a-vis the more common evolutionary ones, as in the 
current case of the possibility of a serious error in the record? I cannot help but 
wonder why you did not take me up on this instead of repeating the same old 
error-prone open-loop process. By improperly rejecting the MS you are merely 
passing the buck. The Cannon-Jensen matter is a double error, it occured in 
your journal, and it should be rectified in your journal. 
Editors are just as culpable as referees for inefficiencies in the review 
process. Instead of exercising their supervisory role, editors usually concur 
with referees without question and end up merely as correspondents between 
authors and reviewers. I have found only about 1 in 10 editors take an active 
helpful role in ensuring a proper review. In one case an editor insisted on a 
closed-loop resolution with speedy beneficial results. 
Perhaps the matter of atomic timekeeping seems to you and the referees 
to be too remote from today's problems and therefore not worth the effort to 
pursue a proper conclusion. But the travesty that has occurred with my MS 
could equally have occurred in some urgent area, as energy, a field for which 
you obviously have much concern. How many potential solutions to the energy 
crisis have been denied publication by errors in the review process? I know of 
several simple potential solutions which warrant investigation, yet I hesitate to 
offer these t o the scientif ic journals because of the three P's — Politics, 
Personality and Prejudice — which too often substitute for technical rigour in 
evaluating unsolicited manuscripts. The time and aggravation involved just do 
not seem worth the effort. 
Science is the printed record. The referee process, by controlling this 
record, has a crowbar e f f ec t on the development of science. Errors in this 
process, by delaying or preventing dissemination of useful ideas and results, 
have a marked depressive e f fec t on technological growth. Improved efficiency 
in dissemination of key developments would speed solutions to all problems 
compared t o the rate under the existing slow and burdensome review process. 
Sincerely, 
Martin Ruderfer. 
Appendix P 
Author's comments on review of "One-Way Doppler Effects . . ." 
The referee has confused the one-way travel time T with the proper time 
t. His initial expression (27r(fT - x/X)) is meaningless since T is defined by the 
distance between source and receiver. The correct expression should be 
27r(ft - x/X). The remainder of his "derivation" is thereby useless. 
Furthermore the referee's result cannot be correct since it does not agree 
with equation (8). This equation is the basis for relativistic aberration and 
should have alerted the referee that something was wrong with his derivation. 
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Although it is true that the phase wavefront cannot be measured in flight, 
it is nevertheless observable at the time the wavefront enters the observer's 
measuring apparatus. Equations (9) and (10 ) are thereby operational and 
pertinent. 
The referee's confusion between T and t is exemplified by his remark 
that T = 0 for a rotating clock. Since T = r/c, it is necessarily > 0 when r > 0 
as in the context discussed. 
There is no uncertainty about the meaning of t — it is clearly defined in 
Equation (1). 
In his last comment the referee has misapplied the principle of 
equivalence. The gravitational redshift gh/c2 exists independently of the 
Doppler shift (e.g. see J.B. Thomas, Astron. J., 80 , 407 (1975) , right column). 
For Earth, these give separate contributions to the total frequency shift of a 
surface clock and were so calculated by Cannon and Jensen. These were also 
independently evaluated in the Hafele and Keating experiment. An earlier 
referee rightly pointed out that corresponding contributions from Sun also 
exist at the clock site. I simply showed on p . l 9a [ p . 4 0 0 ] that the daily change 
in gravitational redshift between the clock positions nearest to and furthest 
from Sun, g s h / c 2 , is negligible. The orbital Doppler shift is included in the 
analysis comprising Equations (24)—(32). 
In sum, the referee bases his rejection on an alleged falsification of 
Equation (13) which he correctly states is "crucial for the author's 
contention". However his attempt at falsification is grossly in error. 
It should be further noted that Cannon and Jensen did not reject their 
original findings but only their theory. Without a theory they could not 
harmonize their original findings with the later one with about 80 clocks and 
chose the ad hoc explanation of an "artifact" in the data. My MS affirms that 
all of their data have a common explanation required by relativity. 
M. Ruderfer 
Appendix Q 
11 March 1977 
Dear Dr Ruderfer, 
Your paper, "One-Way Doppler Effects in Atomic Timekeeping", has by 
this time been examined by nine people of known competence whose opinion 
is that we should not publish it. We decline to consider this paper any further. 
Yours truly, 
Editorial Staff . 
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Appendix R 
16 March 1977 
The Editor, 
Science. 
Dear Dr Abelson, 
I cannot dispute that your nine reviewers are of "known competence" 
provided we understand the term to be restricted to what is commonly known. 
There is no justification for assuming that any man's competence encompasses 
the unknown. Otherwise every "expert" may be expected to solve any problem 
that represents a good jump beyond the state of the art which, judging from 
the plethora of unsolved problems, has not yet come to pass. My report 
concerns a little explored area — one-way light propagation — for which there is 
a paucity of experts of known competence. This applies to the nine referees: 
although one stated the report was excellent, one offered criticism which I 
answered and the others would not or could not comprehend my contribution. 
The last attempt was a travesty. 
It is precisely in such cases — the revolutionary quantum jump — that 
significant progress o f ten results as opposed to the smaller evolutionary 
advances contained in most reports. Both types are essential to scientif ic 
progress. However the review system is primarily suited for the latter; it fails 
miserably for the former and history bears this out. This is my whole point. 
The inadequate review of my paper attests to a glaring deficiency in the referee 
system. A thousand more like rejections would still not justify your decision. 
Something must be done for those few cases that probe uncharted 
territory. Man has too many urgent unsolved problems and too little t ime to 
continue to indiscriminately squander and squash creative efforts. This is not a 
matter for authors or referees to resolve — it is clearly a matter of editorial 
policy and practice; it represents a timely challenge of lasting potential benefit 
if it can be done. 
I can only repeat my offer — as an editorial experiment I am willing to 
participate in a test for the concept of closed-loop review for the type of 
dispute represented by my paper. Whether or not it results in acceptance, the 
experience is bound to be of future utility to you and other editors if properly 
done. 
Sincerely, 
Martin Ruderfer. 
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Appendix S 
26 April 1977 
Dear Dr Ruderfer, 
Due to your actions, the time and effort spent on your paper has been 
quite large and, although our nine reviewers may be wrong, we have decided 
to terminate our consideration of this paper. 
There are other journals for such papers and, if your paper does have 
merit, it will be published somewhere. 
Yours truly, 
Editorial Staff . 


